

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND GOLDEN CASTLES:
AN INTERPRETATION OF CHRISTIAN ETHICS IN RELATION
TO THE PROBLEMS OF HIGH RACE CONSCIOUSNESS
IN THE UNITED STATES

BY

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B.S. (University of California) 1934
S.D. (Union Theological Seminary) 1937

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Submitted in the Department of Christian Ethics
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Theology
in the
Pacific School of Religion

June, 1949



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THESIS



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


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INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

Speaking of race relations, the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches confessed:

It is here that the church has failed most lamentably, where it has reflected and then by its example sanctified the racial prejudice that is rampant in the world. Yet it is here that today its guidance concerning what God wills for it is especially clear.¹

The objectives of this study are to seek the will of God in this area of human relationships and to search for the forces which give rise to relationships which are contrary to the will of God. More specifically stated: the study will endeavor to determine the forces which tend toward the formation and maintenance of caste and to formulate a statement of an interpretation of Christian ethics dynamically relevant to the problems of color caste stratification in the United States.

An attempt will be made in this study to relate a more dynamic conception of Christian ethics with a dynamic theory of social causation as both impinge upon a particular conjuncture of social forces--color caste. Christian ethics will be interpreted from a dynamic, realistic, "existential" point of view. Social processes will be seen from a similar perspective.

The scope of this paper will be limited to a study

¹World Council of Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design (New York: Harper, 1948), III, 195.

of Christian theology and ethics in areas more directly related to the problems of intergroup relationships. However, it is obviously impossible to discuss a phase of theology or ethics without touching upon all others; for theology and ethics are integrated wholes which are incapable of being treated in a compartmental fashion without engendering a serious sense of unreality. In order to circumscribe the scope of this study, a somewhat artificial line will be drawn to keep within some reasonable length. This will probably result in a certain lack of balance in the presentation.

The sociological phases of the study will be limited to the caste relationship between the Negroes and whites in the United States and the caste-like stratification in California, particularly in rural society.

It is the hope of the writer that this study may contribute in a small measure to the recovery of the unity of human knowledge, which was lost at the end of the Middle Ages. A new integration, based not on some static concept, but on a dynamic one, is desperately needed today.

Clarification of Some Terms

Attempts will be made throughout the paper to define terms as the necessity arises. However, a few definitions and clarifications of terms are called for at the outset.

Race and Color

Even the sociologists often use the term "race" rather loosely. For example, Oliver Cromwell Cox writes: "For the sociologist a race may be thought of as simply any group of people that is generally believed to be, and generally accepted as, a race in any given area of ethnic competition."¹ Likewise, Edgar T. Thompson defines the term broadly:

Biologists and physical anthropologists have attempted to give the term "race" a precise biological connotation, but their definitions do not always conform to the way people actually deal with one another in society. In the social sense a racial group is one whose members are treated as such, believe themselves to be such and behave as such.²

It cannot be denied that this is the way people, particularly prejudiced people, use the term "race." Precisely because of this, such loose usage should be avoided. "It has biological and genetic connotations which are incorrect in this context and which are particularly dangerous as they run parallel to widely spread false racial beliefs."³

Ashley Montagu argues for the elimination of the term "race." "The term 'race' should be discarded entirely in the cultural reference and the more appropriate term 'caste' employed in its stead, while the term 'race'

¹Oliver Cromwell Cox, Caste, Class, and Race (New York: Doubleday, 1948), p. 319.

²Edgar T. Thompson, "Introduction," Edgar T. Thompson, ed., Race Relations and the Race Problem (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1939), p. viii.

³Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma (New York: Harper, 1944), p. 667.

should be replaced by the term 'ethnic group' in the biologic or ecologic context, and should not be used in any human context whatever, except" Here he sees justification for the use of the term "race" "as referring to the five or six large divisions of man."¹ Even in this latter context it may be noted that even in regard to these great divisions there hardly exists a clear cut division. Clyde Kluckhohn, for example, points out: "With some qualifications and exceptions, one may almost say that, if all living humans were arranged in a single sequence according to degree of resemblance, there would be no sharp breaks in the line but rather a continuum where each specimen differed from the next by almost imperceptible variations."²

However, as Gunnar Myrdal notes: even when all these are taken into account and, when it is recognized

that the great majority of American Negroes have Caucasoid ancestry as well as Negroid, and when it is also recognized that modern psychological research has discounted the previously held opinions that there are great innate mental differentials between racially defined population groups, it still does not follow that the race concept is unimportant in the Negro [or the Oriental] problem In spite of all heterogeneity, the average white man's unmistakable observation is that most Negroes in America have dark skin and woolly hair, and he is, of course, right.³

¹M. F. Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942), p. 74.

²Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Myth of Race," Religion and Our Racial Tensions, Vol. III of Religion in the Post-War World, ed. Willard L. Sperry (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1945), pp. 16-17.

³Gunnar Myrdal, op. cit., p. 116. Re Caucasoid ancestry, see pp. 197-199, infra; Re mental differences, see pp. 339-343, infra.

For the purpose of our study, we shall attempt to avoid as consistently as possible references to the term "race" except as it refers to the "five or six large divisions of man." However, the terms "race relations," "racial tensions," and "race prejudices," and the like are unavoidable. The definition for "racial group" given by Robin Williams: "One whose members through biological descent share distinctive common hereditary physical characteristic,"¹ will serve us if we limit these groups to the "major divisions of men."

The term "color" will be used to substitute for the term Negro, especially in connection with caste, as color caste. There is no reason why the term color caste should not be used to refer to other caste-like groups of colored peoples, such as the Orientals in California, but in deference to popular usage and in recognition of the fact that the caste status of the Orientals differ considerably from that of the Negroes, we limit the usage to the Negro group.

Caste

Cox begins with an assumption that a caste system exists only in India, proceeds to describe the kind of caste stratification which exists in India and concludes that the relation between the Negroes and the whites are race relations and not caste relations. This writer finds

¹Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Inter-group Tensions, Bulletin 57 (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947), p. 42.

the term "caste" to be entirely legitimate for application to the situation in the United States, particularly in the South. We have already rejected Cox's use of the term "race."

Caste is defined in the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences by A. L. Kroeber as "an endogamous and hereditary sub-division of an ethnic unit occupying a position of superior or inferior rank or social esteem in comparison with other sub-divisions."¹ A large group of the students of Negro-white relations in the United States have taken a conception of caste such as that defined by Kroeber and applied it to "race relations."²

According to Warner, caste indicates an unequal distribution of privileges, duties, obligations, opportunities, etc. between the groups which are considered to be higher or lower. This much of the definition, however, also describes "class." "A caste organization, however, must be further defined as one where marriage between the two groups is not sanctioned and where there is no opportunity for members of the lower group to rise into the upper groups or for the members of the upper to fall into the lower one."³ Gallagher differentiates between class

¹A. L. Kroeber, "Caste," Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York: Macmillan, 1930), III, 254.

²See Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1377. Among them are Buell G. Gallagher; a group around W. Lloyd Warner of the University of Chicago (John Dollard, Allison Davis, Buford H. Junker, Walter A. Adams, Burleigh B. and Mary R. Gardner, and Paul S. Lunt); Louis Wirth; and Robert S. Lynd.

³W. Lloyd Warner, "Introduction," Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner and Mary R. Gardner, Deep South (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1941), p. 9.

and caste simply:

The class into which an individual is thrust is largely determined by his economic status, although "family" and other factors such as education and profession may have subsidiary parts to play in determining his class. The caste in which he is kept is determined by his external racial characteristics, and it is presumed that an individual cannot leave the caste into which he is born.¹

The operation of the caste structure will be discussed at some length in Part II. It is necessary here to note that under color caste, "the white man's floor is the Negro's ceiling."²

Ethnic, Cultural, "Nationalital," Minority

"Ethnic" is another of those words which can be used very loosely and inexactly. Paul Hyatt used the word "ethnic" in a very broad sense to "designate all groups whose distinguishing characteristics are racial, religious or national."³ Ashley Montagu's definition is much more useful for the purposes of this paper, and will be followed: "An 'ethnic' group represents one of a number of populations, which populations together comprise the species Homo sapiens, and which individually maintain their differences, physical and cultural, by means of

¹Buell G. Gallagher, American Caste and the Negro College (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1938), p. 71.

²Buell G. Gallagher, Color and Conscience (New York: Harper, 1946), p. 5.

³Paul Hyatt, "Class and Ethnic Attitudes," American Sociological Review, VIII (February, 1948), n. 1, p. 36.

isolating mechanisms such as geographic and social barriers."¹

"Culture" used in denoting the differences between various culturally different groups may be defined as "the complex of distinctive attainments, beliefs, traditions, etc. constituting the background of a racial, religious, or social groups."²

"Nationalital" is used by Henry Pratt Fairchild as an adjective of, or pertaining to, nationality (as distinguished from national, which pertains to nation). Fairchild, in differentiating "nationalital" from "ethnic," writes: "What can best be called 'ethnic groups'-- [are] groups that are differentiated and identified in the popular mind by distinguishable traits which represent varying admixtures of cultural patterns and racial identities."³ In most cases, the word "culture" will serve, and will be used in this study. But whenever a sharper focus is needed, "nationalital" will be employed.

"Minority" is widely used to cover many groups, religious, ethnic, nationalital, and racial. However, because of its very inclusiveness, it is not very useful and sometimes affords opportunities for the blurring of differ-

¹Ashley Montagu, op. cit., p. 73.

²Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed., 1935).

³Henry Pratt Fairchild, Race and Nationality (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1947), p. 70. It is, of course, needless to point out that quotations of this sort, even if they indicate the agreement of this writer to the statement quoted, does not imply that he agrees with the author's valuations, presuppositions or conclusions.

ences. For instance, Myrdal points out that "minority group" and "minority status" "fail to make a distinction between the temporary social disabilities of recent white immigrants and the permanent disabilities of the Negroes and other colored people."¹ This distinction becomes one of great importance, especially in regard to the problems of the minority groups in California. The degree of permanence of disability vary less sharply among these minority groups. For example, the degree of permanency of disabilities suffered by persons of Mexican descent differ greatly, depending upon many biological and cultural factors, both of the minority group in question and of the "majority" group and of the other minority groups with whom they have interrelationships. They differ also from other minority ethnic and caste groups.² One of the stock arguments for the continuance of segregation of the Orientals in churches is based upon the failure to make a distinction between the degree of permanency of disabilities of different minority groups.³

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 667.

²Cf. Ruth Tuck, Not with the Fist (New York: Harcourt, 1946), pp. 42 ff.

³For example: "Just as German, Swedish and other nationality Methodist churches were integrated in time, the Japanese and Chinese Methodist churches will be integrated into the Caucasian Methodist churches, too." The difference, which may signify much or little, depending greatly on factors outside the church as well as inside, is that Germans and Swedish are Caucasians, while Japanese and Chinese are not.

Groups, Intergroup Relations

In order to refer to the entire gamut of interrelationships, including interracial, interreligious, inter-ethnic, inter-"nationalital", a convenient term "intergroup" is widely employed. However, the term "group" can refer to a collection of almost any kind of objects. Obviously, a definition of "group" when used as "intergroup" tensions, relations, hostility, etc. must be given. R. M. MacIver provides a definition which is both inclusive enough and distinctive. He uses the term to refer to "groups that rest on conceptions of them as different kinds of human beings, on conceptions of them as races, peoples, or ethnic groups."¹

Presuppositions and Value Premises in Social Inquiry

In the course of social inquiry, that is, in an inquiry in which human beings are involved, the point of view of the inquirer and valuations present in the materials he investigates will influence the outcome of the inquiry. The presuppositions and value premises, implicit or explicit, of the inquirer will inevitably enter into the process of inquiry. Complete objectivity is impossible, even if desirable, in a field of research in which the inquirer himself is somehow involved. Moreover, the "facts" and data that he has to work with are already infused with the valuations of the persons with whom he deals. Further-

¹R. M. MacIver, The More Perfect Union (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 11.

more, valuations and value judgments are integral parts of the materials he studies. In order to prevent his investigation from being vitiated by undue amount of bias, a conscientious attempt must be made to control bias, by making explicit both the presuppositions and the value premises of the inquirer himself, and those which are part of the materials that he uses.

Science, Social Sciences, and Philosophy

In dealing with the presuppositions and valuations in social inquiry, it becomes useful at the start to make quite clear what we mean by the social sciences. We may begin by adopting provisionally a description of the scientific spirit given by William Adams Brown: "the open-minded and conscientious spirit that is unwilling to leave any test unused in its search for the truth."¹ Under this rather inclusive interpretation of science, we may include natural science (pure and applied), social sciences, and theology. The term "human sciences,"² or "Geisteswissenschaften" or "the sciences of the spirit,"³ appears

¹William Adams Brown, Pathway to Certainty (New York: Scribner, 1930), p. 19; Cf. Sir J. Arthur Thomson, Science and Religion, a Symposium (New York: Scribner, 1931), p. 24; A. D. Ritchie, Scientific Method (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., 1923), p. 14; Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925), p. 4; James B. Conant, On Understanding Science (Yale Univ. Press, 1947), p. 24.

²As translated and used by Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics (Harper, 1947), pp. 10-11.

³John Baillie, The Interpretation of Religion (New York: Scribner, 1928), pp. 4-5.

to this writer to be much more precise, and under it theology as well as history and ethics can be included. But the term "social sciences" is so common and is so generally understood that it will be used throughout this study. The adjective "social" is not to be understood, in this or any other connection, to be opposed to "individual." "Social sciences" include, among others, psychology, anthropology, sociology, political science, and economics.¹ Theology as a science will be discussed in a later section of this paper.

It is necessary in this connection to refer briefly to the role that philosophy plays in the relationship between the different sciences and between science and religion. We can only point to the function of philosophy at this time. Used in a general and broad sense, philosophy refers to "an attempt to gather together in a single synoptic view all the evidence as to the ultimate nature of existence which we are able to gain from any and every quarter."² Special sciences, including theology as a science, provide the evidences for philosophy. What this paper is attempting to do is a philosophical task.

Social and Individual

When we use the term social sciences, instead of

¹Conant adds history to this list. Conant, op. cit. p. 5.

²Baillie, op. cit., p. 37; cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper, 1935), p. 13.

human sciences or the sciences of the spirit, and include psychology among the "social sciences, it becomes at once obvious that we do not use the term "social" in the sense in which it is contrasted to the term "individual." Social and individual are adjectives which refer to different aspects of human experience. Charles Horton Cooley, writing in 1909, points out:

Social consciousness, or awareness of society, is inseparable from self-consciousness, because we can hardly think of ourselves excepting with reference to a social group of some sort, or of the group except with reference to ourselves. The two things go together, and what we are really aware of is a more or less complex personal or social whole, of which now the particular, now the general, aspect is emphasized.
 Self and society are twin-born, we know one as immediately as we know the other,¹

Likewise Lynd is emphatic in his protest against the loose usage of the word, "society." To him, "it is a tautology to speak of 'the individual in society.'" "To speak of the individual is to speak of a something living among and interacting with other individuals; and, save in the biological sense, the term has no other meaning."²

Buell Gallagher characterizes the "doctrine that the human being and human experience can be separated into two distinct and autonomous entities called 'individual' and 'social'" as one of the most pernicious of modern doctrines. He asserts:

¹Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization (New York: Scribner, 1909, 1913), p. 5.

²Robert S. Lynd, Knowledge for What? (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 153-154.

The very fact of self-consciousness depends upon the differentiation of self from others and from things--selfhood is dependent upon sociality. And in human experience, personality is never found, except as both the social and individual aspects of human beings and human experience are found. Personality development in its dynamics underscores the truth: both individuation and socialization as aspects of human growth and of the maturing personality.¹

The words social and individual will be used in this paper as different aspects of the integral human experience. The nature of the self and the development of the self and the ego will be discussed in a later chapter.²

Two Kinds of Presuppositions

At least two different kinds of presuppositions may be distinguished in scientific inquiry. The first may be called metaphysical presuppositions. These assumptions or postulates are basic to any sort of scientific inquiry: that such inquiry is possible, that there is truth or reality to be investigated, etc. "It is, of course, true that even in the natural sciences there can be no knowledge that is absolutely independent of any act of faith, or of assumptions which are incapable of scientific proof."³ F. Ernest Johnson comments:

¹Buell G. Gallagher, "Causation and Conscience," Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, eds., Learning and World Peace, Eighth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in Their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life, September 7-10, 1947, (New York: Harper, 1948), p. 536.

²See pp. 302-306, infra.

³Richardson, op. cit., p. 11; cf. Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), p. 39.

The scientist has his fixed point--his faith in the ultimate validity of his method. He is ready for many surprises, but not for the discovery of an utter capriciousness in nature. Yet one finds almost no recognition of this important fact in current expositions of scientific method.¹

Speaking of the assumptions of the scientific enterprise, E. A. Burtt writes: "Since the essential point of this assumption is that some intelligible order obtains in the world we may call this briefly the Postulate of Order. The aim of science is to reveal as much order in nature as it proves possible to find."² This is a metaphysical or philosophical assumption, and clearly within the sphere of philosophy. This is also related to the subject matter of theology. This assumption is not altogether absent from the valuations of scientists, that is, they may feel that the universe ought to be cosmos instead of chaos.

In discussing the thirteen temptations of science, Ferre points out that "scientific method cannot, obviously, deal with the ultimate. That is a philosophic, metaphysical, and religious problem." But he notes: "Since science deals with what is here and now actual, particularly along rigid descriptive lines, the logical tendency of thought has made it easy to assume that this area equals the whole area of truth." "The false use of science has led to a naturalism

¹F. Ernest Johnson, "Is There a Deficit in Our Prevailing Philosophy of Education?" Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, eds., op. cit., pp. 396-397.

²E. A. Burtt, Principles and Problems of Right Thinking (New York and London: Harper, 1928, 1931), p. 219.

which has simply for the most part been taken for granted as demanded by the method of science."¹

The second kind of presuppositions and valuation may be called existential. They are involved in the relationship between the inquiring subject and the subject-matter or object of investigation. The social scientists and theologians are, in the way the natural scientists are not, involved in the object of their study. Their whole personal existence is included, in a sense, in the subject-matter of their investigation, which is human existence in its manifold aspects. Complete impartiality and detachment is only theoretically possible in the social sciences. Valuations are unavoidable. If valuations or presuppositions are hidden or unconscious they become biases which distort the inquiry and findings even more than if they were clearly defined.

There are at least two different kinds of existential valuations and presuppositions. One arises out of the relationship between the scientist and the subject-matter of his inquiry (i.e. comparative detachment in the case of the natural scientists and greater involvement in the case of the social scientists.) The other arises out of the relationship between the scientist and his culture (Comparative detachment in the case of natural scientists--less so in the case of social scientists--in more democratic societies;

¹Nels F. Ferre, Faith and Reason (New York: Harper, 1946), pp. 79-80.

obedience to the will of the dominant group in the state in a totalitarian society).

Again we must remind ourselves that the metaphysical assumptions that underlie the scientific inquiry and the existential involvement of the inquiring scientist are very closely related, as the plight of the Soviet geneticists (and some experts hired by, or subservient to, the commercial interests in a capitalistic culture) indicates. We shall discuss this relationship in the following section.

Existential Involvement of the Inquirer

Some of the characteristic differences between natural and social sciences (or human sciences) arise: (1) as we have seen, in the involvement of the inquirer in the subject-matter of his inquiry and the way in which a degree of objectivity is nevertheless obtained; (2) in the fact that biases are part of the data of social inquiry. Regarding the existential involvement of the inquirer, Myrdal writes:

Full objectivity, however, is an ideal toward which we are constantly striving, but which we can never reach. The social scientist, too, is part of the culture in which he lives, and he never succeeds in freeing himself entirely from dependence on the dominant preconceptions and biases of his environment.¹

Too strenuous a striving for full objectivity, moreover, is itself fraught with dangers and pitfalls.

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1035.

"Valuations are present in our problems even if we pretend to expel them. The attempt to eradicate biases by trying to keep out the valuations themselves is a hopeless and mis-directed venture."¹ And the desire for objectivity is itself an expression of valuation.

Lynd is quite impatient with the social scientists who place undue emphasis upon being "empirical," and who in their provisional acceptance of the values and goals of a going system are, in the course of inquiry, drawn within the net of assumptions of that very culture.²

We have thus far placed different kinds of sciences along the scale of objectivity-subjectivity, and of aloofness-existential-involvement, with mathematical science on the one end of the scale and social science on the other. Sciences may also be placed along the scale of morality.³ In the mathematical, physical, and biological sciences, the factor of morality does not enter. Only when conscious choice is possible, that is, in human or social sciences, is the question of morality relevant. And in areas where conscious choices are possible, and therefore moral valuation is a factor, ethical judgment both of subject and object must be considered openly and critically.

¹Ibid., p. 1043; cf. Lynd, op. cit., p. 2 and 116; cf. Gerhart Niemeyer, "Faith and Facts in Social Science," Theology Today (January, 1949), pp. 489-490.

²Lynd, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

³See Niemeyer, op. cit., pp. 488-489, 490-491.

Again Lynd is incisive at this point. Speaking of values and social sciences, he characterizes the reluctance of the social scientists to accept full partnership with man in the adventure of living, as adolescent poseurs.¹ Myrdal is equally clear concerning moral judgments and people's valuations and beliefs.

It is sometimes assumed to be the mark of "sound research to disregard the fact that people are moral beings and that they are struggling for their conscience. In our view, this is a bias and a blindness, dangerous to the possibility of enabling scientific study to arrive at a true knowledge. Every social study must have its center in an investigation of people's conflicting valuations and their opportune beliefs. They are social facts and can be observed by direct and indirect manifestations.²

In this statement Myrdal also indicates that the biases are part of the subject-matter of social inquiry.

Lynd recognizes the dangers of distortion which arise out of confining valuations to those of a single culture and claiming objectivity and ethical neutrality. On the other hand, Lynd rejects revelation as the guiding values of ethical judgment.

Myrdal is more cautious in the statement of his hierarchy of valuation. But his valuation is also confined

¹"They tend to mute their role as implementers of innovation. So one observes these grave young sciences hiding behind their precocious beards of "dispassionate research" and "scientific objectivity." They observe, record, and analyze, but they shun prediction. And, above all else, they avoid having any commerce with "values". . . . It [social science] prefers to say that for science the word "ought" ought never to be used, except in saying that it ought never be used." Lynd, op. cit., p. 181.

²Myrdal, op. cit., pp. xlv-xlvi; cf. also p. 10.

³Lynd, op. cit., p. 191.

within the rationalistic, humanistic framework, and sees no particular need to assess this basic presupposition critically, while he recognizes the hypothetical nature of all other preconceptions and valuations, including his adoption of the American Creed as the instrumental norm of value premises.¹ Myrdal does not define the term, rational. All the attempts to define terms such as reason, rationality, and reasonableness tend either to be too inclusive and vague to be meaningful or too narrow, giving the impression of being some "faculty" or having some solid quality.²

That rational criterion is the only rational criterion is not denied: that is, there is no other way to evaluate norms of value premises critically, scientifically, intellectually--in other words, rationally--than by the use of the rational method. There is no "supra-rational," "irrational," or "existential" method that can be applied generally, rationally; and there is no other way to apply general principles to specific cases than by the rational method. If this sounds tautological, it is because we have reached the limit of rational thinking.

The title of Myrdal's magnum opus, An American Dilemma, is suggestive of the irrational character of the situation he describes. He regards the fact that the con-

¹See Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 1043-1044.

²Cf. comment of Brightman of Ferre in Eighth Symposium, op. cit., p. 509; cf. Dewey, op. cit., p. 10. (Dewey's argument against hypostatizing of reason is very helpful.)

flicting valuations are held by the same person as being the essence of the moral situation.

The moral struggle goes on within people and not only between them. As people's valuations are conflicting, behavior normally becomes a moral compromise. There are no homogeneous "attitudes" behind human behavior but a mesh of struggling inclinations, interests, and ideals, some held consciously and some suppressed for long intervals but all active in bending behavior in their direction.¹ (*entire passage in italics*)

This is hardly exceeded by any "existentialist" theologian.

This criticism of rationalism and humanism is not intended to be a defense of the view that "ethics could be regarded as a comfortable thing apart, given at the hands of God as an inscrutable 'moral law implanted in the hearts of men,' a thing to which social science could hand over all its problems of values."² The relationship between the social sciences and Christian ethics is that of a dynamic working together in a common endeavor. It is further asserted here that both ends and means are the concern of both the social sciences and theology, on the one hand, and of

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. xlvi. Lynd, too, writes: "Our major institutional forms and accompanying slogans derive from an era which not only viewed man as 'equal' but also as 'rational.' We now know man to be basically emotional in his motivations and only sporadically able to sustain the tensions involved in taking thought in order to direct his actions. Science is daily opening up new dimensions of complexity even in the commonplace situations of daily life-- And yet, so great is our reliance upon the rational omni-competence of human beings, that we largely persist, as already suggested, in the earlier habit of leaving everything up to the individual's precarious ability to 'use his head.' As a result, our personal and cultural dilemmas today are heavily traceable to the irrationality of behavior around allegedly rational institutions." Lynd, op. cit., p. 234.

²Lynd, op. cit., p. 191.

and of ethics and religion, on the other.¹ Again the relationship is symbiotic rather than compartmentalized. Further elaboration of these statements will be undertaken later.

Controlling Bias in Social Inquiry

We have already noted that presuppositions and valuations influence social inquiry. It is necessary that this influence be controlled; in order that presuppositions and valuations may be examined by the researcher and the readers, it is necessary that they be explicit, concrete, and specific.

According to Myrdal, bias may be defined as follows:

The beliefs are not only determined by available scientific knowledge in society and efficacy of the means of its communication to various population groups but are regularly "biased," by which we mean that they are systematically twisted in one direction, which fits them best for purposes of rationalization.²

To him, "there is no other device for excluding biases in social sciences than to face the valuations and to introduce them as explicitly stated, specific, and sufficiently concretized value premises."³ This will be accepted as the working basis for controlling bias in this inquiry.

The instrumental norm of value premises of this study, one corresponding to Myrdal's American Creed, may

¹Cf. Buell Gallagher, "Mr. Hutchins and Mr. Dewey," The Christian Century, January 24, 1945, pp. 524-525; cf. Robert M. Hutchins, "Education for Freedom," The Christian Century, November 15, 1944, pp. 1314-1316.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1030.

³Ibid., p. 1043; cf. pp. 1059-1060.

be designated as the Christian Ethic.. It will be one of the tasks of Part One of this paper to make an explicit and fairly concrete statement of Christian Ethics as it serves as the basis of its valuations. It must, however, be stated here that by Christian Ethics is not meant a set of fixed dogmas, or a general principle, nor a legalistically conceived ideal. Rather, it is a dynamic set of valuations arising out of man's response to the revelation of God.

A Theory of Social Causation

Before we discuss the writer's interpretation of Christian Ethics, it may be helpful to investigate the nature of the social process, particularly that of intergroup relations. The writer has found the discussion of social causation by R. M. MacIver to be most helpful in understanding the process of social change and the part that various "factors" play in the process. One of the key notions of MacIver is that "Cause is dynamic."¹ He writes: "Cause is a conjuncture of factors; effect is a conjuncture of factors continuous with and sequent upon the former."² He differentiates between event and process:

By event we mean a single manifestation, representing a unique historical moment, dated in time and space. An event thus offers an obvious antithesis to a process, since the latter is continuous through time and need not manifest itself in any event or series of events. The process works its way "underneath," the event "breaks out."³

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¹R. M. MacIver, Social Causation (Boston: Ginn, 1942), p. 28.

²Ibid., p. 29.

³Ibid., p. 125.

Events are discontinuous, processes are continuous. . . . We look for the causation of events outside of the events but for the causation of processes inside of the processes. . . . By social process we mean a system of social change taking place within a defined situation and exhibiting a particular order of change "through the operation of forces present from the first within the situation."¹

In the operation of caste in the present moment, to take an example, the caste pattern of segregation and discrimination is a form of social process. An event, such as a race riot or lynching, arises out of the continuity of social process. Within the continuity of process are forces making for the maintenance of relative equilibrium, as are also forces making for the breakdown of that equilibrium. The equilibrium is maintained until some conjuncture, that is, some precipitant or complex of precipitants, acts upon this equilibrium to break it. "This conjuncture enlists itself on the side of the innovating, unstabilizing forces, breaks the leash that restrains them--and so the event is born."²

"The whole causation of the event is operative in the occasion of the event," MacIver points out. But since a process is continuous, "it cannot be explained by the conjuncture of forces at any one moment." Therefore, "we must look for determinants that are themselves persistent, that work more deeply in the soil of society, that are congenial and understandably related to the direction of the

¹MacIver, op. cit., p. 130.

²Ibid., p. 129.

process. We cannot any longer think merely in terms of casual conjuncture, or of precipitant and unstable equilibrium."¹ In the type of social pattern such as caste, "many dynamic factors meet, focus, clash, and cooperate in the shaping of the pattern. These have to be assessed at every stage of the process."² These factors may be already present or enter anew into the conjuncture. The role of "dynamic assessment," according to MacIver, "is to bring into a single order of coherent relationships the objectively diverse factors involved in social behavior."³ "The assessing process, whether it takes effect as an individual or as a collective activity, is a function of the personality of the social being, as it apprehends alternatives of behaving, as it discerns their relation to the value-system it incorporates."⁴ As there is a relatively coherent personality behind the dynamic assessment of the individual, so there is a "relatively coherent cultural complex" behind "like and converging assessments of many individuals."⁵

If there is to be any weighting of various factors, which are so dynamically interrelated that none of them have any independent efficacy, it employs no objective

¹MacIver, Social Causation, op. cit., p. 133.

²Loc. cit.

³Ibid., p. 306

⁴Ibid., p. 306

⁵Ibid., p. 307; cf. p. 372.

scale. "In so far as there is weighting it is relative to a value scheme."¹ "The total apprehended situation, including conditions as well as specific means, controls the value assessment and the direction of the value quest."²

Regarding the methodology of causal investigation MacIver emphasizes that "the setting for every such inquiry into causes is a challenging difference between two comparable situations"³ "What above all we need to make specific is the linkage of difference to difference."⁴

Attribution of causation is the progressive revision of a hypothesis, which is also a process of verification. But "the verification of any significant hypothesis of social causation is never complete, but only approximate."⁶

MacIver points out that we must project ourselves by sympathetic reconstruction into the situation.⁷

Every social phenomenon is an expression of some meaningful system. We piece the system together from a myriad evidences--not as outsiders but as in some degree ourselves participants. . . . But complete

¹Ibid., p. 332.

²Ibid., pp. 332-333.

³Ibid., p. 374; cf. pp. 347-387.

⁴Ibid., p. 377 .

⁵Ibid., p. 385.

⁶Ibid., p. 392; "One conclusion that has emerged in the course of our enquiry is that the discovery of the causes of social phenomena is progressive and always approximate, always incomplete. We seek to trace the routes of specific transitions within the larger flux. What we designate causes are the various conjunctures of things in the process of creating some differences that arrests our attention."
Ibid., p. 382.

⁷Ibid., p. 391.

certitude eludes us. The unity, however coherent, exhibits deviations and conflicts. The systems we construct do not integrate all the manifestations we discover within them. The particular phenomenon may be the offspring of the system, but every birth is difference as well as likeness.¹

In dealing more specifically with intergroup relations, MacIver divides the "configurations of causality" into two major types: "One presents a balance of forces, the other a kind of circle or roundabout. . . . The first type stresses the opposition of forces; the second, the interlocking of forces."² He mentions four forms of balance or equilibrium: (1) The tense equilibrium, which is punctuated by outbreaks set off by precipitants, which may be fortuitous or designed; (2) the precarious equilibrium, the type of situation that portends imminent change in one direction only, in which any disturbance may serve as a precipitant; (3) the indifferent equilibrium, the antithesis of tense equilibrium, in which a precipitant can quickly change the balance, toward or away from discriminatory practices; and (4) the moving equilibrium, the type of situation which "has accomodated itself to certain definite trends without breach of continuity or serious disturbance."³

The second configuration is that of circles, "in which a series of conditions or forces sustain, confirm,

¹Ibid., p. 392.

²R. M. MacIver, The More Perfect Union (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 53.

³Ibid., pp. 53-61.

and generate one another."¹ This circular pattern is often combined with the quilibrium pattern. In the causal "vicious circle" of discrimination, "discrimination breeds discrimination." The primary circle can be presented as follows:

discrimination → conditions of life confirmed or imposed by
discrimination → discrimination

In symbolic form: $D^1 \rightarrow C^1 \rightarrow D^2 \rightarrow C^2 \rightarrow D^3 \rightarrow C^3$ etc., in which D stands for discrimination and C for the sequent conditions relevant to it. In a stabilized situation of discrimination, we have $D \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow C$ etc.² This is the situation which Davis, Gardner, and Gardner describe, in which "caste is almost 'perfect' economically and socially."³ MacIver describes the operation of the vicious circle of discrimination as follows:

The discriminating group starts with an advantage. It has greater power, socially and politically, and usually it has a superior economic position. Thus it is enabled to discriminate. By discriminating it cuts the other group off from economic and social opportunities. The subordination of the lower group gives the upper group a new consciousness of its superiority. This psychological reinforcement of discrimination is in turn ratified by the factual evidences of inferiority that accompany the lack of opportunity, by the mean and miserable state of those who live and breed in poverty, who suffer constant frustration, who have no incentive to improve their lot, and who feel themselves to be outcasts of society. Thus discrimination evokes both attitudes and modes of life favorable to its perpetuation, not only in the upper group but, to a considerable extent, in the lower group as well.⁴

An upper caste complex and its counterpart, a lower caste complex, are developed and institutionalized out of this


¹Ibid., p. 61.

²Ibid., pp. 61-67; cf. Myrdal, pp. 1065, 1070.

³Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, op. cit., pp. 481-482.

⁴MacIver, More Perfect Union, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

situation. This is represented graphically by MacIver as follows:¹



MacIver remarks, concerning the operation of the vicious circle, "a favorable change in any one of the distinctive conditions will, if it can be held constant long enough, tend to raise the other conditions and to bring about a readjustment of the whole system in conformity with the favorable change."² He draws the "obvious conclusion" "that where feasible the attack on the vicious circle should be made not at one point only but at several."³

Drawing lessons from the vicious circle, MacIver points out that the upper caste should seek to comprehend that their very discriminations dispose the members of the lower caste to the ways which the supraordinate group despises and uses as grounds for discrimination--dirtiness, laziness, irresponsibility, etc. "The more severe the discrimination the more evidence it will itself provide to justify its own perpetuation."⁴ If the members of the upper group dislike certain traits of the subordinate caste, the best contribution they can make to eradicate these traits is to cease discrimination. The members of the lower group, in turn, can promote in their own ranks "those attitudes

¹Ibid., p. 68.

²Ibid., p. 71.

²Ibid., p. 72

³Ibid., p. 78.

and those responsibilities which will make their full entrance into the life of the community an easier transition and a more obvious contribution to the welfare of the whole."¹

Different groups have different characteristics. "Genuine cultural differences exist all about us, and all men set store on their own culture." But these differences need not separate group from group.²

¹MacIver, More Perfect Union, op. cit., p. 79.

²Loc. cit.

PART ONE

CHRISTIAN ETHICS

CHAPTER I

FOUNDATIONAL: THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS

In discussing the presuppositions of social inquiry, we were led to adopt a terminology which is peculiarly that of social scientists, which conveys certain technical and special meanings. It is the task of those who are dedicated to the clarification of the interrelationship among the so-called disciplines to make words meaningful across the boundaries of the various fields of inquiry. This is not the task of this particular study, but it is necessary to note the need at this point.

We have spoken of Christian ethics as a set of value premises. We have spoken of choosing Christian ethics as the instrumental norm of this inquiry. These are very misleading words in the field of Christian ethics and Christian theology. Actually, we do not select Christian ethics as a norm of value premises. It is more accurate to say that we hold to the Christian faith, and that Christian ethics is one mode of expression of that faith, in the same way that Christian theology is a rational and scientific attempt to interpret the Christian faith. We are gotten hold of by the Christian faith just as much as we choose the Christian faith. It is a simultaneous, interacting--in other words, dynamic--two-way process. The choosing of the American Creed (as with Myrdal) may also be a dynamic,

two-way process. Many Americans actually choose (e.g. naturalization) the American Creed, but even those who do, are first gripped by the significance of the Creed and the ideals expressed by it. In other words, selection of a set of value premises takes place in a much deeper sense--in a much more existential sense than the purely rational--than the language of the social sciences that we have employed appears to indicate.

Theology as a Science of the Christian Faith

Before proceeding to the discussion of the relationship of Christian ethics to the Christian faith, it may be helpful to go back one step and briefly investigate the relationship of Christian theology to the Christian faith. Christian theology may be defined as a science. Emil Brunner, in a symposium entitled, "Wissenschaft und Glaube," asserts: "Denn in der Theologie treffen ja diese beiden Grössen, Wissenschaft und Glaube, wie nirgends sonst zusammen, da die Theologie nichts anderes ist als die Wissenschaft vom Glauben."¹ (For in theology, these two magnitudes, Science and faith meet as nowhere else; theology is no other than the science of faith.)

Aulen is also emphatic at this point: "The function of systematic theology is purely scientific in so far as its task is to clarify the significance of the Christian faith."²

¹Emil Brunner, "Theologie" Emil Brunner et al., Wissenschaft und Glaube (Erlenbach-Zürich:Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1944), p. 9.

²Gustaf Aulen, The Faith of the Christian Church (Philadelphia:The Muhlenberg Press, 1948), p. 4.

Richardson defines theology as "the investigation at the level of empirical science of the facts involved in the existence of the believing, worshipping and witnessing Christian community." He regards the task of Christian apologetics today in terms of the demonstration "that the Christian faith can bear scrutiny in the light of modern scientific method, that is, by the scientific method appropriate to it, which is theological method."¹ He includes theology among the human sciences, along with psychology and history.

Concerning theology as an empirical science, Brunner comments that "the Devil would pass the most rigorous examination in dogmatic and Biblical theology with distinction."² According to Brunner, "theology is not a 'sacred science, though it contains, as its context and its basis, the sacred revelation."³ "Theology stands very close to the word of God, but it is not itself the Word."⁴ "It is secular like every other academic subject."⁵

Johanson differentiates between the natural sciences and theology in terms of the differences of relationships between the inquirer and his subject matter. The relationship between the scientist and his subject-matter is an impersonal "I-it" type, whereas the relationship for the

¹Richardson, op. cit., p. 55.

²Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1946), p. 420. Cf. Aulen, op. cit., p. 5.

³Ibid., p. 390.

⁴Ibid., p. 420.

⁵Ibid., p. 391.

theologian is that between man and God, an "I-Thou" type of relationship. The task of the theologian is made difficult because of this relationship, "wherein there are two dynamic centers of knowing and of action." Judgment proceeds from both sides.¹ Johanson, in this very keen observation, omits a very important area of inquiry which falls somewhere intermediate between these two poles, namely, the social sciences.² In his field of human relationships, a social scientist has to consider that complex of relations in which he is wholly involved and yet which he seeks to understand rationally. It is in this area that a student of Christian ethics endeavors to bring the findings and insights of theology and Christian ethics and those of the social sciences into a dynamic and integrated unity.

Faith and Reason

Far more important than the question whether theology is a science or not is the inquiry concerning the relationship between theology and the Christian faith, and between

¹E. Jerome Johanson, "Two Problems in the Relations between the Natural Sciences and Theology," Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein and R. M. MacIver, eds., Approaches to National Unity. Fifth Symposium of Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Harper, 1965), pp. 712-718.

²He does speak of the sciences of the spirit, but these are "in addition" to natural sciences and deal with "the facts of the moral and religious life of mankind." However, he does not deal with the social sciences as we have defined them above, pp. 12-13, supra.

faith and reason. The task of Christian theology is to make the Christian faith intelligible. "Theological understanding still belongs to the sphere of reason."¹ The Christian faith is based on God's revelation,² but this faith must be explained as far as possible by the use of reason.

There is an ambiguity in the use of the terms "reason" and "rational" which is almost unavoidable. On the one hand, man must be a rational being, that is, he must have reason, which means possessed of the full power of thought and participating in the tradition and system of meanings involved in language and culture. But, on the other hand, when "reason" is set over against "faith" as a means of arriving at truth either in fact or value, it means "discursive reasoning," that is, the logical criticism and systematization of ideals. Such reasoning does not produce primary knowledge of values or of facts. Primary knowledge is provided by sense perception, intuition, and "faith." But reason in the first sense, that is, to be possessed of the full power of thought, is necessary in order to understand, to find meaning in the knowledge provided by sense perception, intuition and faith.

Brunner stresses this importance of reason when he writes: "Reason is the conditio sine qua non of faith."³

¹Brunner, Revelation and Reason, op. cit., p. 420.

²Ibid., p. 237; Aulen, op. cit., p. 28.

³Brunner, Revelation and Reason, op. cit., p. 418.

The purpose of God in creating man as a rational being, "one who can understand and use words," is the reception of His Word of revelation.¹ But again it must be emphasized that reason as such does not produce faith or evaluate faith or revelation. Rationalism, which regards reason to be the ultimate or supreme criterion of reality or truth, is rejected by this writer as a partial and distorted view of the truth. The purpose of this section is to make this position more explicit, that is, to attempt to demonstrate that reason and faith are both necessary in apprehending truth and understanding reality, and to explain the function of faith and reason, which are distinct but mutually reinforcing.

Brunner points out that the break of continuity, or distinction of function, does not occur between science and theology, or philosophy and theology. All these are rational. The transition or distinction occurs between theology and faith.² For although faith must pass through, so to speak, rational understanding, faith is not itself intellectual, logical (that is, rational) understanding. Intellectual understanding, on the other hand, does not necessarily produce faith.

The whole personality of man, and not only his reason, responds in an act of faith.³ Again in the words of

¹Ibid., p. 416.

²Ibid., pp. 389, 420.

³C. G. Jung writes concerning the need for "a

Brunner, "faith consists precisely in the fact that the heart and the reason again become one, that the reason becomes warmed, and the heart becomes rational. . . . In agape alone is man wholly integrated; without it he loves unreasonably and he reasons lovelessly." God's words awaken faith within us and bring the heart and reason together.

Thus faith does not put the reason out of action, but through faith the word of God takes the reason into its service. Rational thought is not abandoned--for faith itself is truly rational thought about God and about life as a whole--but all that is got rid of is the sinful misuse of thought, the illusion of reason. Reason is not annihilated by faith, but it is set free.¹

Richardson also speaks of liberating "reason from the toils of rationalism and its corollary, skepticism."² He maintains that faith is necessarily bound up with reason.

treatment of the personality as a whole." "It [the meaning of life] is much more a question of his unreasoned need of what we call spiritual life [than of his outer circumstances], and this he cannot obtain from universities, libraries, or even churches. He cannot accept what these have to offer because it touches only his head, and does not stir his heart." C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (New York: Harcourt, 1939), p. 224.

¹Brunner, Revelation and Reason, op. cit., pp. 427-429.

²He points out that rationalism "loves to represent the issue between itself and Christian philosophy as one of reason versus "belief" or "mere opinion"; it does this by concealing its own faith-principle or by pretending that it is not a faith-principle at all but one which is either rationally demonstrable or self-evident to all thinkers." Richardson, op. cit., p. 242.

The most important function of faith is "that of making possible rational assent to the address of God." To him, our knowledge of God is essentially a rational knowing made possible by faith in the biblical revelation."¹

Erich Frank recognizes that the Positivists are right in saying "that it is not merely the logic of the theoretical arguments which directs the argumentation of the metaphysician, but rather a certain preconceived conviction which has been borne out through his life." But he insists that "the same is true of the Positivist himself." The Positivist has his irrational belief, "belief in the perceptible world and in natural life which, to him, is the ultimate truth upon which he has decided to stake his whole existence once and for all." Human reason does not rest upon itself. Rather, rational conclusions are dependent upon premises, "which reason itself is unable to prove because they are rooted in a deeper stratum of the human mind."²

Frank reminds us that "a God of this world cannot be God for us, and that what we do call God, we can find only in our faith, not in any theoretical philosophical system." On the other hand, he cautions us that merely subjective consciousness is not a sufficient foundation upon which to base the existence of God.

The principle of voluntary belief, this "I believe," hardly differs from the principle of the sovereign

¹Ibid., p. 243.

²Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1945), p. 39.

"I think" or "I will," which it was to replace. . . . Subjective concept of belief is a contradiction in itself. A belief that believes only in itself is no longer a belief.

He asserts: "For true belief transcends itself; it is belief in something--in a truth which is not determined by faith, but which on the contrary, determines faith,"¹

At the conclusion of his book on Philosophical Understanding and Religious Truth, Frank returns to the central question of faith and reason. "Before God, our reason becomes mute and it is in silence that He reveals Himself to us as the Presence by which we are determined in our whole existence." However, this does not mean that we acquiesce in vague feeling and religious imagination. "What we feel, we must try to recognize in fact or else we do not really believe in it." He maintains:

There is no twofold truth. Faith must come to terms even with the opposing truth of scientific and practical reason, in which we trust in our everyday existence; it is the function of philosophy to strive toward the solution of this antinomy. Reason, on the other hand, cannot rest content with truths that are unrelated to the motivating belief of our life and must seek for their ultimate ground. Only by thus wrestling with its own limitations does our reason gain a glimpse of the Absolute as the Present which lies in the Future. In this struggle consists the perennial task of philosophy.²

That is also just the trouble with philosophy. It is perennial, whereas life demands immediate answers. Religion provides working answers to these philosophical questions. The Christian faith rooted in the revelation

¹Ibid., pp. 41-43.

²Ibid., p. 104.

of God gives the answers to the perennial questions of ultimate issues. It is the joint task of theology, from the side of faith's answers, and of philosophy, from the side of questions of reason, to work out a rational, believing philosophical theology or theological philosophy. The two cannot be separated--the philosophical queries presuppose, in asking, the theological answers; the theological answers, of course, presuppose the questions of philosophical inquiry into ultimate issues.

This leads us to Paul Tillich's philosophy of "belief-ful realism." According to Tillich, "belief-ful realism"

is a total attitude toward reality. It is not a theory of the universe, neither is it a kind of practice but it belongs to a level of life which lies underneath the cleavage between theory and practice. . . . By the connection of belief-ful and realism the most fundamental of all dualisms is called into question and if it is justly called into question it is also overcome. Faith is an attitude which transcends every conceivable and experienceable reality; realism is an attitude which rejects every transcending of reality, every transcendency and all transcendentalizing.

After discussing the evasion of the tension between the two in two directions: in the direction of a belief-ful realism (e.g. positivism at its noblest), and in the direction of idealism, he concludes:

Hence we are led to the surprising result that faith and realism, just because of the tension which prevails between them, belong together. For in faith the unconditioned tension is present and no attitude which weakens this tension can be associated with it. Idealism weakens it, beliefless realism cancels it, belief-ful realism expresses it.¹

¹Paul Tillich, The Religious Situation, trans. H. Richard Niebuhr (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), pp. xiii, xiv.

This relationship between faith and reason or between the believing attitude and realism is of such a nature that all these rational statements are only approximations, analogies¹, symbols pointing to reality.² Yet we must attempt to make as rational a statement as possible of a relationship which transcends reason.

Nels Ferre, in replying to the criticism of F. Ernest Johnson, that his treatment of the relation between religion and reason "leaves it less than clear," answers: "To me this position is a necessary transcript of our actual situation as knowers." Then he attempts to clarify:

Reason can prove something valid only in terms of something more valid. Since God is the most valid truth and reality that can be found, by definition, also were He not God, nothing more valid can logically be found to prove Him true, else were that God. Nevertheless, since God is truth, the reason is from God, that only can be right religion which squares with the truest

¹Comparing analogies, Frank explains in the concluding chapter entitled "Letter and Spirit": "But what is truth? Our theological concepts can be true only in an analogical sense. . . . Religious truth is concerned with an absolute will and implies that the demand made upon my conscience expresses the will of God Yet, even in faith, man knows that the forms in which he experiences God's will cannot pertain to Him in a literal, but only in an analogical, sense. Thus, since all our knowledge--whether theoretical, practical, or religious--always represents a relation to an object different from itself, its truth can be only that of an analogy through which this relation itself may be determined as true." Frank, op. cit., p. 161.

²Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy (New York: Scribners, 1937), Chapter I, "As Deceivers, Yet True," pp. 3-24. "The Christian Religion may be characterized as one which has transmuted primitive religious and artistic myths and symbols without fully rationalising them." p. 7.

use of reason, reason itself being constantly under the correction of reality.¹

Miguel de Unamuno points out that we come to the living God only by the way of love and not by the way of reason. "Reason rather tends to separate us from Him." However, Unamuno recognizes that science may serve as the gateway to religion:

Science teaches us, in effect, to submit our reason to the truth and to know and judge of things as they are--that is to say, as they themselves choose to be and not as we should have them. . . . Science is the most intimate school of resignation and humility, for it teaches us to bow before the seemingly most insignificant of facts. And it is the gateway of religion; but within the temple itself its function ceases.²

Paul Ramsey, in an article on Kierkegaard's existentialism, reminds us that existential thought is "existential thinking, not merely existential existing." It is a process of thinking which has "enough presence of mind to think always of the self as subject in vital relation to whatever happens to be the object of thought."³ Kierkegaard derides "the thinker who can forget in all his thinking also to think that he is an existing individual." Such an individual will never explain life. "He merely makes an attempt to cease to be a human being, in order to

¹Nels Ferre, "A Religion for One World," Bryson, Finkelstein, MacIver, eds., Learning and World Peace, op. cit., p. 498.

²Miguel De Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J. E. Crawford Flitch (London: Macmillan, 1931), p. 197.

³Paul Ramsey, "Existenz and the Existence of God: A Study of Kierkegaard and Hegel," The Journal of Religion, XXVIII (July, 1948), 157.

become a book or an objective something."¹ Again, in another connection, Kierkegaard characterizes as fantastical "that which so carries a man out into the infinite that it merely carries him away from himself and therewith prevents him from returning to himself."² In such a process, "the self is simply volatilized more and more." The self at last becomes a sort of abstract sentimentality which is so "inhuman" (or impersonal) that it ceases to apply to any particular person. But the self then only participates impersonally in the fact of some abstraction such as that of mankind in abstractio. An abstract thinking man is "infiniteized," but not in such a way that he becomes more and more himself, rather he loses himself more and more. "The law for the development of the self with respect to knowledge, in so far as it is true that the self becomes itself, is this, that the increasing degree of knowledge corresponds with the degree of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself." When this fails to happen then the self is squandered in the production of a kind of impersonal knowledge, "pretty much as men were squandered for the building of the pyramids."³

¹Soren Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson (Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), p. 85.

²Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), p. 46.

³Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, op. cit., pp. 46-47.

This self-knowledge that Kierkegaard so strenuously contends for is not, in the ordinary sense of the term, "subjective." Rather, "it is relational, in that the self as subject and the self as object of thought are always thought together; never is the object taken apart from the existing self."¹ As to the existence of an abstract thinker, Kierkegaard writes:

An abstract thinker exists to be sure, but this fact is rather a satire on him. . . . For an abstract thinker to try to prove his existence by the fact that he thinks, is a curious contradiction; for in the degree that he thinks abstractly he abstracts from his own existence.²

However, he cautions against drawing the conclusion from such a criticism of the abstract thinker "that an existing individual who really exists does not think at all." "He certainly thinks, but he thinks everything in relation to himself, being infinitely interested in existing."³

Existential thinking also recognizes its limits and limitations much sooner than abstract thinking. "At a certain juncture the existing individual must bring forth 'decision.'"⁴ Or in the language of this paper, existential thinking makes "dynamic assessment" of the total conjuncture of various forces, and makes decisions. The existential thinker always remembers the self's involvement

¹Ramsey, op. cit., p. 161.

²Kierkegaard, Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., p. 281.

³Loc. cit.

⁴Ramsey, op. cit., p. 161.

in the situation, "discovers its own limitation outside of itself in decisive ethical alternatives."¹

Some of the most incisive words on the dynamic interaction of reason and revelation have been written by Reinhold Niebuhr in his latest book, Faith and History. Niebuhr points out the three temptations to err that Christian theology confronts in pursuing "the task of correlating the truth of the Gospel as apprehended by faith to truth otherwise known." The first error is to "regard the truth of faith as capable of simple correlation with any system of rational coherence and as validated by such a correlation"² (e.g. modernism). The second error arises "when the effort is made to guard the uniqueness of the truth of faith and to prevent its absorption into a general system of knowledge by insisting that Christian truth is miraculously validated and has no relation to any truth otherwise known"³ (e.g. Protestant literalism and obscurantism). The third error is "to validate the truth of faith but to explicate it rationally in such a way that mystery is too simply resolved into ostensible rational intelligibility"⁴ (e.g. Catholic rationalism). He presents an "ideal" commerce between "the specific truth, revealed by the various historical disciplines and the and the final truth about

¹Ibid., p. 162.

²Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Scribners, 1949), p. 165.

³Ibid., p. 166.

⁴Ibid., p. 167.

man and history as known from the standpoint of the Christian faith." "In such a commerce", states Niebuhr, "the Christian truth is enriched by the specific insights which are contributed by every discipline of culture. But it also enriches the total culture and saves it from idolatrous aberrations."¹

We have discussed a great deal about the relationship between theology, revelation, Christian faith, and reason. Various thinkers have placed different emphasis and have looked at the relationship from slightly different viewpoints. Yet they are all attempting to describe a relationship which they conceive to be dynamic, interrelated. The writer's own statement would run somewhat as follows, noting the fact that these descriptions are only approximations, analogies, and symbolical representations: Revelation is the basis of the Christian faith. The Christian faith is at once received as the response of the whole personality of the believer and is arrived at through the rational and intellectual thinking of the seeker. The relation between faith and reason is that of dynamic interaction. The content of the Christian faith is rationally systematized by theology and related to the believer's total world-view by philosophy. The Christian is at once the believer and the rational thinker. The believing act of the Christian and his reasoning go together, interact with each

¹Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 167.

other, and work together all through the process of inquiry and interpretation.

Revelation

We have come to the innermost core, the most fundamental basis of one's faith, one's philosophy, one's presuppositions and value premises. We have seen that there is no presupposition-less thinking or valuation without value premises. We have studied the relationship between reasoning and believing in the formation of these value premises and religious faith. Now we must ask ourselves what is the content of the faith. The answer of a Christian, at least those of the more orthodox or traditional leanings, is "the revelation of God." The act of decision here is a symbiotic act of rational thinking and the "leap of faith." Revelation is not to be thought of in terms of a dogmatic creed nor of the infallible scriptures nor of the infallible head of a church. Rather it is to be thought of as the revelation of God in a person. The significance of this faith in the revelation must be expressed in the best intelligible formulation possible for the time. This process began very early in the formulation of the New Testament itself. Even the earliest letters of St. Paul indicate his attempts to translate and interpret the contents of revelation into words and categories of thought that his readers could understand. Even between the two letters to the Thessalonians we note a shift of emphasis in thought forms

into which the great beliefs of the apostle were poured.¹ The Gospel stories which came later are also an amalgam of facts and interpretations of faith.²

It is usually convenient to differentiate between general and special revelation. General revelation arises out of the fact that God is the creator. William Temple emphasizes: "Unless all existence is a medium of Revelation, no particular Revelation is possible; for the possibility of Revelation depends on the personal quality of that supreme and Ultimate Reality which is God."³

Richardson likewise writes:

Since the essence of the Christian understanding of revelation is that all revelation comes from God, if there is such a thing as truth or as the knowledge of God at all, it must come from the gracious and revealing activity of God Himself. All truth is one, and all truth is God's truth, for God, if He exists, must be the God of truth. . . . The pressure of truth or meaning upon our minds is nothing other than the impact of God upon us, even though we may not have learnt to call Him by His proper name. It is one of the activities of God in His self-manifestation which is included under the heading of general revelation.⁴

While opposing rationalism, Brunner more vigorously opposes radical fideism of Barthian theology, "which along side of the Word of revelation does not recognize any second, independent, source of knowledge for any sphere of life." He recognizes the feasibility of the argument of the ration-

¹Cf. E. F. Scott, The Literature of the New Testament (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1932), pp. 121, 123-124.

²Cf. E. F. Scott, The Validity of the Gospel Record (New York: Scribner, 1938), pp. 21, 25-26, etc.

³William Temple, Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan, 1934), p. 306.

⁴Richardson, op. cit., p. 121.

alist, but regards the assertions of fideism to be, in itself, "quite impossible."¹

Regarding the relationship of special revelation to general revelation, Richardson uses the analogy of the relationship between self-consciousness and consciousness. There is no simple, quantitative, or unbroken line of development from consciousness to self-consciousness, "since the latter is an emergently new kind of existence; there is a saltus, a leap from one to the other."² Special revelation is not a mere addition to general revelation. Its effect, the Christian faith, is a "new seeing," a new point of view, a new norm of value premises. We are again at the point of decision, the leap of faith that we discussed at the close of the previous section.

This writer's own experience of conversion tends to make him regard the Christian faith in terms of a "leap of faith," rather than of continuous development and growth or of arriving at the faith by rational thinking.

William Temple is very helpful in clarifying the concepts of general revelation, preparatory revelation, and specific revelation. Preparatory revelation consists primarily in historical events, secondarily in "the illumination of the minds of prophets to read those events as disclosing the judgment or the purpose of God." We do not find

¹Brunner, Revelation and Reason, op. cit., p. 378.

²Richardson, op. cit., p. 133.

an authoritative declaration of the theological doctrine, "but living apprehension of a living process wherein those whose minds are enlightened by divine communion can discern in part the purposive activity of God."¹ According to Temple, "the essential condition of effectual revelation is the coincidence of divinely controlled event and minds divinely illuminated to read it aright."²

In Jesus we find the perfect and focal expression of the whole reality of this revelation. "It is of supreme importance that it should thus be given in a Person." The revelation is not a set of dogmas or propositions to which we assent intellectually. It is a Person to whom we respond with our whole personality.

"In other words," writes John Knox, "revelation is revelation: it is not information or indoctrination."⁴ It is an act. "Jesus Christ was an act of God--or, if one prefers, in him took place the revealing act of God." And the medium of revelation is an event.⁵ Knox points out that this event, Jesus Christ, belongs in a peculiarly intimate sense to a stream of history, which may

¹Temple, op. cit., p. 312.

²William Temple in John Baillie and Hugh Martin, eds., Revelation (New York: Macmillan, 1937), p. 107.

³Ibid., p. 114.

⁴John Knox, On the Meaning of Christ (New York: Scribner, 1947), p. 14.

⁵Ibid., p. 29.

be called Hebrew-Jewish-Christian culture, which is the bearer of our spiritual life. At the same time, Jesus Christ imparts to that stream its distinctive character. This stream itself might in a certain perspective be thought of as a single event, which would include all of the history of Israel and of the Christian church. The central event of this event (or stream of history) is Jesus Christ. This central event includes: "the personality, life and teaching of Jesus, the response of loyalty he awakened, his death, his resurrection, the coming of the Spirit, the faith with which the Spirit was received, the creation of the community."¹

Knox tells us that the ancient doctrines of Trinity are true "not because they are metaphysically accurate descriptions of the nature of a person--how can we hope to define in this sense the nature of Christ when we have no idea how to define our own nature?--but because they are authentic and effective representations of the nature of an event." These are symbols of "God's uniquely and supremely revelatory act in Christ."²

William Temple calls our attention to the fact that the intellectual activity of theology may help in pointing men to Christ, but Christian doctrines "are not themselves the vehicle of the content of that revelation; they are the expositions of it."³

¹Knox, op. cit., p. 34.

²Ibid., pp. 56-57.

³Temple, in Baillie and Martin, eds., op. cit., pp. 120-121.

We apprehend the revelation through the records of the scriptures, but we do and we must study the Biblical records themselves critically with the full and unfettered use of the intellect. The Biblical testimony of Christ--the synoptic gospels as well as the letters of Paul and the fourth gospel--is an integration of the facts of history and the interpretation of history. As Knox writes: "That [the Gospels] brings us, indeed, not Jesus 'as he was' in some simple objective sense, but Jesus as he was remembered and therefore to some extent interpreted, in the generations immediately following his life, is one of the surest results of biblical study over many decades."¹

Richardson also notes that "we cannot assent to a dichotomy of event and interpretation, regarding the former as objective and the latter as subjective." The two are too closely interrelated. He characterizes as false the contrast between the "simple Gospel" of Jesus and the "theology" of the apostolic Church.² Richardson maintains:

Christian faith supplies the necessary principle of interpretation by which the facts of the biblical and Christian history can be rationally seen and understood. No other principle of interpretation can give us so reasonable a view of the facts which the prophetic and apostolic witnesses record.³

The writer assents to the above statement, although

¹Knox, op. cit., p. 61.

²Richardson, op. cit., pp. 147-148.

³Ibid., p. 150.

he feels that not all that can be said definitely and concretely and rationally about the criterion of interpretation of the historical records is contained in it. It is the whole impact of the personality of Jesus which we receive from the records (while we take into consideration all of the critical assessment of the records themselves) which comes close to being the very core of the criterion of interpretation.

Christian Ethics and the Christian Faith

We have come to the crucial point in our discussion, namely, what do Revelation, and Reason, and Faith have to do with Christian ethics? What is the relationship between Christian ethics and Christian faith, Christian ethics and Christian theology, Christian ethics and revelation? We may state at the outset that Christian ethics bears to the Christian faith a relationship analogous to that of Christian theology. Likewise, moral conscience and reason are parallel. Man's conscience interprets the Christian faith, but it is not a legalistic or moralistic application of a general ethical principle. Christian conscience, under the impact of the Christian faith, presents the Christian with a demand, a command, an imperative, which is at the same time the gift of the Grace of God.¹

¹For further development of this theme, see pp. 99 ff. infra. See also p. 361-365, infra.

Emil Brunner begins his preface to The Divine Imperative with the statement:

The question, "What ought we to do?", the great question of humanity, is the entrance to the Christian Faith; none can evade it who wish to enter the sanctuary. But it is also the gate through which one passes out of the sanctuary again, back into life; but in spite of the fact that the question--so far as the actual language is concerned--is unaltered, it has gained a new meaning.¹

Nothing magical happened; the man, both entering and leaving is the same person, erring, imperfect, weak. But something has happened to him. "There he stands, this weak human being, in the midst of life, among other people; but because he comes 'from thence,' he now has another 'position' in this world, and it is this which makes him a Christian. What this encounter means for the answering of the question, "What ought we to do?", constitutes the subject-matter of Christian Ethics."²

It is not the purpose of this chapter to attempt to answer that question, that is, to give the content of the subject matter of Christian ethics, or even a small portion of it. This attempt will be made in subsequent chapters. The aim is to endeavor to show the relationship between the Christian faith and ethics in an attempt to explain how Christian ethics forms the basis of our presuppositions and value premises. The illustration of Brunner quoted above

¹Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative (New York: Macmillan, 1942), p. 9.

²Loc. cit.

fails to give a complete picture. All analogies are imperfect and therefore misleading. Yet it does convey some idea of what is meant regarding the relationship between the Christian faith and Christian ethics.

Through his rational, aesthetic, and moral experiences, man comes to the knowledge of God and faith in Him, which are given in fellowship with Him by His self-disclosure (revelation). Reason, conscience and aesthetic sensitivity are, to use a rather crude illustration, two-way channels through which the impact of God's self-disclosure makes itself felt, both in drawing man to Him and leading man out into the world.

God's Revelation and Man's Response

We cannot trust our own conscience when we know that our conscience does not give us authoritative word but only contradiction and confusion. Nor can we depend upon others' words, no matter how religiously and ethically grounded, because they are also human and involved in the actual, sinful contradictions which characterize so much of human existence. This is true even if (rather, especially when) they are giving the expositions of God's revelation, whether as received in direct, mystical experiences, through the scriptures, through theological inquiry, through ethical endeavor, through rational inquiry, or any other approach to truth, reality, or God. We must not expect to find authority in doctrines, dogmas, creeds, interpretations of the scrip-

tures, pronouncements of the Church, or in any other human agency. Rather than trying to find some authoritative statement of the truth, we need to seek the truth in the dynamic interaction between God's revelation and man's response.

God's revelation in this sense is the self-disclosing activity of God. This statement itself is a statement of faith: we believe in God. We believe that God reveals himself. We believe further that man can respond to this revealing act of God. However, man cannot know God's revelation in fullness; we know only in part. The picture we receive is distorted by our finiteness, our interrelationship with other persons, and our sinful assertions of ourselves in which we set ourselves over against God as if we were His equals.

Man responds to this revelation of God--this is man's activity in response to God's self-disclosure. This is not to say that man does not actively seek God; he does. But in the context of our analogy (for this is only an analogy), man's seeking can also be understood in relation to God's seeking of man. To God's revelation of himself, we respond with our whole personality. We receive God's revelation through our rational, moral, religious, and aesthetical sensitivities. We come to "know" and "believe in" God, incompletely to be sure, through our own experience and others' experiences which become our own. The Scriptures, the creeds and theological statements of the Church, the mystical experience of Christians (both "saints" and "here-

tics"), the findings of philosophers and social scientists, history, poetry, art and music and all other manifestations of man's life experience interact in response to, and are directed toward, God's revelation. In the dynamic interaction of all these life experiences, we come to "perceive" God. When we are pressed against the wall we say: We "grew up" to "know" God; we learned about God; we arrived at this conclusion through rational processes; we received it as revelation; we accepted in faith; we believe what the Bible says; we hold a certain theology; we absorbed it from the culture; we were inspired by the Holy Spirit; we had a mystical experience; we were converted; our conscience told us; and offer a hundred other "explanations." But in the end, we know that what we have said is not quite all that needs to be said, and that we shall not be able to give a complete explanation. It is out of the impact of the dynamic Personality of God upon the dynamic personality of man and vice versa that faith arises. In the moral experiences of man, this faith arises out of the impact of God's ethical demand and man's conscience. In man's rational experience, this faith is perceived in terms of the interaction of God's revelation and man's reason. In man's aesthetic sensitivity, the interaction of God's revelation and man's response is seen in terms of beauty in art, music, and literature. The religious experience of man includes all these facets of man's response to God's activity. In the narrower sense of mystical experience, these are presented in mystical litera-

ture, devotional writings, poetry, music, etc., and approach the expressions of rational aesthetic experience.

The Christian faith arises out of this interaction of God's revelation and man's response. The Christian faith is expressed in various ways corresponding to the facets of man's experience. Christian ethics is the expression of this faith in the context of man's moral conscience. Theology expresses the faith in rational terms. Devotional literature, music and religious art express faith in aesthetic terms.

Special Revelation in this context is the statement of the core of one's Christian faith. Being a statement, it is man's statement. Its form and content depend upon man's response, which is influenced by his cultural heritage, his religious experience, his education, his personality growth and development--in fact, by his total learning process. The source of this revelation, the writer believes to be God's self-disclosure. This is the basic assumption behind the use of the words, "man's response." But being the statement of man's response, it is relative, finite, incomplete, partial, biased, "existential," influenced by the culture in which man lives and has his being. Therefore any statement of the specific revelation must not be made the final authority. This statement of special revelation for this writer would center around the personality, life, work and teachings of Jesus, the response of loyalty he awakened, his death, his resurrection, and the creation of the community with the coming of his Spirit.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL: THE NEW TESTAMENT ON INTERGROUP RELATIONS

Jesus and Intergroup Relations

In discussing the basis of the Christian faith and of Christian ethics, the writer summarized his conception of special revelation in terms of the life, personality, teaching, work, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, whom we call the Christ. It is to be noted in this connection, as well as in others, that the life and personality and work of Jesus are not to be understood apart from the existential situation that confronted him, including the whole array of historical and cultural forces. Among the cultural forces that he faced were social norms which determined the prevailing intergroup prejudices.¹

It is crucial for the study of intergroup relationships based upon the presuppositions and valuations stated above, to seek the "mind of Christ" on this particular relationship. At the outset, we accept the statement that "the gospels contain an abundance of evidence that Jesus lived

¹Intergroup prejudice refers to prejudice between groups "that rests on conceptions of them as different kinds of human beings." MacIver, op. cit., p. 11; See p. 11, supra.

in his complex and racially mixed environment the life of a loyal and devoted Jew."¹ The intergroup prejudices of his culture included hostility against Romans, Samaritans, "the people of the land" (because of their neglect of ceremonial and ritual laws), and Gentiles in general.² Coupled with these was the intense pride of the "Chosen People."

There are passages in the Synoptic Gospels which indicate that Jesus might have shared some of these prejudices of his culture. A number of texts can be cited to buttress this suspicion. Among them may be included the following: he did not conduct any public healing or preaching ministry outside of Jewish compatriots³; he had some harsh and unkind things to say about the Gentiles⁴; he specifically charges his disciples to avoid going to the Gentiles and the Samaritans⁵; he is reported to have indicated that the twelve disciples are to rule over the twelve tribes of Israel.⁶

¹Harvie Branscomb, The Teachings of Jesus (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), p. 321.

²Cf. Ibid., pp. 324-328.

³See Mark 7:24.

⁴"And in praying do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do." (Matt. 6:7); ". . . . that those who are supposed to rule over the Gentiles lord it over them, . . ." (Mark 10:42); "If he refuses to listen even to the church, let him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector." (Matt. 18:17); and the reply to the Syrophenician woman, Mark 7:27, Matt. 15:26. (All New Testament references in this chapter are from the Revised Standard Version.)

⁵Matt. 10:5; Matt; 10:23 indicates that they were to concentrate their efforts on Israel.

⁶Matt. 19:28. "Truly I say to you in the new world,

Bultmann maintains that Jesus "took for granted" as did his contemporaries that the Kingdom of God was to come for the benefit of the Jewish people." He asserts that the passages concerning the twelve disciples judging the twelve tribes are "indeed not genuine words of Jesus," but recognizes that "the history of this earliest community itself shows plainly that the preaching of Jesus had not extended beyond the boundaries of the Jewish people." Bultmann also dismisses Matthew 10:5, 6 and Matthew 10:23 as sayings "put into the mouth of Jesus." Concerning the stories of the Syrophoenician woman, he notes that it comes "from the time of the controversy over the conversion of the Gentiles," and considers that this story shows "that there are exceptions among the heathen who are worthy of being saved."¹

Among all these sayings attributed to Jesus, the harshest and seemingly the most prejudiced is his reply to the Syrophoenician woman: "Let the children first be fed, for it is not right to take the children's bread and throw it to the dogs." (Mark 7:27)² In this form, this saying attributed to Jesus contains in it the characteristic

1 . . . you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel; also Luke 22:29-30.

¹D. Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word (Scribner: 1934), pp. 43-44.

²According to Matthew 15:21-28, Jesus answered to the woman's second entreaty with the remark: "I was sent only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." The remark about the dogs is the answer to the third pleading of hers.

earmarks of a prejudiced mind. The term "dogs," whether a term of contempt or of endearment¹ certainly sets off "a Greek, a Syrophoenician by race," as a different kind of human being. If it is a term of contempt, then hostility is open and manifest. If it is a term of endearment, it is no less objectionable, for it is so often in the diminutive terms of endearment that the patterns of caste are maintained.² If Gould is correct in his statement, the effect is even more damaging. He writes:

But I am inclined to believe that Jesus did not use the term seriously, but with a kind of ironical conformity to this common sneer, having felt in his own experience how small occasion the Jews of his time had to treat any other people with contempt.³

To assert or to imply from the belief that Jesus was and remained a loyal Jew and not an internationalist or cosmopolitan, that Jesus must have shared the prevailing prejudices of the Jews, is to attribute to him "human" failings which much lesser persons have overcome. It does not at all fit in with the rest of the picture of Jesus in the Gospels.

¹See H. D. A. Major, T. W. Manson, and C. J. Wright, The Mission and Message of Jesus (New York : Dutton, 1938), p. 102; but see Ezra P. Gould, Gospel According to St. Mark, The International Critical Commentary (New York: Scribner, 1901), p. 136; see also Oskar Holtzmann, The Life of Jesus trans. J.T. Bealby and Maurice A. Canney (London: A. and C. Black, 1904), p. 312, n. 1.

²E.g. "childishness" is one of the most widespread stereotypes directed against the Negroes; see for example, pp. 324 f. , infra.

³Gould, op. cit., p. 136. However, it is possible, as will be suggested later, that Jesus used the term (not with a kind of ironical conformity but) with a kind of unconscious, entirely unintentional conformity to popular usage.

Many white persons who have grown up in the deep South with strong prejudices have been able to cast off prejudice quite readily, and the transformations have been definite and permanent.¹

To reject explanations of difficult passages with a categorical statement such as "a picture of the life of Jesus which is built on a virtual denial of the Gospel story is neither a sound basis for faith nor even good apologetics,"² which Branscomb does in connection with this passage, seems dangerous not only from the standpoint of exegesis but from the perspective of faith itself. From such a basis, it would be well-nigh impossible to discuss whether any passage contains genuine sayings of Jesus or not, as indeed Branscomb does.³ Branscomb's own "best explanation" that "His words to the woman are not so much an answer to her request as an expression of His deep feeling over the crucial issue which He faced," is hardly an explanation. This he realizes. "This interpretation does not eliminate the harshness of the comparison between the Jews and Gentile, but it makes Jesus's statement one direct-

¹For example, a Negro friend of the writer, a Northerner and a graduate of Union Theological Seminary, emphatically stated to him that the best and most understanding friends of the Negroes are white Southerners who have cast off race prejudice. Cf. Anna G. Goldsborough, "1947--A Voice of Today," Survey Graphic (January, 1947), 26. An editorial comment states: "A great-grandniece of Jefferson Davis, the President of the Confederacy, affirms an emancipation of the mind and spirit."

²B. Harvie Branscomb, The Gospel of Mark, James Moffatt, ed. The Moffatt New Testament Commentary (New York: Harper, n.d.), p. 132.

³E.g., Ibid., p. 233.

ed to His own problem rather than a gratuitous insult to the woman."¹ We shall discuss more fully the relative evils of "gratuitous insult" and remarks of folks who don't "set out to be mean" in a later chapter.² It is sufficient to state here that this "explanation" is hardly an explanation concerning the difficulty which is "not so much with its main thought as with the form in which the thought is expressed."³ It is not like Jesus to be so engrossed in his own problems that he would project his bitterness toward the Jews on the Syrophoenician. However, here again we must be careful not to make too positive a statement, for our ideas as to just "what is like Jesus" and what is "not like Jesus" are products of studying just such passages as these and our own presuppositions and biases. It is not at all unlikely in the present situation that Jesus was quite definitely affected by the situation which forced him to withdraw from active work in his own beloved country. Howard Thurman writes that the words of Jesus, "It is not meet to take the children's bread, and cast it to the dogs," "had in it all the deep frustration which he had experienced, and there flashed through it generations of religious exclusiveness to which he was heir." However, this is not to assert that Jesus projected his frustration by acts of

¹Ibid., p. 132; See also Holtzmann, op. cit., pp. 311-312.

²See pp. 332-336, infra.

³Branscomb, Mark, op. cit., p. 132.

bitterness or aggression toward the woman. Thurman regards these words as "more a probing query than an affirmation."¹

It is a temptation to those who recognize their own biases to lean over backward to give the benefit of doubt to the views which do not fit their own biases. This must be resisted just as much as the tendency to draw conclusions which are favorable to their own viewpoints. Especially is this caution necessary where there is a strong motivation to appear intellectually respectable, and overscrupulously objective. The writer's own bias definitely favors the rejection of this particular form of the saying of Jesus. But that in itself is not sufficient ground to conclude that he must not reject the saying as unauthentic, any more than it is to do the opposite.

The writer, who is far from being an expert on the subject, makes the following provisional observations at this point: (1) That Jesus felt he was called to preach to Israel, that he did not envisage the evangelization of the Gentiles, and that he wanted to keep his presence in this district secret, and therefore did not desire to attract attention by healing -- all these seem quite plausible;² (2) That uncertainty exists as to the exact wording of the saying. It could very well have been that "the harsh words

¹ Howard Thurman, Jesus and the Disinherited (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1949), p. 91.

² Branscomb, Mark, op. cit., pp. 130-131; Bultmann, op. cit., p. 43; Holtzmann, op. cit., p. 311.

. . . . were spoken by one or other of the disciples," as asserted by Warschauer.¹ It could have been that "the allusion to dogs has been thrown back into Jesus' words from the woman's reply, and that she was the first to mention," as I. R. Glover maintains.² (3) It is possible, too, that Jesus merely reflected, almost unconsciously, at least unintentionally, the prevailing form of the expression without in any way participating in the attitudes of prejudice or hostility that accompanied the words. (4) It is also possible that Jesus manifests a change and growth in his life. If this passage is authentic to the very last detail (concerning which this writer has some doubts), then perhaps it is true that Jesus changed his attitude toward the Gentiles as the result of his contact with them, and of the incontrovertible evidence that they, too, showed genuine faith in him and in his God.³

Indeed, Branscomb's own treatment of the problem of Jesus' attitude toward the Gentiles is very illuminating.

¹Quoted by Branscomb, Mark, op. cit.; also in Harvie Branscomb, The Teachings of Jesus (Nashville: Cokesbury Press, 1931), pp. 334-335.

²Quoted by Branscomb, Mark, op. cit., p. 132.

³This view of the life of Jesus certainly does not conflict with the interpretation of the Christian faith that has been presented in this paper. Indeed, the writer does not accept the view that Jesus held all his views in every detail from the very first moment of his public ministry (to set the time at a late period of his life), completely independent of his relation to the changing situations and to his experience of interaction with the situations. This would be denying essential qualities of his genuine human nature.

Instead of concentrating on one such passage, he suggests that the attitude of Jesus on the whole should be considered. He reminds us that (1) Jesus did not share the strong anti-Roman prejudice and hostility of his people¹; Jesus did not share the anti-Samaritan prejudice of his people²; Jesus did not share the general antipathy toward the "people of the land" of his fellows Jews of his day,³ and Jesus did not share in the extreme pride of the chosen people held by his compatriots.⁴

Jesus is represented by Luke as illustrating the point that "no prophet is acceptable in his own country," by reference to the record that with all the widows in Israel, Elijah was sent to a widow in Sidon, and that with all the lepers in Israel, only Naaman the Syrian was cured by Elisha. (Luke 4:24-27)

The overwhelming evidence of the Gospel records seem to support the view that Jesus treated the Gentiles in terms of respect and concern which transcend the barriers of intergroup hostility. Jesus often spoke of the entrance of the Gentiles into the Kingdom and the Jews remaining outside. (Luke 13:28; cf. Matthew 8:11-12). It is true that

¹Branscomb, Teachings of Jesus, op. cit., pp. 324-326; see Matt. 8:10.

²Ibid., pp. 326-327; see Luke 17:16; Luke 9:55; John 4:40 ff.

³Ibid., pp. 327-328; see E.g. Luke 15:3-7 (The Lost Sheep).

⁴Ibid., p. 328; Matt. 8:11 ff.; Luke 13:29.

this Kingdom is conceived in terms of the Jewish one, and that the Gentiles will come, not instead of the Jews, not like the Jews, but to shame the Jews. "But the chief significance of this saying is negative," writes Bultmann, "if many Gentiles are to bring the unrepentent Jews to shame, then clearly, belonging to the Jewish race does not constitute a right to a share in the Kingdom."¹

In one of the most loved "parables," Jesus pictures a hated Samaritan to indicate the nature of brotherhood and "neighborliness" which belongs to the very essence of eternal life. To this we now turn.

And behold a lawyer stood up to put him to the test, saying, "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?"

He said to him, "What is written in the law? How do you read?"

And he answered, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself."

And he said to him, "You have answered right; do this and you will live."

But he, desiring to justify himself, said to Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?"

Jesus replied, "A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half-dead. Now by chance a priest was going down that road; and when he saw him he passed by the other side. So likewise a levite, when he came to the place and saw him, passed by the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was; and when he saw him, he had compassion, and went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and wine; and he set him on his own beast and brought him to an inn; and took care of him. And the next day he took out two denarii and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, 'Take care of him; and whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I come back.' Which of these three, do you think, proved a neighbor to the man who fell among the robbers?"

¹Bultmann, op. cit., p. 45.

He said, "The one who showed mercy on him."
And Jesus said to him, "Go and do likewise."¹

The question that the lawyer asked of Jesus, "And who is my neighbor?", is the crucial question. It is the question of defining the limit of neighborliness; is it my family, my fellow worshippers in the Synagogues, or does it include all Jews, good and bad alike? This is precisely the question which strikes at the very core of intergroup relations. For the intention of the questioner is: am I to love someone outside my group?

The question is the question of limitation, boundary. The answer is the answer of love, which forever transcends the boundaries of in-group and out-group. Love could not answer the lawyer's question in legalistic terms of definitions that he asked.² It had to be answered in its own terms: it is love that creates neighborliness. It is not to be delimited by the definitions of the neighbor. The parable is doubly relevant to our question of intergroup relations because the Samaritans, though in every sense--geographic, racial, cultural, linguistic, and religious--a neighbor to the Jews, were certainly not so considered by

¹Luke 10:25-37.

²Some authorities (e.g. Montefiore) find difficulty in the apparent fact that the parable "does not fit in with, or answer, the question," Montefiore writes: "The subject and object of charity were muddled up in the Evangelist's mind." But he finds its teaching to be: "Deeds of love must not be limited by race." He also finds some difficulties in the collocation of Priest, Levite, and Samaritan. But of the parable itself and its teachings, Montefiore has only highest esteem. C. B. Montefiore, The Synoptic Gospels (London:Macmillan, 1927), pp. 465-468.

the Jewish people. They were the particular out-group who were singled out to be despised. They were "a different kind of human beings" as far as the Jews were concerned. Even when the lawyer saw the point of the parable, he would not vocally admit that it was the Samaritan who was the real neighbor; it was "the one who showed mercy on him."

Manson points out "the narrow striving for a definition of neighbor fades out of sight before the spectacle of a man's generous action to a stricken fellow mortal."¹ In spite of some of his difficulties concerning the apparent incoherence between the answer and the question, Montefiore finds this parable to be "one of the simplest and noblest among the noble gallery of parables in the Synoptic Gospels." "Love, it tells us, must know no limits of race and ask no enquiry. Who needs me is my neighbour. Whom at the given time and place I can help with my active love, he is my neighbour and I am his."²

St. Paul and Intergroup Relations

From the address of Paul at Areopagus in Athens, the following quotation, which is widely referred to in the discussion of intergroup relations, is taken: "And he made from one every nation of men to live on all the face of the

¹William Manson, The Gospel of Luke James Moffatt, ed., The Moffatt New Testament Commentary (New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1930), p. 131.

²Montefiore, op. cit., p. 468.

earth, having determined allotted periods and boundaries of their habitation."¹ It is interesting to note that the word, nation, used here is the translation of the Greek word, ethnos,² from which one of the key words of this paper, ethnic, is derived. Paul is asserting here the truth that science has finally come to accept, at least tentatively: that all ethnic groups are descendents of common ancestors. Montagu writes:

Concerning the origin of the living varieties of man we can say little more than that there is every reason to believe that it was a single stock which gave rise to all of them. All the varieties of man belong to the same species and have the same remote ancestry. There is a conclusion to which all the relevant evidence of comparative anatomy, paleontology, serology and genetics points.³

Ruth Benedict asserts simply: "The Bible story of Adam and Eve told centuries ago the same truth that science has shown today: that all the peoples of the earth are a single family and have a common origin."⁴

But within this quotation from the Acts of the Apostles, which is used so widely by the upholders of Christian equality and brotherhood, there is contained an ambig-

¹Acts 17:26.

²See the discussion of the concept of the church as a new race, pp.403-406 , infra.

³M. F. Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1942), p. 47.

⁴Ruth Benedict, Race: Science and Politics (Rev. ed.; New York: The Viking Press, 1945), p. 171; also Ruth Benedict and Gene Weltfish, The Races of Mankind (New York: Public Affairs Committee, Inc., 1943), p. 3.

uous phrase: "having determined allotted periods and boundaries of their habitation," which is capable of being interpreted to uphold the stratification of society, or at least restriction of the free movements of people, geographically or socially. This appears to be on a different level of ethical demand from that of the parable of the Good Samaritan. For instance, Foakes-Jackson writes: "As a creation of God, man has a common origin, yet national divisions have been of old God's ordinance. This is the Hebrew idea (see Deut. xxxiii) of the seventy nations of the world."¹ Calvin, as is to be expected, interprets this to mean foreordination of every status of life. He writes:

He [Paul] doth testify that He had determined, before men were created, what their condition and estate should be. . . . God doth testify in this place by the mouth of Paul, that it was appointed before in His counsel how long He would have the state of every people to continue, and within what bounds He would have them contained. . . .

. . . . Now, we see, as in a camp, every troop and band hath his appointed place, so men are placed upon earth, that every people may be content with their bounds, and that among these people every particular person may have his mansion.²

Paul, on the other hand, asserts: "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus."³ But the very fact that Paul had to assert the essential

¹F. J. Foakes-Jackson, The Acts of the Apostles, Vol. 5 of The Moffatt New Testament Commentary (op. cit., 1931), p. 166.

²John Calvin, Commentary upon the Acts of the Apostles, ed. by Henry Beveridge (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1859), vol. 2, p. 142.

³Galatians 3:28; see also Colossians 3:11, I Corinthians 12:13.

equality of all men is an indication of the existence of inequality of status in the minds of the persons whom he is addressing. If the differences were a matter of indifference, the declaration would not have been made, at least with such emphasis. It is precisely because such stratification and discrimination existed within the communion, "the discord in the body" of Christ, to an extent that threatened the very life of koinonia, that the Apostle had to protest. The protest was not so much against inequality of origin, or gift, or even status, but against making these the sources of division, discord and disharmony. In Moffatt's translation, the passage reads: "There is no room for Jew or Greek, there is no room for slave or freeman, there is no room for male or female."

This same Paul, who insisted on the overcoming of discrimination within the Christian community based upon ethnic, status, and sex differences, was the one who cried out from the depths of his spirit: "For I could wish that I myself were accursed and cut off from Christ for the sake of my brethren, my kinsmen by race."¹ This is intense loyalty to the ethnic group to which he belonged. It is a high type of altruistic and religious racialism, but it is a form of racialism nonetheless.

Thus, even within the New Testament itself, we find ample evidence of conflict and tension between the absolute ethic of love and the task of establishing relative justice

¹Romans 9:3.

in the realm of ethnic relations. Mutuality and harmonious cooperation are the ideal; diversity, stratification, and tension are the actuality.

The Early Church and Intergroup Relations

Even in the earliest communities of Christians (before Paul), there were murmurings arising out of the difference of cultural background: "Now in these days the Hellenists murmured against the Hebrews because their widows were neglected in the daily distribution."¹ Both groups belonged to the same biological heritage, they were bound together in the most intense emotions of new converts to a new religion. Though the cleavage was within the same race, nation and religion, and depended solely upon the non-biological factors of geography, language and culture, this cleavage was similar enough to the ethnological division which includes both the biological and cultural factors that the situation can be included in the category of ethnic differences.

The decisions of the Apostles were, interestingly enough, based upon relative and prudential considerations rather than upon the ethic of absolute equality and love. It was both wise and fair that the members selected from among the subordinate group, the Hellenistic Jews, be given the task of distribution, which was the occasion of complaint for discrimination. There could be no cause for further

¹Acts 6:1.

murmurings due to group prejudice. The dominant group, with decisive power in them, did not need to fear mistreatment at the hand of the subordinate group.

The seven men thus chosen were selected on the basis, not of business and administrative ability, but because they were "men of good repute, full of the Spirit and wisdom."¹ They were placed in a position definitely inferior to the Apostles. They were so placed not necessarily because of the differences of ability, or manifestation of faith, but almost entirely on account of their geographical origin, cultural differences, and lack of seniority. Surely Stephen and Philip possessed superior ability to some of the Apostles. However, that this was not the fixed and rigid arrangement can be seen from the fact that an outsider and a late comer into the movement, Paul, came to assume the position of high esteem in the churches of the centuries that followed. Even in this connection, we note that this transfer of preeminence from the Palestinian Jews to the Hellenistic Jews, then to the Gentiles, followed the parallel transition of the membership of the Church. In other words, it was not so much the transcendence of ethnic barriers as it was the shift of dominance from one group to another.

From this very brief review of just one instance, we can note that the earliest Christian community was not completely free from intergroup tensions. In spite of the

¹Acts 6:3.

enthusiasm of the new converts, the imminent expectation of the Parousia, and the spirit of love that was dominant in the mores of the society, it had not united the group into a sense of brotherhood that overcame very insignificant differences of culture. It is noteworthy also that the approach of the Apostles to the problems that arose was not that of solving them by the application of the standard of ethic of the second mile and of patient suffering, even as Luther advised, nor an admonition not to be anxious, nor yet the application of the parable of the Good Samaritan. Rather, tensions were reduced, complaints adjusted on the basis of fairness and practical justice, taking into consideration the relative needs and relative power and status of the groups involved. The poor widows belonging to the Hellenistic group needed more protection because they were in a far weaker position. This is the kind of fair and practicable solution in which the earthly justice of this world--even of the purest Christian community--consists. In many ways, the solution arrived at was more equitable, if not based on absolute equality, than any of the several attempts that might have been made to apply the love ethic.

Luther might have admonished the Hellenistic widows to accept the conditions as is and to suffer and submit without murmuring. Sectarians might have insisted upon absolute equality, of leadership as well as of property. Some might have quoted Jesus' saying, "Be not anxious." Others might have remembered his words: "Whoever would be first among

you must be your slave," and demanded that Peter actually distribute goods. Still others might have called their attention to the return of the Lord and told them to forget injustices. Some might have insisted on equal representation for distribution, seven Hellenists, seven Hebrews, with the chairman chosen by the fourteen from outside the committee. Some might have quoted the parable of the Good Samaritan and demanded that the widows, particularly of the Hellenistic minority, be given priority in all distributions. In all probability, none of these attempts to apply the more absolute ethic of Jesus to the problem would have been as fair and just as the prudential one decided upon by the Apostles. Of course, it is entirely possible that a more just arrangement may have been made. But it is likely to have been made if they considered the various factors involved and weighed them in all fairness to each group, remembering always all these absolute ethical demands of Jesus.

The foregoing statement is not meant to convey the impression that the disciples desired to dominate the church, nor that they acted completely without regard to some ethical principles. It is asserted only that the disciples apparently did not intend to apply the absolute ethical principles to the letter. It is entirely possible that the implied ethical principles employed on this occasion were the total and common good of the community and the actual fitness of each individual and group to the tasks of the

community. That "fitness" in case of the apostles was their possession of the gospel at first hand and therefore their ability to teach authoritatively. In case of those chosen to distribute, their "fitness" consisted in their being from the minority group involved. Not an absolute ethical principle, but rather some intermediate axioms of conduct based upon fairness and justice were depended upon to settle a controversy of intergroup nature arising very early in the life of the Christian community.

We have seen that intergroup tensions of the sort that we are concerned with in this study were already present even in the earliest community of Christians. The controversy between St. Paul and the Judaizers, which occupies such an important place in the New Testament, may be viewed from this perspective. This discrepancy between the love commandments of Jesus and the exigencies of the social situation in which stratification has always existed has, from the very beginning, harrassed the Christian community. It has never been eliminated from the life of the church as a whole.¹ Moreover, the people and groups which have felt most certain as to the identity of their motives and actions with the absolute demands of the love ethic have been the very groups that have perpetrated in the name of the love ethic some of the most barbarous and cruel acts known in the history of mankind.

¹For a further discussion of intergroup tensions within the church, see pp. 366 ff., infra.

CHAPTER III

SYSTEMATIC: THEOLOGY FOR A DYNAMIC CHRISTIAN ETHICS

Creation, Corruption and Redemption in Race Relations

St. Paul's views of creation, the Reformation conception of "Divine Orders," and the modern neo-Orthodoxy's reinterpretations of these have contributed both to the general confusion concerning the question of race and racism, and to the clarification of that confusion. We have noted that Calvin interprets Paul's statement concerning the determination of "boundaries of habitation" in terms of the ranks and positions of troops. Needless to add that this is also the tendency of Lutheran thought.

The Oxford Conference takes a similar view: "The Christian sees distinctions of race as part of God's purpose to enrich mankind with a diversity of gifts."¹ This statement reflects a confusion concerning the biological and cultural heritage. It has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that culture is not transmitted biologically. Montagu states:

Culture--and by culture I understand social behavior and all its products--is something that one

¹J. H. Oldham, The Oxford Conference (Official Report) (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1937, p. 45.

acquires by experience, unlike one's physical appearance, which one acquires through the action, for the most part, of inherited genes; and the culture of individuals, as of groups, will differ according to the kinds of experience which they have undergone. The culture of different peoples, as of different individuals, is to a very large extent a reflection of their past history or experience.¹

If there be any enrichment of mankind with a diversity of gifts, it would come through cultural heritage, not because there are distinctions of races. The report of Section I of the Oxford Conference states: "The existence of black races, white races, yellow races, is to be accepted gladly and reverently as full of possibilities under God's purpose for the enrichment of human life."² The fact is that the existence of different races has very little to do with the enrichment of human life. Diversity and enrichment can be had without regard to race; for race, as used in the Oxford report, and used correctly, refers only to biological heritage. As a biological fact, the existence of different races should perhaps be regarded as "orders," at least for the present moment, and in any case be accepted gladly and reverently as being within God's purpose of creation (for instance, it is possible the black races may be more adapted to sunnier climates). But this does not necessitate the acceptance of inequality

¹Montagu, op. cit., p. 144; see also Benedict, op. cit., pp. 181-186; Allison Davis, "Some Basic Concepts in the Education of Ethnic and Lower-Class Groups," Hilda Taba and William Van Til, eds., Democratic Human Relations, Sixteenth Yearbook of the National Council for the Social Studies (1945), pp. 263-265.

²Oldham, op. cit., p. 60.

of cultural development, least of all, inequality of status, as "orders" in the purpose of Creation. At this point, Brunner's incisive delineation of the problem (of creation and corruption) is most helpful, particularly because he stands within the framework of "orders." He distinguishes between Divine Creation and the sin of man which corrupts Creation.

Nothing real exists in this world which is not willed by God; but there is also nothing in this world which God does not also not will. He wills it in so far as it is His creation; He does not will it in so far as in it the form of creation has been distorted and spoilt by sin.¹

Augustine also discusses the relationship between creation and sin which corrupts creation:

No doubt the two are generated simultaneously--both nature and nature's corruption; one of which is good, the other evil. The one comes to us from the bounty of the Creator, the other is contracted from the condemnation of our origin; the one has its cause in the goodwill of the Supreme God, the other in the depraved will of the first man; the one exhibits God as the maker of the creature, the other exhibits God as the punisher of disobedience: in short, the very same Christ was the maker of man for the creation of the one, and was made man for the healing of the other.²

From this viewpoint, it is not impossible to regard the existence of race "distinctions" as a feature of creation, at least provisionally. However, even this is very

¹Emil Brunner, The Divine Imperative, A Study of Christian Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1942), p. 126; see also pp. 336-339 for fuller discussion.

²Saint Augustin, "Anti-Pelagian Writings," Volume V of Philip Schaff, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (New York: The Christian Literature Company, 1887), p. 251.

doubtful in view of the finding that races are not distinct, that their differences are external, and that these differences are gradations in a continuum.¹ Moreover, the "races" are constantly changing.²

Cultural differences also can be regarded as orders of creation. Racism, on the other hand, must be condemned as belonging to the realm of sin, which corrupts the order of creation. Of this, the Oxford Conference was sure: "Against racial pride or race antagonism the church must set its face implacably as rebellion against God."³ There is no room for any differentiation between the races as to their intrinsic value. All share alike in the concern of God.⁴ It is the ambiguous nature of the human situation that orders of creation (races) and the sins which corrupt creation (racism) are so intricately intertwined that it is well-nigh impossible to separate them. But to be able to recognize that the situation is mixed and that the different elements need to be seen in their right perspective is extremely helpful. This is a field in which theology and

¹See. P. 5, supra. Cf. Clyde Kluckhohn, "The Myth of Race," op. cit., pp. 16-17; also Benedict, op. cit., pp. 22 ff; also Edmund Davison Soper, Racism, a World Issue (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1947), pp. 16 ff.

²Ashley Montagu defines ethnic group tentatively as follows: "An ethnic group represents part of a species population in process of undergoing genetic differentiation; it is a group of individuals capable of hybridizing and integrating with other such ethnic groups to produce further genetic recombination and differentiation." Ashley Montagu, op. cit., p. 44.

³Oldham, op. cit., p. 46.

⁴Ibid., p. 60.

Christian ethics on the one hand and anthropology, psychology, history, economics, and sociology on the other, are dynamically related and are able to work together toward the solution of the problems of racism. As Karl Mannheim suggests, "it is . . . necessary for Christian thinkers more intimately to blend theological thought with sociological knowledge."¹

The redemptive power of the Grace of God is needed both to free creation from sin and to restore it toward the likeness of its original purity, and to regenerate it to a new, higher, dynamic righteousness, born out of conflict and tension.

In order to understand the nature of the corruption of God's creation, an understanding of man's existential situation and his sinfulness toward God is necessary. A theological position which may be designated as theological existentialism has gained ascendancy since the days following the war, which has come to be called the First World War. This theology offers some very helpful guides towards our understanding of man.

The Existential View of the Sinfulness of Man
As a Clue to the Understanding of
Social Interrelationships

The tensions, conflicts, and hostilities of inter-group relations can hardly be understood without some understanding of man. It is central to the existential view of

¹Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1944), p. 125.

man which has come to assume a position of prominence in Protestant theological thought in recent years to point out that man is a sinner.

A number of factors contributed to the rise (or revival) of the conception of man as sinner. The two world wars within a generation, with all their brutality and terror, impressed upon modern man the depth to which man can sink. The persistence of tensions and conflicts within and between nations attest the seriousness of the ills which progress or evolution do not seem to overcome. The dark outlook of the future with the power and potentiality for destruction held by men who give no evidence of being equal to the task before them; the realization that advances in science and education do not necessarily mean unmixed good but that they may spell the annihilation of mankind; the findings of sociology concerning the nature of social relations which are based on struggle and survival; the findings of depth psychology that the subconscious and unconscious control so much of our lives--all these contributed in a measure to the rethinking of man as sinner in the sight of God.

Existentialist Theology

The existential approach is, in its most basic attitudes, the "life-situation approach." It is the study of man as he actually exists in this time and space relationship, in relationship with his fellow men, and in relationship with the ultimate Person. Ralph Harper contrasts exis-

tentialism with classical Greek philosophy, which "has a theory of man; [but] it has no theory of the person."¹ "It [existentialism] can trace its lines back to the urgent tones of Biblical Christianity and Judaism, its philosophical analysis to Saint Augustine."² Christianity based upon the faith that God was revealed in a person, gave "man an excuse to hold himself dear."³ Christianity has insisted upon the eternal significance of each person. Charles Duell Kean speaks of Existence as the third level of man's experience in relation to two other levels: of history and the intellect. "The problem of Existence is that level of experience in which man comes to grips with the problem of his own meaningfulness, as he is, where he is."⁴ "Soren Kierkegaard (who died in 1855) was the father of contemporary existentialism."⁵ Heidegger, Kafka, Unamuno, Jaspers, Berdyaev, Barth, Rousselot, Sartre, and a host of others followed.

Existentialist View of Human Sinfulness

We have discussed briefly in a previous chapter the existentialist view of faith and reason.⁶ Here, we shall

¹Ralph Harper, Existentialism (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1948), p. 4.

²Ibid., p. vii.

³Ibid., p. 9.

⁴Charles Duell Kean, The Meaning of Existence (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 89.

⁵Harper, op. cit., p. 44; see pp. 44-47, supra, for Kierkegaard's view of faith and reason.

⁶See pp. 36-49, supra.

briefly summarize the existentialist view of human sinfulness, especially those held by Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and Emil Brunner.¹ Various expressions of human sinfulness with illustrations from race caste relations will be discussed in some detail later.²

The existence of man, that is, his being in space and time and in the context of experience, is characterized by his sinfulness. This is so much so that the word, existence, at least as Paul Tillich uses it, has become a value-loaded term descriptive of the human existence "as is," which it "ought not to be." For Tillich existence signifies, first, being as distinguished from not being; second, being in time and space, as distinguished from essential being; and third, the antagonism between existence and essence. The fact of this antagonism is the question implied in existence.³ To Tillich, "original sin" is the theological counterpart of the philosophical concept of existence as a universal

¹This is not to assert that these three theologians are existential theologians. The purpose of this section is to point to some of the views of human sinfulness held by these theologians which may legitimately be labeled "existentialist."

²See pp. 344 ff., infra.

³From my notes in Systematic Theology 53, Paul Tillich, "Existence and the Christ," First Part: "Man and Existence," Oct. 3, 1939, p. 4 and Oct. 10, p. 1. (Hereafter will be designated Tillich, S. T. 53 or 54.)

reality.¹

In this more technical and value-loaded meaning, the word "existence" is used in contrast to the word "essence" and has a force of negative evaluation of man's being in time and space. It implies man's self-contradiction and divided personality, his feeling of anxiety, fear, melancholy, and guilt.

The essential nature of man is man's original goodness. This is the state of innocence before contrasting elements of human nature are disturbed by his action.² The moment man acts, that is, when the potential vital impetus of his spirit is actualized, transition (the Fall) from essence to existence occurs. To Tillich this is the original fact of history--"the basis of all factuality, the fact in which all facts are rooted." This transition (the Fall) is the "universal and original fact in which all beings participate." Being the basis of all factuality, this cannot be explained. Rather, it must be told as a myth, which is the symbolic form of describing reality in which events in time and space stand for reality beyond time and space. However, this myth must be interpreted in rational,

¹Ibid., First Part, I, 5. "Existence as the Universal Reality (So-called 'Original Sin')", N v. 21, 1939, p. 1. However, Tillich says he does not like to use the term "original sin."

²Ibid., First Part, I, 2, "The Qualities of Man's Essential Nature," propositions 1, 2, and 3. Oct. 24, 1939, pp. 5-6.

especially anthropological, terms.¹

Tillich emphasizes that this transition from essence to existence is participated in by all men at every moment of time, as well as by totality of time.² This is shared by all other beings as if by fate, but man feels his responsibility for his existential situation.³ This is also Niebuhr's emphasis: that sinfulness is inevitable, but man is nevertheless accountable.⁴ Brunner likewise takes cognizance of the "fact of the fatal cleavage in human nature and the fact of full responsibility." Noting the evident impossibility of our visualizing this situation, he writes:

The Biblical revelation, however, shows us both in one, since it tells us that we are sinners, that means human beings who not only sin now and then, occasionally--that is, every time we do not do the good--but whose very being is defined as sin; but this also means human beings who are fully responsible for all the evil they do, and for the evil in their nature as well.⁵

In the footnote to the foregoing passage Brunner stresses the necessity of speaking of sins first of all as act and not to consider it only in terms of state of being,

¹Ibid., First Part: I, 4, prop. 2, 3, 4, Nov. 14, 1939, p. 9; First Part: I, 5, Nov. 21, 1939, p. 1.

²Tillich, S.T. 54, op. cit., Fifth Part, Third Section, A, III, 3, April 9, 1940, p. 3.

³Tillich, S.T. 53, op. cit., First Part, I, 5, Prop. 2, "The Original Sin as fate and guilt." Nov. 21, 1939, p. 2.

⁴Reinhold Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man (New York: Scribner, 1941), I, 255-264; also see pp. 94-95, infra.

⁵Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt, trans. Olive Wyon (London: Lutterworth Press, 1939), p. 116.

being, and cautions against the replacement of the personal knowledge of sin by an impersonal metaphysic of sin.¹ Tillich likewise emphasizes that existence is both fact and act; it is fate and guilt at the same time.² Our existence is a fact, universal and original, yet every act in man's freedom is his own decision to which man is accountable. Each act comes out of the existential situation of contradiction into which he is placed, but at the same time, man confirms his existential situation by each act. Every act is the result of both the given fact of existence and the decision in freedom. The totality of man's character, the character of his existence, participates in each decision and in each act.

Niebuhr emphasizes that man's sinfulness is occasioned, not caused, by the contradiction of finiteness and freedom, not by finiteness or creatureliness.³ He points out that the consistent naturalists actually deny the reality of a responsible self when they reduce human behavior to the dimension of "facts of nature." On the other hand, others forget the weakness of man and exaggerate his dignity and evade the fact of his guilt. They do not recognize that human power and freedom contain destructive, as well

¹Loc. cit., n. 2.

²Tillich, S.T. 53, op. cit., First Part: I, 5, prop. 4, "Original and Actual Sin." Nov. 21, 1939, p. 4.

³Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit., p. 178.

as well as creative, possibilities. They deny with particular vehemence "the responsibility of the self in the center and quintessence of its will and personality for the destructive side of human freedom."¹ The mystery of original sin is "that the recalcitrance of the human heart should not be simply the lag of nature but a corruption of freedom and should not be overcome by increasing freedom."²

This freedom of man is not unconditioned or absolute freedom. As Brunner puts it, "the freedom from which, in which and for which man has been created is Freedom-in-responsibility, freedom-in-and-for-love."³ Man's freedom is complete only when he remains in dependence upon God, "because the being of man is actually based upon man's dependence upon God, upon the Call of God which chooses him and gives him responsibility."⁴

Tillich notes that the antagonism between man's essential nature and his existential situation is possible because man is free. This freedom is part of his essential structure. This freedom implies his infinity, yet man is finite because he is also part of his world.⁵ According to Tillich: Destiny and freedom are polar concepts of life;

¹Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 100.


²Ibid., p. 101.

³Brunner, Man in Revolt, op. cit., p. 262.

⁴Ibid., p. 263.

⁵Tillich, S.T. 53, op. cit., First Part, I, 1, Oct. 10-17, 1939.

necessity and accident are mechanical concepts and represent two outermost limits. Destiny is possible because man is free; likewise, freedom presupposes destiny. This relationship may be shown as follows:¹



"Original Sin," "Original Righteousness," and
the Redemptive Power of God

In the discussion of the inevitability of man's existential situation and his accountability, we note that there is a basic, and possibly irreconcilable, difference between this and the position that holds that sinfulness is to be associated with intent and with an act of defiance or hostility to God. In a Note "On Exaggeration in Language Concerning Sin," Tennant writes:

As we have already seen, mere unavoidable imperfection has sometimes been confounded with evil which can only be called "moral" in the sense that it bears the mark of inconsistency with the objective requirements of the moral standard, without reference to the inward aspects of enlightenment and intention which we have found to be characteristic of the strictly "moral." This so-called moral evil has, next, been identified with sin. And lastly, sin in general has far too frequently been regarded as deliberate enmity towards God. Theories of evil which would do away with degrees of sinfulness or guilt have been propounded--Kant's is an example--the logical outcome of which would be that man is filled with an insatiable and diabolical lust for whatever is morally loathsome to God.²

¹Ibid., Nov. 14, 1939, p. 2.

²F. R. Tennant, The Concept of Sin (Cambridge: Univ. Press, 1912), p. 273.

Tillich meets some of the objections of Tennant. He refuses to use the category of "strictly 'moral'" evil. He hesitates to use the term "Original Sin." On the other hand, he, more than anyone else, seems to make existence and sinfulness synonymous--man, in the fact of existence, actualizes the contradiction between what he is in essence and what is contradictory to that essence, namely existence. Tillich proceeds from this tautological definition of man's existence (man exists; therefore man exists in an existential situation) to the description of man's existence in terms of the orthodox Christian conception of man's sinfulness. In Tennant's language, Tillich implies in this, "defiance or hostility to God."

Niebuhr attempts to overcome this difficulty by insisting that sinfulness is inevitable but not necessary:

The fact of responsibility is attested by the feeling of remorse or repentance which follows the sinful action. From an exterior view not only sin in general but any particular sin may seem to be the necessary consequence of previous temptations. A simple determinism is thus a natural characteristic of all social interpretations of human actions. But the interior view does not accept the simple determinism of the exterior view. Its contemplation of its act involves both the discovery and the reassertion of its freedom. It discovers that some degree of conscious dishonesty accompanied the act, which means that the self was not deterministically and blindly involved in it. Its discovery of that fact in contemplation is a further degree of the assertion of freedom than is possible in the moment of action.¹

Niebuhr also endeavors to establish the importance of the

¹Niebuhr, *Nature and Destiny of Man*, op. cit., I, 255; also see pp. 251-254, pp. 255-256; in fact, the entire Chapter IX, pp. 241 ff.

degrees of relative goodness and justice, of the differences of guilt (in contrast to the equality of sin.)¹ We have noted that Tillich asserts that the transition from essence to existence occurs because man is free.

Whatever the safeguards or qualifications, the difference between the position of Augustine, Brunner, Tillich, and Niebuhr on the one hand, and that of Tennant and those who oppose the inevitability of sinfulness, on the other, is quite clear. Perhaps there is an unbridgeable chasm between the two, although this writer cannot help but feel that the truth seems to escape the insistence of one or the other of these two positions. The writer's view may be summarized as follows: Self, in existing, exists in freedom and in contradistinction to other selves, including God. Tensions and conflicts between selves are actually unavoidable, although not necessarily so, ideally or essentially. Self creatively reaches out to include others. In doing so it is both altruistic and selfish. In both, it is inevitably self-centered. Thus, even the most altruistic extension of self is in a measure egocentric.² In race-caste relations, this is very clearly demonstrated in the attitude and acts of paternalism toward persons belonging to a subordinate caste. There is an element of genuine concern for the latter's well-being, but it

¹See pp. 346-348, infra.

²For fuller discussion of self, see pp. 301-308, infra.

is always mixed with the feeling of condescension. The caste system is not forgotten or overcome (otherwise, it would no longer be paternalism). The Southern "I love my 'niggers'" attitude--and its concomitant, "I know my 'niggers' and love them better than you damyankees"--is the classic attitude of this paternalism. It is tragic because the conscious intentions of the Southerner are so sincere and so close to altruism, and the Northerner's criticism often hypocritical and unrealistic. Yet this is the very attitude that insists upon the freezing of the caste stratification to "keep the 'niggers' in their place." Paternalism hurts, at times, more than out-and-out discrimination. Because the other persons, and the caste structure itself, are included in the self as part of the self, any encroachment upon these persons or the system is defended with all the vehemence and self-righteousness of self-defense. Likewise the in-group solidarity and race pride of the lower groups may be more than mere reflex of caste, and contain elements of selfishness and sinful pride. Seen in this light, the existentialist view of human sinfulness loses some of its most objectionable features.

The concept of "original sin" and its opposite are often viewed in reference to their respective ethical fruits. In respect to the ethical fruits, both positions seem to produce two contradictory results. The existentialist or neo-Orthodox position may result in one of two tendencies: On the one hand, to lead to an easy conscience (much

against the advocates of this position) and complacency. After all, we are all sinful, we shall never be perfect. Therefore, let us be satisfied with the relative better. On the other hand, it may end in morbidity and a constantly uneasy conscience, and inability at times to choose between relative good and evil. The position of those who oppose them may lead to similar two positions: On the one hand, easy conscience and complacency. Man is responsible only for failure to perform what is possible; this or that ethic is impossible under the circumstances; therefore, I am not responsible or accountable for this or that act. On the other hand, morbidity and ethical impotency may result: I must obey the absolute commands of Jesus in every situation; I fail here and there; I must strive harder and harder. The one position absolutizes the relative ethical demands, the other finds the absolute authority for the absolute ethic in God, and tends to relativize ethical standards.

The argument of Augustine against Pelagians is illuminating for us at this point. To the assertion of Pelagians that "God would not command what He knows could not be done by man," Augustine answers: "Who can be ignorant of this?" Concerning the cry to God, "Let not the greediness of the belly nor lust of the flesh take hold on me!" [Eccles. 23:6] he writes:

Now, if we were to put this question to him personally he would very rightly answer us and say, From that prayer of mine, in which I offer this particular petition to God, you may understand in what sense I said, "If thou wilt, thou mayest keep the commandments."

For it is certain that we keep the commandments if we will; but because the will is prepared by the Lord, we must ask of Him for such a force of will as suffices to make us act by the willing. It is certain that it is we that will when we will, but it is He who makes us will what is good, of whom it is said (as he has just now expressed it), "the will is prepared by the Lord." (Prov. 8:35) Of the same Lord again it is said, "It is God who worketh in you, even to will!" (Phil. 2:13) It is certain that it is we that act when we act; but it is He who makes us act, by applying efficacious powers to our will, who has said, "I will make you to walk in my statutes, and to observe my judgments, and to do them." (Ezek. 36:27)¹

It is really not my will but God's will which makes it possible for my will to will a good act. It is the Grace of God which works within me to make ethical actions possible at all for me.

While pointing out that Agape is "no simple possibility in life," Niebuhr writes that it is nevertheless the "final law of human existence." "Consequently the highest forms of self-realization are those which are not intended or calculated but are the fruit of some movement of 'grace' which draws the self out of itself despite itself into the love of God and the neighbor."²

God, the Creator, has created the possibility of the good within us in giving us freedom and creativity and dynamic spiritual impulse. But when we exercise this freedom, we disrupt our essential harmony and act in contradiction to our "original righteousness." Yet the basis of our ethical action is never lost and is always with us as God's

¹Augustin, "On Grace and Free Will," Chapter 32, (XVI), Anti-Pelagian Writings, op. cit., p. 457.

²Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 175.

creatures possessing freedom. God as redeemer grants us the possibility of regenerative and ethical action, i.e., action in conformity to the will of God. The Grace of God works within us to will the good, exercising our own God-given freedom.

The Christian Ethic of Love as Law
and as Grace of God

A great deal of the difficulty concerning the discrepancy between the demand of perfect love and the demands of the social situation in which one is placed arises out of the fact that we, consciously or unconsciously, regard love as a law, albeit the highest. Brunner insists that Christian ethics cannot be defined in terms of laws and principles.¹ He opposes the legalistic interpretation of Christian ethics which attempts to apply general principles to specific situations. At the same time, he opposes the false antinomianism and fanaticism which deny the existence of any guide but the Holy Spirit. To Brunner, "the Good consists in always doing what God wills at any particular moment."² This will of God, we know "only through His revelation, in His own Word. Therefore His Command is also primarily a gift, and as such a demand."³ God's Word is two-fold: the Scripture and His Spirit. God is both the Creator and Redeemer. The will of God is "always the same

¹Brunner, Divine Imperative, op. cit., Chap. XI, pp. 111-121.

²Ibid., p. 83.

³Ibid., p. 114.

and yet it is different every time."¹ "The Good is simply what God wills that we should do, not that which we should do on the basis of a principle of love. God wills to do something quite definite and particular through us, here and now, something which no other person could do any other time."²

Karl Mannheim points out the necessity of an existentialist approach in Christian ethics, over against the rationalistic, or legalistic approach, when he writes:

The meaning of a norm becomes concrete only if one refers it to the context in which it works. Without the social frame of reference the norm remains empty. The contextualization of moral codes is, therefore, one of the outstanding tasks. . . . A rule may sound very Christian in the abstract; in the concrete it may produce opposite results.³

The conception of Christian ethics in existential, in contrast to rationalistic or legalistic, terms has a further advantage of making it possible for the theologian to use the findings of the social sciences. Mannheim is again very specific at this point.

Every rational formulation of a principle is misleading, as it tempts us to logical deduction, where intellectual consistency remains the only criterion of truth; whilst a concrete image in one stroke conveys to us overt behaviour, inner motivations, the image of concrete personalities and the concrete social context in which all that occurred. . . .

If this interpretation of Christian Truth be correct, . . . then two important sociological characteristics of a norm can be demonstrated on it. On

¹Ibid., p. 92.

²Ibid., p. 117.

³Mannheim, op. cit., p. 125.

the one hand, it leaves open great scope for adaptation, and on the other it prevents man from getting lost in the endless possibilities of changing his behaviour which ultimately are bound to lead to the disintegration of personality and society.¹

Augustine declares that what is demanded of us is not obedience to some human standard or law. Regarding the statement that Zacharias and Elisabeth were without sin in this life, he writes:

Now, so far as I can see, this statement was made in accordance with a certain standard of conduct, which is among men held to be worthy of approval and praise, Such a standard Zacharias and his wife Elisabeth are said to have maintained in the sight of God as they in their sincerity appeared to men, so were they known in the sight of God. The statement, however, was not made with any reference to that perfect state of righteousness in which we shall one day live truly and absolutely in a condition of spotless purity. The Apostle Paul, indeed has told us that he was "blameless, as touching the righteousness which is of the law;" [Phil. 3:6] This, however, the apostle counted as "dung" and "loss" in comparison with the righteousness which is the object of our hope and which we ought to "hunger and thirst after," [Matt. 5:6] in order that hereafter we may be satisfied with the version thereof, enjoying it now by faith, so long as "the just do live by faith."²

In the ecumenical movement of the present century we notice both the tendency to regard Christian ethics in terms of the application of general principles and the necessary correctives applied to it. The Message of the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work at Stockholm in 1925 declared: "We have accepted the urgent duty of applying His Gospel in all realms of human life--industrial,

¹Ibid., pp. 128-129.

²St. Augustin, op. cit., p. 235.

social, political, and international."¹ The Oxford Message emphasized, on the other hand, the first duty of the church "that it be in very deed the church--confessing the true faith, committed to the fulfillment of the will of Christ, its only Lord, and united in him in a fellowship of love and service."² This was the corrective needed to be applied to the more legalistic interpretation of the gospel. Amsterdam also sees the Good in terms of the will of God, as revealed in his word: .

But there is a word of God for our world. It is that the world is in the hands of the living God, whose will for it is wholly good; that in Christ Jesus, His incarnate Word, who lived and died and rose from the dead, God has broken the power of evil once and for all, and opened for everyone the gate into freedom and joy in the Holy Spirit; that the final judgment on all human history and on every human deed is the judgment of the merciful Christ; and that the end of history will be the triumph of His Kingdom, where alone we shall understand how much God has loved the world. This is God's unchanging word to the world.³

Niebuhr counsels the Christians to avoid the pitfalls of both the legalists and the relativists. The legalists must be refuted "whenever they make too sweeping claims for fixed standard of conduct." At the same time, the abyss of nihilism which lies at the edge of moral

¹Charles S. Macfarland, Christian Unity in Practice and Prophecy (New York: Macmillan, 1933), p. 350.

²Oldham, op. cit., p. 45.

³"Message, First Assembly of the World Council of Churches" World Council of Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design (New York: Harper, 1948) (at the end of the book, no page number.)

relativism must be avoided.¹ He points out: "In New Testament faith the same love (Agape) of Christ which symbolizes the suffering and forgiving love of God by which the sinful recalcitrance of the human heart is finally vanquished, is also the norm of goodness for those who seek to walk in newness of life."²

Agape is relevant to the structure of human existence because it is "both the fulfillment of the self's freedom and the contradiction of every actual self-realization insofar as every actual self-realization is partly an egoistic and therefore a premature closing of the self within itself." Agape is both "a perpetual source of judgment upon every other norm which may be used tentatively to describe the self's duties and obligations," and the refutation of "the lawlessness of those theories which imagine that the freedom of the self entitles it to have no law but its own will."³

The relevance of the Agape of Christ is even more problematic in relation to the structure of human society than to the structure of individual existence. The tendency toward ethical dualism is very strong in the main streams of Christian thought. Catholic ethics places Agape in the realm of counsels of perfection to be fulfilled by the ascetics. Lutheran ethics makes a sharp distinction between

¹Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 173.

²Ibid., p. 174.

³Ibid., p. 179.

the realm of grace and the realm of law. Martin Luther states:

There are two kingdoms, one the kingdom of God, the other the kingdom of the world. . . . God's kingdom is a kingdom of grace and mercy, not of wrath and punishment. In it there is only forgiveness, consideration for one another, love, service, the doing of good, peace, joy, etc. But the kingdom of the world is a kingdom of wrath and severity. In it there is only punishment, repression, judgment, and condemnation, for the suppressing of the wicked and the protection of the good. For this reason it has the sword, and a prince or lord is called in Scripture, God's wrath, or God's rod.

. . . . In the exercise of their office, worldly rulers cannot and ought not be merciful, though out of grace, they may give their office a holiday.¹

At the recent Assembly of the World Council of Churches, this tendency toward ethical dualism was quite noticeable. On the one extreme was Karl Barth who, outdoing Luther, declared: "The care of the church and the care of the world is not our care." More moderately, and more in line with Luther, Martin Niemoller said:

God has his own programmes and His own work. But we have to keep on undertaking new programmes for helping our brethren. . . . It is true, we cannot realize the right order of society because such a thing does not exist in this decaying world. Neither can we establish permanent peace and abolish war. . . . But it is still our duty to work for better social orders and conditions, and to work seriously for the abolition of war. For Christ's sake we have to bear witness that God is the God of justice and peace, that He does not want chaos and war.²

¹"An Open Letter Concerning the Hard Book against the Peasants," 1525, Works of Martin Luther (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman and Castle Press, 1931), IV, 265-266.

²Martin Niemoller, "The Christian Witness in the World," a mimeographed copy of the speech at the World Assembly of Churches, Amsterdam, 1948.

Niebuhr observes that the distinction that ethical dualism makes is provisionally justified, because the norm of love has more direct relevance to the more intimate relations of persons than to the rough methods by which a community preserves a tolerable harmony and justice. Mutual love and loyalty, which rise above rational calculations and power-politics, are the highest possibilities of social life. Sacrificial love prevents mutual love from degenerating into merely calculation of mutual advantages and finally to resentment over the inescapable lack of complete reciprocity in all actual relationships. Justice may "degenerate into mere order without justice if the pull of love is not upon it."¹

The Catholic moral theory "assumes that the requirements of natural law are absolute and inflexible, being contained in the reason which the creature has from God." But question must be raised whether such reason is untainted by the claims of the class, culture, nature, or hierarchy which defines the standard.² Marxism, while jeering at bourgeois moralism, elaborates new principles of justice in "which equality became the absolute rather than the guiding

¹Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 185.

²"One need only consider how every privileged class, nation, or group of history quickly turns privileges into rights, to be stubbornly defended against other claimants in the name of justice, to recognize the importance of this final scruple about our schemes of justice from the standpoint of Christian love." Ibid., p. 186.

principles of justice."¹

Niebuhr points out that "the most universal norms are significantly the most negative, such as the prohibition of theft and of murder." Their almost universal acceptance is due to the fact that they define our minimal obligations to the neighbor. But any definition of moral obligations which goes beyond the minimal terms are discovered to be "rational formulations of various implications of the love commandment, rather than fixed and precise principles of justice."²

Equality is the most frequent general principle of justice in the thought of the proponents of natural law. According to Niebuhr, "equality stands in a medial position between love and justice." Equal justice is both the law of love in rational form and something less than the law of love. He points out that "equality is a guiding, but not an absolute, standard of justice." "An adequate social theory must do justice to both the spirit of equality and to the necessities of functional inequality."³

As we move away from the "primary principle of justice" to more detailed conclusions, "judgments become more hazardous, and conclusions should be regarded as the fruit of social wisdom rather than pure logic." Niebuhr cites the example of the doctrine of property held by Catholic and

¹Ibid., p. 187.

²Ibid., p. 189.

³Ibid., pp. 189-190.

Protestant social theories. They both tend to make "the right of property much too absolute."¹

Niebuhr points out that "there are fewer specific principles of justice with 'eternal' validity than is assumed in almost all theories of natural law." He observes that "rules of justice do not follow in a 'necessary manner' from some basic propositions of justice." They contain contingent elements. The rules of justice

are the products of social wisdom and unwisdom. Reason itself is not the source of law, since it is not possible to prove the self's obligation to the neighbor by any rational analysis which does not assume the proposition it intends to prove. Yet reason works helpfully to define the obligation of love in the complexities of various types of human relations.

Here Agape again is the negation as well as the fulfillment of all schemes and structures of justice.² Niebuhr asserts that it is not possible to dispense with subordinate laws of justice, "but it is important to recognize the historically contingent elements in every formulation of the principles of justice."³

In the discussion of various aspects of race and caste relations it is necessary to remember that "rules of

¹Ibid., p. 191. Clement of Alexandria, on the other hand, makes the right of property less rigid and absolute. He emphasizes the psychological and spiritual effects of the riches. He writes: "Things external hurt not." He points out the equal sinfulness of the greed of the destitute and the greed of the rich. He declares that riches are not to be thrown away, but are to be used for the welfare of men. Titus F. Clement, "Who is the Rich man That Shall Be Saved," Ante-Nicene Fathers, II, 595, par. XIV-XVI.

²Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 193.

³Ibid., p. 195.

justice" in these relationships are precisely of this nature. We must remind ourselves that even the most general principles--e.g. political, economic, and social equality of the races, and democratic race relations--contain some elements of contingency and that when applied to specific situations a great deal depends upon "social wisdom and un-wisdom." Moreover, even the best intentions are always tainted with the perspective and bias of the persons involved. And above all, we must remind ourselves that every principle and every decision must always be tempered with the redemptive love of Christ. Without Agape, the most rational, the best intentioned, and the wisest dynamic assessment and application of general ethical principles will tend to degenerate either into hard moralism or ideological rationalization. On the other hand, unless utmost wisdom and rational thinking are applied, love, too, can fall into the opposite error of soft sentimentality or immoral inaction and acquiescence to an evil social pattern.

The Christian's conformity to the love ethic is not to be conceived solely in terms of human initiative and action. Augustine declares concerning the relation of the love ethic to the law of free will and grace: "When it is said, 'Let us love one another,' it is law; when it is said, 'For love is of God,' it is grace." He explains:

But forasmuch as these precepts are given in the law, both old and new from what source is there in men the love of God and of one's neighbour but from God Himself? For indeed, if it be not of God but of men, the Pelagians have gained the victory; but if it come

from God, then we have vanquished the Pelagians. Let, then, the Apostle John sit in judgment between us; and let him say to us, "Beloved, let us love one another." (I John 4:7) Now, when they begin to extol themselves on these words of John, and to ask why this precept is addressed to us at all if we have not of our own selves to love one another, the same apostle proceeds at once, to their confusion, to add, "For Love is of God. It is not of ourselves, therefore, but it is of God. Wherefore, then, is it said, "Let us love one another, for love is of God," unless it be as a precept to our free will, admonishing it to seek the gift of God? Now, this would be indeed a thoroughly fruitless admonition if the will did not previously receive some donation of love, which might seek to be enlarged so as to fulfill whatever command was laid upon it.¹

The Christian ethic of love cannot be reduced to universal or timeless principles that can be anticipated and made to apply to every situation. A Christian makes the maximum use of the general principles of justice, but his application to specific situations partakes the nature of ad hoc decisions. He makes a dynamic assessment of the forces confronting him, the ethical issues involved, and the imperative of the loving will of God for the particular person and for the particular situation.

In the realm of Christian social action, Tillich's conceptions of universal and special Kairos are helpful to us as guides to our thinking and to the making of decisions. Tillich contrasts the "thinking in the Kairos" with the "thinking in the timeless Logos," which "is an immense abstraction which cannot do justice to the passing fate and decision of immediate existence." In the "dynamic thinking in terms of creation" (thinking in the Kairos), time is all-

¹Augustin, op. cit., p. 459.

decisive, whereas in the static type of thinking (in the Logos), time remains insignificant. In this dynamic thinking, time is not the mere duration but rather "qualitatively fulfilled time, the moment that is creation and fate." Tillich calls this fulfilled moment "the moment of time approaching us as fate and decision, Kairos." This Greek word attained the "deeper meaning of fullness of time, of decisive time, only in the thinking of early Christianity and its historical consciousness."¹ "The Kairos is the creative actualization of the Logos; the Logos is the eternal criterion of the Kairos."²

To the Christian, the Christ appeared in the "fulness of time." Jesus preached, "The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand." (Mark 1:15) Paul testified, "When the time had fully come, God sent forth His Son, born of woman, born under the law, to redeem those who were under the law, so that we might receive adoption as sons."³ (Galatians 4:4-5)

According to Tillich, the reign of Christ among

¹Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, Trans. N. A. Rasetzki and Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Scribner, 1936), pp. 128-129.

²Tillich, S.T. 54, op. cit., Fifth Part: "History and the Kingdom of God," Third Section: "The Kingdom of God in and above History," A. "The Kingdom of God and the New Being (Christ) in History," III, Prop. 6, April 9, 1940.

³Unfortunately for this discussion, Paul uses the word, Chronos instead of the word kairos, which is used in Mark 1:15. But the meaning for the Christian is clear. Tillich's point is still pertinent, whether Paul uses these words in the sense Tillich does or not.

the elect is the historical symbol, and the ultimate victory of the Kingdom of God is the supra-historical symbol of the end of history.¹

Tillich makes a distinction between the universal and special Kairos. "The universal Kairos is the standard for every special Kairos." For every historical moment there is a special manifestation of the Kingdom of God, which is the special Kairos for that historical moment. The consciousness of this present special Kairos gives ultimate meaning to concrete historical actions without creating utopian illusions. For every period or moment of history, a special Kairos has a special demonic structure to overcome.² Tillich endeavors to overcome the ethical dualism of Lutheranism and the utopianism of socialism with this conception of the special Kairos. Concerning the use of the word "Kairos" Tillich explains:

The term is meant to express the fact that the struggle for a new social order cannot lead to a fulfillment such as is meant by the Kingdom of God, but that at a special time special tasks are demanded, and one special aspect of the Kingdom of God appears as a demand and expectation. The Kingdom of God will always remain as transcendent; but it appears as a judgment to a given form of society and as a norm to a coming one.³

For Tillich, religious Socialism is a special Kairos for

¹Tillich, S.T. 54, op. cit., Fifth Part, Third Section, A., II, 2, "The Symbols of the Beginning and End of History," April 9, 1940, pp. 1-2.

²Ibid., III, Prop. 7, p. 8. For the discussion of the demonic, see pp. 360-361, infra.

³Tillich, Interpretation of History, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

our day.¹

One of the clearest statements of this conception of special Kairos is found in the report of Section III of the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches:

In the light of that Kingdom, with its judgment and mercy, Christians are conscious of the sins which corrupt human communities and institutions in every age, but they are also assured of the final victory over all sin and death through Christ. It is He who has bidden us pray that God's Kingdom may come and that His will may be done on earth as it is in heaven; and our obedience to that command requires that we seek in every age to overcome the specific disorders which aggravate the perennial evil in human society, and thus we search out the means of securing their elimination or control.²

In the field of intergroup relations in the United States, it is our task to seek the special Kairos for our day and to work for its fulfillment, remembering always that it is not to be understood in utopian terms or identified with the Kingdom of God. Seen in this perspective, the color caste structure with all its attendant evils presents itself as a possible special demonic structure to be overcome in this historical period, at least in this particular field of human relationships.

It is the purpose of Part Two to find the historical roots and study the structure of caste in two different expressions of caste relations in the United States. In Part Three attempts will be made to relate the findings of Part Two to the discussion of theology and ethics in Part One.

¹Ibid., pp. 59-60. See Hans Ch. V. Hase, "Paul Tillich in Marburg," Union Seminary Quarterly Review, IV (November, 1948), 49.

²World Council of Churches, op. cit., III, 189.

PART TWO

COLOR CASTE

CHAPTER IV

HISTORICAL ROOTS OF COLOR CASTE

IN THE UNITED STATES

The Reasons for Choosing Two Particular Expressions of Caste

For the purpose of studying the roots and structure of caste stratification in the United States, the following two particular expressions of caste system will be studied in this Part: (1) the caste system involving the Negro, and (2) the caste or caste-like stratification in California, especially in rural communities. The reasons for choosing these two expressions of caste are not that they are typical or that when these two are considered we have exhausted all types of caste structure in the United States. These two areas are chosen as illustrations of the pattern and operation of caste. The aim of this Part of the paper is to study these two areas to see if there are any relationships that might warrant making some assertions concerning the operation of various factors, at least in these two instances.

The Negro-white caste relationship has been chosen particularly because of the amount of research already undertaken on this area of the problem and the amount of integrated and summarized materials available for study. No

original research will be attempted in this area. The study will be in the nature of making summaries and drawing implications from the results of studies already completed in this area of social relationships.

The caste-like stratification of California, with the emphasis upon rural society, has been chosen for a number of reasons: (1) the writer's vital interest and immediate concern in the subject; (2) the crucial importance of this particular society in the destiny of the nation and of international relations, owing to its strategic location and its rapid growth of population and influence; (3) the meagerness of materials concerning caste and caste-like stratification in California. Rural, rather than urban, social life has been taken as the primary object of study because it is more easily comprehensible and because the pattern of caste established in rural communities appears to continue to operate in more urban communities. Furthermore, some thoroughgoing economic and sociological researches have been completed relative to the agricultural situation in California and some results are now available for use in this study. However, only arbitrary lines can be drawn between rural and urban life, particularly in California. Moreover, rural and urban life interact with each other to such an extent that it is difficult to draw even the most arbitrary lines.

European Expansion and the Slave Trade

That the status of the Negro in American life constitutes a caste status is widely recognized.¹ It is also generally held that the caste structure involving Negro-white relationships is rooted in slavery, has been continued in the sharecropping system following the Emancipation, and has permeated the total life of the South, reaching out into the entire nation. It is the aim of this chapter to seek the historical roots of the caste system and to inquire how these have influenced the subsequent history of race relations in the United States. Our study will be in the form of summaries of primary and secondary sources, including those which are summaries themselves, rather than an original research. For the purpose of our study there is a wealth of materials which is available for the inquirer.

A convenient starting point for a brief sketch of the rise and development of race-caste in America is the economic expansion of Europe. Tawney, in an introductory section to *Continental Reformation*, gives a vivid picture of the economic expansion which after a century of patient and persistent preparation burst out into a flood of economic activities with its climax in the great Discoveries.²

¹ See the discussion of Caste, Introduction, pp. 6-8, supra.

² R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism vol. A23, Pelican Books (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Pelican Books Limited, 1926), pp. 73-76.

Lichtenberger summarizes the situation as follows:

The Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century through the opening of new trade routes to India and America, the development of world markets, and the increased output of silver from the German, Austrian and Mexican mints, made possible the productive use of capital which had heretofore been employed chiefly in military operations, and which resulted in its rapid increase. Great companies flourished and a new class of wealthy merchants arose to vie in luxury not only with the great landed proprietors but even with princes and kings.¹

As European people came into contact with the peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas, problems of race relations in the modern sense of the term arose. W. E. B. Du Bois points out that a doctrine of race arose "based really on economic gain but frantically rationalized in every possible direction."²

It was a curious twist of history that coupled this ebullient spirit of expansion and the new spirit of Enlight-

¹Lichtenberger, Development of Social Theory, p. 153, cited by W. E. B. Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now (New York: Holt, 1939), p. 127.

²Du Bois, Ibid., pp. 126-127; Gallagher writes also: "Before these two world events [Industrial Revolution and the Great Enlightenment] the dogma of white supremacy as we know it was not in existence." Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 78.

Likewise Johnson writes: "This is, incidentally, a good starting point in history because prior to the Industrial Revolution there was no race problem in the present-day sense and, consequently, no race relations." Johnson, "Race Relations and Social Change," op. cit., p. 273.

"The modern conception of 'race' is of fairly recent origin." M. F. Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, op. cit., p. 10.

"Racism is a creation of our time." Ruth Benedict, Race: Science and Politics, op. cit., p. 4.

enment with the most inhuman and brutal acts of the traffic in men (and women and children). Du Bois observes: "The new thing in the Renaissance was not simply freedom of spirit and body, but a new freedom to destroy freedom; freedom for eager merchants to exploit labor; freedom for white men to make black slaves."¹ Likewise Gallagher writes: "The Industrial Revolution and the Great Enlightenment are the parents whose union sired the notion of Caucasian superiority."² The causal relationship involving the Enlightenment, Commercial Expansion, Slave Trade, and the Industrial Revolution is an instance of dynamic interaction, rather than a single "key cause," in social process. The traffic in slaves gave impetus to the Industrial Revolution; "the cry for the freedom of man's spirit became a shriek for freedom in trade and profit."³ The Industrial Revolution, which came to flower three centuries following the Commercial Revolution, let loose the gigantic power of organized greed into the world. The Renaissance with its idea of individual freedom tempered by the Christian ideal of the worth of the common man was twisted so as to exclude the black men. The very loftiness of the ideal tended to cut it off from actual life, particularly as it concerned men of colored skin. In the vicious circle of greed, economic power, race dogma, idealism and brutality re-enforced each other until

¹Du Bois, op. cit., p. 126.

²Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 78.

³Du Bois, op. cit., p. 127.

the Christian conscience was dulled by the acceptance of the actual conditions that obtained. In this nexus of interrelated forces, as time went on, white men who were duped by false pride of "race" also became victims--wage slaves and tenant farmers--who were kept down by the same forces, in common misery with the black chattel slaves whom they despised.¹

Although the modern slave trade began with the Mohammedan conquests of Africa, the life of the slave in these countries was far different from what his lot became in the New World. Under Islam, the demand for slaves was a luxury demand. Slaves became soldiers and servants and supplied the harems. When converted to Islam, a slave became a brother. Some rose high in power and prestige. The introduction of Negro slaves into Europe was undertaken by the Spaniards in the fourteenth century, followed by the Portuguese. These slaves brought into Spain and Portugal in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were servants, and were in general treated kindly.²

¹Du Bois writes: "Fortunately, as Gobineau rationalized this subjection of men, Marx saw the virus of labor exploitation, of labor regarded and treated as goods, poisoning Europe. He saw the social revolution in ideas which traffic in labor force for power and personal enjoyment, brought; and he saw this becoming the object of that very industrial revolution to which black slavery gave birth. Freedom then became freedom to enslave all working classes and soon the emancipation of the new wage slaves, arising out of the hell of the Industrial Revolution, was hindered by chattel slavery and then men began dimly to see slavery as it really was. Ibid., pp. 128-129.

²Ibid., p. 132.

Soon after the voyages of Columbus, Indians were enslaved and put to work in Haiti. After the cruel oppression of Dovadillo and the tragic reduction of the native population from 1,000,000 to 60,000, Negro slaves were brought in to do the work.¹ By the beginning of the sixteenth century references to Negro slaves are widespread and common.² Traffic in Negro slaves destined to the West Indies and to the American continents became established and grew, "passing successively into the hands of the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French, and the English."³ By the eighteenth century, Negro slaves were being transported across the Atlantic at the rate of fifty to one hundred thousand a year.⁴ Charles S. Johnson writes: "In a sense not to be dismissed too lightly, America, including its islands, was settled chiefly from Africa and by Negroes. Before 1800 the number of Negroes brought here was more than twenty times that of all Europeans combined."⁵

Slavery and Color Caste

The first Negroes that landed in Virginia in 1619 were not slaves but indentured servants like many of the

¹Charles S. Johnson, The Negro in American Civilization (New York: Holt, 1930), pp. 3-4.

²Du Bois, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

³Ibid., p. 134.

⁴Loc. cit. Also, p. 142.

⁵Johnson, Negro in American Civilization, op. cit., p. 5.

fellow white colonists.¹ For many years they were so counted and so treated. It was some fifty years before the status of slavery was crystallized.² Even as late as 1723, free Negroes voted in Virginia. In North Carolina a former discrimination against Negro voters was laid aside by the Act of 1734 and was not re-enacted until over a hundred years later, and even those who had been voting were allowed to continue.³

Cotton and slavery represent the kind of dynamic interrelationship that we have been discussing throughout this paper. Slavery and the slave trade were flourishing before the increase of cotton acreage. An almost insatiable demand for cotton fibres to clothe cheaply millions of men and women all over the world was also ready and waiting.

¹James Curtis Ballagh, A History of Slavery in Virginia (Baltimore, 1902) cited by Everett V. Stonequist, "Race Mixture and the Mulatto," in Edgar T. Thompson, ed., Race Relations and the Race Problem (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1939), p. 251, and by Charles S. Johnson, "Race Relations and Social Change," in Ibid. p. 279. Also John H. Russell, The Free Negro in Virginia, 1719-1865 (Baltimore, 1913) cited by Stonequist, op. cit., p. 251; cf. Du Bois, op. cit. p. 197. However, Guy B. Johnson considers that "the importance of this fact [that the first Negroes were not slaves] has probably been overestimated." Guy B. Johnson, "Patterns of Race Conflict," Edgar T. Thompson, ed., op. cit., p. 125.

²Charles S. Johnson, "Race Relations and Social Change," op. cit., p. 280.

Guy B. Johnson writes, however, "The crystallization of lifetime slavery as a legal institution in early Virginia and Maryland was in a sense merely a confirmation of what has already become accepted social practice." Guy B. Johnson, op. cit., p. 126.

³W. E. G. Du Bois, Black Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935), pp. 6-7.

The Industrial Revolution in England and in the North, coupled with growing capitalism, was ready to turn these fibres into clothing. All these forces were brought together and reached a point of cumulative reinforcement when Eli Whitney invented the cotton gin in 1793.¹

From this time, the history of the South and the Negro took a new turn. Cotton culture spread into the fertile areas of the South and with it spread the plantation system and slavery. In 1791, exportation of raw cotton to England amounted to less than 200,000 pounds; in 1794, it was 1,600,000 pounds; and in 1837, over 444 million pounds. The price of slaves increased. Slavery became profitable. Cotton was king. The struggle between the small working farmers and the planters was soon settled. The independent farmers were driven back to the poor land, or to the west, where they were to be followed by plantations and slave labor. Soon occasional flares of abolitionist thought changed into a solid defense for slavery. Scholars provided arguments for the rationalization of slavery based upon the "inferiority" of the Negroes. Religious leaders called upon the Bible to defend the institution of slavery.²

Cotton production leaped from 650,000 bales in 1820 to 2,500,000 bales in 1850, and to four million bales in 1860. This development increased the economic rivalry be-

¹Johnson, The Negro in American Civilization, op. cit., p. 8.

²Ibid., pp. 8-9.

tween the cotton-raising South and the industrialized North.¹

In the meantime, the northern states had been emancipating the slaves following the conclusion of the Revolutionary War. It was a natural consequence both of the decline of profits in slavery and of the ideology of the war. Vermont emancipated the slaves in 1779; Massachusetts, in 1780; Pennsylvania, gradual beginning in 1780; New Hampshire, in 1783; Connecticut and Rhode Island, in 1784. The exclusion of slavery in the Northwest Territory took place in 1787, and gradual emancipation began in New York in 1799 and New Jersey in 1804.²

In the political struggle between the industrial North and the plantation South, the power of the South in the nation was effective because it was "a huge, compact, and self-conscious economic association bent upon political objects--the possession of the government of the United States, the protection of its interests against adverse legislation, dominion over the territories, and enforcement of the national fugitive slave law throughout the length and breadth of the land."³ The slaveholders dictated and prescribed the policy of the Democratic Party.⁴ And the

¹Du Bois, Black Folk, op. cit., p. 203.

²Ibid., p. 200.

³Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan, 1927), p. 7.

⁴Loc. cit.

Democratic Party controlled the national government.¹ The planter interests in the Democratic Party demanded greater and greater degree of dominance in the Democratic Party. The party convention of 1860 did not break up on the issue of slavery as such but on the demand of the planter interest for "absolute sovereignty." The Northern Democrats were willing to open the territories to slavery, but not to make it obligatory in the territories.²

The Republicans, sensing victory, were cautious. Still, they went on record in favor of "liberty for the territories, free homesteads for farmers, a protective tariff, and a Pacific Railway."³ Abraham Lincoln was nominated. "On the slavery question Lincoln's attitude was firm but conservative. He disliked slavery and frankly said so; yet he was not an abolitionist and he saw no way in which the institution could be uprooted."⁴ Lincoln was elected, although he obtained far less than a majority of votes.

The relationship between the North and the South grew worse between the election and the inauguration. Soon after the inauguration, the Second American Revolution was on, in which "the capitalists, laborers, and farmers of the

¹During the 32 years preceding the inauguration of Lincoln, "the Democrats controlled the Presidency and the Senate for twenty-four years, the Supreme Court for twenty-six years, and the House of Representatives for twenty-two years." Ibid., p. 20.

²Ibid., p. 30.

³Ibid., p. 32.

⁴Loc. cit.

North and West drove from power in the national government the planting aristocracy of the South."¹ It was a war "not to abolish but to limit slavery."² Frederick Douglass said in Boston in 1865, that the Civil War was begun "in the interests of slavery on both sides. The South was fighting to take slavery out of the Union, and the North fighting to keep it in the Union; the South fighting to get it beyond the limits of the United States Constitution, and the North fighting for the old guarantee;--both despising the Negro, both insulting the Negro."³

Although unintended, emancipation became a military necessity as the war progressed. As the Union Army marched into slave territory, fugitive slaves flocked to them. At first this was regarded as a temporary and exceptional matter. Soon it became a general phenomenon. General Butler in Virginia declared them "contraband of war," and used them as laborers. The Secretary of War approved his action. Fremont in Missouri freed the slaves of the enemy round about him. This was logical because the slaves were the chief provider of food and raw material for the enemy. Also they were among the chief assets of the enemy.⁴ President Lincoln

¹Ibid., p. 54.

²Du Bois, Black Folk, op. cit., p. 204.

³Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 61.

⁴Beards write concerning emancipation: "Its result was the complete destruction of about four billion dollars worth of 'goods' in the possession of slave owners without compensation." Beard, op. cit., p. 100.

promptly repudiated him.¹ The runaway Negroes became laborers and spies and farm workers for the Northern armies. "Without legal authority and in spite of it, suddenly the Negro became a soldier. Later his services as soldier were demanded. . . . But as a soldier, the Negro must be free."²

President Lincoln tried to hold the country and keep slavery, but could not. It became evident that "either the power which slaves put into the hands of the South was to be taken from it, or the North could not win the war. Either the Negro was to be allowed to fight, or the draft itself would not bring enough white men into the army to keep up the war." Moreover, the North needed the moral strength to keep the rest of the world from recognizing the South. In June, 1862, slavery was abolished in the territories. On January 1, 1863, slaves of all persons in rebellion were declared "henceforward and forever free."³ By the end of the Civil War, "one hundred and eighty-seven thousand Negroes enlisted in the Northern armies, of whom seventy thousand were killed and wounded."⁴

Non-slave-owning whites in the South, particularly in the mountain districts, had no desire for war, much less to be drafted into the army. There was also much pro-unionist

¹Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 63.

²Ibid., p. 66.

³Ibid., pp. 82-83.

⁴Du Bois, Black Folk, op. cit., p. 205.

sentiment.¹ The poorer whites resented particularly the exemptions granted to the rich and the owners of slaves.² The planters countered with the racist argument that "after all he was white and that he and the planters had a common object in keeping the white man superior." Yet the poorer whites could see that it was a "rich man's war and the poor man's fight." However, as the Negroes ran away and came back with the conquering Northern army, the fear and hatred against the Negroes grew in the hearts of the poor whites.³

Reconstruction, Restoration, and Color Caste

After the assassination of Lincoln, the Republicans led by Stevens and Sumner dominated the Congress and shaped the Reconstruction policies. Congress passed a series of reconstruction acts in addition to the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. Southern states were divided into military districts commanded by military officers. Negro men were given the right to vote and most of the leading Confederates were disfranchised. The military authorities proceeded to organize the state governments with the aid of freedmen and white men who were still eligible to vote. Ratification of the three amendments was given as the condition of re-admission to the union. It was not until 1870 that the last of the seceded states were back in the Union.⁴

¹Beard, op. cit., II, p. 78. ²Ibid., p. 74.

³Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit. pp. 80-81.

⁴Beard, op. cit., II, p. 120.

Du Bois sees the struggles of the Reconstruction period in terms of the conflict between the combination of Northern industrial and finance capitalism and the forces of "abolition democracy," on the one hand, and the reassertion of Southern "land-slave feudalism," on the other.¹ This curious alliance of democracy and capitalism, which established what Du Bois calls the dictatorship of the proletariat², was based on common opposition to the resurgence of Southern political strength, and was backed by the military power. As soon as the Northern capitalists and Southern aristocrats came to an understanding, the alliance was dissolved, the military support withdrawn, and the experiment collapsed. In the midst of this struggle were the southern poor whites, whose position was symbolized by President Andrew Johnson. "It was the drear destiny of the Poor White South that, deserting its economic class and itself, it became the instrument by which the democracy in the nation was done to death, race provincialism deified, and the world delivered to plutocracy."³

Andrew Johnson became the president upon the death of Lincoln on April 15, 1865. He was of humble origin, a Tennessean, a bitter hater of Southern aristocracy, but a strong advocate of free-soil and democracy. But "Andrew

¹Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 240, p. 325, p. 346, etc.

²Ibid., p. 346; cf. p. 240.

³Ibid., p. 241; cf. p. 275.

Johnson could not include Negroes in any conceivable democracy."¹

Suddenly catapulted into the Presidency, he gradually retreated from the championing of democracy when he realized what economic democracy meant to the Negroes, and became an ally of the resurgence of the Southern plantation system.² Under the influence of Seward, he began to oppose the legislative actions of Congress and the popular support of the Republican policies in the election of 1866.³ Impeachment charges were brought against him but he was acquitted. Under the leadership of Sumner and Stevens, Congress took the initiative from him and passed a number of acts concerning the Reconstruction of the South over his veto.⁴

Black Codes and the Freedmen's Bureau

All through these years Black Codes were passed in the South which attempted to perpetuate Negro slavery under a different name. Du Bois writes:

In all cases, there was plain and indisputable attempt on the part of the Southern states to make Negroes slaves in everything but name. They were given certain civil rights: the right to hold property, to sue and be sued. The family relations for the first time were legally recognized. Negroes were no longer real estate.

Yet, in the face of this, the Black Codes were deliberately designed to take advantage of every misfortune of the Negro. Negroes were liable to a slave trade under the guise of vagrancy and apprenticeship laws; to make the best labor contracts, Negroes must leave the old plantations and seek better terms; but if caught wandering in search of work, and thus unemployed and without a home, this was vagrancy, and the victim could be whipped and sold into slavery. . . .

¹Ibid., p. 242.

²Ibid., p. 322.

³Ibid., p. 325.

⁴Ibid., p. 335 ff.

The Negro's access to the land was hindered and limited; his right to work was curtailed; his right of self-defense was taken away,; and his employment was virtually reduced to contract labor with penal servitude as a punishment for leaving his job. And in all cases, the judges of the Negro's guilt or innocence, rights and obligations were men who believed firmly, for the most part, that he had "no right which a white man was bound to respect."¹

One of the vestiges of these Black Codes is the kind of debt peonage which still exists. Another is the vagrancy laws. In recent years, however, this practice has been virtually stamped out.²

To counter the effects of these attempts at establishing a sort of serfdom in the South, a bill was passed by Congress creating the Freedmen's Bureau to protect and educate the freed Negroes and to give relief to the freedmen and refugees. President Lincoln signed the bill immediately after its passage on March, 1865, and appointed General Oliver Howard as its chief. It was a compromise measure. The Bureau continued some of its functions until June, 1872.³ The immediate task of the Bureau was to relieve hunger and distress. "In four years the Bureau issued over twenty-one million rations to the hungry and unemployed--fifteen and a half million to blacks and five and a half million to whites."⁴ Another very important effort undertaken was to secure fairness in the unemployment of labor. The Bureau encouraged written wage agreements and endeavored to enforce them.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 167.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 228.

³Ibid., pp. 220-224.

⁴Ibid., p. 225.

⁵Ibid., p. 225.

One of the achievements of the Bureau was the beginning made for the education of ex-slaves. Assisted by army officers, Northern churches, educators, and philanthropic organizations, the Bureau established a wide-spread system of Negro public schools. Du Bois writes: "There can be no reasonable doubt that common school instruction in the South, in the modern sense of the term, was founded by the Freedmen's Bureau and missionary societies, and that the state public school system was formed mainly by Negro Reconstruction governments."¹

Systematic plans were made to care for the sick.

"The judicial work of the Bureau consisted in protecting the Negro from violence and outrage, from serfdom, and in defending his right to hold property and enforce his contracts."² Concerning the achievements of the Bureau, Pierce writes: "Notwithstanding abuses and extravagances, the bureau did a great, an indispensable work of mercy and relief, at a time when no other organization or body was in a position to do that work."³

The Reconstruction Act

The Reconstruction act was passed in 1867, following the election of a Republican Congress. The act "put ten of the former confederate states under military rule, provided

¹Ibid., p. 664 (Georgia excepted).

²Ibid., p. 226.

³Paul Skeels Pierce, The Freedmen's Bureau, p. 104, Quoted in Ibid., p. 227.

for the organization of local governments under federal supervision, and declared that the said states should not be entitled to representation in Congress--in effect denied readmission to the Union--until they ratified the pending Fourteenth Amendment."¹ The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 29, 1868. The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870.

A series of elections took place in the South in 1867 in which Negro voters outnumbered whites.² Although many planters were disfranchised or refused to vote, more "poor whites" than ever before voted.³ In the elections of the delegates to the constitutional conventions of these states the proportion of Negro delegates elected ranged from 61 per cent in South Carolina to 10 per cent in Texas.⁴ Negroes held the majority in the House in the South Carolina legislature between 1868 and 1878 except one year, and the whites held the majority in the Senate all these years.

The Effects of Reconstruction

Concerning the period of Reconstruction, there is a great deal of accusation and denunciation, expressing value judgments based upon very strongly held value premises

¹Beard, op. cit., p. 118.

²Ibid., p. 371: 703,459 Negroes, 460,161 whites, 1,363,620 total.

³Ibid., p. 372.

⁴Louisiana, 50 per cent; Florida, 40; Virginia, 21; Georgia, 19; Miss., 17; Ala., 17; Ark., 12; E. Tex., 11.
Ibid., p. 372.

and colored by biases and prejudice. No doubt there was confusion, chaos, corruption and violence. The destruction of war and the bitterness of defeat, complete disruption of productive activities, a basic revolution of economic and social structures--all in a brief span of years--could not but bring chaos and despair. The contending forces of planters aspiring to regain possession and power, poor whites aspiring to rise into political and economic dominance, Negro freedmen seeking to obtain real freedom and security, Northern capitalists concerned with seeking profit, the ambitious and crooked of both races and sectional backgrounds working to make the most of the confusion for their personal aggrandizement--all helped to add to the confusion. The Negroes were ignorant and inexperienced. The poor whites were also ignorant and inexperienced. They were thrust into positions of power and responsibility completely without preparation. Then there were the Northern "carpet-baggers" and the Southern "scalawags." Over all was the military occupation, even at best a highly objectionable thing.

It is not the main purpose of this paper to unravel the dynamic forces that interacted to produce the confusion, nor to ethically assess the contending forces. Important as this period is in the history of the formation of color caste in the United States, it is clearly outside the writer's competence and the scope of this paper to discuss at any length the experiment of Reconstruction. An observa-

tion of Du Bois will be quoted at this point, recognizing fully the one-sided nature of his valuations. The presentation of this view of Reconstruction may be partially justified in view of the general impression gained from the study of American History that Reconstruction was a vengeful measure and an utter failure.¹ Du Bois writes:

An experiment in democracy followed which instead of being a complete failure as most Americans no doubt thought it would be, was so successful that a new revolutionary bargain was needed to overthrow it.

The chief charges against these labor and Negro governments are extravagance, theft, and incompetency of officials. The charge is that they threatened property and that they were inefficient. These charges are undoubtedly in part true; but they are often exaggerated. The South had been impoverished and saddled with new social burdens. In other words, states with smaller economic resources were asked not only to do a work of restoration, but a larger permanent social work. The property holders were aghast. They not only demurred, but, predicting ruin and revolution, they appealed to "race" pride, secret societies, intimidation, force and murder. They refused to believe that these novices in government and their friends were aught but scamps and fools.

Most of the legislation which resulted in fraud were basically sound.

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Many Negroes and whites were venal, but more were ignorant and deceived. The greatest stigma on the white South is not that it resented theft and incompetence, but that, when it saw the reform movements growing and even in some cases triumphing, and a larger and larger number of black voters learning to vote for honesty and ability, it still preferred a Reign of Terror to a campaign of education, and disfranchised men for being black and not for being dishonest.²

¹For instance, Hicks speaks of "Radical reconstruction" as being "as bad as ever," (p. 141) and of ending "the scandal of reconstruction." John D. Hicks, The American Nation (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941), p. 145.

²Du Bois, Black Folk, op. cit., pp. 208-210.

John D. Hicks, writing about "an orgy of corruption" under the "carpet-bag rule," discusses the guilt of the Negroes: "Of all those who participated in the work of Radical reconstruction the Negroes were the least of all to blame for its excesses. Only a few of them understood what was being done, and only a few of those who did were shrewd enough to line their pockets with plunder. For the most part they were but helpless victims of the conscienceless rogues who controlled them."¹

Hicks also notes the bright side of the Reconstruction. The carpet-baggers and freedmen represented the underprivileged classes. "Free public schools for the children of both races were generously supported." The tax burden was distributed with better regard for ability to pay. Poor relief was undertaken. Roads, bridges, and public buildings were built. "Most of all, the taste of democracy that the lowly of both races obtained was not soon forgotten."²

Restoration of White Supremacy and the Establishment of Color Caste

Lawlessness was rife in the South following the close of the Civil War. Du Bois summarizes the different phases of lawlessness as follows:

¹Hicks, op. cit., p. 39.

²Loc. cit.; Du Bois summarizes the positive good under three headings: "(1) democratic government, (2) free public schools, (3) new social legislation." Du Bois, Black Folk, op. cit., p. 210.

First, it was that kind of disregard for law which follows all war. Then it became a labor war, an attempt on the part of impoverished capitalists and landholders to force laborers to work on the capitalist's own terms. From this, it changed to a war between laborers, white and black men fighting for the same jobs. Afterward, the white laborer joined the white landholder and capitalist and beat the black laborer into subjection through secret organizations and the rise of a new doctrine of race hatred.¹

It is difficult enough to heal the wounds of an international war, in which the enemy is at some distance away. But when the central symbol of the civil war was left amidst the defeated as a distinct race, considered inferior but at times actually holding a position of superiority upheld by the army of occupation, hatred was harder to disappear. Moreover, the proud and formerly wealthy planters were left poor and with no other way to make a living except by exploiting former slaves on their only remaining capital, the land. The poor whites were determined to keep the blacks from access to richer land and better jobs. "A three-cornered battle ensued and increased lawless aggression."²

Secret organizations, such as the Ku Klux Klan, the Knights of the White Camellia, and the White League were organized throughout the South and spread terror and violence against the Negroes. The employment of the shibboleth of race united the white, rich and poor, against the blacks.³ With the rigorous measures undertaken by President Grant

¹Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 670.

²Ibid., p. 673.

³Ibid., p. 680.

under the three Enforcement Acts of 1870-1871, the activities of the Klan abated.¹ But the maintenance of Republican rule in the South upon which Reconstruction depended could not last long. After the election of 1872 and the panic of 1873, "the Northern reform movement had begun to unite itself with Big Business and Super-Finance, and to sympathize with the Southern planters. . . . The labor vote was divided along the color line."² Seven states had been "redeemed" from the Reconstruction government, under the domination of carpetbaggers and scalawags, namely, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas and Texas. "This had been accomplished by unifying the white majority and suppressing the Negro vote by intimidation and economic pressure."³ As the result of the disputed election of 1876 Hayes was declared elected. The new President removed the troops from the South. The Democrats took over. "The 'Solid South' had become a fact; military reconstruction had broken down."⁴ Restoration was accomplished. Color caste was firmly established.

The Negroes did not surrender the ballot easily or immediately. "But it was a losing battle, with public opin-

¹Hicks, op. cit., pp. 48-49.

²Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 684.

³Loc. cit.

⁴Hicks, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

ion, industry, wealth, and religion against them."¹ "The decisive influence was the systematic and overwhelming economic pressure. Negroes who wanted work must not dabble in politics."²

Cotton Tenancy and Color Caste

Out of the confusion and chaos of Reconstruction and Restoration following the Civil War arose a system of cotton tenancy which is peculiar to the South and forms the physical and economic basis of color caste. Edgar T. Thompson writes concerning the place of the plantation in the life of the South:

In the South [the basic institutions--the school, the church, the family--] are parts of the plantation "system." . . . It is the plantation which is not continuous with other sections of America. . . .

For this reason whatever is "different," whatever is special about the South appears to go back to the plantation and to the system of institutions which has grown up around it. And the plantation is by no means a dead, ante-bellum institution, even though it is not as strong and as vigorous as it once was.³

Rise of Cotton Tenancy

Cotton tenancy was born out of the conjuncture of needs and available resources at hand. There were, on the one hand, aristocratic landholders with nothing but pride and land, and, on the other, an ignorant population with no

¹Du Bois, Black Reconstruction, op. cit., p. 692.

²Ibid., p. 693.

³Edgar T. Thompson, "The Plantation: The Physical Basis of Traditional Race Relations," Edgar T. Thompson, ed., Race Relations and the Race Problem (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1939), p. 183.

experience of responsibility who were told suddenly that they were emancipated from slavery but who were not provided with land, tools, or much in the way of guidance. Out of this condition arose a system of tenancy in which little cash was required. Ruper Vance describes it:

In what must have been an era of primitive barter, a system was arrived at whereby labor was secured without money wages and land without money rent. Up and down the Cotton Belt southern states after 1865 vied with one another in passing crop lien laws. Accepted as the temporary salvation of a wrecked economic structure, the system has increasingly set the mode for southern agriculture. Under the crop lien system the unpropertied farmer mortgages his ungrown crop for the supplies necessary to grow it. He also pledges a portion, third, fourth, or half of his crop, for use of the land. The most outstanding commentary one can make on the South is to point out the fact that from that day to this the percentage of those who must secure their year's livelihood by crop liens has steadily increased. Many of the enfeebled aristocracy saw their once proud acres go on the block for ridiculously low prices; but the hopes for the rise of a vigorous yeomanry to take their places never materialized. The crop lien system was developed to readjust the Negro to cotton production on terms more fitting a modern economy than slavery.¹

"Its success was so great," observes Vance, "as to be disastrous." The poor whites on the fringes of plantation areas poured into the new arrangement and helped to make this temporary expedient a permanent institution, and further aggravate the racial tension.

¹Rupert B. Vance, Human Geography of the South (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1932), p. 187. Also see Arthur F. Raper, Tenants of the Almighty (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 77-89, for a detailed description of the process of the rise of share-cropping and cotton tenancy in Green County, Georgia.

The Plantation South

In the plantation South,¹ the basic pattern of social stratification is very simple, the major divisions being white landlords and Negro sharecroppers. The white wage laborers, sharecroppers and tenants as well as Negro landlords and wage hands form a considerable proportion of the southern farm population, but on the plantation themselves the croppers are predominantly Negro.²

On the plantations studied by the W. P. A. in 1934 and 1937, the sharecroppers were the most important type

¹Plantation South is a region where plantations are heavily concentrated, namely "the level lands of eastern North Carolina, the lower Piedmont and Upper Coastal Plains of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, and the Delta and Loess Bluff regions of the Mississippi and its tributaries in the states of Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas. U. S. Works Progress Administration, Thomas J. Woofter, Jr. and Associates, Landlord and Tenant on the Cotton Plantation (Washington, 1935), p. 1.

Characteristics of this area are: "High percentage of tenants, a high degree of concentration of land ownership, a heavy proportion of Negroes, a very mobile population, per capita farm income higher than those in other southern counties but lower than those in other farming sections of the country, small proportions of urban and village dwellers, scarcity of industries, large families, poor school facilities, especially for Negroes, and utter subjection to King Cotton; boom when the King is prosperous and gloom when the King is sick." Woofter, op. cit., pp. 1-3.

Plantation may be defined, as the Census does, as a "tract with five or more resident families, including the landlord," or, in terms of acreage, "tracts of 260 acres or more. . . ." Ibid., p. 17.

²For example, according to a study of the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Area, "Of the total farm land in the 10 counties in 1934, 62 per cent was operated by tenants. Approximately 87 per cent of the tenants that year . . . were Negroes." E. L. Langsford and B. H. Thibodeaux, Plantation Organization and Operation in the Yazoo-Mississippi Delta Area (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 1939, U.S.D.A. Tech. Bulletin, No. 682, p. 3.

of labor, followed by wage hands, share tenants, and cash and standing renters in that order.¹ The Negroes predominated among the sharecroppers on these plantations.²

However, the most important change in recent years has been the rise of white tenants, croppers, and wage hands. In 1940 throughout the South (including both plantation and non-plantation areas) white tenants (except croppers) outnumbered Negro tenants 7 to 2, and white croppers and laborers slightly outnumbered the Negro croppers.³

¹The percentages of the types of labor for 1934 were as follows: Sharecroppers, 45.5; Wage hands, 36; Share Tenants, 14.9; Cash and Standing Renters, 4.0; For 1937: Sharecroppers, 45.5; Wage hands, 41; Share Tenants, 11.1; Cash and Standing Renters, 2.7. U. S. Works Projects Administration, William C. Holley, Ellen Winston, and Thomas J. Woofter, Jr., The Plantation South, 1934-1937 (Washington: 1940), pp. 6-7, Table 6 and Fig. 3. These figures are based on the study of 246 plantations which were included in both the 1934 and 1937 investigations.

²Among these same 246 plantations, 1.2 % in 1934, 2.0% in 1937 were with all white tenants; 59.0% in 1934 and 51% in 1937 were with all Negro tenants; 39.8% in 1934 and 37.0% in 1937 were with both Negro and white tenants. Ibid., p. 15, Table 9.

³See Table 1, p. 142, and Fig. 1, p. 143. White tenants total 700,582, Negro tenants, 207,510. White croppers and laborers total 807,868, Negro croppers and laborers, 806,421. Woofter writes of this: "In 1860 the situation was simple. Practically all land in the Southeast was cultivated by planters with slave labor or by small white owners with their own family labor supplemented occasionally by some hired labor. Hence, at that time practically all whites engaged in agriculture were owners and almost all Negroes were laborers. . . . In 7 cotton states, . . . total males engaged in agriculture increased from about 1,100,000 in 1860 to 2,100,000 in 1930. This was for the most part a white increase since Negroes engaged in farming increased only about 28,000 or 3 per cent, as against a white increment of 940,000 or nearly 300 per cent." Woofter, op. cit., pp. 12, 13.

TABLE 1

NEGRO AND WHITE AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN THE SOUTH
BY TENURE, 1930, 1940


(Number in Thousands)

Tenure	Negro				White			
	1930		1940		1930		1940	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
Total (exclusive of family workers)	1,393	100.0	1,188	100.0	2,945	100.0	2,893	100.0
Owners and managers	183	13.1	174	14.7	1,250	42.4	1,384	47.9
Cash tenants	98	7.0	65	5.4	140	4.8	190	6.6
Other tenants except croppers	208	15.0	143	12.0	569	19.3	511	17.6
Croppers	393	28.2	299	25.3	383	13.0	242	8.4
Wage laborers	511	36.7	507	42.6	603	20.5	564	19.5


Sources: The Fifteenth (1930) and the Sixteenth Census of the United States. Data for 1930 from Myrdal, op. cit., p. 236; data for 1940 from Arnold Rose, The Negro in America (New York: Harper, 1944, 1948), p. 85

NEGRO AND WHITE AGRICULTURAL WORKERS IN THE SOUTH BY TENURE, 1930, 1940

Percentages of Total Number



Percentages by Tenure--Negroes



Percentages by Tenure--Whites





Fig. 1

Source: From Table 1, p. 142.



Woofter comments: "Tenant conditions can no longer be shrugged off as features of the race problem as white and Negro tenants are in most respects equally disadvantaged."¹ However, it is extremely important to separate the problem into two--as it concerns the white farm laborers (including croppers, for croppers are but a different type of farm laborer rather than a different type of tenant)² and as it concerns Negro farm laborers. Tenant conditions cannot be shrugged off precisely because they are features of the race problem in which the fact that conditions of the Negro and white are almost equally disadvantaged aggravates the problem rather than eases it.

Moreover, the conditions of the Negroes are generally worse than those of the white even though in a great many cases the two are equally bad. Myrdal points out:

The fact that nowadays almost two-thirds of the tenants are white has been emphasized time and again in the discussion. It does not follow, however, that white tenancy is more serious than Negro tenancy. Rather it is the other way around. . . . Negroes, more than whites, are concentrated in the lower tenure groups, and . . . in each tenure group Negroes are economically much weaker than whites.³

¹Woofter, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

²Although the Census classes sharecroppers as tenants, as we have seen and shall see, the croppers are actually closer to farm laborers in regard to status, income, housing provided, amount supervision given, etc. than tenants. See T. Lynn Smith, The Sociology of Rural Life (Rev. ed., New York: Harper, 1947), pp. 278-285. Cf. Richard Sterner and Associates, The Negro's Share (Harpers, 1943), p. 17.

³Myrdal, op. cit., p. 243; see table 1, p. 142, supra; Fig. 1, p. 143, supra. According to above figures, Negroes constituted 29.1 per cent, and whites 70.9 per cent of total agricultural workers in 1940, exclusive of unpaid family workers.

In the opening thirty years of this century, the increase of white tenants was mainly in smaller holdings, both in plantation and non-plantation counties.¹ However, there has been a white infiltration even into the position of the tenants in plantations, where Negroes have been and still are predominant. But even in the case of white tenants on plantations, "white workers tend to be more concentrated in the outlying districts, or on the least valuable parts of the plantations where the tenants work more independently and have a higher tenure status; whereas, Negroes more often make up the bulk of the labor force on the main part of the plantations, where they can be closely controlled and supervised by the owners or managers."²

More important to the inter-caste relationship is the fact that for a large number of white tenants, tenancy represents a downward step in the agricultural ladder, whereas Negroes ascended from slavery. Woofter notes:

Among the whites. . . . the proportion of ownership declined with the rapid rise of white tenancy. Thus, the present Negro tenants and owners are children and grandchildren of laborers while the white tenants and laborers are children and grandchildren of landowners. For the former, tenancy is a step in advance of the previous generation, for the latter, a step backward.³

This consciousness may be a factor in the resentment of the white tenants, especially when they are made to conform to the caste-like etiquette toward the landlord in the planta-

¹Myrdal writes: "It is certain, however, that the great majority of these small-holding tenants are white." Myrdal, op. cit., p. 243.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 244.

³Woofter, op. cit., p. 13.

tion areas.¹ Direct economic competition with the Negro laborers, croppers and tenants as well as their low social status, makes these white laborers, croppers and tenants more aggressive and violent in the maintenance of caste structure and race pride. Davis, Gardner and Gardner, investigating the situation in the Deep South, observe:

In the Delta areas of the State, where white and colored tenants are competing at an increasing rate. . . . most of the white men work for a living (as contrasted with the white planters in Old County). . . . In such a community, . . . the white population must resort to terrorization continually in order to impress the colored group with the fact that economic equality or superordination on the part of the latter is not real equality or superordination--in other words, that caste exists all along the line, as the myth demands, and that actually any white man, no matter now poor or illiterate, is superordinate to any colored man and must be treated with appropriate deference.²

This description of the myth of caste is, incidentally, a very incisive definition of caste. These investigators found that the situation differs where the economic status and caste status reinforce each other--"where almost all of the colored people are families of poverty stricken tenants and almost all of the white people are families of owners or large landlords." In these areas, "caste is almost 'perfect' economically and socially, and there is relatively little terrorization of the lower caste."³

On the other hand, these same sociologists notice

¹See pp. 159-160, infra.

²Allison Davis, Burleigh B. Gardner, and Mary R. Gardner, Deep South (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1941), pp. 481-482.

³Loc. cit.

that "in many instances. . . . lower-class whites living in Negro neighborhoods treated their Negro neighbors in much the same way as did their white neighbors."¹

Concentration of Land Ownership

The pattern of land ownership is basic to the pattern of caste and class stratification in the rural South, as it is throughout the world. Although the majority of landowners in the deep South own small to medium sized holdings, a large proportion of acreage is held by the large landlords, the white planters.

In twenty Georgia plantation counties in 1934, for example, 16.3 per cent of proprietors, owning 260 acres or more, held 55.7 per cent of the acreage. Since these figures were obtained from tax books which list non-contiguous tracts separately, the actual concentration of ownership is even greater than appears in the figures above.² In addition, many owners of large tracts also operate additional rented land.³ Banks and insurance companies and mortgage companies also have acquired large holdings throughout the plantation areas as the result of foreclosures.⁴

¹Ibid., p. 50.

²Woofter, op. cit., p. 19. Among the 646 plantations studied by Woofter and others, "39 per cent of the landlords reported owning other farms with an average of 2.9 other farms per multiple owner." Loc. cit.

³The 646 plantations owned 86 per cent of the plantation acreage and rented 14 per cent. Ibid., p. 20.

⁴"The proportion which such corporation-held acreage formed of the total of all land in farms was as high as

The actual concentration of ownership and control is difficult to determine even by studying tax books. The most effective way appears to be that of making an intensive study of a small area and observing the operation of actual ownership control. This was undertaken by the authors of Deep South. They found:

. . . . of the nearly 2000 farm-operators in Old County, less than 400 owned any land in 1935. Of these 400, 36 persons owned or controlled practically half of all the land of the county and almost a third of the cultivable land. (Two of these 36 were Negroes). Of these 36 persons, 7 owned or controlled 22.2 per cent of all the land, although they constituted but one-third of one per cent of all farm operators. If we were to take, as the property-owning unit, the family and not the individual, we should probably find as much as three-fourth of all land in Old County owned by members of these 36 families.¹

Six families controlled practically all of the most desirable land in the Old County.²

Arthur Raper also found similar conditions in Greene and Macon Counties in Georgia.³

twenty per cent in some counties." Ibid., p. 20.

"It is estimated that areas amounting to 30 per cent of the cotton lands of various states are owned by insurance companies and banks." Charles S. Johnson, Edwin R. Embree, and W. W. Alexander, The Collapse of Cotton Tenancy (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1935), p. 33.

¹Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, op. cit., p. 276.

²Ibid., p. 278.

³ Arthur Raper, Preface to Peasantry (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N. Carolina Press, 1936), p. 91. "White people own more than 95 per cent of the acreage in Greene and Macon counties, and one-seventh of the white owners hold more than one-half of all the land. Large tracts are more or less restricted to certain areas in which nearly three-fourth of all land is in tracts of 500 acres and over; in other sections of the counties are grouped the small holdings.

With occasional exceptions, the large holdings have always been found on the most fertile soil and the small holdings on the least fertile soil." Raper, op. cit., p. 91.

There is a degree of absentee ownership prevailing among the landlords in plantation areas. These farms are owned by individuals who do not give undivided attention to the operation of their plantations due to inability, disinclination, or because they hold other occupations, very often that of merchant.¹ Cash tenancy is common with absentee landlords.²

Concerning these absentee landlords, Woofter notes: "It is the absentee landlord who, through ignorance, laxity of supervision, or cupidity, most often allows the 'mining' of the land and the loss of the productive top soil through erosion."³ Raper, on the other hand, observes: "Absentee ownership is associated with the disintegration of plantation farming and involves but little acreage outside the big plantation areas." Absentee ownership is not an unmitigated evil because both whites and Negroes become owner-operators by purchasing land from these absentee landlords.⁴

Power and social status are closely related to the ownership of land. This is particularly true of the plantation South, where there is a tendency to identify the "upper class" with "the old planter family." "The ownership of large

¹Raper found that "of the 837 white owners in Greene having more than 50 acres, only 278 were listed as farmers by the 1930 Census; of Macon's 702 white owners 320 were listed as farmers." Raper, op. cit., p. 103.

²Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., pp. 284-288.

³Woofter, op. cit., p. 22.

⁴Raper, op. cit., p. 103.

estates has tended to remain among a kinship group, not only as a result of the size of the kinship group but also because land, once inherited, has been kept for its value in increasing the owners' social status.¹

The stratification of rural society into landlords holding large tracts of land, and sharecroppers and tenants cultivating small plots of land, tends to give rise to (or to maintain) the domination of the social structure by the landowners. T. Lynn Smith asserts:

Indeed, it can be stated with some degree of certainty that concentration of land-ownership and large-scale agriculture inevitably results in the production of a small, high class of the elite, on the one hand, and the reduction of the masses dependent upon agriculture to a state of ignorance and poverty, on the other.

Smith refers to the "latifundia of the Romans, the estates of the Junkers in eastern German, the haciendas of the Latin Americas, the sugar centrals of Cuba and the West Indies, the extensive ranches of the western states, or the plantations of the South," and writes: "Close inspection will show maldistribution of lands to be at the core of practically every rural problem."²

Andre Siegfried, writing before the first World War concerning Western France, observes that the domination of

¹Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., pp. 276-277.

²T. Lynn Smith, op. cit., p. 305. Smith adds: "The Biblical threat, 'woe to them that join house to house, that lay field to field, till there be no place, that they be placed alone in the middle of the earth,' [Isaiah 5:8] was an attempt to stay the proletarianizing of the rural workers that accompanies a concentration of ownership. Ibid., p. 304.

the landlord to the maximum degree occurs when the great estates coincide with the small cultivation by tenants or laborers and when the proprietor resides on this land. He states:

The union of these three conditions is irresistible. One may very well comprehend that the situation may be thus: the richer the landlord, the more modest the tenant, the greater the differences between them, the greater will be the authority of the former over the latter.¹

The situation fits the plantation South almost exactly.²

Siegfried speaks of the "risk that an agrarian proletariat may arise that may become a dangerous enemy of the proprietor."³ It is precisely the function of the American caste system to prevent the rise of a self-conscious and united agrarian proletariat. The color-caste line very effectively separates the two segments of the proletariat in the plantation South--poor whites and Negroes--so that it is well-nigh

¹Andre Siegfried, "The Influence of the Regime of Landed Property on the Formation of Political Opinion," from Andre Siegfried, Tableau politique de la France de l'ouest sous la troisieme republique (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1913) pp. 370-379, quoted by Pitirim A. Sorokin, Carl C. Zimmerman, and Charles J. Galpin, A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1930), I, 405.

²Loc. cit. Even to the manner of speech, the two are strikingly similar. Siegfried states: "In speaking of his farmers, the Vendean noble says, 'my boys'; in Lannion one speaks of them as 'subjects' of such or such a 'Monsieur'; and in rural Anjou one hears likewise this altogether feudal expression, 'I am of the subjection of Mr. X or Y.'" Loc. cit. The difference between the two rural societies, one in Western France and the other in southern U. S., are: (1) in southern U. S. the situation is complicated by the existence of race-caste division; and (2) the peasants in France vote.

³Ibid., p. 407.

impossible to unite the two against the landlords or even to keep one group neutral in the struggle of the other to resist the exploitation of the landed aristocracy. The poorer whites serve in the plantations as the overseers of the Negroes, as well as the croppers and tenants in direct competition with the Negroes. Under the caste system, white croppers and Negro croppers compete in the sense believed to be basically different from the competition between every individual cropper and every other individual cropper. This takes on the nature of intergroup competition--competition between two different kinds of human beings.¹ Consequently, a deeper kind of competition than among individuals of either group results. Under this sort of stratification, all other competitions and conflicts, such as class conflicts, are subordinated to this most fundamental cleavage which cuts across all others.²

While a small group of planters holding large acreages control a large proportion of land, we must remember that the great majority of land owners holds small and medium size farms. In 20 counties in Georgia, where large holdings are concentrated, Woofter found that 83.7 per cent of the landowners held 250 acres or less.³ However, in terms of acreage, those owning less than 260 acres held only 44.4

¹Cf. p. 11, supra; cf. MacIver, op. cit., p. 11.

²Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., 676 ff. "The concept of caste struggle. . . . is much more realistic." [than the class struggle] Ibid., p. 676.

³Woofter, op. cit., p. 18, table 4.

per cent of the total acreage.¹ The numerical preponderance of the small landowners in the areas in the South outside of plantation areas is much greater.²

The average value of owner-operated farms in the South in 1940 (\$27.11 per acre including building) was lower than either the cropper -"operated" land in the South (\$33.28) or the national average (\$31.37).³ The difference between the values of owner-operated and the croppers-"operated" land indicates the kind of real economic competition that the small and middle size owner-farmers encounters in the cropper-"operated" plantations. As we have noted before, the majority of the landowners are white² and the majority of the croppers in plantations are Negroes, although this latter preponderance is decreasing.⁵ This situ-

¹Ibid., p. 18, table 5. The discrepancy between 250 acres and 260 acres appears in the original tables. The text indicates, however, that 250 is a typographical error, and should read 260 acres.

In Green and Macon Counties, Georgia, the white owner-farmers, for the most part, have always been small owners or have come up from the tenant class. In Greene County, about one-sixth of the white owner-cultivators came from the hill country. A larger number of the newcomers became renters. A white tenant occasionally rose into ownership. Raper, op. cit., p. 106.

²By definition, plantation areas are areas where plantations predominate (see note 1, p. 140, supra.). By definition, then, outside the plantation areas, smaller landholders have greater numerical preponderance than in plantation areas.

³Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 235-236; Rose, op. cit., p. 85.

⁴See table 1, p. 142, supra.

⁵See pp. 141-147, supra.; Table 1, p. 142, supra.

ation reinforces the caste competition in which the small white landowner, competing against heavy odds of the superior economic strength of the planter, easily identifies the Negro cropper with the planter under whom he works as an object of enmity. It is the "cheapness" of the cropper's labor that makes this competition so unfair to the small owner-farmer. But he fails to see that it is certainly not the cropper or the Negro who brought about this "cheapness." It is the function of the caste system to act as a blindfold in this clearly defined competitive situation, and to divert the resentment against competitors into aggression against the exploited caste, which is being used to the disadvantage of the working farmer and to the advantage of the planter.¹

Among the small owners of land in the South are Negro owners. There are also a negligible number of Negro planters.² According to Raper, most of the earliest Negro farm owners became owners "through the advice and assistance

¹See Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 235-236; Rose, op. cit. p. 85. See pp. 316-320, infra. The same sort of psychological mechanism works in the relationship between white owner-farmers and Negro tenants as between white tenants and Negro tenants. For a more detailed discussion of the unfair competition of cheap labor, see pp. 281-283, infra.

²See table 1, p. 142, supra; also p. 148, supra. In 1934, in Greene and Macon Counties, Georgia, 10.6 per cent of Negro farm families were owners. Raper, op. cit., p. 34, table II.

In the same year, among the Negro owners in 24 Georgia counties, 74 per cent owned less than 100 acres, 22 per cent, 100 to 260 acres, and 4 per cent, 260 acres and over (average 71 acres). The figures for white owners were: 47 per cent, less than 100 acres, 34 per cent, 100-260 acres, and 19 per cent, 260 and over (average 213 acres). Woofter, op. cit., p. 24, table 10.

of their ex-masters."¹ He notes that Negro ownership

can be achieved only by means of a most exacting and highly selective procedure: the would-be owner must be acceptable to the white community, have a white sponsor, be content with the purchase of acreage least desired by the whites, and pay for it in a very few years.²

Davis, Gardner and Gardner found evidence of a great number of "sales" of land by white landlords to colored tenants in boom times and the taking back of land without due process of law in hard times.³ Some Negro women received land as gifts from their white common-law husbands; but in line with the operation of caste, fewer children of Negro mothers received land as gifts from their white fathers.⁴

Myrdal and Rose give the following handicaps of the Negro landowners: background in slavery; the fact that Negroes were not encouraged to show much initiative but rather to be dependent and to accept a low position; lack

¹Raper, op. cit., p. 111.

²Ibid., p. 122.

³Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., pp. 293-296. However, Raper did not find too great a number of instances of such foreclosures in Greene and Macon Counties. He writes: "As a general rule, however, foreclosures was the last resort." Raper, op. cit., p. 134-135.

⁴Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., pp. 297-298. The authors explain: "Since the caste system ignores the sociological kinship between white parent and colored offspring but allows a definite place in the system for cohabitation of a white man with a colored woman, it is to be expected, perhaps, that white men should publicly admit the second relation by making gifts of property to colored women but not the first." Ibid., p. 298.

of legal security; need of the Negro to associate with a white person of some standing in the community; the Negro's earnings being less than those of white workers, prejudicial credit rating due to the belief of the Negro's racial inferiority; poor educational opportunities; the concentration of Negroes in areas where few small holdings are for sale; and attempts to prevent Negro ownership legally.¹ It is to be wondered at that as many as 173,628 Negro farmers owned land in 1940² against all these odds.

The Sharecropper

A very brief description of the sharecropper is necessary for the purpose of this chapter. Arising out of slavery, emancipation, reconstruction and restoration, the plantation tenant represents "an antiquated paternalistic labor institution in the midst of modern American capitalistic society."³ A sharecropper is essentially an agricultural wage laborer who receives a share of the crop instead of a fixed cash wage per hour, per day, or per week. He shares in the risks without sharing in the control of the crop.

Contracts are practically never written. Records of advances and repayments, if kept at all, are almost

¹Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 240-242; Rose, op.cit., pp. 86-87.

²See table 1, p. 142, supra.

³Myrdal, p. 245; Rose, op. cit., p. 87.

always in the hands of the landlord, who holds absolute control. "The fairness of settlement is largely dependent upon his landlord's sense of justice."¹ Cheating of the Negro sharecroppers by the landlords is prevalent and is widely recognized.² Intimidation and resort to actual violence by planters or by men commissioned by them(but not necessarily by just any white man) are frequently used to control the Negro croppers. Here again the caste system reinforces the plantation system and vice versa.³

The planter manages crops, labor, and animal power. He makes the decision on "both his and the tenant's share of the crop."⁴ The cropper receives subsistence during the year in order to feed and clothe his family, as well as advances in seeds and fertilizer. "Theoretically, the tenant's income is a portion of the crop, collectible when the

¹Woofter, op. cit., p. 11; cf. Raper, op. cit., p. 162.

²A Negro landlord explained to a white planter why colored tenants frequently stole from their landlords:

The white man has beat him, and kicked him and shot him, and hurt him, and lynched him, and cheated him, and stole from him for so long, that the Negro feels that anything he can steal or cheat the white man out of is no more'n what's been done to him! The white man has made him crooked and immoral.

The white planter then said: "You know, I believe you're right about that." Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, op. cit., p. 396; cf. Johnson, Embree and Alexander, op. cit., pp. 8-10.

³Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., pp. 393-394.

⁴Woofter, op. cit., p. 29.

crop is marketed. In practice, the tenant collects this income in advance at the rate of from \$5 to \$20 per month."¹ Tenants pay extremely high rates of interest for these advances. The study of 246 plantations in 1934 and 1937 showed that "the weighted annual rate of interest declined from about 40 per cent to 36 per cent. Even so the rates remained two to three times as high as those paid by operators for short-term credit." It observed that "the high interest rates paid by tenants are a major factor in preventing their rise up the agricultural ladder. The pressure to pay these debts also strongly influences against diversification and for raising of a cash crop."²

In many ways, the tenant-landlord relationship is not simply an economic relationship. It "retains . . . something of the quality of the master-slave regime."³ It has been frozen into a caste system.

The tenant is highly subordinated to the planter in the usual planter-tenant situation and . . . furthermore he is expected to behave in a manner indicative of his subordination. . . . He must be properly deferential in his manner and speech.⁴

¹Loc. cit.; Of those surveyed 86 per cent made advances to tenants, averaging \$12.80 per family per month for an average of 7 months. Ibid. p. 59. In the Yazoo-Mississippi area, planters advanced, in 1936, \$161.56 to sharecroppers, and \$282.92 to share tenants. Langsford and Thibodeaux, op. cit., p. 48.

²Holly, Winston, and Woofter, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

³Raper, op. cit., p. 91.

⁴Davis, Gardner, and Gardner, op. cit., p. 402.

This relation between the white planter and the Negro cropper determines pretty largely the pattern of caste relationship between all white persons and all Negroes throughout the South and even in other parts of the United States. Raper and Reid, in a book with a suggestive title, Sharecroppers All, observe:

Why have we expanded the term "sharecropper" to include many non-farm workers? Simply because most Southern communities are feudalistic. The revealing phrase "my workers" may be heard in factory and downtown buildings as well as at the end of the cotton rows. The company store of the mill village is not unlike the commissary, the factory supervisor not unlike the plantation overseer. But the parallel does not stop with the factory town, or with the South, and the significance is national.¹

This may be characterized as "factories in the fields" in reverse, namely, "plantations in the cities."

The infiltration of the whites into the ranks of croppers and wage hands, traditionally Negroes' jobs, until they have outnumbered the Negroes, has done "little to modify the traditional pattern which grew up along the color line in the years following the Civil War," The two groups together now share the common disabilities and help to "maintain the regime that continues to rob them of self-direction."²

The increase of white croppers and laborers, instead of weakening caste discrimination, has tended to absorb the

¹Arthur F. Raper and Ira De A. Reid, Sharecroppers All (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1941), p. v.

²Raper, op. cit., p. 157.

subordinate whites into the pattern set for the Negroes.

Davis and the Gardners observe:

The behavior of any tenant, white or colored, is in fact, very much that expected of a colored individual in relation to a white. The tenants' deferential behavior not only is a matter of color but is partly a result of his occupational subordination to the landlord.¹

Although this situation in itself represents the breakdown of a rigid caste line based solely on color, it only serves to further aggravate the interracial tension between the two subordinate competitive racial groups. The relationship between the white landlords and white tenants is more strained. Ordinarily a white person does not have to be obedient or deferential to another white person because of his low occupational or class status. But "when he enters a planter-tenant relation in a county like Old or Rural, where almost all tenants are colored, he must behave virtually as a colored tenant would, and must accept the same treatment."² This gives rise to strong antagonism between the planter and his white tenants, which is often diverted into antagonism toward the white planter's Negro croppers, who are also his real competitors. The racial visibility, the tradition of slavery, the permissive social pattern of the white group, and the defenseless position of the Negroes all contribute toward making the Negroes fit targets

¹Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., p. 402.

²Ibid., p. 403.

of the aggression of these frustrated whites.¹ Planters often prefer the Negro tenant who fits into the plantation pattern more easily because of his caste as well as of his class. This in turn creates further resentment on the part of white tenants.² Johnson, Embree and Alexander write:

Although white families now form the great majority of the cotton tenants, the old "boss and black" attitude still pervades the whole system. Because of his economic condition, and because of his race, color and previous condition of servitude, the rural Negro is helpless before the white master. Every kind of exploitation and abuse is permitted because of the old caste prejudice. The poor white connives in this abuse of the Negro; in fact, he is the most violent protagonist of it. This fixed custom of exploitation of the Negro has carried over to the white tenant and cropper. Yet it has been impossible to bring about any change, even to get the poor white workers to take a stand, since any movement for reform is immediately confused with the race issue. Because of their insistence upon the degrading of three million Negro tenants, five and a half million white workers continue to keep themselves in virtual peonage.³

The Croppers' Plane of Living

It is a well known fact that the plane of living of the sharecroppers in the deep South, both Negro and white, is very low. On the whole, the plane of living of the Negroes is lower than that of the whites, in the same locality and in the same class of tenancy.

One of the most basic factors determining the low

¹See pp. 317-320, infra.; for the key concepts concerning the operation of frustration and aggression in race relations, see Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town op. cit., p. 444.

²Davis, Gardner and Gardner, op. cit., p. 468.

³Johnson, Embree, and Alexander, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

standard of living is the extremely low income that these tenants, croppers and wage hands receive. Among 3,272 croppers and share tenants reporting in 1937 in the nine plantation areas of the South, the average gross income was \$385 including \$27 from A A A payments and \$27 from occasional labor on the plantation. Crop expenses were \$85, leaving \$300 net income. Deducting \$104 for subsistence advance and interests, the tenant received \$196 net income. This net income represented a rise of about 30 per cent over \$151 in 1934. Even when an estimated \$100 worth of production for home use is added, the total net income amounts to only \$400 in a "good cotton year of 1937."

According to Raper's study in Greene County and Macon County in Georgia in 1934, "the cash incomes of the Negroes in each county were below those of the whites in that county." However, "the Macon County Negro owners, renters, croppers, and wage hands respectively had higher cash incomes than the Greene county whites in the same tenure classes."¹

The food consumed by the poorer farm families in the South, both white and Negro, consisting mainly of the

¹Raper, op. cit., pp. 33-58.

In 1934, the Negro croppers' cash income was \$35.65 and the value of home-grown food, \$145.95, making a total of \$281.58; in Macon County, cash income \$339.12, home-grown provisions, \$180.81, totalling \$519.93. The total income of the white croppers, who had a higher percentage of cash income and a lower percentage of the value of home-grown products, was \$384.85 in Greene, and \$1,007.25 in Macon County. Ibid., p. 55, Table X.

three M's (meat, meal, and molasses) and "taters" is rich in fats and low in vitamins. This contributes to the "low vitality, frequent ill health, high susceptibility to contagious diseases, and high death rate among the farm tenant families."¹ Chicken is considered a typical Southern food, but "one seventh of the families went a whole year without eating a chicken or an egg."² Inadequate nutrition, resulting not only from lack of money, but also from ignorance and from bad food habits of long standing, constitute a basic problem in the South.³

Housing is extremely poor for the lower income landless farm families, particularly the sharecroppers and wage hands in the Plantation South. Houses are of poor frame construction, unpainted, in need of repairs, overcrowded, lack even very primitive sanitary and plumbing facilities, and have inadequate lighting. Cotton fields come right to the porches. According to Raper's study of the two Georgia counties, "the vast majority of landless families move every year or so from one shabby cabin to another."⁴ It is not unusual to find a family of ten living in two or three rooms.⁵ The sources of water supply, wells and springs, are very often extremely unsanitary. Facilities for the

¹Ibid., p. 52.

²Ibid., p. 53.

³Holly, Winston, and Woofter, op. cit., p. 53;
cf. pp. 55-58.

⁴Raper, op. cit., p. 59.

⁵Ibid., p. 62.

disposal of human excrement are very inadequate.¹

Low income, poor housing, limited sanitary facilities, low educational level, and unbalanced and poorly prepared food all contribute toward high rates of illness and the prevalence of easily preventable diseases. These in turn increase their poverty and the vicious circle goes on.² Woofter remarks: "The high Negro death rate has been attributed largely to ignorance and this is undoubtedly a major factor, but the unhygienic living conditions, many of which are dictated to the tenant by the system, must also be assigned a major portion of the blame."³

Education and Color Caste

This ignorance of the Negroes, which contributed so largely to poor health and high mortality rate, is itself a result of the caste structure. And again, this ignorance, aggravated and perpetuated by the system, tends to strengthen and maintain the system. Woofter notes that the plantation system was a "device for the cultivation of large tracts of land with relatively ignorant labor."⁴ And the landlords tend to discourage the education of their tenants and crop-pers, "especially for the Negroes, but also for the

¹"Scarcely two percent of the rural families had fly proof privies, about two-thirds had open privies, while the remaining one-third had none." Ibid., p. 68.

²"Three diseases which are readily controlled if preventative measures are applied which remain major health problems in the rural South are typhoid and paratyphoid fever, pellagra, and malaria." Ibid., p. 62.

³Woofter, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

⁴Ibid., p. 142.

whites."¹ This tendency among the dominant political and social class, coupled with the apathy of the subordinate classes, both white and Negro, and the general low income level and low value of taxable property, has made the educational level of the Southeast, particularly in the rural areas, the most backward in the nation.² The growing of cotton, in which the peak season comes during the school term, and the high mobility of the tenant families also militate against educational attainments. The Negro cropper is the most seriously affected.³ Not only the South, but the entire nation, suffers from this low educational standard in the South. For it is a well established fact, that the South, particularly the rural South, is the population seed-bed of the nation.

"The Southeastern farm population which received only 2.2 per cent of the national income in 1930, was faced with the responsibility of educating 13.4 per cent of all children of school age."⁴ No matter what measure of educational criterion is used--literacy, expenditures for education, teachers training and salaries, length of school term, grades completed--the Southeastern States, particularly their rural areas, are behind other states in the Union.⁵

¹Ibid., p. 142.

²Ibid., p. 140.

³Ibid., p. 126.

⁴Holly, Winston, and Woofter, op. cit., p. 63.

⁵Woofter, op. cit., pp. 125-144; cf. Holly, Winston, and Woofter, op. cit., pp. 63-69; cf. T. Lynn Smith, op. cit., pp. 388-404.

The most flagrant discrepancies occur, however, between the Negro and white educational facilities within the same area in the Deep South. Compared with these, the discrepancies between the educational opportunities offered the white children in the South and children in other sections of the nation are relatively less serious. In regard to the above listed criteria, education for the Negroes falls far short of that for the whites.¹ Raper made some intensive studies of the educational facilities for the whites and for the Negroes in Greene and Macon Counties, Georgia. He discovered that less money was spent in 1934 than in 1928, and the shrinkage of expenditures was greater for Negroes for the white schools. In Greene County, in 1934, the average amount spent for a white child was seventeen times as great as the amount for a Negro child; in Macon County, the ratio was twenty-five to one, and in the State as a whole, five to one.² The great bulk of the amounts appropriated by the State to County Boards of Education for Negro children was diverted to white children.³

¹Literacy, Woofter, op. cit., p. 128; quality of schools, Ibid., p. 130; grades completed, Ibid., p. 131; length of term, Ibid., p. 132; salaries of teachers: median salaries of white rural teachers in 17 (southern) States, \$788; of rural Negro teachers in these States, \$388; median salaries of all classes of white rural teachers, \$945. Ibid., p. 136.

²Greene County: \$30.87 for a white child, \$1.84 for a Negro child; Macon County: \$47.10 and \$1.82; State: \$32.46, and \$6.73. Raper, op. cit., pp. 306-307.

³In 1933, "in Greene, Negro schools received \$5,001 of the \$21,235 appropriation [for Negro education]: in Macon, \$5,964 of the \$24,339 state allotment for Negro schools." Ibid., p. 307.

This was a general practice throughout the State. "The white schools had spent upon them an amount equal to 100 per cent of the state appropriation to the county board of education for white educables plus the money diverted from Negro to white schools, plus all funds received from county taxes, municipal taxes, district taxes, bonds, loans, sale of property, endowments, and other sources."¹ The expenditures of federal funds followed the same pattern. Through the middle of November, 1934, seven per cent of federal expenditures was spent for Negroes in Greene, and 6.6 per cent for Negroes in Macon County, although Negroes constituted the majority of the school population.² Even after the great improvements were made by the United Farm Program under the sponsorship of the Farm Security Administration, the educational situation in Greene County in 1941 was as follows: "The white teachers in the county system received average annual salaries of \$799, and the colored teachers \$437. . . . The average school attainment for white pupils is the eighth grade, for the Negroes low third grade."³

The actual operation of the segregated school system thus gives a most graphic picture of what happens to

¹Ibid., p. 308.

²In 1928, Negroes constituted 56.7 per cent of the school population in Greene County, and 70.1 per cent in Macon County. Ibid., pp. 309-310.

³Arthur Raper, Tenants of the Almighty (New York: Macmillan, 1943), p. 309. For another graphic illustration of the effects of segregation of schools, see "West Memphis Schools," Life, March 21, 1949, pp. 79-84.

the theory of "separate but equal" school systems. The diverting of Federal as well as State funds for Negro children to white schools is part and parcel of the system of segregation, which is an integral part of the operation of the caste system. The President's Committee on Civil Rights declared that "the separate but equal doctrine has failed." The Committee explains:

The separate but equal doctrine has failed in three important respects. First, it is inconsistent with the fundamental equalitarianism of the American way of life in that it marks groups with the brand of inferior status. Secondly, where it has been followed, the results have been separate and unequal facilities for minority peoples. Finally, it has kept people apart despite incontrovertible evidence that an environment favorable to civil rights is fostered whenever groups are permitted to live and work together. There is no adequate defense of segregation.

The Committee recommends the "conditions by Congress of all Federal grant-in-aid and other forms of federal assistance to private or public agencies for any purpose on the absence of discrimination and segregation based on race, color, creed, or national origin."¹

Some Recent Developments and Color Caste

Collapse of Cotton Tenancy

Several factors of an economic nature have been interacting cumulatively in the recent years to break down

¹"To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights." New York PM (November, 1947), p. 23.

the plantation-sharecropping system of the South. It is difficult to separate these factors into causes and effects because effects tend to reinforce the causes in a "which-came-first-chicken-or-egg" circle. Moreover, from our view of dynamic social causation, in which "everything is cause to everything else,"¹ causes and effects, if isolated, represent an unrealistic, static picture. Such a picture lacks the dynamic dimensions characteristic of the social situation in which a static equilibrium if obtained is "entirely accidental."²

The disappearing sharecroppers:--Among the factors which interact with each other in the direction of the collapse of cotton sharecropping are: the mechanization of agriculture, industrialization and urbanization of the South, migration of Negroes and poorer whites, the depression, AAA and the War. Among the indications of the collapse of the cropping system is the decrease, both relative and absolute, of the number of sharecroppers and the relatively much less decrease in the number of wage laborers. Table 1 indicates that between 1930 and 1940 the number of Negro croppers in the South decreased 94,000 whereas the decrease of the number of wage laborers was less than 3,000. The number of white croppers decreased over 140,000 whereas the number of white wage laborers de-

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 78; cf. Appendix 3, Ibid., pp. 1065-1070.

²Ibid., p. 76.

creased only 37,000. In percentages of the total number engaged in agriculture: among the Negroes, between 1930 and 1940, croppers decreased from 28.2 per cent to 25 per cent and the wage laborers increased from 36.7 per cent to 42.6 per cent; among the whites, croppers decreased from 13 per cent to 8.4 per cent, wage laborers from 20.5 to 19.5 per cent. This represents a rise in the tenure status among the whites, and, in general, a decline among the Negroes. Although the percentage of Negro owners increased from 13.1 to 14.7 per cent, the actual number of owners decreased almost 10,000. There were much greater decreases of cash and other tenants (not including the croppers), 100,000 among these two relatively higher classes of tenants.¹ What happened seems to be that the higher classes and wage laborers migrated into towns or to other parts of the country. Likewise, many croppers became wage laborers or migrated. A large number of laborers probably have migrated too, their places taken by the ex-tenants and ex-croppers. The total decrease of persons gainfully employed in agriculture in the South between 1930 and 1940 were: Negroes, 205,500, and whites, 52,500.

¹See table 1, p. 142, supra., and Fig. 1, p. 143, supra.

²Rose writes: "The changes do not mean that the situation has been improved, but rather that it has deteriorated to such an extent that sharecroppers and tenants are being forced out. Many of the ex-tenants and ex-croppers may have stayed in agriculture. They have simply been reduced to wage laborers on the farms." Rose, op. cit., p. 90.

Agricultural Adjustment Administration.--One of the factors that has contributed to the decline of cropping is the operation of the Agricultural Adjustment program (AAA). The depression had already cut down on sharecropping but the AAA which followed drastically reduced the number of croppers, both white and Negro, and Negro tenants. The objective of the AAA was to increase the farm income by limiting acreage, removing surpluses from regular markets, paying direct subsidies to farmers, and encouraging conservation practices.¹

Negroes were most severely affected by the reduction of the acreage, because, first of all, the acreages most drastically reduced were on the plantations where the Negroes predominated.² Moreover, at first the landlord took all the benefit checks. When, later the checks were paid directly to the tenants, the landlord saw the benefit of decreasing the number of tenants and operating the farm with wage laborers, and they proceeded to follow their economic interest. The credit relationship between the croppers and the landlords, the one-sided nature of keeping accounts, and the legal impotence of the Negroes all worked to the benefit of the landlords.³ Furthermore, the control of the local administration of the AAA was in the hands of the farmers

¹Ibid., p. 91.

²See pp. 140-141, supra.

³Rose, op. cit., p. 91.

and county agents who have "attitudes on economic, social and racial questions similar to those of the large landowners."¹

Johnson, Embree and Alexander, after two years (1933-1935) of intensive study of cotton culture and farm tenancy in the region commonly known as the Old South, write: "The government under the AAA has assumed many of the risks of the landowners, and thrown them on the tenant."

It is but the blunt truth to say that under the present system the landowner is more and more protected from risk by government activity, while the tenant is left open to risks on every side. Only after he loses first what property he may possess and then his tenure does the tenant come to the form of risk insurance designed for him--relief.²

They observed that the "tenant found himself the loser in any event; if he was not displaced from the farm entirely, he remained as a casual laborer, and if he did not suffer this change in status, his operations were so small as to be unprofitable."³ They conclude:

The net result of the program was that the landlords participated in the federal relief program and received the benefits it offered while the tenants merely obeyed the landlord's instructions. Federal relief came to the cotton belt, was translated into plantation terms and the system (except for the further displacement and impoverishment of tenants) was bolstered and given a new lease on life. ⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 91-92.

²Johnson, Embree and Alexander, op. cit., pp. 50-51.

³Ibid., p. 55.

⁴Ibid., p. 57.

There were other measures undertaken by the Federal government to assist the farmers which were more constructive socially, and relatively more beneficial to the Negroes. Notable among them was the Farm Security program (FSA). Compared with the expenditures for the AAA (\$5,300,000,000 for 1934-1941), much of which went to the wealthier planters, the amount spent for the FSA (\$1,121,000,000) was very small¹ in view of the greater need. FSA was severely criticized by the Farm bloc in Congress for being "relief," although much greater sums went to the farmers of higher income brackets, who needed such relief a great deal less but were considered a good "business."²

Even under the much fairer treatment of the FSA, and although they did receive aid roughly proportionate to their population, the Negroes did not get a share proportionate to their need.³ Here again caste operated to prevent the improvement of the members of the subordinate caste.

Mechanization.--Another factor, along with AAA, which enhanced the decline of the sharecropping system in southern plantations was the mechanization of agricultural operations. Up until the middle 30's there had been very little mechanization in cotton, especially in the plantation areas. Here again the vicious circle was operating: low degree of mechanization in growing cotton kept the labor cheap, the cheapness of abundant labor supply made mechani-

¹Rose, op. cit., p. 98.

²Tr. loc. cit.

³Ibid., p. 99.

zation unprofitable. The difficulty of obtaining credit and the high rate of interest also hindered mechanization.¹

There has been a slow rise in mechanization in the South, particularly in the Southwest--Texas and Oklahoma. Speaking of two Texas Panhandle counties, Hall and Childress, Paul S. Taylor testified before the La Follette Committee in December, 1939:

The landlords force tenants off the place, then use the increased cash income resulting from the agricultural adjustment program and funds received for the sale of their own livestock as payments on tractors, so that more and more tenants "cant get a farm," and people say, "The 'farmall' is ruining our country." The driving force of mechanization, like drought and depression before it, is already expelling families who flee half-way across the country. These are not just "croppers," but yeoman farmers--tenants on thirds and fourths; not only Negroes, but white Texans as well.²

Taylor observes that "large-scale tractor farming will support fewer operators, who will depend on wage laborers."³ He further notes that "mechanization is invading the Delta."⁴ Referring to the general belief that the labor pattern of the deep South will delay the mechanization there until the commercial distribution of cotton pickers is realized, Taylor writes: "The effects of development of the row-crop, all-purpose tractor, of the depression and the relief program,

¹Ibid., p. 92.

²Paul S. Taylor, "Development of Industrialized Agriculture," Testimony before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, Seventy-sixth Congress, second session, pursuant to S. Res. 266, Part 47, California Agricultural Background. San Francisco, California, December 6 and 13, 1939. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 17267.

³Ibid., p. 17270.

⁴Ibid., p. 17273.

and of building good roads were not foreseen, and under these conditions the planters' resistance is yielding readily."¹

Concerning the trend toward wage labor, Taylor remarks:

The distinguishing features of the present trend toward wage labor, when accompanied by mechanization, are (1) to increase in scale of farming operations, which reduced opportunity for the small cropper or tenant to achieve anything resembling independent farming status, and (2) the great reduction in demand for human labor in cotton production, which decreases the opportunity of finding any place at all in the process, even that of a wage laborer. This trend is permanent.²

Taylor notes that "whites and blacks, managing share tenants and sharecroppers, alike, are swept from the land." In the Texas Panhandle, "mainly native American white tenants are being displaced." In the Delta, "the dislocation affects principally black sharecroppers in Mississippi and both blacks and whites in Arkansas."³ It is certain that a widespread use of mechanical cotton pickers, which are now being manufactured on a commercial scale, will further drive the Negroes, as well as whites, off the land in the South.⁴

Unionization of farm workers.--One of the forces that attempted to counteract to a measure the ills of the plantation has been the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, now called National Farm Laborers' Union, AFL. The organi-

¹Loc. cit.

²Ibid., p. 17274.

³Ibid., p. 17276.

⁴Cf. Rose, op. cit., p. 93.

zation of agricultural labor and tenants has always been a very difficult task anywhere, but it has been particularly difficult in the South. "Isolation, a low educational level, poverty, lack of cooperative habits, the tradition of paternalism and dependence, frequent moving, a weak legal order, and the split between the Negroes and whites further hampered organization in the South."¹

The Southern Tenant Farmers' Union was founded in 1934 by a group of Negro and white sharecroppers living in eastern Arkansas. "Its first efforts were directed toward protecting the rights of sharecroppers and tenants under the AAA cotton control program."² Because of its attack on the plantation pattern of exploitation and its breaking of the caste pattern, the wrath of the planters was visited upon the unions with violence. One of the most spectacular incidents occurred in January, 1939, when displaced sharecroppers and other discontented rural workers camped near a Missouri highway, thereby demonstrating their plight, and received wide publicity throughout the nation.³ In 1943 the union had some twenty thousand farm families, tenants, croppers, and wage laborers in its membership in 142 local organizations in the plantation areas. "Approximately 75

¹Loc. cit.

²Charles S. Johnson and Associates, Into the Main Stream (Chapel Hill, Univ. of N. C. Press, 1947), p. 98.

³Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1250; Raper and Reid, op. cit., p. 44, photograph opposite p. 37.

per cent of the membership is now composed of farm laborers; about 50 per cent of the members are Negroes. The leaders are native southerners of both races." The writers of Into the Main Stream comment: "Compared with the total number of the victims of this system, twenty thousand members are only a handful; yet the fact that among an utterly depressed and generally apathetic people, twenty thousand white and Negro farm workers have joined together for the improvement of their lot is an omen of no small significance for the future of southern agriculture."¹ This is one of the few very significant points in the rural South at which the caste structure shows signs of being consciously and actively attacked by the common action of the members of both castes united in a common economic and social interest. From the standpoint of those who condemn the caste system and work for justice in economic and other relationships, the actions of labor unions such as the S.T.F.U. represent a move in the right direction. Recently the union changed its name to the National Farm Labor Union in accordance with the nature of its membership and began to take action nationally.²

Urbanization and Migration of the Negroes

It is evident from the foregoing discussion that in-

¹Charles S. Johnson and Associates, Into the Main Stream, op. cit., p. 99.

²For instance, it led a strike in the Di Giorgio Farm, near Bakersfield, California, in Winter, 1947-1948.

creasing numbers of Negro agricultural workers are being forced to leave the farms and plantations. Among the factors that have tended in the recent years to drive out the Negro and white croppers, tenants, and laborers, we have mentioned the drought, the depression, AAA, and mechanization. Among other factors are the boll weevil, soil erosion, and the movement of cotton production to the Southwest and the West.¹ Conditions outside southern agriculture, such as relatively less rigid caste conditions, greater opportunities for education and medical care, job openings in industries, and opportunities, real or imagined, of receiving relief and WRA aid², are some of the factors that helped to pull the Negroes, who were being pushed out of the agricultural areas, toward the cities in the South, and more particularly toward cities in other sections of the country. These city-ward and north- and westward movements of the Negro people were greatly stimulated by World War II. "Almost two-thirds of the Negroes now live in nonfarm areas, and . . . eventually most Negroes will have to enter the non-agricultural economy of America."³

Urbanization of the Negroes in the South.--Urban Negro laborers in the South have experienced increasing hardship, at least relative to the position of the white laborers,

¹Sterner and others, op. cit., p. 12.

²Ibid., pp. 19-20.

³Rose, op. cit., p. 101.

between the Civil War and World War II.¹ During slavery the Negroes held virtual monopoly of, or tended to dominate the labor market in, not only the agricultural labor, but also in domestic and unskilled, semi-skilled and even some skilled jobs. It was to the economic interest of the masters to keep the whites out of these opportunities. Since the Restoration, Negroes have been driven out of one kind of job after another. The plight of the white farmers and workers, which forced the farmers into tenancy, worked in the same way in industry to increase the competition of the Negroes. Every advance in mechanization and every improvement in wages and conditions of labor tend to make an increasing number of occupations "white man's work" instead of "Negro jobs." Caste, with its slogan of "keeping the Negro in his place," and with its attendant discrimination in justice, politics, education and public service creates "an atmosphere in which economic discrimination becomes natural or even necessary in order to prevent 'social equality.'"² Rose finds little hope for the Negro in Southern industry.³

The Negroes have been and are still concentrated in the South. Until the Great Migration of the first World War, the important migration of the Negroes was from the rural to the urban areas in the South, which still continues.

¹Ibid., p. 103.

²Ibid., p. 130.

³Loc. cit.

The proportion of the Negroes living in the cities in the South increased from 22.0 per cent in 1910 to 37.3 per cent in 1940.¹

The Northward and Westward migrations.--The Great

Migration of the Negroes to the urban North took place during World War I. The Negroes who migrated to the North were employed as unskilled workers for the most part and remained in such occupations. The myth of Northern prosperity, occupational opportunities, income, availability of relief and other social security benefits, greater freedom as a human being, more security as a citizen, coupled with the depressed conditions in the South, worked cumulatively to encourage Northward and city-ward migrations of the Negroes, which continued even after the Armistice, and received a great impetus during World War II. There had not been any significant migration to the West until World War II. The proportion of all Negroes living in the North and West increased from 10.4 per cent in 1910 to 23.8 per cent in 1940.² During the recent war years, Negroes followed not only the traditional path toward Northern industrial areas, but also to the shipbuilding and airplane manufacturing centers in the South and the Pacific Coast. Close to half a million Negroes are estimated to have migrated to the Northern and

¹Rose, op. cit., p. 63.

²Loc. cit. "However, because of the huge white population of the North, Negroes constituted only 3.7 per cent of the total Northern population in 1940." Loc. cit.

Western industrial centers and another half a million to the cities of the South.¹

Fair Employment Practice Committee (FEPC)

Negroes were much more fully absorbed into war industries during the second World War because of more acute need² and because of a deliberate effort of the Federal Administration to prevent discrimination through FEPC and other measures. The public aversion to Nazi racism, the apparent effectiveness of anti-white-supremacy propaganda of the Japanese, and the general war aims of the allies expressed in terms such as the Atlantic Charter, helped to make this absorption possible. Well-known leaders like Wendell Wilkie, Pearl Buck, and Eleanor Roosevelt repeatedly insisted upon the importance of ending discrimination against racial and religious groups. Negro leaders and the masses were better organized than ever before. The "March-on-Washington Movement" led by A. Philip Randolph succeeded in persuading President Roosevelt, without actually carrying

¹Rose, op. cit., p.65.

²Ibid., p. 66. On the other hand, Rose points out that the Negroes did not migrate in as great a number as during the first World War, and that they did not make entries into previously all-white industries to the important degree that they did in the previous war. Rose gives the following reasons: (1) existence of unemployment at the start of the war, (2) better organized resistance in the North to accepting Negroes, (3) acceptance of trade unions by employers and consequent lack of their need of Negroes to fight unions, and (4) smaller need for unskilled Negro workers than during the first World War. Rose, op. cit., p. 134.

out the protest march, to sign the Executive Order 8802 on June 25, 1941. The order stated that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or in government on account of race, creed, color, or national origin. The Fair Employment Practice Committee was set up. FEPC, in spite of its limitations of power and finances, did much to stop discrimination in employment. Federal FEPC was killed by Congress in 1946. Several states have enacted state FEPC laws.¹

In a recent article on legislating against prejudice, Arnold Rose concludes from the study conducted by Gerhart Saenger: "Although Saenger's findings need to be verified with more cases, the existing evidence seems to be that New York State's FEPC law has reduced prejudice as well as discrimination." He refers to the effectiveness of a fait accompli. "The evidence is most suggestive that the readiness to accept Negroes in a given department by partially prejudiced people is a function of Negroes being there already--which in turn is a result of the employers' conformity with the law."²

Unionization of the Negro Workers in Industries

To the Negro, a most important recent change in

¹Rose, op. cit., pp. 136-137. The California FEPC proposal lost in the election of November, 1948.

²Arnold M. Rose, "You Can't Legislate Against Prejudice,"--or can you?" Common Ground, IX (Spring, 1949), p. 66.

American economy, according to Myrdal and Rose, is the "increased power of labor unions, and particularly their rising importance for unskilled and semi-skilled workers."¹ In the past, their experiences with trade union had been none too good. The growth of industrial unions under the Wagner Act and during the War, and the policy of the more liberal unions, particularly among the CIO unions, offer some hope of combating discrimination regarding employment opportunities, promotion, etc.

According to the study made by Northrup during the 1940-1943 period, a majority of the exclusionist unions are found in the railroad unions.

The American Federation of Labor's expressed policies of racial equality and the effort of the early leaders to adhere to them were short lived. The disappearance of the Knights of Labor as the rival of AFL, and the realization that ideals stood in the way of expansion, put an end to the adherence to the policies of equality. After 1900 the AFL adopted the explicit policy of organizing "negroes into separate locals or directly affiliated "federal" union. The Great Migration of the First World War brought the color question before the AFL conventions. The actions of the 1920, 1921, and 1922 conventions were discriminatory to the Negro members. After the decline in the twenties, trade unionism had a resurgence in the thirties. The Negro labor movement found its spokesman in A. Philip Randolph. But

¹Ibid., p. 131; Myrdal, op. cit., p. 401.

the actions of the AFL have continued, in general (or at least in wide areas), to support the practices of discrimination.¹

The Congress of Industrial Organization has, from the outset, been more consistent in its adherence to its constitutional provision to "bring about the effective organization of the working men and women of America regardless of race, color, creed, or nationality." Northrup observes: "Thus far there can be little doubt that both the CIO and its constituent unions have sedulously adhered to this non-discrimination policy in organizing Negroes."²

Some of these CIO unions, such as United Mine Workers and the United Steelworkers, have succeeded in organizing mixed unions even in the deep South. An instance of the breaking down of the caste structure is indicated by Northrup in the case of the Alabama UMW unions, in which the district leaders advocated the election of whites as presidents and Negroes as vice-presidents. The purpose of this compromise was the feeling that the employers should be accustomed to joint grievance committees before being subjected to the still more caste-breaking experience of having to deal with Negroes as equals. As to the result, Northrup

¹Herbert R. Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro (Harper, 1944), pp. 9-14.

²Ibid., p. 14.

writes:

The results of this policy of gradualism are already discernible. According to a number of informants of both races, "Negro members of grievance committees, who a few years ago would have risked physical violence had they raised their voices in joint union-management meetings, now argue their cases quite as freely as their fellow white members." . . . White members no longer hesitate to call a Negro unionist "brother," to shake hands with Negro delegates without displaying embarrassment. And, now, Negro delegates contribute rather freely to discussion.¹

Some of the concluding remarks that Northrup makes as the result of his survey are pertinent to our study. They indicate the nature of the caste structure, its relationship to the economic organization of the industry involved, and the influence of the ethical stand taken by the leaders of the unions upon the caste practices (or lack of it) of the unions. He found that "unions frequently take the racial employment pattern of an industry as given and make no attempt to alter it." Northrup's description of the formation of more inclusive policies of the industrial type of unions in mass production industries illustrates the cumulative nature of dynamic social causation. He writes:

Unionism could not succeed in the automobile and iron and steel industries until the industrial form of organization was adopted. Since the bargaining strength of industrial unions depends upon their ability to enroll all workers in an industry, and not, like craft unions, upon the extent to which they can monopolize a certain skill, Negroes had to be admitted freely if the steel and automobile workers were to succeed. In order to ensure the cooperation of Negroes, however,

¹Northrup, op. cit., pp. 166-167. "In the deep South, steel union leaders followed the practice which the United Mine Workers had initiated in 1933." Ibid., p. 180.

these organizations had not only to admit them, but they had also to strive to obtain equal treatment for them. This meant they were forced to make an effort to open up occupations to Negroes which were formerly reserved for whites. We thus have an interesting case of the structure of the industries giving unions no choice but to adhere to an equalitarian program in organizing Negroes, which, in turn, led the unions to alter the structure of the industries by causing changes in their racial employment patterns.¹

This industrial type of unionism fosters an equalitarian philosophy and this philosophy strengthens the policy which is in line with its own economic interest.

The exclusionist policies of the railroad brotherhood are promoted by the prevailing caste outlook of its leaders, many of whom were white Southerners. These policies are further strengthened by the diversity of crafts within the industry and the differential between the various levels of jobs. In addition, the fact that the railroad "brotherhoods" have always stressed the fraternal and beneficial aspects of their organization makes them more sensitive to the patterns of caste, in common with the purely "social" organizations such as the lodges, service clubs, and churches. In the consciously held "white man's rank order of discrimination,"² denial of "social equality" stands above the discrimination of a more purely economic nature. Initially, at least, these railroad unions "refused admission to Negroes on the ground that racially mixed unions would mean granting Negroes 'social equality', something which a

¹Northrup, op. cit., pp. 233-234.

²Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 60-61; see pp. 195-197, infra.

majority of members have refused to countenance."¹ This illustrates the manner in which arguments which rank high in the white man's mind are used to rationalize the practices of discrimination which avowedly belong to a lower rank in the order of caste discrimination.

Northrup notes that "Negroes almost invariably fare better when national officers assume charge than they do when such questions as admissions or promotions are left for the local leaders to handle."² The national leaders are more detached and hold a more long-run view of the policies than the local leaders who are subject to the displeasures of the rank and file. Local autonomy and democracy are not, in this instance, synonymous.

On the other hand, Myrdal points out that "the basic weakness of many labor unions in America has been their lack of democracy. The rank and file have been allowed too little influence; they have also cared too little about retaining influence."³ They have been dominated too often by "bosses " and leaders, who care little for the general welfare. The rank and file, too, when they made their influence felt upon the local leaders, often followed their caste feelings rather than the interest of the union or of the community. Myrdal and Rose point out that their pressure for the union shop is a sign of weakness. "But such

¹Northrup, op. cit., p. 235.

²Ibid., p. 237.

³Myrdal, op. cit., p. 406; Rose, op. cit., p. 133.

power [union shop] can be tolerated in a democratic country only if the doors to the unions are kept open and if democratic procedures within the unions are amply protected."¹ Northrup also asserts: "Unions which practice race discrimination in any form should be forbidden to be parties to closed-shop agreements of any sort."²

Although there are forces within the labor movement which tend to strengthen and to perpetuate the caste structure of our society, it appears that in the long run, the labor movement will tend to break down the caste barriers that separate the segments of American life.³

Various "Factors" Contributing to Color Caste

In the course of tracing the historical development of caste stratification involving Negro-white relationships in the United States, particularly in the South, we have noted that various "factors" have entered into the process of the establishing and maintaining of the structure of color caste. We have noted how difficult it is to isolate

¹Rose, op. cit., p. 133; Myrdal, op. cit., p. 407.

²Northrup, op. cit., p. 250.

³Rose summarizes: "Weighing the various factors, however, we are inclined to believe that the growth of unionism will in the long run favor the Negro. Two main reasons for this belief are: (1) that to exclude one group from full participation in the union movement is to put a weapon into the hands of the enemies of trade unionism, which they will know how to use; (2) that the labor market will in all probability be subject to more government control and the national administration will be forced to attempt to defend the Negro's place in the labor market. Rose, op. cit., p. 132.

or even identify these various "factors" even in order to show that these "factors" are inextricably interrelated. We have also mentioned that we believe in the dynamic and cumulative nature of social causation.¹ The notion that "economic factors" are the "basic causes and that others are incidental is rejected. As Myrdal points out:

. . . . it is, indeed, difficult to perceive what precisely is meant by "the economic factor." The Negro's legal and political status and all the causes behind this, considerations by whites of social prestige, and everything else in the Negro problem belong to the causation of discrimination in the labor market, in exactly the same way as the Negro's low economic status is influential in keeping down his health, his educational level, his political power, and his status in other respects. Neither from a theoretical point of view--in seeking to explain the Negro's caste status in American society--nor from a practical point of view--in attempting to assign the strategic points which can most effectively be attacked in order to raise his status--is there any reason, or indeed, any possibility of singling out "the economic factor" as basic. In an interdependent system of dynamic causation there is no "primary cause" but everything is cause to everything else.²

Even a sketchy treatment of the historical development of color caste indicates that it represents a dynamic conjuncture of various forces. This conjuncture has characteristics of a combination of equilibrium and vicious circles.³

By the opening of the modern era, power and cultural

¹See pp. 24-31, supra.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 78. See MacIver, Social Causation, op. cit., pp. 119-120 concerning "Economic factors." He writes: "Even to speak of the 'factors' as interwoven is to assert of each a degree of independence that simplifies and mechanizes their causal interdependence." Ibid. p. 119.

³See pp. 28-30, supra.

differences were already evident--European expansion was coupled with the stagnant cultural status and impotence of the people of Africa, Asia and the Americas. The cultural and power differential was greatly aggravated by the commercial expansion of the sixteenth century and the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The great discoveries worked as precipitants of a series of events that disrupted the social processes. The settlement in the Americas stimulated the slave trade, and the slaves made possible the rapid progress of colonization. The vicious circle operated to widen the cultural, social, and economic distances between the superordinate European whites and the subordinate African Negroes ($D^1 \rightarrow C^1 \rightarrow D^2 \rightarrow C^2$) until a system of chattel slavery was firmly established in the southern part of the newly independent United States. Beliefs and valuations kept pace with the fact of difference. Whites and Negroes were obviously different; whites were the masters and the Negroes were the slaves; whites were white, Negroes were black. Caste was associated with color. Once established, caste status deepened and perpetuated the economic, social, cultural, intellectual and all other distances between the castes. The economic factors connected with the growing of cotton, the technical event of the invention of the cotton gin, contributed in no small measure to the maintenance of slavery. Religion, too, came in for its share in contributing to the establishment and the perpetuation of slavery. First, the slave trade and slavery

were justified by arguing that they helped to bring heathen under the influence of a Christian civilization, and slavery was defended by quotations from the Scriptures. Events settled down to processes;¹ equilibrium was obtained; vicious circle began to function smoothly, $D \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \rightarrow C$, round and round.² The idyllic relationship became a general belief: "the white masters were kind, black slaves were happy"

Then came the great eruption of the Second American Revolution. Various forces held in check burst upon the historical conjuncture. The equilibrium was completely lost. The vicious circle attempted to maintain its direction with suppression and the Black Codes, but soon began to reverse itself. Emancipation and Reconstruction turned the world upside down by the use of Federal troops, collaboration of "carpet-baggers," "scalawags," and freedmen. The political alliance of Northern industrial capitalism and abolitionist sentiment succeeded in maintaining the revolution for a number of years. The formerly dominant group in the South retaliated with violence and intimidation but was not successful until political conditions changed and the occupation forces were withdrawn. Caste took the place of the ante-bellum slavery system. Former conditions were quickly "restored." Negroes were once more "put in their

¹See pp. 24-25, supra.

²See pp. 28-30, supra.

place." Booker T. Washington, in his Atlanta speech in 1895, said: "In all things purely social we can be separate as the five fingers, and yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."¹ Black Codes were written into law. Violence and intimidation and discrimination continued. A whole set of etiquette grew up to enforce and symbolize caste distinctions.² Caste became stabilized, equilibrium maintained, and the vicious circle once again operated smoothly, round and round, every round deepening the caste differential.

Then came the whole gamut of forces, tumbling, one upon another, causes and effects, effects becoming causes of another series of effects, precipitating eruptions and changes--World War, urbanization, mechanization, unionization, FEPC, Civil Rights. Through it all, the vicious circle of caste maintained itself pretty much and spread its pattern and beliefs northward and westward and city-ward. Northern cities with black ghettos developed their own caste structure, based, to be sure, on the pattern established in the southern plantations, but modified and adjusted to their own needs and exigencies. Caste, once firmly established in the value premises of a large section of people, tended to maintain itself against the breakdown of external forces which were of great significance in the causal nexus in establishing caste.

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 641.

²See pp. 207 ff. infra.

Yet, there is a degree of fluidity in the structure of caste. Most important, there are indications that a sense of uncertainty and doubt has crept into the valuations and beliefs held by those who reflect, rather than vigorously assert, the prevailing caste prejudices. This is important from the viewpoint of this paper because of the crucial importance of value premises in the maintenance and change in the social process,¹ and the central interest of Christian ethics in changing value premises.

More specifically, as to the operation of the economic forces in the shaping and maintaining of caste patterns, we noted that economic "factors" are not the sole nor the basic causes. Rather, they form an important part of the conjuncture of various forces that shape the pattern of caste. Political factors also operate in much the same way. We shall have more to say about the "social" factors, socio-psychological factors, and religious factors in subsequent sections of this paper.

Economic forces interact with other forces to determine the form of the caste structure. Gallagher, for example, discovered a significant correlation between cotton and

¹See pp. 90-91; cf. MacIver, Social Causation, op. cit., pp. 307, 332, 333, 337-340, 373, 388, etc. "We have insisted on the primary experimental fact that back of every social change there is a reassessment of a situation by individuals or groups and a readjustment, in terms of that reassessment, of activities relating means to valuations. This is the unifying process that brings into one dynamic synthesis the inner or subjective order of urges, values, and effective goals and the outer orders of environmental reality." Ibid., p. 388.

lynching, that is, between "annual fluctuations in the per acre income of the cotton grower and annual fluctuations in the number of lynchings of Negroes by whites in cotton states."¹ However, he cautions "that all that is given in this Appendix is a rough indication of the fact that, in general, when the economic situation grows more desperate , the deeply grooved habits of social antagonism find overt expression in an increased number of lynchings."² It is out of the social process, characterized by "the deeply grooved habits of social antagonism," that the event of lynching erupts, precipitated by some rumor, lie, or criminal act. The event in turn further deepens the grooves of social antagonism. The adverse economic conditions help to change the balance from less to more tense equilibrium, thus making it more susceptible to eruption by the slightest precipitant. The economic adversity aggravates the aggressive tendencies of "poor whites" by increasing the intensity of their frustration.³

¹Gallagher, American Caste and Negro College, op. cit., p. 383.

²Ibid., p. 397.

³For the discussion of the operation of frustration and aggression psychology, see pp. 317 ff. infra.

CHAPTER V

THE OPERATION OF COLOR CASTE

The Basic Pattern of Color Caste

Arising out of the institution of slavery, maintained through the economic, political, educational, "social" and every other sphere of human relationships in the South, the caste structure separates the white from the Negro. The basic pattern of caste is that all Negroes are lower than the lowest whites. As Gallagher points out: "The white man's floor is the Negro's ceiling."¹ When and if the Negro attains a higher status in regard to wealth or education, which would ordinarily give him a higher social standing, "that progress must be interpreted as an improvement in condition but not in status--the caste line may be dented but it must not be broken."² Etiquette is used effectively to maintain the caste differential.

The Rank Order of Discrimination

Myrdal gives a very useful list which he calls "the white man's rank order of discrimination." This is the arrangement of various types of discrimination ranked according

¹Gallagher, American Caste and Negro College, op. cit., p. 94.

²Ibid., p. 95.

to the degree of closeness to their relation to the anti-amalgamation doctrines as given by white Southerners.

Rank 1: the bar against intermarriage and sexual intercourse involving white women.

Rank 2: the several etiquettes and discriminations, which specifically concern behavior in personal relations. (These are the barriers against dancing, bathing, eating, drinking together, and social intercourse generally; house entrance to be used, social forms when meeting on streets and in work, peculiar rules as to handshaking, hat lifting, use of titles, and so forth. These patterns are some times referred to as the denial of "social equality" in the narrow meaning of the term.)

Rank 3: the segregation and discrimination in use of public facilities such as school, churches and means of conveyance.

Rank 4: political disfranchisement.

Rank 5: discriminations in law courts, by the police, and by other public servants.

Rank 6: the discriminations in securing land, credit, jobs, or other means of earning a living, and discriminations in public relief and other social welfare activities.¹

Myrdal notes "that the rank order is very apparently determined by the factors of sex and social status, so that the closer association of a type of interracial behavior is to sexual and social intercourse on an equalitarian basis, the higher it ranks among the forbidden things."²

Myrdal finds "that the Negro's own rank order is . . . just about parallel, but inverse, to that of the white man."³ The Negro resists the economic discrimination most vigorously. He is almost indifferent to the barriers of intermarriage, except as it represents the white man's belief of Negro inferiority and is used to bolster all the other

¹Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

²Ibid., p. 61.

³Loc. cit.

practices of discrimination.

The Bar Against Intermarriage

The bar against intermarriage, more specifically the marriage between white women and Negro men, ranks highest in the white man's order of discrimination and enters into almost every discussion of interracial relations. No matter what phase of this problem is being discussed, the question almost always appears: "Would you like your daughter or sister to marry a Negro?" The primary importance of the question of amalgamation, as Gallagher points out, "lies in the fact that it is a powerful emotional block to clear thought and constructive action in the field of race."¹

The Negroes, whose rank order of protest against discrimination is roughly inverse to that of the whites, hold rather "distant and doubtful interest" in this matter of intermarriage.² Amalgamation, at least for a very long time, does not necessarily bring about the end of color caste. As long as there is color differential, there is a ground for color caste. "It is not color, but caste based on color, that is the seat of the iniquity."³

Miscegenation

From even a superficial observation of a number of Negro people, it is quite obvious that some sort of inter-

¹Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 161.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 61. See also Margaret Halsey, Color Blind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), pp. 122-123.

³Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 161.

mixture of races has been taking place. The results of the study of M. J. Herskovits, who checked the genealogies given by the Negro persons with the anthropometric measurements of nose width, sitting height, lip thickness, and skin color, are summarized by Louis Wirth and Herbert Goldhamer in the following table:¹

TABLE 2

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS IN GENEEOLOGICAL CLASSES
(Herskovits)

	Number	Percentage	Combined Percentage
Unmixed Negro	342	22.0	
Negro, mixed with Indian	97	6.3	28.3
More Negro than white	384	24.8	
More Negro than white, with Indian	106	6.9	31.7
About same amount of Negro and white	260	16.7	
About same amount of Negro and white with Indian	133	8.5	25.2
More white than Negro	154	9.3	
More white than Negro with Indian	75	5.5	14.8
Total	1,652	100.0	100.0

Wirth and Goldhamer maintain that Herskovits' "investigation provides the safest basis for a present estimation."²

¹Louis Wirth and Herbert Goldhamer, "The Hybrid and the Problem of Miscegenation," Characteristics of the American Negro, ed. by Otto Klineberg (New York: Harper, 1944), p. 270.

²Ibid., p. 271.

If according to this estimate, only 22.0 per cent of "Negroes" are unmixed Negroes and 28.3 per cent have no white ancestry, and the rest (71.7 per cent) have white ancestry, it is evident that a great deal of miscegenation has occurred between the whites and the Negroes. Miscegenation is continuing, not only between the Negroes and the mixed Negro-whites, but between the whites and the Negroes and between the whites and the Negro-whites.

It is only the arbitrary operation of the caste system, which places all the offspring of miscegenation involving Negroes in the Negro caste, that "insures" the "purity" of what is called the white race. The white race is certainly involved in intermixture with the Negro race. If the white parents, or at least if all the white fathers, had taken their offsprings into their own caste, there would be fewer members in the Negro caste, and the white group would show decided modification.¹

The caste taboo is extremely strong against intermixture involving white women, but is lax concerning those involving Negro women. In fact, it is one of the features of the caste pattern to give the Negro women no safeguards against the encroachments of the white male. Under this caste practice, most of the intermixtures between whites and

¹"It should be clear, of course, that the offspring of Negro-white miscegenation represent equally modification of white and Negro characters. It is because such offspring are socially classified as "Negroes" that the physical modifications are found only in the Negro group."
Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 254, n. 2.

Negroes involve white males. Under slavery, concubinage of Negro women was common. With no legal protection, and with no protection by Negro men possible, Negro females were easy prey of sexual exploitation by white males.¹ During the period immediately following the Civil War until near the end of the century, miscegenation increased considerably.² Subsequently irregular racial intermixture declined radically.³ Powdermaker writes: "With the increasing irregularity of intra-white sexual relationships has come a marked decrease in Negro-White relationships. . . . Popular sentiment against Negro-White co-habitation is increasing on both sides. . . . On the Negro side, increasing race pride and demand for respect undoubtedly strengthen the feeling against Negro-White sex relations."⁴ The more stable relationship of white men having Negro mistresses has also declined. But Dollard cautions "that a rising social pressure has brought people to exaggerate the actual decline in these patterns since slavery days."⁵

The Negroes who are powerless to protect their wo-

¹Ibid., p. 263-238; Everett V. Stonequist, "Race Mixture and the Mulatto," Race Relations and the Race Problem, op. cit., pp. 254-255.

²Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 273; Stonequist, op. cit., pp. 257-258.

³Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 273.

⁴Hortense Powdermaker, After Freedom (New York: Viking, 1939), pp. 195-196.

⁵John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1937), p. 143.

men¹ particularly resent the exploitation of Negro women. The exaggerated legal and "social" bar against Negro encroachment on white womanhood aggravates this feeling. For example, Du Bois protests:

I shall forgive the white South much in its final judgment day: I shall forgive slavery its so-called "pride of race" But one thing I shall never forgive: its wanton and continued and persistent insulting of the black womanhood which it sought and seeks to prostitute to its lust.²

In all the iniquities of caste, this travesty of justice, fairness, decency and human dignity is the most repugnant from the standpoint of morality, either Christian or humanitarian.

Dollard suspects the presence of fear of retaliation behind the Southern white males' preoccupation with Negro males' supposed sexual designs toward the white females. The sexual taboos of caste operate both to hide the white man's fear of retaliation and their guilt feeling for their attack on Negro women, and to insure his accessibility

¹"In actual situations observed in Southerntown and Old City, this taboo meant that a Negro man could not attack a white man who sought out his wife or daughter. He must submit and let the woman go if she wishes. . . . The great value which the white man attaches to his cross caste sexual privileges is indicated by the persistence with which he defends them. Allison Davis and John Dollard, Children of Bondage (Washington: American Council on Educ., 1940), pp. 245-246.

²W. E. B. Du Bois, Darkwater (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Howe, 1920).

of the Negro women.¹

Margaret Halsey, moreover, suspects strongly that the nonprimitive, sexually inhibited white males are jealous of Negro males, whom they suppose to be more primitive and less inhibited.² Dollard and Halsey suspect also the fear and jealousy of the Southern white males that Negro males may be sexually attractive to the white women.³

Thus, it is not the interracial intermixture that is opposed in actual practice but the intercaste marriage, or rather, marriage or sex relations outside the caste pattern, that is so strenuously opposed. Thirty states prohibit marriage between a Negro and a white person.⁴

"Passing"

Under the present caste pattern the only way a person "belonging," or rather, placed in the lower caste can enter the upper caste is by "passing," either occasionally (or segmentally) or completely, voluntarily or involuntarily. That this entails "deception" and attempts of those who "pass" to justify their actions⁵ reflects only the

¹Dollard, Caste and Class, op. cit., pp. 163-164.

²Margaret Halsey, Color Blind (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946), pp. 89-120.

³Ibid., pp. 101-105. See Dollard, Color and Caste, op. cit., p. 170.

⁴Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 363. However, a recent ruling of the California Supreme Court declared the provisions of the Civil Code prohibiting intermarriage (CC 69: 69a) unconstitutional. Perez vs. Lippold, 198 Pacific Reporter 2nd 17 (1948).

⁵Cf. Ibid. Chapter V, "Passing," pp. 301-319.

immorality of the caste structure in which the whites (of this generation) condemn their own descendants (or more accurately, their ancestors) into such positions of disadvantage and degradation, so that these descendants of white ancestors seek to gain by "stealth" what is (or should be) their birthright. It is quite evident that only those who have at least one-half of white ancestry can "pass." The usual estimates are much higher.¹

The iniquity of caste operates not only to condemn Negroes to positions of deprivation but also those who are biologically almost purely white² into the position of "deceiving" in order to obtain what is only justice. This is not to condone the discrimination against the persons of

¹"There appears to be a tendency on the part of some writers to exaggerate the amount of white ancestry required before a physical type is produced which makes passing possible. Thus Reuter states that 'persons with an eighth or less of Negro blood are quite commonly able to pass as white in a society that is not highly discriminating.' That current estimates possibly exaggerate the amount of white ancestry required to those who pass is suggested by the fact that of 35 Negroes who passed as white in the 346 families studied by Day, 16 were $\frac{1}{4}$ Negro (quadroons), 15 were $\frac{3}{8}$ Negro, and 4 were $\frac{1}{2}$ Negro (mulattos). These data are especially valuable since they concern persons who did not merely pass occasionally but 'who had completely lost their racial identity' and most of whom had married white persons. Day also emphasized that she knows of no case of a quadroon who could not easily pass for white." Wirth and Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 308. Citations are from E. B. Reuter, *Race Mixture* (New York, 1931), p. 55; Caroline Bond Day, *A Study of Some Negro-white Families in the United States*, Vol X, *Harvard African Studies* (Cambridge, 1932), pp. 10-11.

²Wirth and Goldhamer, speak of "near-white Negroes" without quotation marks. *Op. cit.*, p. 305 etc. As designation of race (biological) this is exactly like saying "near-white black." It brings into sharp focus the difference between biological and caste definition of the Negro.

other than white race at all. But in the disapproval or condemnation of "passing" is concentrated all that is illogical, iniquitous, and inhuman in the operation of caste. The silences of the social scientists concerning this phase of evil is overwhelming.¹ If there were no discrimination in employment, segregation in residence, exclusions in theaters, hotels and restaurants, there would be no "passing," for there would be no occasion, need or motive for it. "Passing" is purely and simply a function of caste, and it exposes the evil of caste in its grossest form.

To the great majority of those who "pass," namely, those whose ancestry is predominantly white, it involves no more "deception" to declare themselves white (which is biologically true) than to declare themselves to be Negro (which is biologically untrue). Their deception arises only out of the recognition of caste and disregard of ancestry.² From the standpoint of philosophical or rational ethics, it would

¹Cf. Wirth and Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, pp. 301-319; Myrdal, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-130, 133-134, 675, 683-688, 308, 1207-1208, etc. Even an outspoken writer like Gallagher writes in uncharacteristic understatement: "Whatever urge there is to encourage the passing of individuals from the lower to the higher caste is more a responsibility of the white than of the Negro." Gallagher, Color and Conscience, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

²An attack on "passing" by appeal to race pride is of dubious ethical validity. It is true, that under the present caste and power configuration, race pride of the subordinate caste, like the nationalistic spirit of the colonial peoples, is more defensible and less anachronistic historically (having some liberating function). But at best, its value and validity are negative. At any rate, it is a curious phenomenon of caste to be proud of one's race, when one is only one-fourth or one-eighth of that race.

be no more wrong to "deceive" in one realm than the other. From the standpoint of dynamic Christian ethics, it is more defensible to "deceive" concerning caste, the accommodation to which is morally doubtful at best, than to be untrue about one's ancestry.

Intermarriage

There are many myths concerning racial intermixtures, such as the myth of the "black baby."¹ But as Gallagher concludes: "whatever arguments there may be against the marriage of persons from different castes, these arguments are not founded on sound scientific data drawn from verified biological, physiological, psychological, and anthropological research."²

However, this is not to assert as a general principle that intercaste marriages should be encouraged. Marriage is difficult enough without the added complications of social ostracism and cultural adjustment. These complications are part and parcel of caste which controls social relationships in our society. They must be taken into consideration realistically. Due consideration must be given to the welfare of the children of intercaste union and the life

¹Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit., p. 329; they refer to Edward M. East, Heredity and Human Affairs (New York: 1929), p. 100, also to E. A. Hooton, in C. B. Day, op. cit., p. 107.

²Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 170. Cf. Wirth and Goldhamer, op. cit., pp. 320-329.

of the family thus established.¹ But although society is rightly concerned in the success and harmony of the marital relationships of its members, marriage is primarily a personal matter. It is for the two parties concerned to make the decision. The State has no moral right to restrict marriage by race or caste barriers.

Interracial, or rather, intercaste, marriage should not be entered into in a spirit of defiance or crusade. Protest can be registered and crusades launched in other areas of social relationship much more effectively and with a great deal less risk to the personalities involved than by this method. Neither should marriage be rejected solely on account of the caste factor. There may be strong overriding forces, such as love, common interests, mutual respect, that

¹The hatred of the children against the Caucasian parent is often mentioned. (See Gallagher, Color and Conscience, p. 171, also Buell G. Gallagher, Portrait of a Pilgrim (New York: Friendship Press, 1946), p. 106). These children, however, have no more ground for complaint than millions of children of Negro or mixed parentage. They are often better off than other children of Negro parentage. In any case, they would not have been born except for that particular marriage. The fear is based on several fallacies that arise out of the caste situation: (1) That somehow these children would have been born white had the white parent married a white person. Children of white parents are white, of course, but they would not be these children, anymore than they would be their half-brothers if the white parent divorced and married a white spouse. (2) That only the white partner in marriage is of any concern. (3) That only the white half of the children's ancestry is of any concern. This is part of caste ideology. Nevertheless, as long as we live in a caste society, this condition obtains. Hatred can be and is real even if unfounded. Therefore, persons involved must take these factors into consideration. However, this, as any other part of the taboos against intermarriage, is surmountable, given a great deal of clear thinking and common sense. Here is (i.e. requirement of clear thinking and common sense) another argument against intermarriage as protest or crusade against caste.

overcome these difficulties of caste.

The family is the foundation of human fellowship. Therefore marriage is not to be entered into by any unadvisedly, but reverently, discreetly, and in the love of God. . . .

Love and loyalty alone will avail as the foundation of a happy and enduring home.¹

In the making of this decision, perhaps more than any other, the exercise of what MacIver calls dynamic assessment becomes imperative.

It must be emphasized again that the important fact about the intermarriage question is not that many people seriously contemplate it, but that it serves "as a scarecrow to divert attention and thought from the injustices and iniquities of caste."²

Social Segregation and the Etiquette of Caste

Closely following the bar against intermarriage are denials of equality in other areas of "social" relations. Social, used in this sense, has a narrower but more popular usage and signifies personal relations, especially those of a more intimate sort. Social segregation and discrimination are practiced more rigidly in the South, but are by no means absent from the North and the West.

Social Segregation and "Jim Crow"

Whites often assert that Negroes prefer "to be among

¹From the Methodist order for the solemnization of matrimony (an older form, slightly modified in more recent orders). The Methodist Hymnal (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1935), p. 540,

²Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 172.

themselves." But whether they do so as a form of caste accommodation and discrimination or not, "social segregation and discrimination is a system of deprivations forced upon the Negro group by the white group."¹ It is essentially one-sided, although in a real sense whites are bound by the rules of segregation by etiquette as well as by law.¹

Howard Thurman points out that it is a peculiar characteristic of segregation to enable "the stronger to shuttle back and forth between the prescribed areas with complete immunity and a kind of mutually tacit sanction; while the position of the weaker, on the other hand, is quite definitely fixed and frozen."² This is part of the pattern of caste. But even the whites, or particularly the whites, are not to challenge Jim Crow practices themselves. The participants of the "Journey of Reconciliation" discovered that "persons who did not wish to see change, particularly the bus driver, became more angry with the white participants than with the Negroes."³

The practice of social segregation and discrimination, as did other phases of caste pattern, grew out of slavery. Emancipation, or more strictly, Reconstruction, started to break down the basis of social inequality. "The Civil Rights

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 575.

²Howard Thurman, Jesus and the Disinherited (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1949), p. 42.

³George Houser and Bayard Rustin, We Challenged Jim Crow (New York: FOR-CORE, 1947), p. 13.

Bill of 1875 was explicit in declaring that all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States should be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land and water, theaters, and other places of public amusement; applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of previous condition of servitude."¹ After Restoration, however, the doctrine of white supremacy and the dogma that Negroes "should be kept in their place" became predominant in the South. After the Supreme Court in 1883 declared the Civil Rights Bill of 1875 unconstitutional, Jim Crow legislation began to appear. "For a quarter of a century this system of statutes and regulations--separating the two groups in schools, on railroad cars and on street cars, in hotels and restaurants, in parks and playgrounds, in theaters and public meeting places--continued to grow with the explicit purpose of diminishing, as far as was practicable and possible, the social contacts between whites and Negroes in the region."² Connected with this practice is a theory of "separate but equal" doctrine. The President's committee on Civil Rights recently exposed the widely recognized farce of this theory. "The separate but equal doctrine has failed," the Committee declared categorically.³ Hypocritical as these doctrines are, yet they have

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 579.

²Ibid., p. 579.

³"To Secure These Rights: The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights," op. cit., p. 23.

proved to be entering wedges for demands of equality. In a series of recent rulings of the Supreme Court, southern states are being forced to provide graduate schools and professional schools for Negroes at the risk of being forced to accept Negroes in white schools.¹

Supporting the denial of "social equality" is the allegation that all Negroes are "by nature" inferior to the whites.² This solidity of the caste lines, which ignores the class differences within the Negro caste, is strengthened by the Jim Crow laws, and to a somewhat less degree by etiquette. The belief is buttressed by the theory that Negro subordination is part of God's creation.³ The actual condition of caste subordination is used as further proof of the order of creation. So the vicious circle of caste substantiates discrimination by discrimination.

Concerning these rationalizations, especially relative to intermarriage, Myrdal observes "that what white people really want is to keep the Negroes in a lower status."

¹For example, a student at the University of Arkansas reports of Negro students admitted to the University's Law School in the Spring and Fall of 1948. The student is segregated in a classroom in the basement of the School, but because of the overcrowded conditions, some of the white students are allowed to attend the Negro's classes. The Negro student was given a desk in the corner behind a railing "which was later removed." A Negro girl "was admitted to the School of Medicine at Little Rock, entirely without segregation." William T. Shelton, "Segregation failed in Arkansas U." The Intercollegian, LXVI (January, 1949), 15-16.

²For discussion of the inferiority of Negroes, see pp. 339-444, infra.

³For discussion of racial differences as God's creation, see pp. 81-85, supra.

'Intermarriage' itself is resented because it would be a supreme indication of 'social equality,' while the rationalization is that 'social equality' is opposed because it would bring 'intermarriage.'"¹ (*italics his.*)

The Etiquette of Caste

Besides the formal and legal statement of the relationship between the superordinate and the subordinate castes, there has grown up a comprehensive system of etiquette within the caste structure of society to regulate the relationship between castes in a less formal, but no less binding, way. As the pattern of caste itself, it grew up from the days of slavery.²

Robert E. Parks states that "etiquette is the very essence of caste, since the prestige of a superior always involves the respect of an inferior."³ The function of etiquette, according to Parks, is to define and maintain "social distances."⁴ Through this device, it was possible to maintain the most intimate relationships between the master and slave, between the employer and domestic servant, "provided the social ritual defining and maintaining the caste relationship was maintained in its integrity."⁵

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 591; Rose, op. cit., pp. 196-197.

²Cf. Bertram W. Doyle, The Etiquette of Race Relations in the South (Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1937),

³Robert E. Park, "Introduction," Doyle, ibid. p. xx.

⁴Ibid., p. xviii.

⁵Ibid., p. xix.

Etiquette goes deeper than the more formal expressions of caste. Doyle, in the light of a thoroughgoing research on the subject of the etiquette of race relations in the South, writes: "The government exerted by etiquette is not only more elementary than legislation, it also precedes, goes along with, and continues after laws and set rules."¹

Myrdal regards etiquette as an effect of the lack of sanction for intermarriage and characterizes it as "the regimentation of the whole gamut of contacts between adult members of the two races so that these contacts will be as impersonal as possible." He observes: "This ceremonious attitude in race relations is especially striking when we consider that the American tends to be uncereemonious in all his other relations."² For the purpose of this paper, it will suffice to note a few samples of etiquette being observed.

The highest rank in the order of sensitivity or insistence next to purely sexual relations are intimate relations implying erotic advances by Negro males to white females. These are never tolerated. Dancing and swimming together are usually prohibited even outside the South.³

The taboo against eating together forms the "main symbol of social inequality."⁴ This is "one of the strongest

¹Doyle, op. cit., p. 11.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 607.

³Ibid., p. 608.

⁴Ibid., p. 608.

of the taboos and is rarely broken in the South, for eating together carries a strong suggestion of social intimacy which is universally banned."¹ Drinking together evidently is not strongly proscribed as is dining together.² In the North and West, these taboos operate in a spotty fashion.³ Interracial use of toilets, drinking fountains, and rest rooms seems to be tolerated to a greater degree than eating together.⁴ Playing together appears to be associated with the sex taboo, for children play together freely until puberty.⁵

One of the most curious customs (to a non-southerner) is that of the taboo against using "Mr." and "Mrs." and "Miss" for Negroes. Johnson summarizes this taboo as follows:

All Negroes in the South know that they will not be called "Mr." or "Mrs." With few exceptions they expect to be called by their first names in most places and situations. Occasionally the men are called by their last names; and this is regarded as a limited effort to show improvement.⁶

Very often exaggerated titles of "doctor," "professor," or

¹Charles S. Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation (New York: Harper, 1943), p. 143. "When absolutely necessary some device such as laying a stick across the boat in which men were fishing all day, or more commonly, serving meals on separate tables at private homes, is used to demonstrate the observance of this taboo." Ibid., p. 143.

²Ibid., p. 145; Myrdal, op. cit., p. 609.

³Cf. George M. Houser, Erasing the Color Line, rev. ed. (New York: Fellowship Publications, 1947), pp. 15-24.

⁴Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 609-610.

⁵Ibid., p. 610; cf. Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation, op. cit., pp. 145-146.

⁶Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation, op. cit. p.139.

"reverend," is used "to show a little respect without going beyond the etiquette."¹ The use of "Sir" does not designate the recognition of status.² The Negroes, on the other hand, are expected to address all white persons regardless of class as "Mr.," "Mrs.," or "Miss," especially if other white persons are present.³ The motive of gaining the business patronage of Negroes, especially in competition with mail order houses, occasionally serves to lead some whites to disregard the taboo against "Mr."⁴

While conversing with whites, the traditional pattern is for Negroes to keep their eyes to the ground, to scrape the ground with the foot, never to contradict the white man, and to talk in a roundabout manner. The Negro is to use deferential tones and words, while the white man uses condescending tones and words. The purpose of the etiquette of conversation, like all other expressions of the caste pattern, is to provide a continual demonstration of the Negro's inferiority of status and his recognition of that inferiority.⁵

The Negro may sit down in the same room with white persons if the latter invites him. In public places, such

¹Ibid., pp. 139, 141; Myrdal, op. cit., p. 611.

²Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation, op. cit., p. 139.

³Ibid., p. 137.

⁴Ibid., p. 143; Myrdal, op. cit., 611.

⁵Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 611-613.

as conferences, conventions, courtrooms, and theaters, seating arrangements are segregated.¹ Even in some areas in the North such practices are maintained.²

The white man may offer to shake hands with the Negro but not vice versa. In most parts of the South, on most occasions Negroes must enter the white man's house by the rear door. When a white man enters a Negro's house, he must not show any signs of ordinary respect: he enters without knocking and keeps his hat on.

The observance of the etiquette is by no means absolute or universal. But in the South, especially in relationships which might imply social equality, observance is sufficiently widespread and binding to control a great deal of the contact between the two castes.³

Concerning the significance of the rigidly enforced etiquette of race relations in the South, Doyle quotes Parks, who writes:

¹Ibid., pp. 612-613.

²For example, the CORE (Committee on Racial Equality) is constantly fighting segregations in theatres in Northern and Western cities. See Houser, op. cit., pp. 39-45.

³Doyle's book is full of illustrations of departure from the strict uniformity of the requirements of the etiquette. In this connection Warner and Davis point out: "In summary, one can say that where caste is supposed to be found in its most ideal form, India, it is not a rigidly organized, highly formalistic system with invariant rules of behavior but a variety of social systems which tend to recognize rules of endogamy, of descent, and of certain restrictions of relations which help preserve a not too rigidly organized rank order of relations. It must also be emphasized that constant change is the rule rather than the exception." W. Lloyd Warner and Allison Davis, "A Comparative Study of American Caste," Thompson, (ed.) op. cit., pp. 231-232.

This is the significance of the ceremonial and social ritual so rigidly enforced in the South, by which racial distinctions are preserved amid all the inevitable changes and promiscuity of an expanding industrial and democratic society. While etiquette and ceremonial are at once a convenience and a necessity in facilitating human intercourse, they serve even more effectively to preserve the rank and order of individuals and classes which seems to be essential to social organization and effective collective action.¹

While it seems to be true that that is the way etiquette operates in a caste society, it does not seem necessary to assume or conclude from the observance that therefore this particular caste system is "necessary" or "essential." The very fact that it is considered essential and necessary to preserve the rank and order of caste relationship makes it the more vicious, if we take the ethical view that caste is un-American and un-Christian. The very "peaceful"² and "spontaneous"³ nature of its operation makes the etiquette the more pervading and the more oppressive. The etiquette does not, however, even serve to eliminate conflict situations by accommodation, as Doyle asserts,⁴ but rather, as

¹Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1361 (n. 8 on p. 607).

²"Relations which develop between persons in a moral order--that is, in an order where conduct is traditional and customary--are more fixed and lasting, as well as more peaceful, than those established by reason or fiat." (Underlines mine) Doyle, op. cit., p. 11.

³Ibid., p. 172. One with anti-status quo bias cannot read, however casually, Doyle's thesis without noticing the influence of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner and Doyle's strong bias toward the status quo. Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., Appendix 2, p. 1056.

⁴"Conflict prevents the cooperation which is necessary, even if at all times it seems not to be desired. Cooperation is, however, only possible when conflict ceases and accommodation occurs. In most cases, then, accommodation

Myrdal points out, it is a source of embitterment and humiliation, maintained only to avoid violence. The enforced conformity to the etiquette increases, rather than dissipates, resentment and fear in the Negro caste.¹ Emancipation does not lie in using the forms and playing at the practice "as at an amusing game,"² but only in the elimination of caste and caste etiquette. If conformity to etiquette is considered necessary for survival, then, from an ethical point of view, it should be recognized as a compromise and a defeat. Trying to "play the game," by pretending it is a game, and supposing that it does not affect the personality only strengthens the hold of caste upon society, while defeating the hopes of a society without caste. A combination of realistic and dynamic assessment³ of the conjuncture of forces involved, and a realistic and dynamic concept of sin and social guilt⁴ is necessary to grasp the "existential" involvement of oneself, even a

ensues when the Negro assumes the status generally assigned to him and when he accepts the forms of behavior commonly expected of him. That is to say, a reversion to the mode of expected and accepted forms of behavior is generally calculated to solve situations where conflict exists in racial relations. For, by preserving the rank and precedence of persons, etiquette makes effective social action possible." Doyle, op. cit., p. 170. It would seem that social action is unnecessary if one is to accept rank and caste.

¹Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1361 (n. 8 on p. 607).

²Doyle, op. cit., p. 168.

³See p. 26, supra.

⁴See pp. 85-112, supra.

passive participant, in such a compromising situation. A single dimensional, legalistic, or rationalistic or absolutist attitude will not suffice. Neither will simple protest or simple conformity to the status quo. One must be wise as a serpent and harmless as a dove. One must be both "hardheaded" and "softhearted."¹

Residential Segregation

Just as sexual segregation is basic to "social" and other forms of caste segregation psychologically, residential segregation is basic in a physical sense. Ecological, or spatial segregation according to race or caste, in its most drastic form, is the concentration camp of the Nazi or American brand, the latter euphoniously called "Assembly" or "Relocation" Centers for Japanese and Americans of Japanese descent in World War II. Indian reservations differ from these mainly in the size of the area and the degree of restriction of temporary or permanent leave. The residential segregation based upon caste or color or ethnic origin, and enforced by law, covenant or custom, is a modification of these more confining forms of spatial segregation.

Housing segregation is basic to the whole pattern of segregation and other forms of discrimination. Schools, churches, hospitals, and various other institutions achieve segregation at least in part because of residential segregation. It also diminishes even the most casual types of con-

¹Cf. Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., pp. 16-20.

tact between the castes thus separated physically. Residential segregation further limits professional, business, and other forms of interracial contacts because in segregated areas all the day-to-day functions tend to be performed by the members of the segregated group.

This problem of segregation in housing is more important to the areas outside the South, where legal and political restrictions and the etiquette of caste do not generally operate. The differentiation of caste status must be maintained, if caste is to be maintained, by the use of means other than Jim Crow laws and the etiquette. In many Northern and Western states, Civil Rights Laws specifically prohibit discrimination in public places.¹ Thus, one of the most effective methods of establishing and maintaining a caste pattern outside the South has been that of keeping the Negroes "in their place," that is, in their part of town.

¹The following eighteen states have Civil Rights acts: Calif., Colo., Conn., Ill., Ind., Ia., Kans., Mass., Mich., Minn., Neb., N. J., N. Y., Ohio., Penn., R. I., Wash., and Wis. Myrdal, op. cit. p. 1366 (n. 34, p. 630).

California State Law on Rights of Citizens reads as follows:

RIGHTS OF CITIZENS IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION OR AMUSEMENT (Division 1, Pt. 2, Sec. 51)

"All citizens within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of inns, restaurants, hotels, eating houses, places where ice cream or soft drinks of any kind are sold for consumption on the premise, barber shops, bath houses, theatres, skating rinks, public conveyances and all other places of public accommodation or amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to all citizens."

Section 52 provides for the penalty of "not less than one hundred dollars," for whoever "aids, incites, such denial [of sec. 51] or whoever makes any discrimination, distinction or restriction on account of color or race."

This is not to assert that residential segregation has been "planned" nor that it is enforced by the military or police force. The forces tending to concentrate ethnic groups have been: (1) poverty, which tends to concentrate all the poorer families, which a large percentage of recent immigrants and Negroes; (2) ethnic attachment; and (3) enforcement of segregation by the dominant caste.

Concerning the preference of the Negroes to be together, Robert C. Weaver emphasizes, "to the limited extent that it is true, is a most damning indictment of segregation. It illustrates the fact that people who live in ghettos become ghetto-minded; chauvinism grows among them, becoming a serious impediment to national unity and often expressing itself in an anti-white attitude."¹

The methods employed in enforcing residential segregation have been: zoning ordinances, restrictive covenants, social pressure, and acts of violence. The first legal attempt to enforce segregation was taken in 1910 when an ordinance was passed in Baltimore, Maryland.² Many cities followed suit. In 1917 the Louisville ordinance was invalidated by

¹Robert C. Weaver, "Northern Ways," Thomas Sancton, special editor, Segregation. Twelfth in Calling America series, Survey Graphic, XXXVI (January, 1947), 43.

²However, Johnson writes: "In 1890 San Francisco passed the first race segregation ordinance of this sort; but the ordinance, which required all Chinese inhabitants to move from the area theretofore occupied by them to another part of the city, was declared void in court, as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and the treaty with China. Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation, op. cit., p. 173.

the United States Supreme Court,¹ but there were subsequent attempts to enforce segregation by city ordinances. As late as 1940 test cases had to be carried to the Supreme Court to invalidate these zoning ordinances.²

After the failure of the zoning restrictions, the racial restrictive covenant became the primary legal means of enforcing segregation. Tom C. Clark, the Attorney General of the United States, describes these covenants as follows:

In form, these covenants restrict either (a) sale, lease, conveyance to, or ownership by, any member of an excluded group or (b) use or occupancy by any member of that group, or (c) both ownership and use or occupancy. . . . Racial restrictions are sometimes inserted in deeds, but often embodied in written agreements between a group of neighborhood landowners, which are then officially recorded so as to give due notice to all subsequent purchasers or occupants.³

Interested persons and organizations have tested the validity of the restrictive covenants for a quarter of a century. In the most recent cases, the Justice Department submitted a brief amicus curiae, as did church and civic groups. The Attorney General referred not only to legal precedents⁴,

¹Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60.

²Clinard v. City of Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, cited in Sternner, Negro's Share, op. cit., p. 207. Cf. Johnson, Patterns of Negro Segregation, op. cit., p. 173, 176; Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 623-624.

³Tom C. Clark and Philip B. Perlman, Prejudice and Property (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1946) pp. 11-12.

⁴Such as Buchanan v. Warley, Hirabayashi v. United States, Korematsu v. United States, Corrigan v. Buckley.

national policies,¹ international agreements,² but also such sociological and ethical considerations as the effects on public health,³ delinquency, and race hostilities.

The Supreme Court ruled in the Shelley v. Kraemer Case (1948) that the courts cannot enforce the racial restrictive covenants.⁴ Thus one of the most effective weapons of residential segregation was removed. However, the restrictive covenants as such are not prohibited. Moreover other means of residential segregation are still available, such as social pressure, "gentlemen's agreements" and "codes of ethics" among the real estate agents, and out-and-out violence to person and property.⁵

In this area of residential segregation, as in others, the vicious circle operates. The restrictions of residence are maintained by the prejudice of the whites against living next to Negroes, and causes the overcrowding of the Ne-

¹Cf. Clark and Perlman, op. cit., pp. 68-70.

²Such as the United Nations, Inter-American Conference, Ibid., pp. 70-72.

³The Surgeon General of the United States Public Health Service wrote: "To the extent that racial restrictive housing would deny a citizen the opportunity to provide for himself a sanitary and healthful environment, such covenants would, in my view, be prejudicial to the public health." Letter of Surgeon General Thomas Parran to the Department of Justice, dated October 13, 1947. Quoted in Ibid., p. 31.

⁴Shelley v. Kraemer, 16 LW 4426; Chief Justice Vinson, delivering the opinion of the Court, pointed out "that the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court"

⁵Weaver, "Northern Ways," op. cit., p. 45.

groes and pressure for expansion. This in turn strengthens the fear of the whites and stiffens their resistance. The increasing congestion and neglect increase crime and unsanitary conditions which support the prejudice of the whites, and builds in the Negroes fatalistic and defeatist attitudes toward sanitation, decency of appearance, which further confirms the prejudice of the whites. Whites maintain restrictive covenants for the fear of the loss of property value. When the Negroes do move in, the property value drops because the whites move out, thus further "proving" that the fear was well-founded.¹ The properties which are "oldest and most obsolete" deteriorate further through neglect. Large number of boarders and lodgers are kept because of high rents, the pressure of population, and the low income of most of the families in the area. "The intense congestion has its effects not only upon family privacy and family organization but also upon the schools and other public institutions."² Thus residential segregation, whether enforced by restrictive covenants or not, functions to make the discriminated minority more undesirable and gives the dominant caste more "reasons" for discrimination.

In order to combat residential caste segregation,

¹Once the Negroes have moved into the area, however, the property value usually rises again. The Negroes, who are hemmed in and whose rental possibilities are severely restricted by residential segregation, bid up the rents and greatly increase the rental revenues which can be obtained by the landlords with very little costs of upkeep.

²Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People vs. Property? (Nashville: Fisk Univ. Press, 1947), pp. 2-4.

a basic change in value premises held by the dominant caste is necessary along with changes in more external conditions. In the words of the Lord in Aunt Julie's dream: "If you'd changed the human values--which, since you were a human being, nobody was better fitted to do--the real estate values would automatically have adjusted themselves."¹

Now that the fight to end the court enforcement of restrictive covenants is won, attention must be directed toward other forms of enforced residential segregation and toward a more comprehensive meeting of housing needs, particularly for the group most in need.

The Unequal Administration of Justice

On a number of occasions we have already referred to the inequality in the administration of justice in the South. Out of the heritage of slavery, a whole system of legal procedure based upon caste has been established. Practically all public officials in the South are whites, who not only share the white man's attitude toward the Negroes, but who in a peculiar fashion stand for law and order defined in terms of the doctrine of "white supremacy." It is part of the function of the policeman to punish the infraction of the caste etiquette.² They are also watchdogs against

¹From Margaret Halsey, Some of My Best Friends Are Soldiers, quoted in Department of Race Relations, American Missionary Association (New York: Board of Home Missions of the Congregational and Christian Churches) p. 8.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 537.

"social equality." "There are practically no curbs to the policeman's aggressiveness when he is dealing with Negroes whom he conceives of as dangerous or as 'getting out of hand.'"¹

There are some public officials who regard their function to be that of service. Among them are postal officials, relief administrators, county farm agents, the FSA supervisors, the home demonstration agents, and the doctors and nurses of the local health programs.²

The Southern courts are notoriously discriminatory to the Negroes. The lower courts, reflecting the pressure of local opinion most strongly, are the most dangerous to the Negroes. Negro offenses against Negroes are leniently treated by the courts, increasing the tendency toward crime within the Negro community. Negro offenses against whites are severely punished but even the most serious crime against the Negroes by white men are extremely seldom indicted.³ Under these conditions violence against Negroes, including lynching, is perpetrated without any fear on the part of the whites.

In the North, there is much greater approximation to equality before the law, although Negroes are victims of inequality even greater than the general disadvantages of the poor in the expensive legal practices of the United States. There are Negro judges, court officers, and police-

¹Rose, op. cit., pp. 176-177.

²Ibid., pp. 178-179.

³Ibid., pp. 179-181.

men in many Northern cities, and Negroes on jury lists. The possession of the right to vote seems to give the Negro a share in the control of the legal system and to give him some assurance of greater equality.¹

Political Implications of Color Caste

Denial of Political Rights to Negroes

One of the most heated issues of the opening weeks of the eighty-first Congress was related to civil rights of the Negroes. The caste question remains one of the major political issues of the present day in the United States.

Before the Civil War, Negroes were denied suffrage in practically all of the States outside New England. During Reconstruction, all the states enfranchised the Negroes. In the North, this situation became permanent. In the South, however, Negro suffrage was soon taken away, clearly against the intent and spirit of the Constitutional amendments passed and ratified with Negro political rights particularly in view. In the area of political rights of the Negroes more than any other area, is found the greatest difference in intensity, at any rate, between the North and the South.²

The Negroes have become the central political issue in the very section where their political rights have been

¹ Ibid., pp. 171-172.

² Myrdal, op. cit., p. 430.

taken away. Woofter points out: "It is apparent that in excluding the Negro the South is, in a way, politically dominated by the Negro question."¹ Henry Lee Moon notes that the negative aspect of the Negro's political existence "has permeated the political thinking of this nation from colonial times down to the present." All other considerations have been ruinously subordinated to it. He observes that "as a result of this preoccupation with the political status of the Negro, the South remains, culturally and economically, the most backward region in the nation."² In spite of the fact that the white man places political discrimination lower than his opposition to "social equality," in his "rank order of discrimination," he actually seems to resist changes in the political area almost as strongly as "social" relationships. Out of some sort of semi-conscious perception, the white man understands the dynamic inter-relatedness of these factors better than he can state it.

The South has maintained the one-party system quite effectively since 1830, except for the Reconstruction period and the Populist movement of the 1890's. We have already noted the exercise of political rights by the Negroes during Reconstruction. The Populist movement split the white votes which resulted in both the conservative and populist factions

¹T. J. Woofter, Jr., The Basis of Racial Adjustment (Boston: Ginn, 1925), p. 166, quoted in Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1310.

²Henry Lee Moon, Balance of Power (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), p. 11.

appealing to the Negro voters. When the Populist movement declined after 1896, the unity between the Populists and the Democrats became restored and the Negroes were effectively disfranchised.¹ The one-party system persisted. The "Solid South" remained a political reality, even until today. The Dixiecrat revolt of 1948 can hardly be considered a real or permanent break in the one-party system. Recent events in the Congress, e. g. the filibuster, seem to indicate the continued tendency of the Southern politicians to unite.

One of the techniques of Negro disfranchisement has been the "grandfather clause,"² which has been declared unconstitutional. Until 1944 the most efficient method was the "white primary." In that year the Supreme Court held that the white primary was illegal. In 1947 a United States district court ruled that a "private" white primary, too, was illegal, "thus apparently knocking the last legal props from any kind of white primary."³ The most notorious device is the "poll tax." The poll tax requirement tends to limit the voting of the poorer whites as well as the Negroes, but these taxes can be paid for them or they can be left disfranchised, depending upon the advantages to the politically dominant group. Other "legal" restrictions are property, educational, and "character" requirements. Any

¹Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 542-543.

²The grandfather clause restricts "registration for voting to those persons who had voted prior to 1861 and to their descendants, or to persons who had served in the federal or Confederate armies or state militia and to their descendants." Ibid., p. 480.

³Rose, op. cit., p. 157.

of these can be applied so as to eliminate the Negroes from voting and to permit the whites (and a few Negroes) to vote. Besides the legal requirements are the extra-legal and illegal practices, including intimidation and violence.¹

The political implications of color caste have now become a principal focus of politics in the North (as well as in the South), and, by reflex, throughout the nation. Moon calls attention to "the size, strategic distribution, and flexibility of the Negro vote [which lends] it an importance which can no longer be overlooked." He notes also:

What is not usually recognized is that this vote is more decisive in presidential elections than that of the Solid South. In sixteen states with a total of 278 votes in the electoral college, the Negro, in a close election, may hold the balance of power. The eleven states of the old Confederacy comprising the Solid South have a total of 127 votes in the electoral college.²

Unlike the votes of the Solid South, the Negro vote is not pre-committed to any political party, and thus cannot be counted in advance.³

The Doctrine of White Supremacy as a Political Tool

The doctrine of white supremacy is used both to disfranchise the Negroes and to unite the whites in maintaining the supremacy of the dominant whites in the South. One of the defenders of the doctrine states frankly:

The doctrine of white supremacy is a political axiom to the 30,000,000 white people of the South. White Supremacy is a practical doctrine to enable the white people of the South to live in contact

¹Ibid., pp. 157-159. ²Moon, op. cit., p. 10.

³Ibid., pp. 10-11.

with large numbers of the Negroes without the loss of the identity of their ancient culture and their racial purity. Wherever in the world the English-speaking people find themselves confronted with the necessity of living in close proximity to large numbers of Negroes, the doctrine of white supremacy is promptly asserted and maintained.¹

Charles Wallace Collins is correct in stating that the doctrine of white supremacy is a political tool.² It is used effectively to send racist Southerners to Congress, who maintain their seats by the use of this doctrine, win seniority and thus control the chairmanships of the crucial legislative committees in the Congress. In coalition with conservative Republicans, the conservative Southern Democrats can oppose the legislative policy of the President, who was elected in an election which seemed at the time a decisive victory for the comparatively progressive policies that he represented.

The Political and Moral Implications of Color Caste
for the Nation and the World

At a time when atomic and bacteriological warfare is a real threat to the survival of civilization and of humanity itself, and at a time when the United States, particularly the Congress, holds a position of strategic importance in determining the direction of world events, a small reactionary minority in the South wields a power to-

¹ Charles Wallace Collins, Whither Solid South? (New Orleans: Pelican Publishing Company, 1947), p. 40.

² Collins strenuously objects to the injection of religious doctrines into politics but inconsistently (to his logic, not to his objective) asserts the injection of a political dogma of white supremacy.

tally disproportionate to its number or significance.¹ The Southern minority in the Congress is reactionary and anachronistic because their ideology is directed toward the idealized past, the ante-bellum days of slavery and feudalism. The vociferous and powerful "key" minority in the legislative halls of the mightiest nation in the world is maintained by the doctrine of white supremacy, the ideology and slogan of color caste. Color caste strengthens the doctrine, and the dogma of white supremacy, in turn, supports the political tenure of the reactionary Southern bloc in Congress. The South insists that caste and the political manifestations of caste are matters of "state rights," only of sectional concern. The moral consequence of color caste is the sabotage of national legislation which is of international importance.² The international repercussions do not limit themselves to the interference of much needed foreign policy legislation by the actions of the Southern bloc, but also consist in the loss of moral prestige and influence of the nation when such influence and prestige are of utmost importance, not only to the United States but also to the entire world. In an interdependent world, immoral prac-

¹ Rose quotes Marian D. Irish: "In the 1940 election about ten per cent of the voting population of the United States . . . was able to elect . . . one-fourth of the members of Congress." Rose, op. cit., p. 168.

² During the filibuster against the change in the cloture rules, during March, 1949, conducted by the coalition of Southern Democrats and a number of northern Republicans, not only the Civil Rights and labor legislations, rent control, etc. were held up, but also the ECA appropriation. Time, LIII (March 21, 1949), 22.

tices of one section of a nation cannot be contained either in that section or even in that nation.

These are the moral consequences for the world of the iniquity of color caste. Christian and humanitarian ethics demand that this caste structure be eliminated, not only because it hurts the immediate victims of caste, both white and Negro, and because it threatens the very foundations of our American way of life, but also because it helps to subvert the moral influence of the nation and to destroy the precious amount of sanity and time needed to prevent the annihilation of mankind. Moreover, color caste must be uprooted from the world scene wherever it occurs because it runs counter to the ethical convictions and aspirations of mankind enunciated in the U. N. Charter: to promote "the respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."¹

This is not to assert that the doctrine of white supremacy or the pattern of color caste is the only or the most important factor in the causal nexus that may lead to war. What is emphasized is that in such a tense state of equilibrium, any powerful force may be sufficient to precipitate (or counteract the effectiveness of an anti-precipitant) a series of events which may cumulatively lead to war. In an interdependent world, a social structure with such implications cannot be left as a sectional matter. It must be the concern of the entire nation as it confronts the serious problems of international peace.

¹From Article I, also Article 55 of the Charter. See John P. Humphrey, "International Protection of Human Rights," Annals, Vol. 255 (January, 1948), pp. 15-21.

CHAPTER VI

CASTE-LIKE STRATIFICATION IN CALIFORNIA RURAL SOCIETY

The review of some of the facets of the caste stratification involving Negroes and whites, particularly in the South, gives us a clue as to the nature of social stratification in rural California.¹ As we have already men-

¹By rural California or California rural society is designated not only the open country and the smaller towns, but also much of larger towns which are rural and agricultural by economic dependence on agriculture and other tangible or intangible aspects of non-urban nature. Much of California, outside the two major metropolitan areas, are included in this concept of rural California. T. Lynn Smith points out:

Rural and urban do not exist of themselves in a vacuum, as it were, but the principal characteristics of each may be found shading into, blending, or mixing with the essential characteristics of the other. . . . A scale, rather than a dichotomy, would provide the most satisfactory device for classifying the population or group according to rural or urban characteristics. Instead of being purely rural or purely urban, one community merely has more urban or more rural characteristics than another. T. Lynn Smith, The Sociology of Rural Life (rev. ed. Harper, 1947), pp. 15-16.

This is the sense in which the term rural society is used, referring to the more rural sections of California. It is interesting to note that one of the recognized representatives of agricultural employers (not necessarily farmers) in California has been the manager of the Agricultural Department of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, Dr. George P. Clements. See U. S. Congress, Senate, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Report of the Committee on Education and Labor, 74th Cong., Report N. 1150, part 3, pp. 257 etc.

tioned, sociological materials concerning California communities which deal directly with the caste-like stratification are meager compared with those concerning the Negro-white relationships. The objective of this chapter is neither to make an original survey to supplement these materials, nor to review all pertinent materials available on the subject. It is rather to seek some further understanding of the structure of California rural society by the use of perspectives gained through the study of the caste structure in the South.

Brief Sketches of Caste-like Stratification in California Rural Society

Before we begin our study of the historical development of caste or caste-like structure in California, it may be helpful to make a rough thumb-nail sketch of the situation. The following pictorial presentation, based on the writer's impressionistic observations, may serve as an approximate guide. A more accurate picture requires further sociological findings. The vertical scale indicates class gradations. Class divisions are not delineated both because they are hard to determine (actually they are more like a continuum than clear-cut divisions)¹ and because they

¹Liston Pope writes: "Social stratification in the United States has been proceeding rapidly for several decades, but according to most indices, American society still has the character of a continuum rather than of several discrete planes; Further, the degree and modes of stratification vary considerably by region, by size of town, and perhaps by other factors." Liston Pope, "Religion and the Class Structure," Annals of The American Academy, Vol. 256 (March, 1948), p. 84.

are not crucial to our study.

I. The Dominant Groups: "White Americans," Northern and Central Europeans, descendants of Southern Europeans, a few ex-"Okies" and ex-"Arkies."

II. The Intermediate Groups:

A. Late-comers not racially or ethnically distinct: "Okies" and "Arkies" (by and large, economically the lowest class, but in regard to race and ethnic origin about the "purest" of "Anglo-Americans"; at present, still socially separate from older residents, but because of racial identity to the dominant group, potentially capable of being absorbed.) (See fuller discussion below.)





Fig. 2


B. Nationalital groups not racially distinct from the dominant group: Southern Europeans, Near Easterners and some of their descendants (e.g. Italians and Portuguese, Spaniards, Greeks, Armenians, some Mexicans). (This group includes Giannini and Di Giorgio, two of the biggest farm-factory owners in the world.)



The hatch-door
open at the top

Fig. 3


B-1 Nationalital religious groups not racially distinct from the dominant group: (e.g. Armenian National Church adherents, Greek Orthodox, to a far less degree German and Russian-German Mennonites, Roman Catholic Italians, Spaniards, Portuguese, Mexicans).



open at top

Fig. 4

B-2 Religious groups not racially distinct from the dominant group: notably the Jews.




Social segregation
on religious basis

Fig. 5

III. The Subordinate groups:


A. Racial, ethnic groups (Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, Indians, East Indians, most Mexicans, etc., and most of their descendants).



Caste-like
barriers

Fig. 6


A-1 Racial, ethnic, religious groups: (Japanese Buddhists, Chinese Confucionists and Taoists, Hindus, etc. and their descendants, and to a far less degree, yet in some sense, some Roman Catholic Mexicans).



Caste-like and religious barriers

Fig. 7

B. Racial, non-"nationalital" groups: Notably the Negroes.



Caste barriers

Fig. 8

The Dominant Whites (The Nuclear Group)

In reporting the social stratification in Wasco, Dinuba, and Arvin, California, Walter Goldschmidt employs the terms "nuclear group" and "outsider group" instead of the customary class designations, to delineate class (not primarily caste) stratification. These terms express both the historical and the immediate aspects of the social situation. By the nuclear groups he means "that body which grew up with Wasco and inherited the institutions of the commun-

ity--that body to which Wasco belongs."¹ Goldschmidt estimates that about one-third in Dinuba belong to the nuclear group.²

The Intermediate Groups

White Anglo-American Newcomers, "Okies" and "Arkies."

--Among those designated by Goldschmidt as outsiders are destitute white agricultural laborers, who are dependent upon seasonal employment and public welfare. Outsiders

are those who have arrived somewhat later to serve as agricultural laborers. They remain outside the social wells of the community, against which they are constantly impinging. They are not accepted into the community, and they are not considered in community affairs.

Although the present members of the outsider group are new, this group as such existed "as long as, and to the extent that, industrialized agriculture has prevailed."³ Only the ethnic composition has changed. Although these people are of old American stock, "their poverty, their peculiarity of dress and speech, and the fact they came from outside marked them as a class apart, and they came to be referred to by such derogatory epithets as 'Okie' and 'Arkie.'"⁴ But unlike the ethnic groups they do not have the physical (more strictly, biologically transmitted physical) characteristics to set them off from the dominant group, nor do they have any mechanism for strong in-group ties. They are

¹Walter Goldschmidt, As You Sow (New York: Harcourt, 1947), p. 59.

²Ibid., p. 193.

³Ibid., p. 59.

⁴Ibid., p. 51.

not subject to any restrictive agreements and are scattered throughout the community in poorer housing facilities. "As a result of all these factors, they consistently impinge upon the nuclear group and some attain membership in it." But on the whole, social barriers and limitations upon economic advancement keep this group separate.¹ Although they receive similar treatment by the nuclear group as other groups of outsiders, such as the Negroes and the Mexicans, they remain to themselves, and in fact, have some manifestations of hostility. The primary distinction between the "Okies" and the Negroes and Mexicans in the same economic class lies in the fact "that the white can potentially attain the higher status, which the Negro can never, and the Mexican can only with difficulty."² Primarily because of this distinction white "outsiders" of Goldschmidt are placed in this paper in the intermediate group, whereas many of his middle groups (e.g. Koreans and Japanese) are placed in the subordinate group in this paper. The difference arises out of Goldschmidt's primary interest in social stratification based upon economic class and our interest in caste-like stratification.

Nationalital³ groups.--Among the intermediate groups are many nationalital groups. However, not all nationalital groups belong to this somewhat ambiguous classification. Some

¹Ibid., p. 60.

²Ibid., p. 66.

³"Nationalital" is an adjective of and pertaining to nationality. See p. 9, supra.

members of each of the white nationalital groups belong both to the nuclear and the outsider groups. Perhaps many Italians and a few Italian Americans belong to the intermediate class, but Giannini and Di Giorgio, two of the largest farm-factory owners in the world, can hardly be placed in this category. Northern Europeans generally belong to the dominant group. Many of the Southern Europeans, Near Easterners and a few of their descendants belong to this middle group. Many of these ethnic and nationalital groups are characterized by strong in-group feeling. In many cases, these in-group bonds are strengthened by religious ties. Speaking of Dinuba, California, Goldschmidt describes these groups as follows:

These groups breach occupation barriers. They are by-passed by the dominant community pattern of pecuniary values and are far less urbanized. Within each sphere a more homogeneous atmosphere prevails, while the relationships between members of these groups and the dominant elements of the community are fairly remote. These strong in-groups maintain a solidarity on their own volition, usually religiously inspired one and eschewing any close social ties with the community. Furthermore, they have stable tenure, permanence in the community and are not an impoverished class.¹

Goldschmidt includes the Armenians and Koreans, and the Mennonites in this group. He contrasts their status with that of the Mexicans and Negroes in Wasco. They "are occasionally accepted in community institutions in a manner that does not take place with respect to either the

¹Ibid., pp. 193-194.

Mexicans or Negroes of Wasco."¹ From the standpoint of caste-like status, the Mennonites, who are made up of "persons of various nationality backgrounds, chiefly Russian, German, and Canadians," are on an entirely different basis from the non-white groups, including the Mexicans. Economically, many Koreans and Japanese in Dinuba, as pointed out by Goldschmidt, belong to this group, but from the standpoint of caste-like stratification they should be classed in the subordinate group.

The Subordinate Groups

Orientals.--Many of the Orientals belong to the middle group according to their economic status (e.g. income and occupation). However, the important distinction is the racial difference between them and the dominant group. Whereas the children (if not the immigrants themselves) of the Italians, Portuguese, Spaniards, Armenians and other nationalital groups, and the religious groups such as the Mennonites can become members of the dominant group if they choose to do so, the children of the Orientals, primarily because of race, cannot as a rule belong to the dominant group even if they may become members of some of the organizations. Taboo against intermarriage which ensures the endogamous nature of caste distinction is firmly observed even though the Supreme Court of the State may declare the legal prohibition of intermarriage unconstitutional.

¹Ibid., p. 193.

Some of the members of these groups are further separated from the nuclear group by religious affiliation. Japanese Buddhists, for example, in general have stronger in-group solidarity, and their contact with the rest of the community is more remote. However, as long as Protestant churches, such as the Japanese Methodist, Korean Presbyterian, Chinese Baptist and Armenian Congregational, are segregated, the difference is one of degree. To an average Protestant belonging to the nuclear group, an Oriental (or Armenian) Protestant is just as much a stranger as a non-Protestant. Identification is in name only--there is hardly any actual contact or fellowship across the caste-like barriers of segregated church life.

Mexicans.--Referring to the social stratification in Wasco, Goldschmidt notes that any social advancement of a Negro or Mexican is within his own group and that he does not enter the social sphere of the white community. His externality remains complete. "As a result of common physical characteristics, common social backgrounds, in the case of the Mexican a distinct language, and because the dominant groups insisted upon their geographical segregation, the two minority groups developed an internal unity which resulted in their having communities of their own."¹

Paul S. Taylor, in the report of one of the first studies about the Mexicans he conducted wrote in 1928 concerning the social isolation of the Mexicans in Imperial Valley:

¹Ibid., p. 59.

The social line drawn between Mexicans and Americans in Imperial Valley is as sharp as the separation of their dwellings. Like a red thread it divides them despite physical juxtaposition, and makes a stealthy appearance even in trade where contact is freest. To one degree or another there is separation of Mexican and American school children in six towns of the valley

.
Separation of school children is but another manifestation of the social ostracism based on racial and class differences and on linguistic, hygienic, and other cultural disparities to which Mexicans in the valley are subject.¹

The description by Ruth Tuck of the situation concerning Mexicans and Americans of Mexican descent written almost two decades later concerning another community in which the cleavage does not seem so great as that obtained in the Imperial Valley is basically similar.

There are few legal bars, as such, against the Mexican or American of Mexican descent. He is counted on the white side of miscegenation statutes, as a rule.² . . . No Jim-Crowism is part of his life. . . . School segregation is put upon a basis other than ethnic, officially. Courts have held that the non-Caucasian clauses of restrictive residence covenants do not include persons of Mexican ancestry. If he is a citizen he is not barred from the polls. . . . In some ways this position is an asset, but in other respects it is a liability. It makes the job of fighting the extra-legal discrimination all the more difficult. Rather than having the job of battering down a wall, the Mexican-American finds himself entangled in a spider web, whose outlines are difficult to see but whose clinging, silken strands hold tight.³

¹Paul S. Taylor, Mexican Labor in the United States: Imperial Valley, Vol. VI, No. 1, of University of California Publications in Economics (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1928), pp. 83-84.

²Thus "Mexicans" had been prohibited from marrying Negroes in California until the recent ruling of the State Supreme Court. Perez v. Lippold 198 Pacific Reporter 2nd 17 (1948).

³Ruth Tuck, Not With The Fist (New York: Harcourt, 1946), pp. 197-198.

Negroes.--We have noted in connection with the Mexicans that the Negroes occupy the lowest and the most "outside" status of all the groups in rural communities in California. Being the newest comers into the rural areas of the state, their economic position is extremely disadvantageous. The writer has observed in the Spring of 1947 several tent villages of Negro agricultural laborers just outside of Fresno.

The Composite Pictures

The Composite diagram of the various groups in Wasco would appear somewhat as follows:




Fig. 9

Goldschmidt's own diagram for Dinuba is reproduced below:¹




Fig. 10

¹Goldschmidt, op. cit., p. 194.

This writer would modify it about as follows, taking into consideration the caste factors:




Fig. 11

The diagram for Dinuba (Fig. 11) may be taken as a rough representation of the social stratification in rural California. The nuclear or dominant white group includes the "old American," northern Europeans, many southern Europeans and practically all of their descendants, many people from the Near East and their descendants. Since "Okies" and "Arkies" are class designations, applied from the "stand-point of economic, political and "social"¹ standing, and do not represent caste divisions, these white "outsiders" can become members of the nuclear group as soon as they have resided in the community some years, changed occupations, achieved certain standards of living, and otherwise are ac-

¹According to Davis and Dollard (of "the group of investigators around Professor W. Lloyd Warner." Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1377): "A social class is to be thought of as the largest group of people whose members have intimate social access to one another. A class is composed of families and of social cliques." Allison Davis and John Dollard, Children of Bondage (Washington: American Council of Education, 1940), p. 13.

More usually a class is thought of in terms of occupations and income. Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 673-674. Also Introduction, pp. 7-8, supra.

cultured to the prevailing manner of dress, speech, etc. of the dominant (middle-class) Californian. By common understanding middle-class people from the same Southern or Southwestern States are not "Okies" and "Arkies" but are "old Americans." For the agricultural laborers from the Dust Bowl areas, acculturation is not an easy matter. Allison Davis maintains "that even among whites probably not more than one out of every 100 lower-class people ever learns middle-class culture."¹ The social and cultural distance between the "nuclear" group whites and the "outsider" whites is so great that hostility, prejudice, and discrimination manifested in the relationship between them appear hardly different from caste and caste-like distinctions correlated with physical visibility that characterize the relationship between dominant whites on the one hand and the "racial" groups, e.g. Negroes, Orientals, and most Mexicans, on the other.² On the class scale, most of the "Okies" and "Arkies" (at least until very recently) occupy the floor, which they share with many Mexicans and Negroes, whereas there exist some class gradations within the racial and nationality group. For all intents and purposes the Negroes and Orientals in California are placed in a subordinate caste or caste-like status.³ The positions of the Mexicans and

¹Allison Davis, "Some Basic Concepts in the Education of Ethnic and Lower-Class Groups," Hilda Taba and William Van Til, eds., Democratic Human Relations (Washington: The National Council of the Social Studies, 1945), p. 271.

²Cr. for example Goldschmidt, op. cit., pp. 66-67.

³See p. 269-275, infra.

Americans of Mexican descent are described by Ruth Tuck as semi-caste status.¹ The lower economic status of a large percentage of Mexicans, in comparison with many Orientals, places them in a relatively lower caste-class position than middle-class Orientals.²

Somewhere intermediate between the outsider and nuclear groups are the nationality and religious groups of whites who are segregated by strong in-group ties. Among the intermediate group may also be placed a few of the native white newcomers who are on the way up, and are being absorbed into the nuclear group at marginal positions.³

Historical Roots of Caste-like Stratification in California

In studying the various factors that influence the pattern of social stratification in California, it is necessary, however briefly, to look into history to investigate how the present situation has developed.

Varden Fuller, in a thorough study, traces the development of the large-scale intensive farming in California

¹"The writer's own term 'semi-caste' reflects an appreciation of the fact that permanent group disabilities for Mexican-Americans are less severe and easier to escape than those for Negroes and Orientals." Tuck, op. cit., p. 44.

²Cf. Goldschmidt, op. cit., p. 193.

³Goldschmidt, op. cit., p. 91, 73-74. A distinction is made, for instance, between "dust-bowlers" and "Okies." "The Okie is . . . characterized as a congenital ne'er-do-well without ambition or desire, while the 'dust-bowler' is a person of ability and good character who is temporarily in bad circumstances." Ibid., p. 73.

from the early mission days to the present. The missions were engaged in agricultural production, depending on the labor of native Indians, but the purpose was not economic. Maximum production or efficiency was not their aim. With the transition from mission to civil life in 1834, lands formerly used by missions were "granted in large units to individuals to be used for private gain."¹ Some of the Indians became the laborers of these feudalistic ranchos. "Impressment methods varying all the way from debt peonage to outright seizure and force were common."² Even before 1847 when California was occupied by the Americans, Americans and other foreigners began to participate as rancheros in the economic structure. "Until California entered the union in 1850 as a free state the tendency was to extend the system of forced labor rather than to curtail it."³ Thus even before the admission into the United States, California agriculture had a system of large scale farming with an abundant and cheap labor supply. There were some movements of the Negro slaves from the South. The discovery of gold in 1848 and the influx of anti-slave population changed the whole situation.

Paul S. Taylor in his article, "Foundations of Cal-

¹Varden Fuller, "The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Revolution of Farm Organization in California." U. S. Congress, Senate, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor. Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, United States Senate, 76th Congress, Third Session, pursuant S. 266, Part 54. "Agricultural Labor in California." p. 19877.

²Ibid., p. 19877.

³Ibid., p. 19877, 19876.

ifornia Rural Society," refers to the slavery issue as "the first expressions which show the choice of the kind of agricultural society Americans wanted to prevail in California."¹ He quotes the California Star, March 25, 1848: "We have nothing to create sickness, and nothing to call for a class of laborers forming an unfortunate caste in society, of a color unlike that of the proprietors of the soil."² Although directed against Negroes, who did not become a major factor in the shaping of social stratification in California until almost one hundred years later, the argument is very pertinent, and the use of the words, "caste of a color unlike that of the proprietors of the soil," is highly pertinent in a study of the development of color caste stratification in California.

Slavery was rejected and California was admitted to the Union as a free state in 1850. By that time, however, the "precedent of large-scale farming with an abundant and cheap labor supply was established for California in Spanish and Mexican colonial times."³ Fuller considers that the subsequent organization and development of the large-scale farming was due largely to the character of the popu-

¹Paul S. Taylor, "Foundations of California Rural Society" California Historical Society Quarterly. Vol. 24 No. 3. September 1945. p. 194.

See also Fuller, op. cit., pp. 19777-19898.

²Taylor, op. cit., p. 195; cf. Lucile Eaves, A History of California Labor Legislation (Berkeley: The Univ. Press, 1910), pp. 82-104.

³Fuller, op. cit., p. 19877.

lation. The population of 1870, a year after the transcontinental railroad was completed and Chinese became available as an abundant supply of agricultural labor, consisted of the following two major segments:

At one end of the economic scale was a labor population, composed largely of Chinese, whose economic alternatives were so limited as to force them into the unattractive working position of casual and itinerant laborers. On the other end of the scale were men possessed of exceptional entrepreneurial abilities, including the ability to command large amounts of capital.¹

Fuller observes a relation between Chinese labor supply in California and the Negro labor supply in the South.

There were elements in the population of the early American period which considered the possibility of importing laborers from the Orient to stand in the same relation to the agriculture of California as did the Negro slaves to the agriculture of the South. But these elements were in a minority and the influence of their views was negligible. Other than the soliciting of Chinese labor which was done by the builders of the Central Pacific Railroad, the migration of Chinese to California was unassisted so far as American employers were concerned.²

The community leaders of the 1860-1880 period conceived of the future of California agriculture in terms of communities of diversified family farms. The large-scale grain farms which were being established at the time were not favored, but were tolerated only as a temporary condition. The State Agricultural Society attempted to stimulate the migration of small farmers to California. "Despite these endeavors, the laboring constituents within the population grew more rapidly than the small entrepreneurial. Dur-

¹Fuller, op. cit. p. 19877.

²Loc. cit.

ing the seventies and eighties, when production and marketing conditions favored the transition from livestock and grain to intensive fruit farms, labor was abundant."¹ This condition made the transition possible. Chinese constituted the main constituent of this abundant casual labor supply. They were young, unmarried, and mobile. The employers did not have to bother much about food or furnishing much in the way of living accommodations. However, the people of California, including the employers of Chinese, realized the abnormal nature of this development. "It was frequently foreseen that eventually the labor needs of agriculture must be supplied by a more normal population--at least population with dependents."² When metropolitan labor groups demanded the exclusion of the Chinese, the employers of Chinese did not resist.

But it was not easy to make such a transition. Fuller explains the economic (and social) consequences of this development:

Wherever intensive cultivation had already begun or was in prospect, land values were capitalized on the basis of actual or anticipated returns from the employment of the cheap and convenient Chinese labor supply. To the prospective small operator, this meant paying so high a price for land as to permit him a labor return approximately equal to the wages of Chinese.³

Such conditions discouraged the development of family

¹Varden Fuller, "Some Historical Notes on the Development of Large-Scale Farming in California," The People, The Land, and the Church in the Rural West (Chicago: Farm Foundation, 1943), p. 48.

²Loc. cit.

³Ibid., p. 49.

farms, and tended to encourage the development of intensive, large-scale farming. Beginning in 1889, a depression released a large number of laborers, creating an abundant labor supply for agriculture. The Chinese were now superseded by whites. "So limited were employment alternatives during the nineties that whites were forced to succeed to the labor status of Chinese without substantial improvement in either employment or living conditions."¹ Large-scale specialized farming expanded. Thus the pattern of industrialized agriculture "requiring" an abundant supply of "cheap labor" was established.

When economic recovery depleted the ranks of white "cheap labor" supply at the turn of the century, the Japanese came. Though they were less docile than the Chinese, they were employed out of necessity. Their ambitions to better their economic conditions and to become independent operators were not pleasing to the employers. However, "it was not until after Japanese exclusion (demanded again particularly by the metropolitan laboring class), when resident Japanese began rapidly to establish themselves as independent operators and competitors, that the present general hostile attitude toward them in the rural districts developed."²

The labor supply was ample between 1908 and 1916. When with the entrance of the United States into the War, labor became scarce, some Mexicans were imported from Mex-

¹Ibid., p. 50.

²Loc. cit.

ico. The Mexicans had also been coming into California from the Southwest. In the early 1920's an influx of the Mexicans augmented the labor supply. "They were the pioneers in establishing a new labor unit, the migratory family, with the automobile as the means of conveyance."¹ Another addition to the supply of "cheap labor" during the latter 1920's was the Filipinos.

Fuller summarizes the historical development of agricultural labor supply as follows:

Thus with two brief exceptions [1888 and 1917-1918], California since 1870 has had available an abundant labor supply whose limited employment alternatives left them no better opportunity than casual employment in agriculture. The sources of augmentation to the casual labor supply had been alternatively immigration from low economic standard countries and the movement of depression-opportunity members of the domestic population into agriculture."²

European immigrants have never constituted a significant proportion of this casual labor supply.³

Stuart Jamieson describes this development:

Highly specialized farming on a large scale had depended on a cheap mobile labor force living much below the standards set by organized industrial labor. In the past such a labor supply has been recruited from successive waves of low-paid foreign groups--first Chinese, then Japanese, followed by Hindus, Mexicans, Filipinos, and a minority of other races.⁴

Tables 3 and 4 show the coming of these various ethnic groups

¹Ibid., p. 51.

²Ibid., p. 52.

³Ibid., p. 53.

⁴Stuart M. Jamieson, "The Origins and Present Structure of Labor Unions in Agricultural and Allied Industries of California," U. S. Congress, Senate, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, op. cit., hearings, Part 62, (1940), p. 22531.

into California and their place in the state's agriculture.

Jamieson adds: "During the last few years, however, dispossessed rural families from the 'dust bowl' areas of the Middle and Southwestern States have migrated in thousands to California, and have to a large extent succeeded other racial groups in majority of crops."¹ The last mentioned group, though treated no better, sometimes even worse, than their alien predecessors, was nevertheless different. Concerning these white transients, Dr. Clement of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce declared: "The white transients are not tractable labor. Being Americans citizens, they are going to demand the so-called American standards of living In our estimation, they are going to be the finest pabulum for unionization by either group--the American Federation of Labor or the subversive elements."²

Goldschmidt writes:

What then, set the migration of the thirties apart from previous decades? First, a large proportion of those seeking homes in the West were destitute. Second, the depressed condition of agriculture and the low wages created an unfavorable environment in which these immigrants could seek their fortune. Finally the large army of immigrants--especially from the depressed agricultural states of the Southwest and the region of the "dust bowl"--formed the first native white American families who endeavored to make their livelihood as wage earners on the California farms. These Okies, as

¹Loc. cit.

²U.S. Senate, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Report No. 1150, part 3, The Disadvantaged Status of Unorganized Labor in California's industrialized agriculture (1942), p. 258.

they have been called, moved westward in their broken-down cars, with bag and baggage, children and pets, to fill the role that the Coolie Chinese originally created. They have been the ultimate successors to that long and unbroken line of farm laborers--Chinese, Japanese, fruit tramp, Filipino, and Mexican.¹

The La Follette Committee saw that the responsibility of California agricultural employers for the system of temporary casual employment from an unemployed pool of migratory labor and the abuses of farm labor is not "an unconscious or involuntary one."

California's agricultural industry has made a consistent and deliberate effort to maintain this system of employment and the unemployed pool. The history of California agriculture reveals an enduring vigilance and unending attempts on the part of organized employers to keep open the channels of foreign and domestic immigration which constantly poured into this labor market--Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, Mexicans, and Filipinos, and the domestic migrants during recurring national depressions. These efforts overpowered several feeble attempts to begin a process of stabilization by settling a portion of employed labor forces on the land.²

Early in 1948 the newspapers³ revealed conditions strikingly similar to the mid-1930's before the coming of the Farm Security Administration. Terrible housing conditions, actual lack of food and clothing were being experienced by some 50,000 migrant workers, mostly white, in Fresno County, one of the richest agricultural areas of the world. We are reminded of the La Follette Committee's

¹Goldschmidt, op. cit., p. 20.

²U.S. Congress, Senate, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Report no. 1150, Part 3, op.cit., p. 174.

³Especially the Delaplane articles in the San Francisco Chronicle, March-April, 1948.

report, whose accusation is a great understatement: "Agricultural labor in California is not an occupation; it is an auxiliary to a system of public poor relief and a necessary evil for the operation of a great industry."¹ The trouble is that poor relief, public or private, no longer reaches these laborers since FSA was discontinued by Congress.

As we have noted, Negroes have come to California from the earliest days. Table 3 indicates that they did not become a major factor in the already complex "racial" scene in California until the 3rd decade of the present century. Their real importance dates after 1940 and especially after the opening of World War II, thus following the coming of the "dust bowl" refugees. They were, like their predecessors, attracted to California by employment and other economic opportunities. At present their number is estimated between 300,000 to 350,000 (1947).²

As seen in Table 4, they have not been a factor in the farm labor supply. In 1940 only 8.3 per cent of their number, or 2,395, were gainfully employed in agriculture, of whom 79.6 per cent were farm laborers. However, their position in the caste structure of California is far more important than their numerical proportion. The pattern of caste system is not yet completely rigid regarding the Negroes in California.

¹U.S. Congress, Senate, Violations of Free Speech and Rights of Labor, Reports, Part 3, op. cit., p. 395.

²Cy W. Record, Negroes in the Agricultural Labor Force of California--1850-1947. (a report for Economics 250 B, University of California, May, 1948), p. 29.

TABLE 3

NUMBER OF PERSONS OF VARIOUS ETHNIC GROUPS
IN CALIFORNIA, 1890-1940^a

Year	Mexican	Negro	Japanese	Chinese	Filipino	Indian
1890	11,322	1,147	72,472	0	16,624
1900	11,045	10,151	45,743	0	15,377
1910	48,391	21,645	41,356	36,248	5	16,371
1920	121,176	38,763	71,952	28,812	2,674	17,360
1930	368,013	81,048	97,456	37,361	30,470	19,212
1940	124,306	93,717	39,556	31,408	18,675

TABLE 4

GAINFULLY EMPLOYED WORKERS IN CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURE
BY ETHNIC GROUP, 1930^b

Ethnic Group	Total in Farm Pursuits			Wage Workers as Per Cent of Total in Farm Pursuits	Pro- portion in Eth- nic Group in Farm Pursuits
	Owners, Tenants, Managers and Foremen	Wage Workers	Total		
	Number	Number	Number	Pct.	Pct.
Native White	85,980	84,069	170,049	49.5	12.3
Foreign Born					
White	40,854	33,035	73,889	44.7	18.6
Mexican	1,417	41,191	42,608	96.7	37.0
Japanese	4,784	14,569	19,353	75.3	54.8
Filipino	231	16,100	16,331	98.6	60.2
Indian	797	2,306	3,103	74.3	55.4
Chinese	450	2,191	2,641	83.0	13.5
Negro	488	1,907	2,395	79.6	8.3
Other	211	1,444	1,655	87.2	70.8
Total	135,212	196,812	332,024	58.6	16.5

^aGoldschmidt, op. cit., p. 17. ^bIbid., p. 18

Large-Scale, Specialized Agriculture as a Factor
in the Pattern of Caste-like Structure
in California Rural Society

The historical study of the development of California agriculture leaves us with very little doubt that there is a definite causal relationship between the pattern of large-scale farming and the pattern of caste-like structure in California rural society. It is a "vicious circle" that works both ways; it follows the principle of cumulative causation. For example, availability of "cheap labor" in 1870 made it possible to develop large-scale agricultural enterprise, as suggested by the title of Varden Fuller's thesis: "The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California." On the other hand, the establishment of large-scale farming necessitates "cheap labor" and the stratification of society in which there shall be a permanent subordinate group which will not ascend the "agricultural ladder" and disappear as the source of "cheap labor."

The U. S. Immigration Commission describes this interaction as follows:

Employers have naturally, as a rule, sought the cheapest and most convenient supply of labor. In this way the Asiatics have been employed extensively, and sometimes almost to the exclusion of others, in certain industries. These industries and the conditions under which they have been carried on, have been shaped in such instances by the Asiatics employed. Industries have been developed in advance of a settled labor supply and specialization has been carried to the extreme so that a large migration of laborers has been required to meet the seasonal demands in the different localities, and the living conditions, especially for

seasonal laborers, have been so shaped that they are bad from the point of view of the white laborer.¹

However, the Commission noted: "With better provision for board and lodging there can be no doubt that the number of white men available for such work would be materially increased."²

We have noted in an earlier chapter that the historical roots of caste in the South go back to the plantation-slavery pattern. A similar statement can be made about the race caste system in California. Goldschmidt concludes from his study of the social stratification of three California rural communities:

Three fundamental facts must be recognized with respect to farm labor in California. First, the origin of large-scale farming and the continuance of industrialized agriculture are dependant upon an abundant supply of cheap (relative to price) labor. Second, no group as such has remained as farm labor in California for more than a single generation. Third, it has been necessary for large-scale farm operators to maintain a flow of workers into California in order that they can continue their operations under normal price conditions.³

It is interesting to note in connection with the second point which Goldschmidt mentions that the Country Life Commission of 1908, appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt, observed that as long as we are a democracy, we shall have labor scarcity. It even suggested that farming

¹U. S. Immigration Commission, Japanese and Other Immigrant Races in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain States, Part 25, Vol. 1, Immigrants in Industries (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), p. 176.

²Loc. cit.

³Goldschmidt, op. cit., p. 15.

be changed "in order to adjust to labor supply."¹

The immigration of Chinese and Japanese was stopped by legislation. Most of the surviving Chinese and their descendants went to the cities. Some Japanese went up the agricultural ladder in spite of all legal, extralegal, and illegal barriers placed before them. Many Japanese also went to the cities.² An interesting development among the Mexicans is that the Mexican farm laborers of today are not all the children of those a generation earlier but many are currently imported "Mexican Nationals."

Since by 1940 nonwhite races (not including Mexicans) constituted only 18.9 per cent (24,004 out of the total 126,971)³ of the total farm laborers and farm foremen employed, it may appear that the factor of large-scale farming is irrelevant to the present caste system in California. However, we must remember that the present predominance of white farm laborers, who do not fare even slightly better than their nonwhite predecessors, may only be a temporary situation parallel to that of the 1890's. We must also note that even though the 1940 Census counts Mexicans as white, they are hardly so regarded in the social stratification of California society. Furthermore, as we have already noted,

¹Report of the Commission of Country Life (Chapel Hill: The Univ. of N. C. Press, 1911), p. 94.

²Table 4 gives the proportion of Japanese in farming pursuits in 1940 as 54.8 per cent.

³U. S. Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940, Population, Vol. III, "The Labor Force," Table 13, pp. 232, ff.

Orientalists are placed in the lower caste status regardless of their occupation, education, or wealth.

Varden Fuller concludes his study with the following statement:

Finally by the twenties the concept of abnormality associated with employment of itinerant and casual workers had largely passed away, California agriculture was declared by nature to be such as to demand a permanent supply of itinerant laborers. Since white people refused to perform such "menial" tasks, such a labor supply by its very nature had to be "un-American."¹

If this be true, and we have no reason to doubt it, then when situations change again, another nonwhite group may be persuaded to fill the need of labor supply, complicating still further the already confused caste structure of California rural society. It is possible that a large number of Negroes already in the state, many of whom are unemployed, may be induced to supply this need. Record observes:

After the summer of 1945 Negro employment in war activities on the West Coast dropped precipitously In the cities many of them maintained themselves on unemployment compensation, readjustment allowances and savings following initial unemployment. It was not until 1946 and 1947 that heavy unemployment and their otherwise extreme marginal economic position pushed them into the agricultural labor force. It was from among these unemployed that the Emergency Farm Labor Project drew its "few," "hundreds," and later "thousands" of seasonal workers in the post-war harvest seasons.²

¹Fuller, "Some Historical Notes," op. cit., p. 55.

²Record, op. cit., p. 30. His source is: Emergency Farm Labor Project, Annual Narrative Report, 1948. Berkeley, California Agricultural Extension Service. 1948.

A study of the present situation regarding large-scale industrialized farming is not irrelevant to the study of caste-like structure in California.

Large-Scale, Industrialized Farming in California

It is unfortunate that the 1940 Census did not make a special study of large-scale farming. Basing his figures on the 1930 Census, Taylor points out: "More than one-third (36.7 per cent) of all the large-scale farms in the United States in 1930 were located in California ('Large-scale' means 'annual gross income of approximately \$30,000 or more')"¹

Although numerically very small, large-scale enterprises dominate commercial production and employment of labor. "Although they numbered less than 3,000, or barely 2.1 per cent of all farms in California, they produced 28.5 per cent of all California agricultural products by value, and expended 34.6 per cent of all the cash paid to wage workers by all farms in the State."²

Even when the average of all farms paying cash wages is taken, California exceeds the national average by far. In 1944, the average cash paid for farm labor per farm reporting for the United States was \$665; for Tennessee, \$221; for Iowa, \$456; for New Jersey, \$2,105; for California,

¹Paul S. Taylor, "Factors which Underlie the Infringement of Civil Rights in Industrialized Agriculture," U. S. Congress, Senate, op. cit., Hearings, Part 62, p. 22488.

²Loc. cit.

\$3,367.¹

Employment of farm labor is concentrated on the large-scale farms. Small farmers or family farmers, even in California, do not hire farm laborers.

In January, 1935 in California, 69.8 per cent of all farm operators reported that they were employing no labor at all [according to] Wendzel's estimate in July, 1935, 53.1 per cent of farm operators in the Pacific States employed no wage workers.

Employment was concentrated in a few large farms: in January, 1935, "in the United States as a whole, 14.9 per cent of all wage workers worked on farms employing 10 or more laborers, but in California the proportion reached 37.3 per cent or more than one-third."²

The La Follette Committee report concludes:

This labor problem, yet unsolved, is rooted deeply in the very structure of California agriculture: its industrialized, specialized character; the abnormal and unusual employer-employee relationships, unorganized and lacking in stability; the unusual character of the labor supply, historically composed of cheap seasonal migratory labor with substantial portions of alien or oriental origin; the long-standing existence of serious economic and social maladjustments in the plight of those who work the land without any fixed relationship to it; and an inflexible attitude of the growers, with large commercial and industrial interests, toward farming and farm workers, uncurbed over a long period of time by any strong social regulation or labor organization.³

¹U. S. Bureau of the Census, U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1945, II. Chap. V, Table 10, p. 299.

²Taylor, "Factors which Underlie the Infringement of Civil Rights," op. cit., p. 22489.

³U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Education and Labor, Violation of Free Speech, Report No. 1150, part 3, op. cit., p. 260.

Seasonal Requirements of Farm Labor

Another situation that aggravates the plight of the farm laborers is the seasonal nature of employment. In 1940, for instance, the requirement rose from a low in March of 70,000 to a high of nearly 230,000 in the second week in September, when several fruit crops were being harvested. Fluctuations for the San Joaquin Valley counties were even greater: the requirement rose from a low of 10,000 in mid-March to the double peak of over 100,000 in the first week of September (grapes) and the last week in October (cotton). The difference of nearly 100,000 represented workers, many of whom had dependents. The headlines that reported 50,000 destitute migrant workers in Fresno County in March of 1948 were not exaggerating or telling untruths, nor a special condition due to the drought. They were revealing something that is repeated year after year. The tie-up with the drought only confuses the issue; the only connection that the drought had with the suffering of migrant agricultural labor families was to hasten the harvesting of cotton and to lengthen the "normal" length of unemployment. If Negroes or any other group should enter the farm labor field their lot will be easily forecasted from the ups and downs of the labor requirements where they are located. The situation will not be changed without radical changes both in the scale of farming, and the recognition of the rights of farm labor.

Economic Factors are not the Only Factors

It is necessary to emphasize at this point in the study of the relationship between the economic factors and the development of racism in California that in spite of the apparently strategic importance of the factor of large-scale, industrialized farming in the shaping of caste structure, several facts warn us against the conclusion that this factor is the dominant one or the basic one.

First, all Orientals, and almost all Mexicans, are placed in the subordinate caste, irrespective of their citizenship, length of residence, economic and occupational status, cultural achievement, acculturation, language, or any other factor. They may be accorded certain social amenities which are not too intimate, such as membership in service organizations, even admissions to some dances (such as high school dances) and swimming pools, but in matters basic to caste, especially matters having to do with sex, separation and subordination is practically complete.

Second: In spite of the inferior economic and occupational status of the "Okies" compared with many of the Orientals, and even though at present they may be placed in the lowest position socially, as pointed out again and again by Goldschmidt, they can and do rise into the dominant class as soon as they achieve economic status and change certain cultural habits, which are matters of speech, dress, etc.

Third: The distinctive thing about caste in Calif-

ornia, as is the case in the South, is the factor of race, i.e., biological heritage. This is not a matter of national origin, but of caste based on race. The use of the more sociologically acceptable term, ethnic group, or minority group, should not take the edge off the actually existing condition. It makes very little difference whether one is a Chinese, Korean, Japanese or Filipino; what matters is that one belongs to the Yellow or Brown race. In this sense, race and racism are inseparable. Racism cannot finally be explained away in terms of economic or even cultural factors. Without prejudice already present in the mind of the dominant group, economic factors will not play such an important part in further subordinating the groups considered inferior.

It is pertinent in this connection to quote passages from an editorial of the Sacramento Bee, June 4, 1910.

Opposing the report of Labor Commissioner McKenzie, the Bee writes:

It is so worded as to impress readers with the ideal that the Japanese are indispensable in the absence of sufficient Chinese, Hindus, or other servile labor--being content to be employed for short periods and willing to submit to dismissal at any time, and also being capable of independent subsistence and ready to move on when no longer wanted in any given place.

This is quite a catalogue of "desirable" qualities of farm laborers. Regarding wages, the Bee writes: "It shows there is comparatively little difference between the pay of Japanese and of white laborers."

The editorial shows great insight concerning the

operation of large-scale intensive agriculture: "The great cause of dependence upon Oriental labor has apparently escaped the commissioner, and that is the large acreage of many orchards and vineyards, and the growing of such crops as sugar beets and vegetables on a large scale." It concludes:

It would be far better for the State if such large holdings were broken up into small parcels of five, ten, or twenty acres, each occupied by a family of native birth or European extraction.

.....
Despite the subtle suggestions of the McKenzie report, the policy of exclusion of cheap Asiatic labor has been and remains a good thing for California. But even if it tended to lessen the present volume of production and development, it would be far better for the State than to encourage concentration of farming and fruit growing in a few hands, and to make them industries for large capital and Asiatic labor rather than for sturdy American home makers, or European men and women fitted to become such good citizens.¹ (underline mine)

This is an amazingly able statement of the American democratic ideal of the family farmer. Its economic analysis is keen and on the whole correct. The statement, "even if it tended to lessen the present volume of production and development, it would be better" is downright wisdom that present opponents of the 160 acre limitation refuse to face, or rather, try to evade. Against this background, the race prejudice of the Bee's editor stands out very clearly. The McClatchy paper assumes that Asiatic labor by nature is "cheap," though not in dollars and cents

¹"The Question of Asiatic Labor in California," an editorial, Sacramento Bee, Vol. 107 (June 4, 1910), p. 32.

in wages paid. He assumes that Asiatics, because of race, are not capable of making good family farmers, American homemakers, or good citizens. That he was wrong can be demonstrated in the lives and homes of many an Asiatic farmer who climbed the agricultural ladder in spite of all that McClatchy and others could do to prevent him.* Proving them wrong, however, probably will not make any difference whatever to people completely dominated by the dogma of white supremacy.

Parallels and Differences between the Social Stratification involving Negroes and that involving Orientals and Others in California

The similarity between the status of the Orientals and Negroes is often observed by the students of race relations in the United States. For example, Ruth Tuck, in describing the status of Mexican-Americans, contrasts it with the status of the Negroes and the Orientals. "Many of the problems of the Mexican-American are different than those of the Negro or the Oriental. He has an advantage in that the caste is not closed completely at the top for him."¹ Thus the caste status of the latter groups are considered identical or very similar. Myrdal makes a similar observation: "The Negroes are set apart, together with other colored peoples, principally the Chinese and the Japanese."² However, immediately following this statement, Myrdal de-

¹Tuck, op. cit., p. 205.

²Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

scribes the differences between the situation facing the Negroes on the one hand and the Orientals on the other. It is the purpose of this section to discuss in a summary fashion some of the parallels and differences between these groups of colored peoples.

Race Prejudice and Intolerance

That both Orientals and Negroes are victims of race prejudice need not be stressed here. In this they are to be grouped together and differentiated from the white immigrant groups or from white American latecomers of a poorer class (e.g., "Okies" and "Arkies.") Orientals and Negroes, constituting two of the three (or five or six) major subdivisions of mankind which may legitimately be called races,¹ are physically "visible" in a predominantly Caucasoid society (in power and prestige, and in the setting of aesthetic valuations concerning desirable physical traits²). Supported by the caste taboo against inter-marriage, (which constitutes about the only way to lose this "racial" "visibility"), they remain distinct whereas the other groups whose "visibility" consists of economic factors of income and occupational status, of dress and language, and other outward "cultural" factors, lose their identity much more rapidly.

¹See Introduction, p. 5, supra.

²Note "hair-straighteners" for Negroes, and permanent waves for the Orientals.

As we shall point out subsequently, the status given to the Orientals and their treatment by the dominant group differ in many respects from that of the Negroes, but in regard to the matter of race prejudice, the situation confronting these two racial groups are alike. This similarity becomes striking when the consideration of "assimilation and "unassimilability" are taken into account. Myrdal observes:

America fears the segregation into distinctive isolated groups of all other elements of its population and looks upon the preservation of their separate national attributes and group loyalties as a hazard to American institutions. . . . But in regard to the colored peoples, the American policy is the reverse. They are excluded from assimilation. Even by their best friends in the dominant white group and by the promoters of racial peace and good-will, they are usually advised to keep to themselves and develop a race pride of their own.¹

Oliver Cromwell Cox makes a distinction between race prejudice and intolerance which is useful if not carried too far. He defines social intolerance "as an unwillingness on the part of a dominant group to tolerate the beliefs or practices of a subordinate group because it considers these beliefs and practices to be either inimical to group solidarity or a threat to the continuity of the status quo."² He distinguishes between the two by characterizing race prejudice as "limiting attitudes"³ and

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 54.

²Oliver Cromwell Cox, Caste, Class, and Race (Garden City: Doubleday, 1948), p. 393.

³Cox defines race prejudice as "a social attitude propagated among the public by an exploiting class for the

intolerance as a "suppressive attitude." He points out that the "intolerant group welcomes conversion and assimilation, while the race-prejudiced group is antagonized by attempts to assimilate."¹ It should be noted here that those who are intolerant of Jews, to use Cox's own example, do not "welcome" conversion. "On the contrary, tolerance precedes efforts at conversion--tolerance toward the people, but not toward their religion."² As we shall discuss subsequently, the Orientals and the Mexicans are subjected to both the attitudes of intolerance and race prejudice.

purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so that the exploitation of either the group itself or its resources or both may be justified." Cox, op. cit., p. 393.

This definition reveals a strongly Marxian bias of the author, who writes: "If, therefore, parts of this study seem Marxian, it is not because we have taken the ideas of this justly famous writer as gospel, but because we have not discovered any other that could explain the facts so consistently." Ibid., p. xi.

However, this writer does not criticize this definition of race prejudice just because it is Marxian, but because it seems inadequate. The element of exploitation is usually present, but there are many factors, which are often interrelated with the factor of exploitation but which must also be treated separately (see Chapter VI, infra), that it is highly misleading to define race prejudice solely from the factor of exploitation. This inadequacy is noted by Cox himself, who writes: "A remarkable fact about the California anti-Oriental movements is that they have been mainly initiated by white workers instead of exploiters of labor, the class which we have attempted to show is responsible for all modern racial antagonism." (underline mine.) Ibid., p. 410. As the author shows subsequently, this is not so remarkable if seen from the standpoint of conflicts of economic interest in general. It is remarkable only because economic interest is defined solely in terms of conflict between the exploiting class and the exploited class, and then race prejudice is defined in terms of this conflict, ignoring other forms of economic conflict.

¹Ibid., pp. 393-394.

²Verbal comments of Buell G. Gallagher.

As Cox and Myrdal indicate, the Orientals share with the Negroes the ban against assimilation, both in terms of biological amalgamation and social integration. Several states have laws prohibiting intermarriage between whites and Orientals. Racial restrictive covenants are directed against the Orientals, as well as against Negroes and some nationalital and religious groups. The court rulings on naturalization constitute the basis of various forms of discrimination, such as exclusion acts and Alien Land Laws. The Asiatics are excluded, and branded as undesirable and unsuitable to be assimilated into the main streams of American life.¹ The exclusion of Americans of Japanese descent from the Pacific Coast in World War II is one of the clearest indications of the belief of racially-based undesirability of the persons of Japanese descent.

The principle of the vicious circle operates in this sphere as in many other areas of the social process. The Orientals are believed to be unassimilable from the "nationalital" and racial standpoint. At the same time, movement toward integration and assimilation is often resisted by legal and extralegal means. These means include, besides those mentioned above, social etiquette of a less rigid nature than those applying to the Negroes in the South, which discourages more intimate interpersonal contact between the whites and Orientals, particularly of the opposite

¹See Legal Disabilities, pp. 288-293 infra.

sexes, such as dancing, swimming, and skating (but usually not eating) together, and membership in voluntary social groups such as lodges, fraternal organizations, churches,¹ and service clubs. In some of these social groups, where less intimate relationships prevail, such as in some churches and service clubs, membership is occasionally opened to a few of the members of the Oriental racial groups, sometimes as an expression of an ideal or reward for special merit (usually not as a matter of course). The recognition of merit in schools is much more widely accepted than in groups of a higher age level. Here again we observe the conflict of the American Creed with the prevailing social stratification and race prejudice of the community. The tendency is to make a token demonstration of the belief in the American ideal of fair play and equalitarianism without changing the status quo. These observations are based more on the impressions of the writer than on a sociological survey and are subject to the limitations of all such observations.

This point of similarity between the status of the Negroes and the Orientals is also a point of difference. There is a greater degree of paradox and inconsistency in regard to the resistance against assimilation directed against the Orientals than against the Negroes. In the deep South, where race prejudice against the Negroes is the most thorough-

¹For a fuller discussion of the segregation of the churches, see Chapter VIII, pp. 366, ff. infra.

going, resistance against the assimilation of the Negroes is almost consistent, although it is never quite complete. Even in the most race-prejudiced sections of the South, Negroes are permitted, for example, to obtain some amount of education. But even in parts of California where prejudice is most rampant, and even in segregated schools, education and Americanization have always been stressed greatly. The Orientals are both racial (thus subject to race prejudice) and nationalital (thus to be eventually assimilated) groups. They are subject both to race prejudice and prejudice directed against persons of foreign nationality and cultural heritage.

The Asiatic Exclusion League, organized in May, 1905 to spearhead the anti-Japanese movement, stated in its preamble:

Two or more unassimilable races can not exist peaceably in the same territory. This action between such races results in the extermination of that one which, by reason of its characteristics, physical and mental, is least adapted to the conditions of life originating in the given territory.

• • • • • The Caucasian and Asiatic races are unassimilable.¹

In pursuing the matter of assimilability the U. S. Immigration Commission stated in 1910 at the outset: "The capacity of the Japanese for assimilation, the progress they have made toward assimilation, and the place they occupy in the community are indicated by their literacy, the effort made to acquire the English language, the character of their

¹U. S. Immigration Commission, op. cit., pp.169-170.

reading, their position in political life, their relations with other races, their religious ideals, and related matters."¹

Following up this lead, the Commission found that

the Japanese have a comparatively small percentage of illiterates among them, are intelligent and eager to learn of American institutions, make fairly rapid progress in learning to speak English, and unusually good progress in learning to read and write it. They have not proved to be burdensome to the community because of pauperism or crime.

In spite of all this, the Commission found these factors almost irrelevant in the face of the overwhelming fact of race prejudice.

Yet the Japanese, like the Chinese, are regarded as differing so greatly from the white races that they have lived in but as no integral part of the community. A strong public opinion has segregated them, if not in their work, in the other details of their living.²

All sorts of stereotypes concerning the Orientals and Mexicans (as well as "Okies" and "Arkies") have circulated in California. The Japanese have been described as "buck-toothed, bespectacled, tricky, wordy, arrogant, dishonest."³ They are "servile," "immoral," "treacherous," "sneaking," and "insidious."⁴ On the other hand, the U. S. Immigration Commission found them in 1910 to be "very good" with regard to criminal acts, and "as a race temperate."⁵

¹Ibid., p. 145.

²Ibid., p. 166.

³Carey McWilliams, Prejudice (Little, Brown and Company, 1944), p. 44.

⁴Carey McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1943), p. 156.

⁵U. S. Immigration Commission, Japanese and Other Immigrant Races in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Mountain States, Part 25, vol. I, Immigrants in Industries (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), pp. 165-166.

They were often accused of being intractable and aggressive, at the same time they were criticized for being servile. In fact, the Japanese were feared and hated, not only for their difference and strangeness, but for their possession of "Anglo-Saxon" virtues of aggressiveness, thrift, ambition, and above all, desire to become independent farmers and business men.¹

The U. S. Immigration Commission found that Chinese were preferred to Japanese in 1910. "The reasons advanced for the favorable opinion of the Chinese as against the Japanese were their superiority as workmen, their faithfulness to the employer, a less general desire to acquire possession of land, or to engage in business, and the absence of a desire on their part to associate with others on equal terms."² (underline mine) Here again we recognize "that many arguments in favor of the impossibility of Oriental assimilation are in reality arguments in favor of the prohibition of Oriental assimilation."³

That race prejudice played an important part in the evacuation of persons of Japanese descent from the Pacific

¹Cox points out: "In fact, within limits, the greater the tendency of an exploited people to overthrow the harness of exploitation, the greater the opposition from their exploiters." Cox, op. cit., pp. 421.422.

²U. S. Immigration Commission, op. cit., p. 174.

³Cox, op. cit., p. 419.

Coast during 1942 is widely recognized.¹ One of the testimonies to the presence of race prejudice is furnished by the key person in his own words. Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, writing on February 14, 1942 in his report to the Secretary of War, stated:

The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil possess of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted. The very fact that no sabotage has taken place to date is a disturbing and confirming indication that such actions will be taken. (underline mine.)²

Economic and Political Factors

We have already noted how the economic factors of large-scale organization of farming in California and the need for a supply of "cheap labor" contributed greatly to the rise and maintenance of a caste-like stratification of rural California. We have also indicated that without race prejudice or predilection toward race arrogance and hostility already in the attitudes of the white people in California,

¹For example, Galen M. Fisher, "A Balance Sheet on Japanese Evacuation," Reprinted from The Christian Century (August 18, 25, September 1, 8, 1943), p. 10; Carey McWilliams, Prejudice, op. cit., pp. 251-252; Caleb Foote, Outcasts (New York: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1943), p. 4.

²"Executive Order No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, [in which President Roosevelt authorized the Secretary of War to prescribe military areas, from which any or all persons may be excluded] was the direct result of these steps." (which included this report) U. S. Army, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast (Washington: Govt. Print. office, 1943) pp. 25-26, 34. Cf. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

there would not have been so successful a propagation of prejudice. However, the various forces which entered into the causal nexus were so favorable that even without "racial" factors, similar situations could have been produced, as indeed was produced in reference to the comers of "old American" stock from Oklahoma, Arkansas, etc. However, due to their biologically transmitted physical visibility, the Orientals and Mexicans suffer caste-like status for more than one generation, whereas cultural and economic factors are the main forces which prevent the Caucasoid persons and their descendants from rising in status.

Just as the doctrine of white supremacy is an effective tool for political dominance in the South, the same doctrine, often stated in more frankly economic terms, became the rallying cry for a series of political campaigns. Although supported by a similar economic organization--plantations and large-scale commercialized agriculture and the demand for "cheap labor"--the political use of race prejudice differed radically. Whereas in the South the doctrine of white supremacy was used as a tool by the planter and those who identified themselves with the planter class (except for Reconstruction and Populist periods), anti-Oriental agitation in California was mainly in the hands of the workers, particularly of organized labor.

Lucile Eaves writes that "the legislation on Oriental labor sprang from the people." Anti-Chinese agitations "were the product of the actual experience,--sometimes of the race

prejudices,--of those in the humblest ranks of society."¹ She places the responsibility for the campaign to exclude Oriental labor on the trade-unionists of San Francisco. "This long camping in front of what was felt to be a common enemy has contributed more than any other one factor to the strength of the California labor movement."² The No. 1 item on the platforms of the Workingmen's Party in their election campaign for the Constitutional Convention of 1879 was the exclusion of Chinese labor. A number of their measures were passed by the Convention.³ Henry George, who was connected with San Francisco papers at that time, observed:

The feeling on the Chinese question has long been so strong in California as to give certain victory to any party that could fully utilize it. But the difficulty in the way of making political capital of this feeling has been to get resistance, since all parties are willing to take the strongest anti-Chinese ground.⁴

Practically an identical situation obtained three decades later at the time of the U. S. Immigration Commission investigation, when "the platforms of the three leading political parties of the State in 1910 all contained 'exclusion planks' [against Japanese laborers]."5

¹Lucile Eaves, A History of California Labor Legislation, Vol. 2, University of California Publications in Economics (Berkeley: The Univ. Press, 1910), p. 115.

²Ibid., pp. 5-6.

³Ibid., pp. 35-36.

⁴Henry George, Popular Science Monthly, Vol. 17 (1880), p. 433, quoted by Eaves, op. cit., p. 150.

⁵U. S. Immigration Commission, op. cit., p. 173.

Although the class status and economic interest of the politically dominant group in the South differed diametrically from those of the workers in California, they joined with each other in the interest of maintaining caste status. M. R. Coolidge observed in 1909 that "no small part of the persecution of the Chinaman was due to the fact that it was his misfortune to arrive in the United States at a period when the attention of the whole country was focused upon the question of slavery."¹ Carey McWilliams notes the correlation between the Negro problem and the Chinese question in the vote in Congress on measures introduced after 1876 affecting the Chinese. "No longer interested in Chinese labor, the South was quite willing to join with the Pacific Coast in fitting the Chinese into a caste system which, in many respects, closely resembled that which prevailed throughout the former slave belt."² In the South, the poor whites rallied under the domination of the plantation interests when the political lines were drawn so as to make the issue appear to be racial. In California, on the other hand, the vocal and influential labor was able to overwhelm the opposition of agricultural employers politically by the use of anti-Oriental slogans. The employers then quietly turned to other sources of "cheap labor." Political alignment was different in these two regions, but

¹Quoted in McWilliams, Brothers under the Skin, op. cit., p. 83.

²Loc..cit.

the basic economic dynamic coupled with the political issue centered on caste structure was present in both. In the caste-like treatment of the racial minorities within these societies, both the "poor whites" in the South and the organized labor in California were depressing their own economic and social status. The violent antagonism of the white workers and working farmers in California against the Oriental "cheap labor" tended to drain off their clash of interest with the employing groups of industrial-capitalists and agricultural-capitalists. The working whites in California, like the "poor whites" in the South, tended to direct their resentment against the planters and the capitalist toward the Negroes and the Orientals by identifying the exploited with the exploiters. The factor of caste struggle assumed far greater reality than that of class struggle in both of these areas.

That this was against the economic interests of the working farmers and the agricultural and industrial laborers seems almost self-evident. Yet it is extremely difficult to convince the workers and working farmers of this seemingly simple economic fact. Both the tendencies on the part of these workers to identify themselves with the industrial, commercial, and agricultural employers(as distinct from working farmers) and their caste prejudice hinder them from seeing these simple economic phenomena. George M. Peterson summarizes the interests of the farmers in regard to wage rates as follows:

The farm operators who do all their own work sell their products in competition with the farm operators who hire laborers. Those who hire laborers are interested in securing low costs, and, therefore, want an abundant supply of cheap farm labor. The farmers who do their own work have nothing to gain from such conditions, and in the long run can expect only about the same return for doing their own work as hired laborers get for doing similar farm work. The economic interests of the farmers who do their own work or work part time as farm laborers are more in harmony with the interests and welfare of hired farm laborers than with the interests of farm operators who hire laborers.¹

The relationship of depressed wages to the price of California land and its effect on the working farmer and the farm worker are shown by the report of the La Follette Committee in the following paragraphs:

Even 50 years ago and more, it was evident that a system of agriculture based upon the exploitation of seasonal alien labor was developing in California. Wage rates for agricultural labor declined rapidly between 1850 and 1860 and continued to drop gradually until 1900. Not only was the use of seasonal labor greatly expanded during these years, but wage rates were stabilized at a level which prevented seasonal workers from obtaining an adequate annual wage. The value of California land, meanwhile, rose substantially and was capitalized ultimately on the basis of actual and anticipated profits to be made from large-scale specialized operations and the use of cheap labor.

This maladjustment in land values boded ill for the farm laborer and working farmer alike. Small farmers, whose numbers increased greatly during the twentieth century, were forced to purchase the product of this exploited, low wage-labor. It was in this maladjustment that the civil strife of the past decade and the inarticulate protest of the small farmer against market domination and oppressive indebtedness had

¹Quoted in Arthur W. Stuart, "The Probable Economic Effects of Collective Bargaining between California Agricultural Workers and Employers," U. S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Education and Labor, Violation of Free Speech, op. cit., part 61, p. 22478; see also the entire article, pp. 22475-22479. See also R. L. Adams, "Letter to State Board of Control," State Board of Control, California and the Oriental (June 19, 1920), pp. 125-127.

its genesis.¹

It is hard to understand why such clear "handwritings on the wall" were not properly interpreted by those whose livelihood depended upon the correct interpretation of the operation of these basic economic forces. One of the ways in which the working farmers and industrial workers could have competed effectively against large-scale industrialized farming is to welcome the Oriental laborers into the ranks of organized labor and to the ranks of independent working farmers. This, race prejudice could not tolerate. It is precisely the function of race prejudice and bourgeois prejudice (that is, the predisposition of the worker and the working farmer to identify themselves with the industrialist, the business man, and the agricultural employer) to confuse the issue.

From the very beginning, discriminatory legislation against the resident Chinese, and later against the Japanese and others, was mixed with the agitation for the exclusion of those who wanted to come. The arguments used, and undoubtedly sincerely advanced by many, for exclusion was their desire to prevent the formation of a caste society. However, in successive suppressive measures adopted to discourage the coming of the Orientals and to keep them out of competition with whites, the very caste structure which they sought to prevent was more firmly established.

¹U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of Education and Labor, Violation of Free Speech, op. cit., Report No. 1150, part 3, op. cit., p. 232.

Anti-Oriental prejudice was also used to divert attention of the people from civic corruption. As Schmitz faced indictment in 1906 after his reelection as Mayor of San Francisco, he found a convenient scapegoat in the unpopular Japanese. "Hard-pressed for an effective diversionary issue, Schmitz and Ruef saw an opportunity to save themselves by whipping up a Japanese pogrom."¹ The Native Sons of the Golden West has been active since 1907 in developing a strong in-group feeling among native born white elements in a state in which the population was predominantly foreign,² and in creating a solid political organization. "The organization acquired its great political potency by cleverly using anti-Oriental feeling to solidify its own ranks and to build a compact political organization."³

While it is true that anti-Oriental antagonism arose out of the economic roots of conflict between "cheap Oriental labor" and white workingmen, it soon necessitated systematic agitation by professional race-baiters to maintain it. It is entirely true that race prejudice against the Orientals has become so much a part of the cultural pattern of California that Ruth Fowler observed in 1934 that

group values and opinions are more influential than direct personal experience based on primary contacts.

¹McWilliams, Prejudice, op. cit., p. 21.

²For example, in 1900 among 240,237 males in California (which constituted 65% of the total population of 367,240) there were 198,960 foreign males, or 82.9%. Computed from the table compiled by M. R. Collidge, quoted in Eaves, op. cit., p. 3.

³McWilliams, Prejudice, op. cit., p. 22.

Immediate influences alone do not produce the opinions of the moment, but rather all the accumulated influences both present and past play a part in its creation. Thus changes in individual opinion do not greatly change the total group reaction.¹

But group valuations were formed to a great extent by active and continued agitation. In the history of anti-Oriental agitations there seems to have been periods of intense activity followed by periods of relative lull, depending upon the economic and political situation of the moment. For example, "the 'peak' years of anti-Japanese agitation . . . have been years in which Presidential elections were held: 1908, 1912, 1916, and 1920."²

The evacuation of persons of Japanese descent from the Pacific Coast may be considered a direct lineal descendant of the series of anti-Oriental agitations, although it is true that military urgency and fear of invasion had a precipitant effect upon the situation. The interaction of the military necessity and race antagonism is of such a nature that it is impossible to separate and weigh them. If it were not for the pattern of race relations approaching caste hostility, wholesale evacuation probably would not have been contemplated. On the other hand, it is true that, whether well or ill founded, the fear of invasion coupled

¹Ruth Fowler, "Some Aspects of Public Opinion Concerning the Japanese in Santa Clara County," unpublished dissertation, Stanford University, June, 1934, quoted by McWilliams, *Ibid.*, p. 14. For a change from the earlier situation see the statement by Eaves quoted pp. 279-280, *supra*. Arising out of the direct experience of people who had contact with Orientals, anti-Oriental prejudice had become woven into the social norms of California. But this social norm had to be constantly buttressed by fresh agitation.

²McWilliams, *Prejudice*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

with the anger against the attack on Pearl Harbor, made it easy for the agitation to take effect.

It has often been pointed out that the Justice Department and the Military had not contemplated wholesale removal until the press and professional agitators began to clamor for the proposal. Eric C. Bellquist of the University of California testified before the Tolan Committee:

Despite the treacherous nature of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, there was no immediate reaction of suspicion of aliens in California.

In brief, up to the end of the year, there had been no panic and little infringement upon rights and liberties. The people were calm and went about their business getting ready to face the war, maintain morale, and put forth the common effort necessary to meet and defeat the forces of brutalitarianism.

. In January the commentators and columnists, professional "patriots," witch hunters, alien haters, and varied groups and persons with aims of their own began inflaming public opinion. The ancient western curse of vigilante rule was once more raising its head.

. Not until inflammatory commentators on the "enemy-alien menace" undermined popular confidence did the present hysteria arise.¹

Bellquist quotes Philip Bancroft who wrote to him on February 14, 1942:

In going about the country districts I have been gratified to find much more of sympathy and understanding for the plight of these unfortunate people than would generally be expected from what appears in the papers.

Apparently most of our politicians think they can increase their popularity by attacking these people who

¹Eric C. Bellquist, "The Question of Transferring the Japanese from the Pacific Coast," U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 77th Cong. 2nd Sess., pursuant to H. Res. 113, Part 29, San Francisco Hearings, Feb. 21 and 23, 1942 (Washington: U.S. Printing Office, 1942), pp. 11242-11243.

have very few defenders rather than by leaving the handling of the subject to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the War Department. . . ."¹

Even after the evacuation the same forces of the politically anxious were extremely active. The War Relocation Authority became the target of a great deal of scapegoating by congressional committees, particularly the Dies Committee, and "by a whole long list of badgering groups and individuals on the West Coast."² Anti-Japanese prejudice, rather than abating, became even more violent after the Japanese were removed.³ McWilliams observes: "One other important factor behind the renewal of agitation in 1942--namely, the relocation program had operated so successfully that Californians were becoming indifferent to the entire question The anti-Japanese forces really do not represent the people of the West Coast, not even in the state of California."⁴ He notes that there was very little anti-Japanese feeling for nearly a decade prior to 1940 for the reason that agitation had abated. "Race prejudice is not indigenous in California: it is manufactured there. As one observer has said: 'people have to work hard in California to keep race hatred alive.'"⁵ These political minded groups backed

¹Quoted by Eric Bellquist, op. cit., p. 11243.

²Displaced Japanese-Americans (The text of this pamphlet originally appeared in Fortune magazine, April, 1944) (Washington:American Council of Pacific Affairs, n. d.) p.5.

³Cf. Fisher, "Balance Sheet of Evacuation," op. cit., pp. 21-26.

⁴McWilliams, Prejudice, op. cit., p. 234.

⁵Ibid., p. 235.

probably by those who stood to gain economically by the evacuation, influenced the execution of the program which, as characterized by Justice Murphy, "goes over the 'very brink of constitutional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism."¹

Legal Disabilities of the Orientals in California

As we have noted above, the Orientals have a number of legal restrictions placed upon them. Lucile Eaves cites one of the earliest and most vicious ones in her study of labor legislation in California:

A decision of the Supreme Court in 1854 contributed more than the legislative measures to this setting aside of Chinese in a class to whom all social and political equality was denied. To it must be charged many of these lawless and unjust acts that have furnished such a disgraceful chapter in the history of the State, for it resulted in denying the Chinese the protection of the courts in many of the cases in which they were wronged. The laws of the state already prohibited the testimony of Negroes, mulattoes, and Indians, in cases to which white men were parties. By Judge Murray's decision these laws were made to apply to the Chinese.²

The exclusion of the Chinese from the right to be naturalized became the foundation stone of discriminatory legislation, especially in regard to the Japanese. The exclusion act of 1882 specifically named Chinese, but the Alien Land Laws and the exclusion act of 1924, directed against the Japanese, always used the convenient formula: "those ineligible to naturalization." The ineligibility

¹Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214 (1944) quoted in Alfred H. Kelly & Winfred A. Arbison, The American Constitution (New York: W. W. Norton & Company), p. 818.

²Eaves, op. cit., p. 113.

of the Chinese to become naturalized was established in the Congress on July 4, 1870 in the midst of a heated debate on the Negro issue. Charles Sumner fought hard to amend all acts relating to naturalization by striking out the word "white" wherever it occurred, "so that in naturalization there shall be no distinction of race or color."¹ His amendment was lost, and the Congress conferred the right of naturalization to persons of African descent but not to the Chinese.²

In a series of court decisions, Japanese were ruled ineligible to naturalization: re Saito (62 Fed., 126, June, 1899), re Buntaro Kumagai (163 Fed., 922, Dist. Ct. Washington, A. D., Sept., 1908), re Knight (171 Fed., 299, D. C., E. D., New York, July, 1909), re Takiyi Yamashita (30 Wash., 234, 70 Pac. Rept., 482, Oct., 1902).³

In recent years, particularly during the war, one after another of the peoples were made eligible to naturalization. Chief Justice Vinson noted in connection with the Oyama case:

At the time the Alien Land Law was adopted the right to be naturalized extended only to free white persons and persons of African nativity or descent. In 1940, descendants of races indigenous to the western

¹Eaves, op. cit., p. 130.

²Ibid., pp. 129-133.

³From n. a, U. S. Immigration Commission, op. cit., p. 160.

hemisphere were also made eligible, 54 Stat. 1140; in 1943 Chinese were made eligible, 57 Stat. 601; and in 1946 Filipinos and persons of races indigenous to India were made eligible, 60 Stat. 416, 8 U. S. C. A. sec. 703 (1946 supp.). While it is not altogether clear whether the statute should be interpreted to include or to exclude certain peoples, . . . , it seems to be accepted that Japanese are among the few groups not eligible for citizenship.¹

Bills were introduced in the 80th Congress to make Japanese eligible, but were not passed.²

Restrictive covenants are widely entered into in the various cities in California. In the Shelley v. Kraemer (16 LW 4426) case, the Chief Justice notes:

Restrictive covenants of the sort involved in these cases have been used to exclude other than Negroes from the ownership or occupancy of real property. We are informed that such agreements have been directed against Indians, Jews, Chinese, Japanese, Mexicans, Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos, among others.³

In this important case, the Supreme Court ruled that the actions of State Courts and of judicial officers are actions of the States and that "in these cases the States have acted to deny petitioners the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."⁴

The following states have laws prohibiting intermarriage between whites and Orientals (among others):

¹n. 3, Oyama v. California, 322 U. S. 633.

²However, the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been accepting applications of the Japanese for naturalization. To the writer's knowledge a considerable number of people have already received first papers.

³Footnote 26, Shelley v. Kraemer, 16 LW 4426.

⁴Shelley v. Kraemer, 16 LW 4426. See pp.218-224.

Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, (Louisiana, "Persons of color"), (Maryland, ". . . . or a member of the Malay race."), Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon (Chinese, or Kanaka blood,"), South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming.¹ A recent ruling of the California Supreme Court declared the provisions of the Civil Code (CC 69:69a) prohibiting intermarriage, unconstitutional.²

The Alien Land Law was directed particularly against the Japanese, who aspired to climb the agricultural ladder in the tradition of American family farming. Japanese farm laborers who became tenants and owners were no longer available as "cheap labor," thus were unwanted by the industrial agriculturalists. Moreover, they became stiff competitors of working farmers. Labor was already thoroughly anti-Japanese. It is not difficult to understand that this law was passed in 1913, then strengthened in 1920, and further strengthened subsequently.

Immediately following the opening of the prohibited areas to persons of Japanese descent on January 1, 1945, there was an active campaign on the part of the State to enforce the Alien Land Law, long half neglected by the State, and to push the escheat cases involving agricultural properties of Americans of Japanese descent. With the stringent interpretations of the presumptions of subterfuge

¹From Ashley Montagu, op. cit., pp. 189-193.

²Perez v. Lippold 198 Pacific Reporter 2nd 17 (1948).

written into the amendments, no farm owned and operated by American citizens of Japanese descent was completely "safe" from escheat proceedings. The threat of the court action was enough to bring uncertainty and fear. Many cases were settled out of court with the payment of thousands of dollars to the State. In a test case, Oyama v. California, the judgments of the State courts were reversed by the Supreme Court. Most of the justices, whether concurring or dissenting, expressed an opinion. Chief Justice Vinson in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court on the Oyama case states:

This case presents a conflict between the State's right to formulate a policy of landholding within its bounds and the right of American citizens to own land anywhere in the United States. When these two rights clash, the rights of citizens may not be subordinated merely because of his father's country of origin.

Justice Murphy, (with whom Justice Rutledge joined) concurring, emphasized:

And so in origin, purpose, administration and effect, the Alien Land Law does violence to the high ideals of the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations. It is an unhappy facsimile, a disheartening reminder, of the racial policy pursued by those forces of evil whose destruction recently necessitated a devastating war. It is racism in one of its most malignant forms. . . . Human liberty is in too great a peril today to warrant ignoring that principle in this case. For that reason I believe that the penalty of unconstitutionality should be imposed upon the Alien Land Law.¹

The dissenting Justices also point out the inconsistency. Justice Reed, (with whom Justice Burton joined), dissenting, maintained:

¹Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633.

Discrimination in the sense of placing more burdens upon some than others is not in itself unconstitutional. . . . Unless the California Land Laws are to be held unconstitutional, we think the presumption and its resulting effects must be accepted as legal.¹

This court ruling made it practically impossible for the State to enforce the Alien Land Law. Cases pending were dropped.

In connection with the comparison of caste structure in California to the Negro-white caste pattern, we have mentioned various forces which may be broadly designated as psychological, economic, political and legal. We have noted that these factors are closely interrelated and mutually interacting. Besides these factors which operate in the caste structure in both of these manifestations, there is a factor which is related to the international situation which greatly affects the caste pattern in California.

The Complications of International Relations

The Orientals differ from the Negroes in that they belong to nationalital groups. They have a linguistic, cultural, and national heritage in addition to the racial. In this respect, they are more different and more "visible" than the Negroes. Thus Chinese and Japanese have been subjected to hostile acts for cultural differences.

Moreover, the international situation affects the intensity of hostility against the Orientals in California

¹Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633.

in a way it does not for the Negroes. Carey McWilliams calls attention to the conflicts which developed between California and Japan.

The tensions that developed in California represented sharp and basic conflicts: racial and cultural, economic and political. What happened in California determined the course of events in Oregon and Washington, in Alaska and Peru. It unquestionably influenced the course of events between the United States and Japan.¹

During the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) sympathy toward Japan tended to decrease hostility against the Japanese people in the United States. Likewise, during the Sino-Japanese conflict (1937-1945) sympathy toward the Chinese cause softened aggression and hostility against the Chinese in California. During World War II, hostility against the Filipinos was modified by the American admiration for the courage of the people of the Philippines and the feeling of mutuality in the war against the Japanese. Yet throughout all these periods, the basic caste-like attitude of the people of California did not materially change toward these Oriental peoples. They were still looked upon as inferior peoples, filling subordinate positions in the state's economy. The evacuation of Japanese was "caused" by the War between the United States and Japan. No amount of race prejudice in itself could have forced the Federal government to take such a drastic step.

¹McWilliams, Prejudice, op. cit., p. 14.

Cultural Factors and Acculturation

In connection with intolerance and race prejudice, we have discussed the dominant group's attitude toward assimilation of the Orientals and Negroes. Here we shall briefly note the differences regarding acculturation of nationalital, racial groups such as the Orientals and Mexicans in California, and non-nationalital, racial group, the Negroes.

Acculturation is defined as "the process of learning a culture different from that of one's parental family."¹ Allison Davis defines culture as "a group of basic social habits and values." Culture is a way of life in which the individual is trained by "his family, play-group, social clique, social class, church, and ethnic group."²

After a study of the acculturation process of Mexican, Chinese, and Negro Americans in the public schools in California, Davis notes the difference between them. Negroes are "overwhelmingly American in their culture."³ This fact becomes perfectly clear when a Negro community is contrasted with a community of Italian, Polish, Lithuanian, or other foreign-born Americans. In spite of the

¹Allison Davis, "Some Basic Concepts in the Education of Ethnic and Lower-Class Groups," op. cit., p. 266.

²Ibid., pp. 264-265.

³Ibid., p. 270.

higher status of these immigrant peoples, as whites, they are culturally far less American than are the Negroes. As Davis notes, "the cultural stigmas, with which American whites react to most Negroes, are not foreign in any sense."¹ They are stigmas of lower-class people, whether white or Negro. But since Negroes are kept in the lower-class positions by color barriers, this underprivileged culture has become identified with "Negro behavior."

The problem of acculturation for the Negroes is that of lower-class people learning habits and values of the middle-class way of life. This necessitates a new educational motivation, that of "willingness and effort necessary to prepare himself for a middle-class occupation."² But the color barriers shut these opportunities off from him and weaken his motivation in this direction. And his lack of preparation keeps him in the lower-class occupations.

Chinese culture differs from American culture even more than Mexican culture, thus requiring for the Chinese Americans a greater degree of acculturation. However, according to Davis, "they nevertheless become much more successfully acculturated than the Mexican-Americans." This fact is attributed "(1) to the greater emphasis in their national culture upon education and scholarship, (2) to their higher economic status, and (3) to their


¹Loc. cit.

²Ibid., p. 271.

higher social class position."¹ Acculturation of the American children of these immigrant nationalities is stimulated by the stigmas attached to their parents' foreign culture. This increases the tension between them and their parents. We have already noted in connection with race prejudice that acculturation does not necessarily reduce hostility of the dominant whites toward racial minority groups.

The Interaction of Various Factors:
A Summary

The forces which gave rise to and maintain race prejudice and caste-like social pattern in California are many and are closely and dynamically interrelated. They interact with one another in a manner which is extremely difficult to untangle and identify. The principle of cumulative social causation, or vicious circle, operates here. Moreover, as MacIver points out, this is compounded with the tension between the forces which tend to maintain caste and the forces which tend to break down the patterns of caste. We may modify MacIver's diagram as follows:



The situation in California seems even more unstable than in the Deep South, especially since the outbreak of

¹Ibid., p. 270.

World War II. Both the evacuation and the Oyama case came within these eight years. Caste barriers directed against most Orientals in matters of naturalization, intermarriage, and immigration have virtually been abolished. Herein lies an opportunity for those who believe that caste structure should be destroyed to take advantage of the dynamic fluidity of the situation, and to take actions which tend to strengthen the forces which break down caste patterns.

PART THREE

CHRISTIAN ETHICS AND COLOR CASTE

CHAPTER VII

SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF COLOR CASTE AND THEIR RELATION TO THE THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE OF HUMAN SINFULNESS

At the root of the problem of caste is the problem of man--of person in social relationships. As Myrdal, the sociologist points out:

The American Negro is a problem in the heart of the American. It is there that the interracial tension has its focus. It is there that the decisive struggle goes on."¹

It is at this point more than any other that contact between science and theology, or more specifically, between social sciences on the one hand, and Christian ethics and theology on the other, is made. For theology and ethics are profoundly, if not predominantly, concerned with the nature of man. Niebuhr, the theologian, for example, begins his major theological work with the remark: "Man has always been his own most vexing problem."² Murphy, the psychologist writes: "Most of life's problems and difficulties are self-problems."³ It is the purpose of this chapter to enumerate some of the more widely accepted

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. xliii.

²Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (Scribner, 1941), I, 1.

³Gardner Murphy, Personality (Harper, 1947), p. 562.

theories concerning the psychology of prejudice. It is outside the scope of this study or the competence of this writer to do more than list some of these theories. It is the hope of the writer to relate these theories of psychology to the theological and ethical position of this study as stated in an earlier chapter.¹

In the following sections the writer will seek the psychological roots of prejudice and caste, and study the psychological expressions of prejudice and hostility which are causative in the caste pattern of social relationships.

The Self and Status in the Social Norms of Caste

The writer summarized his view of the self as follows in an earlier chapter:

Self, in existing, exists in freedom and in contradiction to other selves, including God. Therefore, tensions and conflicts are actually unavoidable, although not necessarily so, ideally or essentially. Self creatively reaches out to include others. In doing so, it is both altruistic and selfish. In both, it is inevitably self-centered. Thus, even the most altruistic extension of self is, in a measure, egocentric.²

This problem of the self, of personality, and of the human organism, existing in separation from and in interaction with the environment and other selves, personalities and organisms forms the core of much of the discussions and controversies in theology, ethics, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, sociology and a host of other fields of

¹See Chapter I and III.

²P. 95, supra.

human knowledge and inquiry. It is not the purpose of this brief section to reiterate the discussions or to attempt the formulation of an answer, even of a tentative nature. After a 926-page discussion of the psychology of personality, Gardner Murphy cautions us to use "the spice of a healthy skepticism which will know how infinite are nature the macrocosm, and man the microcosm, how infinitesimal our knowledge of it and of him."¹ It is the purpose of this section to seek some discernible points of contact between Christian ethics and theology, on the one hand, and sociology and psychology, on the other, as they converge on the question of personality, and as the question of personality is related to the problem of inter-caste relationships.

The perception of the self begins in infancy. Murphy, approaching the subject genetically (for the moment), writes: "All the real essentials in the architecture of the self seem to be well separated by the end of infancy, roughly by the time the child is two years old."²

. . . . Self-demarcation and self-love are laid down in their essential forms in infancy and for the most part, subsequent elaborations follow the architectural designs that are established early. The perception of the parts and of their interrelations, the total going concern of the self, and the system of affects directed both to the parts and to the whole, seem to be clear broadly by two years of age. However, a series of changes occur in the next few years; some of them appear in most children, but others are more individualized.³

¹Murphy, op. cit., pp. 926-927.

²Ibid., p. 503.

³Ibid., p. 504.

Continuing the genetic approach, Murphy notes some characteristic "changes in selfhood." "In our culture¹ the dynamic aspects of the self, in the sense of the motive structure that aids its development, seem to move, during infancy and early childhood, from body awareness to two other concerns, prestige and power."² As the child grows, "the self becomes less and less a pure perceptual object, and more and more a conceptual trait system."³

Murphy stresses how deeply "a value is attached to selfhood in our culture."⁴ He calls the system of self-enhancing and self-defending tendencies the ego. In many cultures, including our own, these tendencies are regarded axiomatically as competitive. "Egoism is set in opposition to altruism. . . . No one can enhance or defend himself without encroaching upon the self-enhancement and self-defense of others." This, Murphy finds to be a "very extraordinary doctrine."⁵ He asserts that "the process is primarily one that is culturally derived, not biologically inevitable."⁶

This strange axiom, that self, existing in contradiction to, and, at the same time, in interaction with

¹By "in our culture," he does not mean that similar conditions do not obtain in other cultures. The movement of the motive structure he is referring to here is certainly extremely widespread in many different cultures.

²Murphy, op. cit., p. 505.

³Ibid., p. 506.

⁴Ibid., p. 523; see n. 1, supra.

⁵Murphy, op. cit., p. 524.

⁶Ibid., p. 525.

other selves, tends inevitably, at least in cultures like ours, to involve opposition, is very close to the heart of the doctrine of "original sin." That it is not biologically inevitable is to be reasserted. The doctrine of original sin must be purged of any biological or hereditary or historical interpretations. However, a question may be raised as to the biological ground of competition, on the one hand, and cooperation, on the other. At the close of a thoroughgoing review of investigations conducted regarding the egoistic and altruistic behavior of fish, lizards, birds, and mammals, W. C. Allee observes that "for good or ill, the social system of rank-orders belongs to behavior patterns that characterize a whole subphylum." Therefore it is more difficult to affect these characteristics than those limited to man or to mammals.¹ On the other hand, the same zoologist points out:

The biological realist remembers that the dominance-subordination social system is not always disoperative and raises the question about the extent to which it can be modified with safety. The realist also knows that a strong tendency toward automatic cooperation is even more firmly rooted in animal life than is this characteristically vertebrate social system. Human altruism, like the "peck orders" of human society, is, in part only, a distinctly human development; both have their remote roots in the levels of animal kingdom from which man and his remote ancestors evolved. . . . It is important to remember that in all of biology, the co-operative drift is somewhat stronger in the long run than are the opposite tendencies toward dis-operation.²

¹W. C. Allee, "Human Conflict and Cooperation: the Biological Background," Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, eds., Approaches to National Unity, op. cit., pp. 358-359.

²Ibid., p. 359.

Thus it is shown that both the disoperative and the cooperative tendencies are deeply rooted in his animal nature. It is not demonstrated, at least as the result of these investigations, that either egotism or altruism is more basic or predominant.

What the writer desires to emphasize at this particular point in the discussion of selfhood is that under given existential circumstances, it appears that self-centeredness inevitably becomes (or already is) selfishness, and that egoism is per se egotism. It is enough for the present to recognize that whatever "culturally derived" means, Murphy does not intend that the phrase signify that this "extraordinary doctrine" arises out of the situation alone.¹ It is sufficient here to remind ourselves that such an "extraordinary doctrine" is part and parcel of our culture.

¹Murphy criticizes situationism for trying "to define the organization of the situation first, before turning to the organism, forgetting that it is partly by virtue of the structure of the organism that the situation achieves a structure." He explains the field theory in this connection:

"We cannot define the situation operationally except in reference to the specific organism which is involved; we cannot define the organism operationally, in such a way as to obtain predictive power for behavior, except in reference to the situation. Each serves to define the other; they are definable operationally while in the organism-situation field." Murphy, op. cit., p. 891.

This comes very close to MacIver's conception of dynamic social causation. This field theory (at least as stated above; not necessarily the whole of it) appears to be in harmony with the position of the writer concerning the "existential" nature of Christian ethics: that is, that Christian duty is to be understood operationally in relation to the given situation. See pp. 99-100, supra. Cf. Brunner, Divine Imperative, pp. 83, 114, 117.

"In our culture,¹ the concept of competitive self-enhancement is clear in almost all normal children by the age of three or four."² At the same time that this inevitability of competitive self-enhancement is widely recognized, a sense of responsibility and guilt is attached to it. In his latest book, Niebuhr points out:

Naturalists may argue that human actions have been reduced to the level of "physical events" to which no praise or blame can be attached because they always have "sufficient antecedents." But the common sense of mankind has never accepted this ridiculous denial of a unique freedom in human life and of a consequent responsibility and guilt in human action.³

Murphy points out further that these competitive self-defending and self-enhancing tendencies do not remain in terms of competition for things, but "a great deal that looks like competition for objects is in fact competition for status."⁴ He adds that "as conceptualization proceeds, the simple physical bases of membership character are replaced by conceptual bases. One belongs to a certain ab-

¹This is not to imply that there are not different manifestations (culturally conditioned) of the same basic tendency in other cultures distinct from ours. It may be asserted here without much danger of contradiction that exactly the same condition obtains in Japan, for example, where a similar economic situation but a very different "culture" exist.

²Murphy, op. cit., p. 525.

³Niebuhr, Faith and History, op. cit., p. 95.
For a more extended discussion of inevitability and responsibility concerning human sinfulness, see pp. 90, 94-95.

⁴Murphy, op. cit., p. 526.

stractly defined social group."¹

Muzafer Sherif explains the crucial importance of status by likening it to the anchoring of our bodies in space.

Our individualities which we experience as members of such and such a group or profession or party, are anchored in definite relationships to these social surroundings. This anchoring is our status. How can we characterize the ego formation which takes place in every individual more clearly than by saying that it consists of reaching a status in these many respects? The stability of our status in these many respects forms the identity of our persons. When this stability is obscured, we are confused; when it is damaged we are deeply hurt; when the ties that bind us to a definite status are cut off we toss in a strange and hostile sea with uncertainty and distress. This will last until we anchor ourselves again.²

Ruth Tuck describes the importance of status in a Southwestern town:

Descanso may have a tradition of free-and easy western ways, but it is not a relaxing town. Its people look as hard-bitten and driven, in many ways, as do the dwellers of large cities. Beneath the casual, friendly manners of small community residents, they display the tensions of those who "have their eye on the main chance." They are eternally watchful, to see who got ahead of someone, to see that no one gets ahead of them, or to look for signs of the "slipping" that is so feared. It is a society where constant, invidious comparison is the rule; because, obviously, you can check your own status by seeing who is above you and keeping an eye on those below you. A group which is permanently assigned a lower position offers great psychological release, in this game. As they will always be

¹Ibid., p. 534. It is necessary to point out that color caste groups are not based simply on physical differences, but contain elements of "certain abstractly defined" groups. It is not the color but the caste which defines the status of the Negro, who may, in fact, be just as white or even whiter than some members of the white caste.

²Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (Harper, 1936), pp. 196-197.

"lower," so you will always be "ahead." When self-mistrust and fear of failure creep up, the permanent "lowers" provide convenient targets on which to vent uneasiness.¹

The function of caste becomes clear against this background.

Caste, with its apparent rigidity of the hierarchy of social status, is a manifestation of the psychological need of the sort of anchorage provided by status. Gallagher indicates how upsetting to the individual is "any proposed disturbance in racial norms, or conduct controlled by racial norms."

One loses status; the ego is adrift in a sea of shifting relativity; the mental processes become confused and the emotional responses uncontrolled. This is due to the fact that contemporary American culture (especially, though not exclusively, in the South) has so emphasized racial status as a guarantee of individual status, that racial norms assume a primary position in the hierarchy of individual values; and to the fact that this primary emphasis upon racial status has led to a social experience in which deep emotional attitudes are attached to the social norm, and the mental processes are used to rationalize and to fortify the entrenched position.²

He calls to our attention further that "race is made a symbol of cultural status, automatically classifying individuals and readily serving as a means of directing and controlling the individuals so classified."³

We have already seen how this process operates in economic relations, relationships involving public insti-

¹Ruth Tuck, Not with the Fist, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940), pp. 227-228.

²Gallagher, American Caste and Negro College, op. cit., p. 54.

³Ibid., pp. 54-55.

tutions, and in more intimate "social" relationships. Once such a system of the hierarchy of status is established, it is extremely difficult to break it down, because such a breakdown represents a threat to the stability of status. And the threat to status is a threat to one's anchorage. In other words, the threat of status is the threat of the ego itself. Therefore any disturbance or anticipation of disturbance of the caste pattern is countered with all the vehemence, self-righteousness and "obvious" justification of self-defense. Just as, in our society, self-defence is regarded legally as sufficient justification for acts such as assault and murder, which are otherwise considered felonious, so the threat to status (in the form of a threat to caste hierarchy) is defended with lynching or other forms of violence without any need felt for defense or rationalization other than that of the threat to caste. "Keeping the Negroes in their place" is sufficient justification (just as self-defense is) for any form of violence or breach of accepted norms of morality, precisely because, in a caste society, a threat to caste is a threat to the self.

But it must be pointed out that this condition operates only in a caste society. Anchoring of the self in status may be a fundamental need of personality, but how this is to be achieved is culturally conditioned. In the American South, caste is the predominant status-determining factor. In the North, caste is not so predominantly a

force in determining one's status. Income, education, occupation, and other factors connected with the determination of class status play very important roles, as they do to a lesser degree in the South. From the standpoint of the interpretation of Christian ethics represented in this study, it may here be stated that striving for status appears to be one of the characteristics of the man-in-existence, but how this is socially expressed (as class, caste, etc.) and to what degree depends upon the conjuncture of dynamic forces represented by the person and his situation. (Of course, the person includes the situation and the situation includes the person, in the field of ethical decision.) Thus the person is inevitably involved in sin, both by the nature of his selfhood and by the nature of his cultural (existential) involvement. Yet as a person, with freedom to choose between different manifestations of status hierarchy and between different degrees of acquiescence to the social norms to which he is conditioned,¹ he is both able

¹Murphy, after accepting the assertion that "personality is molded by the social order," asks, "Is there not something paradoxical about the fact that profound frustration is characteristic of modern man, woman, and child. . . ? Such frustration is certainly evidence that the molding process has not finished its task. Cultural relativists, noting how widely the patterns of human conduct vary over the face of the world, must still face the fact that in every society there is protest; people do not do and feel what the society says they should do and feel." Murphy, op. cit., p. 905.

He also points out the paradox: "the greater the organization of power, industrial or political, the greater the power of the individual who knows how to seize the helm. . . . The great individual causes extensive change; the personal factor has become of colossal magnitude." Ibid., p. 912.

to rise above conformity and responsible to the degree that he fails to transcend the unethical social norms to the very limit of his ability to do so. It is the nature of human freedom that this limit appears as a receding goal. To a third person, a "saint" has reached or even exceeded this limit of his ability, but it is very often the "saint" who confesses his sinfulness in what appears to others as exaggerated terms.¹

Prejudice and Caste Aggression

Types of Prejudice

There are at least four aspects of negative interaction between caste and caste-like groups which need to be distinguished: prejudice, hostility, discrimination, and open conflict. In its broadest terms, prejudice may be considered simply as a prejudgment of individuals on the basis of racial, ethnic, or religious group affiliation. For example, behavior patterns of individuals belonging to a particular group are prejudged according to a stereotype which attributes a cluster of traits to individuals as representative of a group. Prejudgment also involves value judgments. "That is, the prejudice is not simply a set of

¹Cf. Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit., I, 257-258; Niebuhr adds: "The ultimate proof of the freedom of the human spirit is its own recognition that its will is not free to choose between good and evil. For the highest reaches of the freedom of the spirit, the self discovers in contemplation and retrospect that previous actions have invariably confused the ultimate reality and value, which the self as spirit senses, with the immediate necessities of the self." Ibid., I, 258.

expectations; it is also a set of evaluations of good and bad, superior and inferior."¹ A prejudiced person thus brings to the situation a positive or negative predisposition toward these traits that he anticipates in the members of a group. "Prejudice, in this general sense, is an inevitable and universal feature of social life."²

A second type of negative interaction is hostility, which is a particular type of prejudice "which violates some important norms of values nominally accepted in the culture."³ Even thus narrowed down, prejudice or hostility is a "blanket concept," covering a wide range of concrete phenomena. Hostility may be mild or violent. It may be directed against persons with whom one has had no contact or with whom contact is intimate and continuous. It may be of type 1 prejudice (hostility), that is, simply a reflection of prevailing social attitudes by the individual. Or it may be of type 2, which is "a necessary part of the personal economy of its possessor because it meets a need created by the dynamics of tension within his personality."⁴

Prejudice is not always correlated with discrimination or conflict. Discrimination may be defined as "the differential treatment of individuals considered to belong

¹Williams, op. cit., Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, p. 36; cf. Cox's definition of race prejudice, Cox, op. cit., pp. 393-394. See pp. 269-274, supra.

²Williams, Reduction of Intergroup Tensions, op. cit., p. 36.

³Ibid., p. 37.

⁴L. Joseph Stone, "Appendix Four: Memorandum on Types of Prejudice," MacIver, More Perfect Union, op. cit., pp. 286-287.

to a particular group."¹ Discrimination always accompanies prejudice, but it differs in degree and type. Discrimination may have reference to biological functions, such as against women, or may be based on culturally imputed significance of certain traits such as skin color, or may not have any real or assumed biological function. Discrimination not only refers to differential treatment but to deviation from the generally accepted social norms, such as equality of opportunity.

A fourth type of hostility or prejudice, open conflict, is a part of the continuum which shades into one another. The maximum of prejudice may be present with the minimum of open conflict, such as the caste situation in the deep South.² Williams distinguishes three major types of "realistic conflicts": conflict of interests, of values (cultural conflict), and of personality types. Among the "unrealistic" components of conflicts, he lists the following three: "ignorance and error, deflected hostility, historical tradition."³ The main forms of deflected hostility are projection and displacement. We shall refer to these more fully later.

Again, as elsewhere, we need to take into consideration the dynamic interaction of all these various forms of

¹Williams, op. cit., p. 39.

²See p. 146, supra; cf. Davis, Gardner and Gardner, pp. 481-482.

³Williams, op. cit., p. 40.

prejudice and hostility.

The known facts create a strong presumption that a main source of the persistence of intergroup hostility is precisely the interlocking and mutual reinforcement of cultural differences, other visible differences, realistic interests, deflected aggression, and other factors. In short, the most important questions may concern . . . the way in which mutual reinforcement operates. . . ."¹

Prevalence of Hostility

In the previous section we have dealt with the theories of the origins of interpersonal competition and conflicts. The universality of self-centeredness has also been noted. What is to be noted here is that hostility and prejudice are also universal, although they vary a great deal in intensity and incidence. There seems to be a general agreement to this statement. Symonds asserts that since frustration and insecurity are universal and necessary, aggression is not only common and universal but, "in fact, necessary and inherent."² "In every known human society there appears to exist a varying amount of 'free-floating aggression.'"³ Allport and Kramer make a "safe estimate" that at least four-fifths of the American population lead mental lives in which feelings of group hostility

¹Williams, op. cit., p. 41.

²Percival M. Symonds, The Dynamics of Human Adjustment (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1946), p. 95.

³Clyde Kluckhohn, "Group Tensions: Analysis of a Case History," Bryson, Finkelstein, and MacIver, eds., Approaches to National Unity: Fifth Symposium, op. cit., p. 224.

play an appreciable role."¹

Ashley Montagu, recognizing the prevalence of prejudice, adds: "What leads to race prejudice is the cultural manipulation of those psychophysical energies which, in most individuals, overtly find expression in some form of aggressiveness, no matter what the nature of the underlying motivation for that manipulation may be." He points out that economic factors are among the most important factors "leading to situations in which race prejudice may be caused to develop, but that such factors are virtually entirely dependent upon cultural factors for the direction which they will be made to give to individual aggressiveness." This is "proved by the fact that the aggressiveness arising under those same economic conditions can just as well be directed towards the production of good fellowship and mutual aid between different ethnic and social groups."² This last mentioned fact is very often forgotten by some students of intergroup relations. It is this fact that makes hostility and race prejudice so repugnant from the standpoint of Christian ethics. It may be "necessary," or at least inevitable, that frustration result in aggression, but aggression need not be directed into these particular channels of hostility. Yet we must recognize the empirical fact that

¹Gordon W. Allport and Bernard M. Kramer, "Some Roots of Prejudice," Journal of Psychology, XXII (1946) 9, cited by Williams, op. cit., p. 51.

²Ashley Montagu, Man's Most Dangerous Myth, op. cit., p. 85.

human beings do tend to find race prejudice (or some similar form of hostility) to be "both a convenient and suitable release object for aggressiveness,"¹ and proceed to follow this culturally approved pattern of behavior, as if "original sin" or even "total depravity" were incontrovertible truths.

Frustration and Aggression

Most of the authors cited in the previous section have referred to aggression as a consequence of frustration. John Dollard and others start with the assumption that the "occurrence of aggressive behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression."² Referring more specifically to the caste situation in a Southern town, Dollard discusses the prejudice against Negroes as a manifestation of aggression arising from frustration.

In the case of the Negro such prejudice centers around the physical features which permit him to be marked off as a caste man. Its function is to keep the Negro in his caste position and it is therefore to be viewed as a defensive-aggressive measure on the part of the white caste. White prejudice is said constantly to be incited by "outrages" committed by the lower-caste group. These "outrages" usually consist of some claim for equality which is perceived as aggressive by the upper caste. Behavior which would be unobjectionable in an upper-caste member is often perceived as out-

¹ Ashley Montagu, op. cit., p. 95.

² John Dollard and others, Frustration and Aggression (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1939), p. 1.

rageously contumacious when done by a lower-caste man. In sum, the fact seems to be that aggression from those against whom we are prejudiced (hostile) is disproportionately felt. Race prejudice is sometimes said to be "caught" out of the social atmosphere; but the tendency to derogate others must be present from the outset and it is merely systematized and given an object and a social excuse when the person comes into the formal circle of race prejudice attitudes. Persons with little need to prop self-esteem through the pain and humiliation of others may participate in formal prejudice patterns, but they will participate without much affects and as a mere convention.¹

Dollard summarizes the psychological mechanism of race hostility by the use of three key concepts. The first is a generalized or "free-floating" aggression, derived from reactions to frustration and suppression.

Cultural restrictions in childhood and the limitations of daily life in adulthood provide numerous frustrations for every individual; hostility is aroused in response to these frustrations. If expressed, this hostility would tend to break up in-group solidarity; so it is systematically discouraged and suppressed. One of the methods of discouragement is to pretend that such hostility does not exist. Though repressed it is not extirpated but utilizes such permissive social formations as race prejudice traditions to vent itself safely on any object. Race prejudice is mysterious because no real occasion is required for its expression; the object does not necessarily have to offend or frustrate. On the contrary there are deflected to the object against which one is prejudiced the hostilities that should be directed toward nearer and dearer persons.²

This free-floating aggression "can be thought of as a tendency to kick, hit, scorn, or derogate someone or something if one could only find out what."³

The second "key" is that of a "permissive social

¹John Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, op. cit., pp. 440-441.

²Ibid., pp. 443-444.

³Ibid., p. 444.

pattern."

The permissive pattern isolates a group within the society which may be disliked. Usually it is a defenseless group. In the South the caste role of the Negro is the pattern which permits white people systematically to derogate him.¹

This lies at the heart of "scapegoating," which will be discussed in a later section of this chapter.

The third essential is "that the object of race prejudice be 'visible.'" Dollard points out:

In our sense, race prejudice is always irrational; if antagonism can be sufficiently explained by real, personal, or social rivalry we do not talk of "prejudice." There are, of course, other ways of utilizing or managing the aggression which can be expressed in prejudice against a minority group; they include, for example, using it for constructive lateration of real life conditions, through the war pattern, or by turning it on the self as in neurosis.²

Leonard Doob takes the case of the "poor whites" as an illustration of frustration seeking outlets in aggression against the Negroes. These poor whites are suffering from a frustration "not only of their basic drives, but also of the other drives which have been derived from their cultural contacts in the past As a result, these people contain within themselves a thorough discontent which assumes the form of an actual or merely a latent aggression."³ The most basic and far-reaching frustration is on the economic level. The success of other whites and the apparent care-

¹Ibid., p. 444.

²Loc. cit.

³Leonard W. Doob, "Appendix I: Poor Whites: A Frustrated Class," Dollard, Caste and Class in a Southern Town, op. cit., p. 474.

free life of the Negroes, who are suffering the same sort of economic and social disabilities, increase the sense of the poor whites' frustration. This discontent, however, is not well defined.

Conflict is created within poor whites because they are both unfavorably disposed toward planters and are dependent upon them for guidance. Another source of frustration is the Negroes, who, according to caste, are supposed to be inferior to them in every respect, but in reality are not so different socially or economically.

They try to compensate for this state of affairs by retaining their social distance in front of Negroes and by perpetuating, whenever possible, the southern ideal of white supremacy. The result of this policy, however, is not very satisfying to them; and hence, on the whole, they have become more tolerant toward the Negroes.¹

Doob found "very little overt aggression" against the Negroes by poor whites. And the only means by which they can retaliate against the planters is by voting. He found "some indication of in-group aggression as a compensatory method." But at the time of the study, "the lower economic class [appeared] generally to have resorted to passive accommodation. He concludes:

In the meantime, then, poor whites are waiting watchfully to see what happens, and, as they wait, the aggression grows within them. . . . Poor whites are terrified both actually and symbolically. They are terrified because they have no real outlet for their aggression."²

¹Doob, op. cit., pp. 476-477.

²Ibid., pp. 478-480.

Gallagher has shown statistically that in times of economic stress and insecurity, latent aggressive tendencies of the poor whites (as well as of the not-so-poor whites) break out in violent behavior.¹

Scapegoating

Scapegoating is not a special phenomenon of race hostility which needs to be treated independently of the general framework of frustration-aggression pattern of human behavior. It fits integrally into the picture presented in the foregoing paragraphs. However, since its relation to the feeling of guilt is of particular interest to this study, that phase of scapegoating will be treated separately, though very briefly, here.

Scapegoating has been used from the earliest times. The sins of the people were confessed by the high priest over the head of the goat, chosen by lot, and then the animal was let go into the wilderness. The guilt was thus transferred symbolically to the goat, and the people felt purged and for the time being, guiltless. "And the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities."²

In the modern device of race scapegoating, the consciousness of guilt is seldom above the surface. But the element of blaming someone else is always present. And this blaming may be due, to a lesser or greater degree, to the

¹Gallagher, American Caste and Negro College, op. cit., pp. 383-397; see pp. 193-194, supra.

²Leviticus 16:22.

need for compensation for a sense of guilt. Members of Gordon Allport's seminar point out: "This projection of guilt onto others is the most classic form of scapegoating."¹ A subconscious sense of guilt, arising out of the white man's abuse of Negro women, may have some relation to the vehemence and pathological fear of the Negro males' sexual potency and aggression.² McLean points out that Southern whites feel devoid of the capacity for expression of warm feelings, including those of sex, but believe that the Negroes possess what they lack:

They anxiously search for something which will give meaning to their lives through their contacts with the Negro. These contacts, however, are fraught with the terror of the forbidden. Their inflexible consciences, in seeking a victim to punish for all manner of forbidden impulses, must keep in subservience those who represent the temptation. Occasionally a lynching relieves the corporate guilt of the white community. Like Abraham who was willing to sacrifice his own son to placate his conscience, man from time memorial has relieved guilt by ritualistic murder.³

McLean also calls attention to "the loss of a secure dependence on a fixed social system." The myth of white supremacy is a device to prop their ego, which has been made insecure by the abolition of the feudal dominance of slavery.

¹ABC's of Scapegoating (Chicago: Central YMCA College, n.d.), p. 16.

²Behind the white man's fear of retaliation cited by Dollard, Caste and Class, p. 164, this writer suspects a sense of guilt on their part for their aggressive sexual behavior against Negro women. Dollard notes that "white people of Southerntown give allegiance to high moral standards and it seems part of his code to suppress all reference to the touchy issue." Ibid., p. 134; see pp. 199-202, supra.

³Helen V. McLean, "Psychodynamic Factors in Racial Relations," The Annals of the American Academy, CCXLIV (March, 1946), p. 164.

She quotes Richard Wright in this connection:

Men still cling to the emotional basis of life that the feudal order gave them, while living and striving in a world whose every turn of wheel, throb of engine, and conquest of space deny its validity. This dual aspect of living is our riven consciousness, our tension, our anxiety.¹

McLean likens the dilemma of the white man to that of maturity.

Industrial civilization has robbed white men of both human dignity and security. The development of the myths of racial inferiority at least gave white men the illusion of being gods. They could control some 'inferior's' fate even if their own lives were so empty and impotent.²

Thus scapegoating is closely related to the sense of fear and anxiety.

Our fear of spies and saboteurs leads us to be unduly suspicious of all foreigners and of innocent minority groups. For many months all--not some--of the Pacific Coast Japanese-Americans have been held in internment camps.³

There were also tales of a Negro uprising or a Jewish plot.

The sense of inferiority and insecurity also leads to scapegoating as we have noted in connection with the poor whites. Desire for power also uses scapegoating techniques for gaining political support. "White supremacy or Negro domination" has been an effective political slogan in the South for generations. Anti-minority issues have

¹Richard Wright, "Introduction," St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1945), p. 22, quoted in McLean, op. cit., p. 162.

²McLean, Ibid., p. 163.

³ABC's of Scapegoating, op. cit., p. 17.

been effective political tools in California since the time of anti-Chinese agitation in the last century.¹

Conformity, which makes for security, is a strong force in the spread of scapegoating. One conforms to social norms of scapegoating in order to establish oneself in the group. A member of an ethnic minority, himself a victim of scapegoating by the dominant caste, may join the dominant group in scapegoating another minority group in order to conform and thus attempt to find some degree of security. This, however, usually only invites scorn, and further aggravates his insecurity.

The choice of victims generally follows the key notions of Dollard. As summarized by the students of Allport:

1. The victim has distinguishing, salient characteristics. He is easily identified; his high visibility
2. The victim has little possibility for retaliation
3. The victim is accessible because
 - a. he is near.
 - b. he is concentrated in one locality.
4. The victim has been a previous object of blame; there is latent hostility against him, though he may be quite guiltless in the present instance
5. The victim can personify an idea or a group which we want to attack²

Among the methods of scapegoating they list: (1) phantasy, that is, scapegoating in thought; (2) verbal aggression, which includes a. rumors; b. jokes, doggerel, derisive cartoons; c. unjust accusations; d. teasing; e. aggressive

¹See pp. 277-281, supra. Cf. McWilliams, Prejudice, op. cit., pp. 20-25.

²ABC's of Scapegoating, op. cit., pp. 49-51.

verbalizations; and f. threats; (3) physical violence, which includes a. personal violence; b. forcible social discrimination; c. forcible economic discrimination; d. legal persecutions and stigmata.¹

Stereotypes

We have already pointed out that prejudging people according to the stereotypes of the groups to which they belong has been one of the fundamental patterns of race prejudice.² Even Guy B. Johnson, who assumes "that after all there is some truth or basis of reality to the traits which are persistently mentioned in literature and in popular thinking,"³ recognizes that it goes without saying, "that a group will develop stereotypes of some sort and that these stereotypes will be extremely biased."⁴ Myrdal gives the following guide to the explanation of these popular beliefs concerning the Negroes, both unfriendly and friendly. He counsels asking the question: To whose good? "Beliefs are opportune; they are in the service of interests. It is these general and specific rationalization needs which give

¹ABC's of Scapegoating, op. cit., pp. 55-57.

²Lippitt and Radke define prejudice simply: "a type of stereotype which does not coincide with the facts." Ronald Lippitt and Marian Radke, "New trends in the Investigation of Prejudice," The Annals of the American Academy, Vol. 244 (March, 1946), p. 168.

³Guy B. Johnson, "The Stereotype of the American Negro," Otto Klineberg, ed., Characteristics of the American Negro (New York: Harper, 1944), p. 18.

⁴Ibid., p. 16.

the beliefs their pertinacity. They give to the stereotypes their emotional load, and their 'value' to the people who hold them."¹

Some of these racial beliefs and the rationalization needs that they serve are mentioned by Myrdal. The belief that Negroes lack mechanical skill is used to keep them out of industries. The belief that the Negro race is childish, immature, and lacking in initiative is used to justify the denial of full civil rights and suffrage to Negroes. The Negroes' presumed lower intelligence is used as an argument for discrimination in education.

The beliefs in the Negro's inborn laziness and thriftlessness, his happy-go-lucky nature, his lack of morals, his criminal tendencies, and so on, serve the purpose of easing the conscience of the good, upright white citizen when he thinks of the physical and moral slum conditions which are allowed in the Negro sections of all communities in America. They also rationalize the demand for housing segregation, and tend, on the whole, to picture the Negro as a menace to orderly society unless "kept in his place" by the caste system.²

Allison Davis refers to a vice-president of a junior high school in Los Angeles who directed most Mexican-American girls to take the "maid's work" course, in spite of the resentment of the parents and the unfair payment and treatment accorded to Mexican-American domestic servants.³ This practice was based on the belief that there were no job opportunities for the girls (and also boys) of this group in occupations other than unskilled or domestic labor. This

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 108.

²Ibid., p. 107.

³Davis, "Education of Ethnic and Lower-Class Groups," op. cit., pp. 276-277.

practice in turn tends to freeze the employment discrimination.

The belief in Negroes' higher susceptibility to disease serves to "explain" the high mortality rates and bad health conditions among the Negroes, and relieves the sense of guilt of the dominant group. We have already referred to the function of sex taboos.

Even the stereotypes which are complimentary to the Negroes serve caste purposes. For example, that the Negro is "more gifted in music, the arts, dancing, and acting than white people; that he is better in handling animals, or sometimes, children; that he is loyal and reliable as a servant that he is, on the whole, a more happy and mentally balanced human being; that he has more emotional warmth; that he can take sorrows and disappointments more easily; that he is more religious in his nature"--all these have in common the fact that "they do not raise any question concerning the advisability or righteousness of keeping the Negro in his place in the caste order."¹

The Negro as a Contrast Conception

One of the manifestations of caste pattern is a conception of the Negro, on the part of the white people, in terms of contrast--as a "contrast conception."

It is often argued that race prejudice arises out of the "dislike of the unlike."² Prejudice against Negroes

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 108.

²Klineberg cites Giddings and Royce as some of

is often explained in terms of physical differences. Gustav Ichheiser asserts:

In every day life we believe what we see. Thus, the real segregation is not in space but in sociosensory perception. And its basis is not a "cultural pattern" or "social (caste) system" or "prejudice" but the nature of perceptual experience.¹

He maintains: "The basis and core of interracial problems is the difference in external personality, and differences in inner personality are mainly (even though not exclusively) a consequence of the reaction of the individual to his own different appearance, or rather his reaction to the actual or anticipated reaction of others to his own appearance."²

Louis Wirth, in commenting on Ichheiser's statement, suggests that one might ask, "why blond-haired persons do not react especially differently to brunets or to red-haired people than they do to their own kind." The answer is: "These characteristics have not been historically and culturally selected as symbols significantly differentiating between social groups."³ Likewise, Klineberg remarks con-

those who hold this view. Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 374. Rose writes: "One of the oldest explanations of prejudice against all minorities is in terms of fear or dislike of differences." Rose, Studies in Reduction of Prejudice, op. cit., VII; 2. k.

¹Gustav Ichheiser, "Sociophychological and Cultural Forces in Race Relations," The American Journal of Sociology LIV (March, 1949), 396.

²Ibid., p. 398.

³Louis Wirth, "Comment," Ichheiser, op. cit., p. 399.

cerning the "high visibility" of the Negro as a sufficient reason for prejudice against him: "It is much more likely that the external visible characteristics are merely made the excuse or the occasion for the manifestation of a pre-existing prejudice."¹ He cites the case of the prejudice against the Jews as an example of prejudice without "high visibility." He states that the best indication "that dislike of the unlike is not a natural but an acquired trait comes from the fact that it is entirely absent in young children."² Rose also states: "History shows that group differences do not inevitably and naturally lead to dislike and hostility, and it also shows that there is as much dislike of imagined or stereotyped differences as of real differences."³

However, Rose adds: "While the theory in its pure form is thus disproved, it nevertheless conforms with observation that men tend to form in-groups in opposition to out-groups, and to avoid sympathetic contacts with members of out-groups that would tend to break down the categoric barriers which are artificially set up."⁴

An exaggerated conception of this difference is

¹ Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 375.

² Ibid., p. 377. This writer also observed among young white, Negro and Oriental children in the Housing Project where he resides no apparent consciousness of racial differences--or consciousness of racial differences being more greatly felt than differences of age, sex, size, ability to get along, etc.

³ Rose, Reduction of Prejudice, op. cit., VII, 2.

⁴ Ibid., p. 2.

that of "contrast conception." According to the whites, particularly in the South, Negroes are their "opposite race," this contrast being conceived not only in its biological terms but also in its sociological implications. To Lewis Copeland, the essence of the racial contrast "appears to be a moral antithesis, which tends to be projected through all social relations."¹ A great deal of the stereotypes and scapegoating techniques can be seen in this perspective.

According to the white man's "contrast conception," Negroes, for example, are thought to be "subhuman in temperament and lacking in emotional control and restraint."² They are believed to have little or no moral restraint. "There is a feeling that he [the Negro] is not amenable to the white moral order."³ White and Negro women are regarded in diametrically opposite ways--white women to exemplify virtues and Negro women to symbolize degradation.⁴ The contrariety between whites and blacks "is pointed out in economic activities, education, religion, language, health, manners, recreation, etc."⁵ This antipodian conception operates to segregate the two races in virtually all activities where the two groups come in contact. There is a wide-

¹Lewis C. Copeland, "The Negro as a Contrast Conception," Edgar T. Thompson, ed., *Race Relations and the Race Problem* (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1939), pp. 155-156.

²Ibid., p. 157.

³Ibid., p. 159.

⁴Ibid., p. 164.

⁵Ibid., p. 165.

spread fear of invasion of the white social order by the black people. The Negro is the counter-race in Southern politics.

This is neither natural nor inevitable; rather, it "arose out of the plantation economy of the South."¹ At first, there was no need for ideology; contrast was obvious enough. "But as the Negro became civilized and threatened to invade the inner sanctity of white society, a social philosophy was built up to rationalize the social opposition and sentiment against assimilation. The contrast now became a symbolic one."² The race ideology, rather than being a part of the natural order, "'naturalizes' the social order, giving an ultimate sanction to the relative status assumed by the races, and at the same time provides a basis for white-caste cohesion."³

The Birth and Growth of Prejudice

We have noted various facets of race prejudice. We must now ask how race prejudice arises in the consciousness of the individual. Horowitz, after a thorough review of a number of studies on the race attitudes of children, concludes: "So far, there is no evidence that attitudes are determined by heredity; and they can be considered learned responses."⁴

¹Ibid., p. 153.

²Ibid., p. 178.

³Ibid., p. 179.

⁴Eugene L. Horowitz, "'Race' Attitudes," Klineberg, Characteristics of the American Negro, op. cit., p. 183.

He summarizes the origin and development of "race" attitudes as follows:

In the course of history certain patterns are established within social-political boundaries. Children are born into communities within which specific patterns and standards are accepted as the established code. These particular social norms are interiorized in the course of the development of the children. The total psychology of the development of young children, their helplessness, their dependence upon adults, the gradual postnatal maturing of their physiological mechanisms, their affective involvements, their position within the society, all determine the specific nature and rate of development of the interiorization of the particular norm. The social norms, once interiorized, are the attitudes of the individual which guide his personal thinking and his general perceptions.¹

Quoting his earlier study, he reiterates what has now become a classical statement: "Attitudes toward Negroes are now chiefly determined not by contact with Negroes, but by contact with the prevalent attitude toward Negroes."²

The development of "race" attitudes in children is summarized as follows:

1. "Race" attitudes appear early in the life cycle of the child; manifestations are found among children in the first grade in school.

2. Such attitudes develop gradually in children in our society.

3. "Race" attitudes as they are manifested in children are not generalized, unitary aspects of the responding individuals in different types of response-eliciting situations.

4. In the course of development different aspects of the "race" attitudes tend to become increasingly well integrated.³

¹Loc. cit.

²Eugene L. Horowitz, "The Development of Attitudes toward the Negro," Archives of Psychology, No. 194 (1936), pp. 34-35, quoted by Horowitz, "Race Attitudes," op. cit., p. 167.

³Horowitz, "Race Attitudes," op. cit., p. 175.

A conclusion may be drawn from the study of the psychological factors of race prejudice and hostility, that an individual existing in society--by the nature of his selfhood and his social interactions--almost inevitably tends to come into conflict with other persons. These interpersonal conflicts are soon canalized into prejudices against other "groups" by the pressure of social norms. At the same time, it seems evident that a child does not come into the world with hereditary (i.e. transmitted through the genes) attitudes toward other "races." He learns by contact with the predominant attitude held by people with whom he comes into relationship. Again, it has been indicated that it is inevitable that a person is involved in the prevailing norms of his culture. But it is by no means proven that a person must inevitably conform to the social norms to the extent he actually does. There is always a choice before the person, between greater and less acquiescence to those phases of the cultural patterns which he regards as evil.

Covert Forms of Caste Discrimination: "Not with the Fist"

So far in our discussion we have emphasized the more overt forms of hostility, discrimination and conflict. In this section, the more covert forms of prejudice will be emphasized. It should be noted at the outset, however, that covert and overt forms of prejudice and hostility are in reality two sides of the same phenomenon. Ruth Tuck,

who emphasizes the covert aspects of hostility, points out: "Descanso will have to undergo considerable degeneration before it will ever strike with its fists, but it will have to experience distinct regeneration before it ceases to do damage--real damage--with its elbows."¹

In a chapter entitled, "The Function of Public Will," Charles Horton Cooley writes:

In the same way the wrongs that afflict society are seldom willed by any one or any group, but are by-products of acts of will which have other objects; they are done, as some one has said, rather with the elbows than the fists. There is surprisingly little ill-intent, and the more one looks into life the less he finds of that vivid chiaroscuro of conscious goodness and badness his childish teachings has led him to expect.²

Taking her cue from this passage, Tuck describes the operations of caste and semi-caste patterns in a Southwestern city as follows:

It seemed that the key to dominant Descanso's attitudes and actions lay in the fact that they were not premeditated, or deliberately cruel. They were compounded, rather, from ingredients of self-interest, careless assurance, and impulsive action. That is why they seem right and natural to the bulk of Descanso's people, who, in their own words, "wouldn't set out to be mean." Because they have elbowed their way to dominance, they do not feel the bad conscience which might have resulted from the use of the fist.³

We have noted a similar pattern of unpremeditated and undeliberate acts of cruelty and discrimination in the

¹ Ruth Tuck, Not with the Fist (New York: Harcourt, 1946), p. 228.

² Charles Horton Cooley, Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind (New York: Scribner, 1913), p. 400.

³ Tuck, op. cit., p. xix.

study of caste relations in the deep South. Davis, Gardner and Gardner observed that "where almost all of the colored people are families of poverty stricken tenants and almost all of the white people are families of owners or large landlords, caste is almost 'perfect' economically and socially, and there is relatively little terrorization of the lower caste."¹ If the elbow works (even though the gun, the sword, and the chain as well as the fist have been used in obtaining this condition), there is no longer any need of the fist.

The etiquette of caste operates substantially without overt forms of violence, although even legal and police force is used to punish infractions of the etiquette.² However, as we have noted already, the very "peaceful" and "spontaneous" nature of the operation of caste etiquette makes it the more pervading and the more oppressive.³ The etiquette does not even eliminate hostility by accommodation,⁴ but rather, it becomes a source of embitterment and humiliation, maintained temporarily only to avoid violence.⁵

Paternalism may be considered a form of covert prejudice which tends to maintain caste without recourse to

¹Davis, Gardner and Gardner, Deep South, op. cit., pp. 481-482.

²Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 540.

³See pp. 215-248, supra.

⁴As Doyle maintains. Doyle, op. cit., p. 170.

⁵Cf. Myrdal, op. cit., p. 1361 (n. 8 on p. 607.)

violence, or even to ill will. Sentimental and condescending goodwill and a solicitous concern for the "weak" and the "underprivileged" without a zeal for the elimination of the caste pattern which causes and maintains weakness and lack of privilege often become, though however unintentionally, a cloak for the maintenance and strengthening of caste stratification. Caste is so pervasive and so insidious that even the "purest" of human motives and intentions are not impervious to its corruptive influence. Even the central precepts of Christian ethics, the parable of the good Samaritan, the teaching concerning "the least of these my brethren," and the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man, can be so interpreted (and have been so interpreted) as to reinforce caste differential.¹ So, paternalism has been established on Biblical and theological bases, at the same time ignoring the genesis and the maintenance of the differentiation of status and privilege.

From the standpoint of Christian ethics, these various forms of covert hostility and prejudice are even more dangerous to the individual and the social order. They not only tend to force conformity and accommodation of the subordinate caste, but also blind and dull the consciences of those who are responsible for maintaining the stratification. Paternalism not only tends to ease the consciences

¹See pp. 409-410, infra.

which need awakening, but also foster the feeling of self-righteous pride, which is one of the worst forms of sinfulness, upon which Jesus spared no invective.¹

Psychological Consequences of Caste upon
the Personality of the Members of
the Lower Caste

Throughout the paper, emphasis has been placed upon the psychology of the prejudiced person, rather than upon the psychology of those who are victims of discrimination and hostility. In a later section of this chapter we shall refer to some of the spiritual damages that the Negroes have suffered as consequences of caste hostility.² In this section, a brief reference will be made to the significance of color, in particular, relative to the personality development of the persons of lower caste.

In the course of a study in Chicago, W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker, and Walter A. Adams found the Negro society in Chicago to represent "a group with an American culture but organized on a castelike or racial basis." They discovered early in the investigation that factors such as social and economic levels, sex, education, and regional backgrounds, as well as individual variations of temperament and physical health, make a great deal of difference. Nevertheless, color, which is the badge of separation from the dominant caste as well as, in a large measure,

¹Luke 11:42-44

²See pp. 355-356, infra.

the basis of stratification within the Negro group, "is the most important single element that determines for better or for worse the development of Negro character."¹

Among the darker Negroes of the lower classes, color is of less significance because of overwhelming preoccupation with the basic struggle for survival. "The significance of color . . . lies in the fact that it strengthens all the social and economic forces that operate to keep the bulk of the Negro population at this stage of cultural development."² The ironic conclusion that the investigators reached is that "color becomes more acute and painful in its consequences the closer the individual approximates those behavior traits and general standards of the large society for lack of which the race is usually reproached." As we have noted in connection with the assimilation of the Orientals and the Negroes, it is as though the dominant group wished "not only to condemn Negroes as inferior beings with unacceptable, if picturesque, modes of living, but also to punish those who change their ways and most completely accept the traditional American values." The Negro who is the most educated, acculturated, and refined is the one who is the most seriously made to feel "that his race, and race alone, bars him from enjoying the full rights of American citizenship."³

¹W. Lloyd Warner, Buford H. Junker and Walter A. Adams, Color and Human Nature (Washington: American Council on Education, 1941), pp. 292-293.

²Ibid., p. 294.

³Ibid., p. 295.

A similar condition obtains among the Orientals. Among the Japanese and Japanese-Americans evacuated from the West Coast, the hardest hit psychologically were those who believed most firmly in the American ideals of democracy and fair play. Some of these became bitter and renounced their citizenship¹ while the vast majority accepted the situation with the attitude of those who were so accustomed to the caste-like patterns or so shocked by the war that evacuation seemed almost an inescapable outcome.

The feelings of insecurity, inferiority, fear, bitterness, resentment, despair, and a host of unwholesome psychological manifestations seem to characterize many (if not most) of the victims of caste hostility in greater or less degree, which are directly traceable (at least as a contributory factor) to the operation of caste.² From a Christian existentialist standpoint, the damages wrought upon the personality of "even the least" is of utmost importance, entirely aside from the injury to the principles of equality, democracy, and justice. So long as caste operates to damage the growth and development of personality of these victims of caste stratification, it gives a Christian sufficient ground to condemn it and to work for the eradication of caste.

¹See, for example, Dorothy Swaine Thomas and Richard S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage (Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1946), pp. 365-370.

²For an excellent discussion of the "Dilemmas of the Negro Caste," see Gallagher, American Caste and the Negro College, pp. 135-158.

Some Scientific Findings on Psychic Characteristics of the Negro

For the purpose of this study, it is necessary only to make a brief summary of the findings of scientists concerning the characteristics (as opposed to stereotypes) of Negroes. As to the physical traits of Negroes, Myrdal concludes:

Little is known about the functional correlates of the physical traits of Negroes, although it might be expected that there are some. There has been some speculation, for example, as to what anatomical traits of Negroes cause their supposed superiority in athletics, but no one has yet succeeded in proving any hypothesis, and, therefore, it is not known whether the superiority, if it exists, has a genetic basis or not.¹

Likewise, concerning the Negro's susceptibility to disease, he makes the practical conclusion "that there is no reason for feeling complacent about the higher disease and death rates of Negroes on the ground that they have a greater innate susceptibility."²

Regarding more general psychic differences, Myrdal observes: "In view of these presumptions and biases, whether valid or invalid, the startling thing is that psychological research has failed to prove what it set out to prove."³ Huxley and Haddon, who emphasize that "it is clear that there must exist innate genetic differences between human groups in regard to intelligence, temperament, and other psychological traits" recognize that it is

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 140.

²Ibid., p. 144.

³Ibid., p. 146.

"not without significance that such an enormous mass of investigation failed to demonstrate what so many are eager to prove."¹

That some did "find" what they set out to prove, and that bias influences a great deal of "factual" findings of science is shown in an example cited by Klineberg:

In connection with the qualitative characteristics of the brain, the early investigations of Bean² have focused attention upon possible Negro-White differences. In a series of studies Bean arrived at the conclusion that the frontal area of the brain was less well-developed in the Negro than in the White, and the posterior area better developed. He believed that this difference paralleled the "known fact" that the Negro is inferior in the higher intellectual functions and superior in those concerned with rhythm and sense perception. Another important difference was in the depth of the convolutions of the cortex, those of the Negro being much shallower and more "childlike" than those of the White.³

He also found other differences. These studies were carried out at Johns Hopkins University under the direction of Professor Mall. Mall became uncertain of Bean's results and repeated the whole study on the same collection of brains on which Bean had worked; "he took the precaution, however, of comparing the brains without knowing in advance which were Negro and which were white."⁴ "Mall came to the conclusion that Bean's findings had no basis in fact [either

¹Julian Huxley and A. C. Haddon, We Europeans (1936) pp. 69, 96-97, quoted by Myrdal, op. cit., p. 146.

²R. B. Bean, "Some Racial Peculiarities of the Negro Brain," American Journal of Anatomy, V (1906), 353-432, cited by Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 291.

³Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 291.

⁴Ibid., p. 292.

regarding the depth of convolutions or the comparative sizes of the frontal and posterior lobes], and that it had not been demonstrated that Negro brains differed in any essential manner from those of Whites." "Incidentally," observes Klineberg, "these two studies taken together illustrate in a very significant manner the importance of stereotypes and 'mental set' in determining what one will see in any given situation."¹

The question concerning the innate genetic differences between Negroes and others regarding intelligence has been of crucial importance ever since the early days of slavery. W. S. Jenkins notes: "From the Colonial period on, the inferiority of the Negro was an assumption made by the slaveholder for which he required little or no demonstration. . . . The entire pro-slavery thought was imbued with the belief of Negro inferiority."² He quotes an English traveler of the 1850's who observed:

There seems, in short, to be a fixed notion throughout the whole of the States, whether slave or free, that the colored is by nature a subordinate race; and that, in no circumstances, can it be considered equal to the white. Apart from commercial views, this opinion lies at the root of American slavery; and the question would need be argued less on political and philanthropic than on physiological grounds.³

The same belief persists today to support the pattern of

¹Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 292.

²William Sumner Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South (Chapel Hill: Univ. of N.C. Press, 1935), p. 243.

³William Chambers, quoted in Jenkins, loc. cit.

caste.

A great many tests and experiments have been conducted to measure innate psychic traits, but "psychologists are coming to realize that they are not, and probably never will be, measuring innate traits directly but are, rather, measuring performance in a limited number of selected tasks, and that performance is determined--in a most complex fashion--by many influences besides innate capacity."¹

Early among the investigators of racial intelligence was C. C. Brigham, who concluded "that there was clear evidence for the innate intellectual superiority of Whites over Negroes."² But later, as the result of more refined statistical analysis, Brigham himself withdrew completely from his earlier position.³ Klineberg cites the instance of Army tests, in which northern Negroes, although below northern whites, were clearly superior to southern Negroes and also to whites from a number of southern states.⁴

Klineberg found "no clear evidence for selective migration" to account for the superiority of northern over southern children. He found, rather, that the results of

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 147.

²Otto Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 297. The work cited is C. C. Brigham, A Study of American Intelligence (Princeton, 1923).

³C. C. Brigham, "Intelligence Tests of Immigrant Groups," Psychological Review 137 (1930), 158-165, cited by Klineberg, Social Psychology, op. cit., p. 297.

⁴Klineberg, "Tests of Negro Intelligence," Klineberg, ed., Characteristics of the American Negro, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

various tests to "argue in favor of an environmental factor."¹ He found the studies of the effects of environmental changes to "indicate that an improvement in the socioeconomic environment of white children raises their test scores considerably." He draws the following implications: "first, that the test scores may not be taken as measures of innate capacity; second, that the inferior socioeconomic environment of certain 'racial' groups, particularly the Negro, imposes upon them a handicap which makes their test results not comparable with those of whites."²

After taking into consideration factors of schooling, of motivation, of rapport between the experimenter and the subject, of cultural background and experience, of speed, and of sampling, Klineberg observes:

It is of course not being suggested that all these factors enter into any single study, but all of them do play a part in "racial" comparisons in general. Together they represent what seem at the present time to be insurmountable difficulties in the way of an objective, scientifically acceptable methodology in this field. The complications which they introduce must lead to the conclusion that racial differences have not been demonstrated by means of intelligence tests. In terms of the achievement of the type measured by the tests, we must state that the Negro is on the average inferior; in terms of aptitude or innate capacity, no such statement can be made.³

Klineberg states: "Most psychologists working in the field at the present time appear to regard the mental test, and psychological methods in general, as incapable of leading to a definitive statement in this regard [i.e. mental in-

¹Ibid., p. 45.

²Ibid., p. 54.

³Ibid., p. 81.

feriority of certain 'races']".¹

Human Sinfulness and Intergroup Hostility

Universality of Intergroup Hostility and Man's Sinfulness

The point of view concerning the character of the social process which underlies this chapter is that of dynamic interaction, as has been repeatedly stated in this paper. Both theology and sociology, ethics and psychology are viewed from this perspective. Moreover, attempt is made in this and other chapters to seek a point of contact between theology and ethics on the one hand, and the social sciences on the other, in the dynamic nature of interpersonal relationships and interactions.

The universality of hostility as described in this chapter, largely through the review of psychological writings, reinforces theological views presented in an earlier chapter.¹ Being "existentialist," this interpretation of theology and ethics attempts to take into consideration in full the actualities of the human situation. Yet the basic presuppositions of the position are not transitory or dependent upon every change of psychological or sociological theory. Rather, it is firmly founded on that Christian faith conceived of as the response of the whole man to the revelation of God.²

¹See Chapter III, pp. 81-112, supra.

²See pp. 48-49, supra.

Integrated with the psychological views of selfhood and personality in the social process presented in this chapter, this position of theology and ethics recognizes the universality and inescapability of competition and conflict. This is particularly true in the kind of society which is stratified both into classes and castes. Yet this ethico-theological position maintains that they are sinful. Hostility and prejudice, though inevitable, are sinful because it is not inevitable or necessary that aggressiveness be directed into these particular manifestations. The aggressive or the accommodating person furthermore feels his sinfulness because he knows it is not inevitable that the degree or intensity of hostility be as great as actually obtains. There is always a "less evil" way, which is the "more excellent way." Moreover, in moments of reflection or imagination he actually transcends the limits of his situation and sees higher possibilities. However, this theologico-ethical position does not maintain that it is the duty of the Christian to rise above the social implications of caste society by his effort alone, or that he is able to do so. It is only as he seeks the grace of God to help him, will he be able to overcome these manifestations of his sinfulness.

Some Theological Ramifications of the Doctrine of Human Sinfulness and Their Relation to Intergroup Hostility

We have already discussed at some length the parallels between the psychological theories of the self and the theological position concerning the self and sin pre-

sented in this study at the beginning of this chapter. What follows in this section is a discussion of some of the ramifications of the Christian doctrine of sin. Just as in the socio-psychological discussion of prejudice, we have concentrated our attention on the negative, pathological aspects of the situation, so in the ethico-theological discussion, we shall limit most of our discussion to the negative, pathological aspects of the problem of man. This is intentional. Our primary interest in this study is the problem of intergroup hostility. Original, essential, ideal harmony of relationships is presupposed, just as health is assumed when speaking of illness. Hostility is seen as a pathological deviation from the essential harmony of social relationships. Likewise, goodness of creation is taken for granted. Our particular concern at this point is the corruption of this order of God's creation.¹ The emphasis of this paper on hostility and sinfulness is not to be taken as a pathological preoccupation with the negative. In the following sections a theological, rather than a psychological outline used in the earlier parts of this chapter will be followed. Examples are cited from sociological and psychological fields for purposes of illustration, not to prove a point.

Equality of Sin and Inequality of Guilt in Intergroup Relationships

Niebuhr's emphasis that men are equally sinners but their guilt is unequal is a relevant corrective to the dis-

¹See pp. 81-85, supra.

cussion of the universality of hostility and sinfulness in intergroup relationships. Niebuhr points out that it is necessary and proper that distinctions between more and less of justice and goodness should disappear at the ultimate religious level of judgment. But he recognizes that this assertion

imperils and seems to weaken all moral judgment It seems to inhibit preference between the oppressor and his victim, between the congenital liar and the moderately truthful one, between the debauched sensualist and the self-disciplined worker, and between the egotist who drives egocentricity to the point of sickness and the moderately "unselfish" devotee of the general welfare.¹

Niebuhr receives counsels for caution from the experience of Catholicism which attempted to overcome this difficulty by incorporating the Stoic concept of the natural law and ended in the defense of the feudal system, and that of orthodox Protestantism which tended, with one disastrous exception in relation to the State, to emphasize the undifferentiated sinfulness of man. He maintains the distinction between sin and guilt. "Guilt is distinguished from sin in that it represents the objective and historical consequences of sin, for which the sinner must be held responsible."² Men who are equally sinful may be equally guilty. They are more equally guilty than they seem to be upon cursory analysis. The guilt of the aggressor and of the victim may not be as unequal as it may seem at first, especially if they are involved in perennial war. Yet men need not be equally guilty

¹Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit., I, 220.

²Ibid., p. 222.

of a specific act of wrongdoing. The prophetic tradition of the Old Testament, maintained in the New Testament, makes the distinction between the guilt of the powerful and the weak, the proud and the meek. Self-righteousness and the vindictiveness of the weak and the downtrodden, who may and usually do become equally, or even more greatly guilty when the tables are turned, must be remembered. Nevertheless, "in a given historical situation the powerful man or class is actually more guilty of injustice and pride than those who lack power."¹

This truth of the inequality of the consequences of sin and the equality of sin, can be demonstrated in the relationship between the dominant and subordinate castes in most dramatic instances. The consequences of the sins of the Negroes and the Mexicans, for example, are almost insignificant compared with the terrible toll that segregation and the caste structure takes in terms of injuries to personalities involved. Yet occasional "race riots" and "zoot suit riots" show that hidden hatred and resentment can burst out in the most violent forms. However, we must remind ourselves that even in the instances of race riots, in which minority groups as well as majority groups participate, the actual damage to persons and property done by the dominant group often is greater than that done by the subordinate group. Just to cite an example, the Chicago Commission on Race Relations noted, after a thorough and impartial investi-

¹Ibid., p. 226.

gation of the Chicago riot of July-August, 1919, stated:

A report on 229 Negroes and whites accused of various criminal activities disclosed the fact that 154 were Negroes and seventy-five were whites. The state's attorney reported eighty-one indictments against Negroes and forty-seven against whites after all riot cases were cleared. These figures show that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were indicted as whites.

At first glance these figures indicate greater riot activity on the part of the Negroes, and that therefore one would expect to find twice as many whites injured as Negroes. But out of a total of 520 injured persons whose race was definitely reported, 342 were Negroes and 178 whites. The fact that twice as many Negroes appeared as defendants and twice as many were injured as whites suggests the conclusion that whites were not apprehended as readily as Negroes.¹

The Commission gives many instances of prejudice and discrimination, even violence, on the part of the police toward the Negroes, and distrust of the police on the part of the Negroes.²

Going back to the equality of sin and inequality of guilt, we note that Myrdal, after starting to study the Negroes, had to shift over to the study of the mind and heart of white America, because of this very factor of "actual power relations." He writes:

The Negroes do not by far have anything approaching a tenth of the things worth having in America.

It is thus the white majority group that naturally determines the Negroes' "place"

. . . . "This is a white man's country."

This stress in the formulation of our problem [i.e. giving primary attention to what goes on in the minds .

¹The Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago, A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1922), p. 35.

²For example, Ibid., pp. 34-36.

of white Americans] it must be repeated, is motivated by an ambition to be realistic about the actual power relations in American society.¹

In emphasizing the importance of beliefs, rather than facts, concerning race, he states, "We have concluded, further, from the actual power situation in America that the beliefs held by white people rather than those held by Negroes are of primary importance."² The actual power situation is of basic importance to race-caste relationships. Possession and exercise of greater power results in greater consequences; hence, greater responsibility is to be attached to greater power. It does not mean that greater power always accompanies a greater sin. Rather, the commission of equal sin on the part of the more powerful results in greater consequences (and therefore, greater guilt).

Sin as Pride

One of the characteristics of man's self-assertion is the pretensions of infinity. This is characterized by Tillich as the will "to be like God."³ This is expressed in several ways, among them: (1) sin as pride, and (2) sin as demonic elevation of creativity. In turn, sinful pride finds expression in a number of ways.

Tillich interprets human pride as the basic sin of

¹Myrdal, op. cit., pp. xlvii-xlviii.

²Ibid., p. 110.

³Paul Tillich, S.T. 53, op. cit., Existence and the Christ, First Part, II, "Man's Existential situation (Sin and Evil)," I "The Will to be like God," p. 5.

man. He regards this as definitive of man's existential situation: "Man's existential situation is determined by the infinity of his spiritual impetus or by his attempt to make his finiteness infinite. (Sin as Pride)"¹

Niebuhr also regards man's attempt to be like God as basic: "The religious dimension of sin is man's rebellion against God, his effort to usurp the place of God."² Likewise he considers pride more fundamental than sensuality.³ Brunner also gives the primary place to this sin of arrogance. In fact, he chose for the English title of his Der Mensch in Widerspruch, Man in Revolt. In the section of this book, "The Primal Contradiction, The Fall," he writes:

The first thing that the Bible tells us about Primal Sin is that it is the revolt of the Creature against the Creator; thus it is not something negative, it is a positive negation. Sin is the defiance, arrogance, the desire to be equal with God, emancipation, a deliberate severance from the hand of God.⁴

Niebuhr distinguishes between three types of pride: (1) pride of power; (2) pride of knowledge; and (3) pride of virtue.⁵

¹Ibid., II, 1, proposition 1, (November 21, 1939), p. 5.

²Niebuhr, Nature and Destiny of Man, op. cit., I, p. 179.

³Ibid., I, p. 186.

⁴Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), p. 129.

⁵Niebuhr, op. cit., I, p. 188.

Pride of power

Under pride of power, Niebuhr recognizes two types: pretensions of the powerful, and the lust for power which has pride as its end.¹

The pretensions of the powerful.--The powerful pretends himself to be the maker of his own position and the judge of his values and the master of his own destiny. This is the particular sin of the dominant caste. The doctrine of white supremacy is a case in point. It is the proud confusion of superiority in economic and political power with the claim of supremacy of the "race."

Gallagher, after tracing the historical development of the doctrine of white supremacy, points out the pretensions of the dominant whites:

The genesis of the dogma of white superiority reveals a fundamental confusion between supremacy and superiority. The first is an undeniable fact of the present world; the second is an invention of the mind to defend the first. Since he now rules the world, the white man deceives himself into thinking that he does so by right: he is supreme because he is superior. He then completes the closed circle of false logic by arguing that the superiority justifies supremacy.²

Lust for power of the insecure.--The particular sin of the insecure is the lust for power. That this is considered a form of pride seems at first to be a bit far-

¹Ibid., I, pp. 188-190.

²Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., p. 79.

fetched. Yet in the field of intergroup relations, insecurity and frustration and will-to-power produce the most violent expressions of racial pride.

(1) It is the most curious twist of this existential situation that the most insecure among the dominant caste are often the most vociferous and the most violent in the assertions of superiority. It is out of the situations of economic poverty and of the lack of social privileges that the "po' white trash" insists upon white supremacy, and upon Negroes "keeping their place."¹ The periods of low income, following low cotton prices, are the times when lynchings take place most frequently.²

Myrdal states: "Economic fear is mixed with social fear: a feeling that the Negro is 'getting out of his place,' and the white man's social status is being threatened and is in need of a defense." He quotes Tannenbaum's observation that: "The South gives indications of being afraid of the Negro It is a fear of losing grip upon the world. It is an unconscious fear of changing status." This feeling lies behind the common saying which a visitor to the South hears from lower class whites to the effect that "'a lynching now and then' is expedient or necessary in keeping the Negroes from becoming 'uppity.'"³

¹See pp. 318-320, supra.

²Gallagher, American Caste and Negro College, op. cit., pp. 381 ff. See pp. 193-194, supra.

³Myrdal, op. cit., p. 563.

We have noted in some detail the operation of the frustration-aggression mechanism of intergroup hostility. Ruth Tuck observes a relationship between a violent outburst among otherwise gentle people and the dualistic doctrine of human nature. Speaking of the days following an incident involving some Mexican-American girls, a Mexican-American youth, and a group of sailors, she writes:

Anyone who believes in the essentially dualistic nature of man would have been fascinated, during those three days in Descanso, in watching normally kind, friendly faces display sadism, fear, and spite. It was impossible to believe that these average citizens, too, did not have something they wished to "take out" on a scapegoat--perhaps their own frustrations, insecurities, and self-mistrust.¹

There are ample evidences of hostility arising among the most insecure people within the dominant group in a caste society. Usually the form of expression of aggression is that of pride.

(2) The other side of the picture is just as apparent: that insecurity and lack of power on the part of the subordinate group engenders hostility, resentment, and lust for power. Niebuhr maintains that this feeling has pride of power as its end, and is to be placed with the pride of power. When the oppressed groups, e.g. the revolutionaries in the French or Russian Revolutions, gain the position of dominance, they express the thirst for power and pride of power in most extravagant ways. But even while the subordinate groups remain subordinate, the feeling of resentment

¹Tuck, op. cit., p. 219.

and bitterness is an expression of sinful existence, readily convertible to overt action.

At the close of the introductory chapter entitled, "Crucial Issues in America's Race Relations Today," in which are given some of the keenest insights into present day race relations problems, Dean Nelson of Howard University School of Religion discusses "what is happening to the Negroes themselves." Among the suffering of the Negroes are the following: brutality and death, lack of medical service and opportunities for normal growth, poor housing, inequality in educational opportunities, economic deprivation, denial of political freedom, and crime that thrives on segregation.¹ To all these, Nelson adds the culminating one: "Of all the offenses from which Negroes have suffered, none is so tragic as that which affects their spirit." He recognizes the loss of faith on the part of the Negroes; "not a complete loss but it is a mounting one and a dangerous one."² Negro ministers are saying: "It is blasphemy to call the segregated church a church of God." "Christian nations have furnished the world with its worst example of unbrotherliness." "We are not allowed at the parks, although provisions are made for ducks and geese. It is hard for us as ministers to teach our children Christianity under such circumstances." Nelson notes with grave concern that "in ser-

¹William Stuart Nelson, "Crucial Issues in American Race Relations Today," William Stuart Nelson, ed., The Christian Way in Race Relations (New York: Harper, 1948), pp. 17-20.

²Ibid., p. 20.

vice after service in Negro churches the theme turns on the abuses suffered by Negroes at the hands of white Americans, and the mood is one of unalloyed hatred."¹

The following statement of Nelson's is of particular significance:

Thus in the wars and in the peace of recent years the attitude of Negroes has been marked by a realism compounded of hope, of bitter complaint, of resignation when there was no recourse, and of deeply laid plans for the future reordering of their relationship with the government.²

God confronts the inescapable pride of man, and the inescapable excess of his pride of power and thirst for power with divine judgment. Man is a creature in spite of all his creativity. His self and his creativity have their source in God. There is need for the deepest and most thoroughgoing contrition before the holiness and majesty of God. Yet even in the confession of contrition, there lurks

¹Ibid., pp. 20-21.

²Ibid., p. 22. It is not the intention of the writer to give the impression that this chapter and this book are bitter and denunciatory. It is a realistic book, and a terribly searching one. Moreover, it is based on a theology akin to the one which has been presented in this paper. It is not pleasant reading; it does not offer easy solutions. It is one of mature realism born of tragedy and pain. But it does offer a genuine hope. Nelson closes this chapter with the words: "It may not be too late to save the Negro people to the religion of their fathers and to the ideals of their country. It may not be too late to save America in the eyes of the world and to save her against the grave weaknesses she harbors within. There can be no question, however, that the sands of time are running out. Americans bear the responsibility now of rising, as they can rise, to the will and the strength which marked the beginning of this nation and which can mark her redemption today." The motive for quoting a rather negative emphasis from the chapter is to show the effect of subjection on the subject people.

an unconscious or semi-conscious pride and self-righteousness that we are better than others who do not profess contrition as vociferously as we do.

Pride of knowledge

Under this heading may be considered the pretension of man to assume the possession of universal and impartial truth when actually he is looking at truth from a particular and biased point of view. This is especially true in race-caste relations. A southern white man assumes he is speaking of the eternal and timeless truth when he refers to white supremacy. To him it is a Divine Order of creation. The northern white man who sees through the ignorance and prejudice of this southern position is unable to realize that for a person living in a northern city with its abolitionist tradition, the existence of restrictive covenants, whether enforced by violence, by the courts, or by public pressure, may be a far greater sin than southern paternalism. A person belonging to a lower caste can hardly know the terrible fear of ostracism held by a member of the dominant group as he considers overstepping caste barriers. The lower-caste man is likely to condemn such a person for cowardice, whereas he himself may not dare to step out of line of the mores of his own caste group, e.g. join a church whose members are predominantly not of his own group. Likewise, it is well-nigh impossible for a person belonging to the dominant group to feel the oppression of the caste

structure, of which a person of the lower caste is constantly made conscious in every relationship in life. Yet everyone unconsciously or subconsciously looks upon his view as a universal one, and others as prejudiced. This is the meaning of caste ideology. The stereotypes are manifestations of this distorted pride of knowledge.

Pride of Virtue

Pride of virtue is a Pharisaic pride--being proud of righteousness when that righteousness is actually sin in the sight of God. It is sinful not only because it does not usually meet the demand of a universal principle, but more especially because it always fails to meet the demands of God. A person who is proud of his virtues can not possibly meet the demands of the will of God because his attitude of self-righteousness and self-complacency precludes the possibility. He sets up or adopts a general principle to which he can conform, and conforms to it. He is usually considered a good man in the sight of other men. Legalistically interpreted (and legalistically, almost any act can be rationalized and justified) he is blameless. Yet if he should have attained a higher capacity for good, he is for that very reason capable of a still higher achievement of righteousness.

This is particularly true in the realm of race-caste relations. What is a good act for one person is far from good for another. It depends upon the situation. To a deep Southerner, it is a great advance to address a Negro

man as "Mr." To a New Englander, it is no virtue to invite a Negro to his home to share meals and bed with him. As in all other fields of ethical action, this is an ad hoc matter. And particularly in the field of race relations the ad hoc nature is very evident. This is not to deny that principles of equality and fairness must be adhered to. What is asserted is that we must not be satisfied with conforming to a set of principles.

Sin as Distortion of Creativity and Demonic Elevation

Perils of a new and higher order

One of the observable facts of the human situation is that when a new and more creative and just relationship is established, that new relationship is immediately (rather, already) tainted with a new and higher form of evil and destructiveness. Every advance in science carries with it a new and greater peril.

So in intergroup relationships, the advance is not necessarily an unmixed good. Dean Nelson points out that the recent advances in race relations are not unmixed good but are limited. He notes that in many instances the advance had been peripheral. Much of the gains have been forced gains. "Progress which comes in these ways may widen rather than close the chasm between men."¹ Perhaps progress has been too little and has come too late. "It is a serious question as to whether Negroes have not already

¹Nelson, op. cit., p. 23.

on the whole been converted to a power ethic and become almost entirely lost to the love ideal of Christianity."¹

There is a growing fear that every advance of the colored people is bringing the society closer to a breaking point and that the greater the gain and greater the power of the oppressed (and thus bringing the power situation more nearly in balance, which is one of the minimum requirements of justice) the fiercer will be the "irrepressible conflict."

The Amsterdam Assembly of the World Council of Churches notes this phenomenon:

Men are often disillusioned by finding that changes of particular systems do not bring unqualified good, but fresh evils. New temptations to greed and power arise even in systems more just than those they have replaced because sin is ever present in the human heart. Many, therefore, lapse into apathy, irresponsibility and despair. The Christian faith leaves no room for such despair, being based on the fact that the Kingdom of God is firmly established in Christ and will come by God's act despite all human failure.²

The demonic elevation

Closely related to this is another element in the concept of the "demonic," expounded by Tillich³--the breaking through of the irrational creative-destructive, dynamic forces of history.

Ethnic consciousness may be considered in terms of

¹Nelson, op. cit., p. 24.

²World Council of Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design (Harper, 1948), III, 189-190.

³Paul Tillich, The Interpretation of History, op. cit. pp. 72-122. Since the demonic element is present in practically all forms of sin we have been discussing except that of inertia, we are dealing with only one aspect of it here.

its creativity and its destructiveness. A sense of community, Volk, the pride of national and cultural heritage, is part of the creative impulse of man which overcomes the separation of individuals and gives meaning and fulness to life. This consciousness of ethnic community is vital and immediate, in contrast to intellectual and rational abstractions such as mankind. It has symbols and myths. It takes on a sacred quality (untouchability, taboo) and ritual dignity. The creed of white supremacy, the flag, the Negro spiritual, etc. take on these "demonic" religious qualities. Ethnic or racial consciousness demands loyalty and obedience. At this point the destructive distortion of this creative dynamic takes over. The dominant ethnic groups subordinate weaker minorities into lower castes. Loyalty to the ruling caste supercedes all other loyalties, including loyalty to God. Weaker ethnic groups develop resentment, bitterness, and tend to absolutize their own loyalty to the "race" or caste or cultural heritage. Some tend to make the isolation and maintenance of their ethnic identity a religious and absolute end. This is the gross manifestation of various forms of racism rampant in the present day world.

The Grace of God and the Efforts of Men

In the foregoing summaries of the various aspects of human sinfulness and their expression in intergroup hostility, the interaction of the deeper religious factors

and the sociological and psychological forces (which cannot in reality be separated) was seen, even though only very partially. What is implied in these discussions is not that man can and must extricate himself by his own efforts alone from the sinful situation into which he is thrown. What is maintained is that only as man confesses his involvement in the social nexus of which he is both the passive and active causal participant is he able to begin to extricate himself from the complete involvement in the nexus. It is further maintained that although confession is "good for the soul," both from the psychopathological and theological points of view, it is not sufficient. From an "existentialist" viewpoint, only as he actively participates in the actual (therefore, ethically mixed) struggles for what is seen as the will of God for the particular situation at the particular moment is he being moral.¹

At the same time a Christian realizes that only as he receives the grace of God is he able even to begin to transcend the limitations of his class and caste ideology and to take effective steps in overcoming the evils of caste. In redirecting his aggressiveness into more constructive channels, he may be able to overcome to a considerable degree both his sense of frustration and of guilt. However, a

¹By actively participating, it is not meant that one should necessarily take on some activity. Very often, refusal to participate actively in a caste pattern, e.g. refusal to conform to caste etiquette or Jim Crow law, is a form of active participation far more real than active participation in some ceremonial observance of the "race-relations" ideal.

Christian must forever be mindful of the fact that at the center of his personality and of his actions is his self, always asserting itself over against other selves and against God. He must remind himself that even if he overcomes some of the ill effects of his aggressiveness, that aggression is always present to be redirected into other destructive channels of behavior. And when he has done what is good in the sight of men and for society, he has done only what is required. Gratitude for the grace of God which enables him to reflect the glory of God, not a pride of accomplishment, must fill his heart.

As we have already intimated, the more constructive channeling of aggressive tendencies of men may be redirected toward the breakdown of the basic caste structure of society. This is not the place to discuss the relative effectiveness of the various approaches, methods and techniques of breaking down caste barriers and of the caste itself. However, we may emphasize the need of replacing prejudice with knowledge, hostility with understanding, discrimination with justice, and conflict with cooperation. Both dominance and paternalism must be done away and their place must be taken by mutual respect. If the members of the subordinate group are weaker, poorer and more ignorant, the members of the superordinate group can surely assist and encourage them--not with condescension but with a genuine spirit of humility and understanding.

In this area of ethical decision and action, as in

others, agape serves both as the judgment of the failure of every attempt to overcome sinfulness and as the ultimate "norm" of ethical action.¹ Only by the grace of God can a person actively and humbly strive to overcome the evil of caste in his own life and in his culture.

As D. M. Baillie reminds us, the paradox of Grace is the central paradox of the Christian life. It is this which makes the Christian life distinct from "mere morality," "so that in a sense Christianity transcends morality altogether and there is no such thing as a Christian ethic."

Speaking of the relevance of the impossible ethic of the Sermon on the Mount, Baillie writes: "In the last analysis a Christian does not live by practising any ethic or moulding himself on any ideal, but by a faith in God which finally ascribes all good to Him." The Christian ethic insists upon the freedom and responsibility of man on the one hand and the prevenient grace of God on the other hand. There is no boundary to delimit the area of God's action and that of man's action. "Whatever good there is in our lives and actions (and it is but fragmentary) is 'all of God,' and it was His before it was ours, was divine grace before it was human achievement, is indeed a matter of God taking up our poor human nature into union with His divine life, making us more truly personal, yet also more

¹See p. 103, supra.

disposed to ascribe it all to Him."¹

In combating a deeply entrenched set of social norms and social patterns such as color caste, it is inevitable that actions be of an ambiguous character. Endeavoring to adhere to ethical principles, such as equality, non-violence, freedom, brotherhood, and democracy will not free a Christian from the dilemmas and conflicts of principles which will arise to confront him in each particular ethical decision he is called upon to make. For example, a proposal for racial equality such as FEPC or the Civil Rights Legislation based upon the principles of equality may infringe in some respects upon the principles of non-violence and freedom, especially if the latter are interpreted in more absolute terms. An action for racial brotherhood such as challenging the caste taboos may, at least in the short-run effects, appear to give rise to conditions which are counter to the principles of harmony and non-violence. A dynamic assessment of all the ethical principles involved in each particular situation in the light of the overarching "norm" of agape and the full recognition of the grace of God is needed in a Christian action to overcome color caste.

¹D. M. Baillie, God was in Christ (New York: Scribner: 1948), pp. 114-117.

CHAPTER VIII

CASTE IN THE CHURCH

The greatest contribution that the church can make to the renewal of society is for it to be renewed in its own life in faith and obedience to its Lord. Such inner renewal includes a clearer grasp of the meaning of the gospel for the whole life of men. This renewal must take place both in the larger units of the church and in the local congregations. . . . If the church can overcome the national and social barriers which now divide it, it can help society to overcome those barriers.

This is especially clear in the case of racial distinctions. It is here that the church has failed most lamentably, where it has reflected and then by its example sanctified the racial prejudice that is rampant in the world. And yet it is here that today its guidance concerning what God wills for it is especially clear. It knows that it must call society away from prejudice based on race or color, and from the practices of discrimination and segregation, as denials of justice and human dignity, but it cannot say a convincing word to society unless it takes steps to eliminate these from the Christian community, because they contradict all that it believes about God's love for all his children.¹

In these clear and plain words the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, meeting at Amsterdam in 1948, set forth the statement of faith and the condemnation of the church's failure to live up to a clearly seen will of God.

In no less an equivocal tone, Pope Pius XII declared

¹World Council of Churches, Man's Disorder and God's Design, op. cit., III, 193.

the Christian doctrine of human unity in his first encyclical. Referring to the violations of this doctrine, the Pope declared:

The first of these pernicious errors, widespread today, is the forgetfulness of that law of human solidarity and charity which is dedicated and imposed by our common origin and by the equality of rational nature in all men, to whatever people they belong, and by the redeeming Sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on behalf of sinful mankind.

.
The apostle of the Gentiles later on makes himself the herald of this truth which associates men as brothers in one great family (Acts xvii:26, 27).

A marvelous vision, which makes us see the human race in the unity of one common origin in God, "one God and Father of all, Who is above all, and through all, and in us all" (Ephesians iv:6); in the unity of nature which in every man is equally composed of material body and spiritual, immortal soul; in the unity of the immediate end and mission in the world; in the unity of dwelling place, the earth, of whose resources all men can by natural right avail themselves, to sustain and develop life; in the unity of the supernatural end, God Himself, to Whom all should tend; in the unity of means to secure that end.¹

John LaFarge, S. J., notes with peculiar painfulness that segregation has penetrated the House of God.²

Thus we observe a common Christian ideal of human unity by both the most representative group of present-day ecumenical Christianity and by the highest authority of the Roman Catholic Church, and a common recognition of the failure to live according to the expressed doctrines of the Church by Roman and non-Roman churchmen. Indeed we need to

¹Quoted in John LaFarge, S. J., The Race Question and the Negro (New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1943), p. 113.

²LaFarge, op. cit., p. 156; see Ibid., pp. 43-50.

cite only a few pronouncements to point out the glaring discrepancies between clearly expressed doctrines of the churches and equally plainly observable fact of the violation of these doctrines. It is the purpose of this chapter to cite a few of the representative statements of the churches; to present statistical summaries concerning the segregation in the churches; to give a brief sketch of the rise and growth of the Negro Church; and to search for some of the factors which tend to maintain or to break down caste segregation in the life of the Church.

Pronouncements of the Church Concerning
Segregation within its Organization

"Christian teaching about race transcends immeasurably the practices of the Christian churches in America."¹ So Liston Pope characterizes the discrepancy between the principles and practices of the churches in the United States. We have already noted the emphatic language with which the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches condemned this failure of the churches.

The Federal Council of the Churches
of Christ in America

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America declared in 1919: "Negroes should be fully recognized as Americans and fellow citizens, given equal economic and professional opportunities, increasing participation in

¹Liston Pope, "Caste in the Church: I. The Protestant Experience," Survey Graphic, XXXVI (January, 1947), 59.

all community affairs; a spirit of cooperation should obtain between the white and colored people, North and South.

. . . ."¹ The Federal Council established a Department of Race Relations in 1921. In 1924 the Federal Council stated:

The assumption of inherent racial superiority by dominant groups around the world is neither supported by science nor justified by ethics. The effort to adjust race relations upon that basis and by the use of force is a denial of Christian principles. To demonstrate that Christian ideas are sufficient to solve the difficult problems of race relations in America is the supreme domestic task before the churches today.²

In 1942 the Federal Council appointed the Commission on the Church and Minority Peoples "in the light of two urgent needs: (1) to strengthen the bases of democracy at home; (2) to make more effective the Church's witness to a practice of the Christian principle of brotherhood."³

At its historic special meeting in March, 1946, the Federal Council declared:

We believe the church today must seek to rediscover the transforming power that inhered in the undivided early Christian community and then apply that power to the massive problem presented by race tensions in community life. Segregation is the pattern of our American race relations.

It found that "segregation in America has always meant inferior services to the minority segregated," and that it is "always discriminatory." The meeting found that the churches have "largely accepted the pattern of racial segregation in

¹Quoted in Frank S. Loescher, The Protestant Church and the Negro (New York: Association Press, 1948), p. 121.

²Quoted in Loescher, op. cit., p. 121.

³Quoted in Ibid., p. 17.

their own life and practice." Unequivocally, it took the following historic stand:

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America hereby renounces the pattern of segregation in race relations as unnecessary and undesirable and a violation of the Gospel of love and human brotherhood. Having taken this action, the Federal Council requests its constituent communions to do likewise. As proof of their sincerity in this renunciation they will work for a non-segregated church and a non-segregated society.¹

Several Denominations on Segregation in the Church

The following denominations affirmed the foregoing renunciation of segregation by the Federal Council as their own words: Congregational Christian, 1946; Disciples of Christ, 1946, 1947; Evangelical and Reformed, 1947; Presbyterian, U. S. A., 1946, 1947.² Without adopting the Federal Council statement, the Church of the Brethren declared in 1947 that they "believe that racial segregation in society, and even more in the church, is contrary to the letter of the New Testament and to the spirit of the Christian faith." The Brethren commended "those who are now promoting brotherhood," and urged their people "to abound more and more along these lines."³ Likewise, the United Presbyterians, in 1946, recommended "that our Churches welcome people of all races into their services and full fellowship."⁴ The Evangelical

¹The Church and Race Relations (New York: Department of Race Relations, The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1946), p. 5; the quotations in the preceding paragraph were taken from Ibid., pp. 2-7.

²Loescher, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

³Ibid., p. 133.

⁴Loc. cit.

United Brethren Church in 1946 urged all their members :
 "1. to encourage interracial fellowship; 2. to maintain friendly relations through the home, school, and church; 3. to oppose all practices of racial segregation; 4. to open our churches to men of all races; 4. to support legislation in harmony with these convictions."¹

In order to implement their resolution, the Congregationalists designated race relations as a major concern for the 1946-1948 biennium.² Galen R. Weaver was called from Hawaii to serve as the executive secretary of the Committee on Church and Race, which was created for the purpose of intensively forwarding this emphasis.³ The Northern Presbyterians authorized a study of how the denomination can achieve a non-segregated church.⁴

The Episcopalians in 1946 requested the appointment of a "bi-racial committee for the purpose of developing plans to stimulate increased participation of Negro laymen in the established program of the Church."⁵

The Northern Baptists, who, with the Southern Baptists, share the same religious traditions with the majority⁶ of the Negro Christians, declared in 1944 that : "We dedicate

¹Loescher, op. cit., p. 134.

²Ibid., p. 43.

³Loc. cit.

⁴Loc. cit.

⁵Ibid., pp. 133-134; p. 43.

⁶Membership in the National Baptist Convention alone constitutes over $\frac{1}{2}$ of total Negro church membership in the United States.

ourselves and seek to commit our churches to teaching, preaching and full practice of Christian relationships with all people, that we seek every possible way of enlarging our fellowship without discrimination."¹ They have not dealt directly with the March, 1946 statement of the Federal Council.²

The Southern Baptists, who not only share the same tradition with Negro Baptists but live in the same region with most of them, declared that they "shall strive to cultivate interracial good will so that members of the Negro race shall have impartial justice, better and more equitable opportunities in industrial, business, and professional engagements, more equitable share in public funds, more adequate opportunities in education." (1940, 1941, 1944). They stated in 1943:

We must deal with the race problem of our land on a different principle, according to which differences will not be permitted to generate bitterness and justice will have a human and Christian, rather than a racial, criterion.

In the same year, they pointed out that "we seek a modus operandi that will diminish friction, eliminate injustices, and promote friendly co-operation."³

¹Loescher, op. cit., p. 131.

²Loescher, who mentions many denominations concerning their stands on this statement, and who cites the 1944 statement of Northern Baptists, does not mention Northern Baptists in connection with the Federal Council statement of March, 1946. Therefore, it is quite certain that he has failed to find any statement by the Northern Baptists on this, and most likely that the Northern Baptists issued none.

³Loescher, op. cit., p. 128.

The Methodist Church on Segregation in the Church

Because the Methodist Church is the largest denomination in the United States, and is the "predominantly white" denomination containing the largest membership of Negroes within it, and because it frankly recognizes that "the problem is probably keenest and the way toward a solution more difficult within The Methodist Church,"¹ it will be treated in greater detail than the other denominations.²

The peculiar history of the Methodist churches in its Negro-white relations can best be visualized in the accompanying diagram (Fig. 12) brought up-to-date from one prepared by DuBois in 1903. When the Methodist Episcopal Church, the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, and the Methodist Protestant Church united in 1939, the Central Jurisdiction was created to include all the "Negro Annual Conferences, the Negro Missionary Conferences and Missions in the United States of America,"³ which included all the Negro work in the newly united Church, except in New England and the Western States (except Colorado and Montana, which contain churches belonging to the Central Jurisdiction.)⁴

¹Discipline of The Methodist Church, 1948 (Methodist Pub. House, 1948), par. 2026, p. 601.

²Also because the writer is a minister of The Methodist Church.

³Discipline of The Methodist Church, 1939 (The Methodist Pub. House, 1939), par. 26, p. 28.

⁴From the map, Discipline, 1948, op cit., p. 642.

THE GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRINCIPAL METHODIST DENOMINATIONS




FIG. 12. CENTRAL JURISDICTION THE METHODIST CHURCH

Sources: Up to 1900, W. E. B. Du Bois, ed., *The Negro Church* (Atlanta: Atlanta Univ. Press, 1903), p. 136; 1939 figures, *The Christian Advocate*, May 19, 1938, p. 481; 1945 Negro Denom. figures, Loescher, *op. cit.*, p. 19; 1947 figures, *Discipline*, 1948, *op. cit.*, par. 2199, p. 643.

In its Social Creed, The Methodist Church states:

"We believe that God is Father of all peoples and races, Jesus Christ is his Son, that we and all men are brothers, and that man is of infinite worth as a child of God."¹

More specifically the Creed declares: "We stand for the rights of racial groups, and insist that the above social, economic, and spiritual principles apply to all races alike."²

In 1944, when, as indicated by the actions of many other denominations, the atmosphere within the Protestant churches was full of sentiments against segregation and discrimination, the General Conference made an unequivocal statement: "We look to the ultimate elimination of racial discrimination within The Methodist Church." The same General Conference created the Commission to Consider the Relations of All Races in The Methodist Church.³

With the report of this study commission before them, the General Conference on 1948 passed a resolution on "The Christian Church and Race." Noting the world-wide scope of the problem of racial discrimination, the resolution called upon the church "to inquire into the nature of the problem of racial discrimination;" and pointed out that "racial discrimination is a fact which asserts itself both in principle and in practice." It stated emphatically:

¹"The Methodist Social Creed," par. 2020, Discipline, 1948, op. cit., p. 583.

²Ibid., p. 585.

³"The Christian Church and Race," par. 2026, Ibid., pp. 601-602.

The principle of racial discrimination is in clear violation of the Christian belief in the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of man, and the Kingdom of God, the proclamation of which in word and life is our gospel. We therefore have no choice but to denote it as unchristian and to renounce it as evil. This we do without equivocation. (*Italics in the resolution.*)

The practice of racial discrimination, too, is evil, being "the prolific mother of injustice, dissension, and division in any society which practices it." "Yet," the resolution points out:

toleration of this practice is as old as the Christian Church itself, and is coextensive with the history of the United States. Consequently, thoughtful persons will know that it cannot be removed by a resolution. Neither will it be removed without real determination by significant parts of the Church and the nation. Hence, we as Christians, must address ourselves with patience and perseverance to the infinitely complicated task of removing racial discrimination, root and branch, from our common life, both in the Church and in the nation in which we live.

It characterizes the strong stands taken by the Federal Council, the International Council of Religious Education, and the Home Missions Council, as "forthright statements of realistic policy," [having] as their common objective the ultimate elimination of racial discrimination from the Christian fellowship."

In making recommendations, the resolution calls attention to the admonition of the Episcopal Address: "We must be wise enough to recognize differences that do exist in the thought and practices of our people, and proceed, not upon the principle that demands conformity, but upon that which achieves unity in diversity." The General Conference recommended: (a) providing full participation of all

racial groups in all programs emanating from the Council of Bishops; (b) calling attention to the recruiting, training, and employment of more colored personnel by the agencies of The Methodist Church; (c) providing complete equality of accommodation for all races in the national and international meetings of The Methodist Church and its agencies; (d) re-studying by its institutions--colleges, universities, theological schools, hospitals, and homes--"any policy which proceeds on the basis of racial discrimination"; (e) individually, and "wherever possible," collectively standing for "equality of political franchise and of economic and educational opportunities for all races"; (f) enacting by the General Conferences of permissive legislation needed "to facilitate co-operation between and among the local churches and the conferences of The Methodist Church on problems now originating in the life of the church because of present organization strictures"; (g) authorizing a continuing commission to study the practices and organization of the world-wide Church "to the end that racial discrimination shall ultimately be eliminated from our fellowship"; (h) acceptance by every Methodist, and every Methodist church, conference and institution "the achievement of full fellowship in our church as vital responsibility."

In the concluding paragraph the resolution sets forth both the depth of the church's difficulties and the height of its aspirations. "We are not unmindful of the difficulties to which we summon The Methodist Church in

in this matter. For we are of all races and nations." As if referring to the more advanced positions taken by many other denominations, it reminded the Church: "Yet we are a frontier church! We therefore summon The Methodist Church once more to take up her position on a frontier."¹

This document brings out all that Myrdal calls the "American Dilemma." In principle, The Methodist Church unequivocally renounces racial discrimination. Yet even in verbal recommendations which carry no power of enforcement, the resolution of the 1948 General Conference is limited to calling attention to, restudying, and standing for certain principles and practices "wherever possible." This resolution is also remarkable in that it does not mention the word segregation even a single time, in contrast to the other church pronouncements cited. It does not seem too far-fetched to infer from this omission that the General Conference regards discrimination and segregation as two separate phenomena and not as different aspects of the same phenomenon, and that it renounces racial discrimination without renouncing racial segregation, either in principle or in practice.

Practices of Major Protestant Denominations

Frank Loescher made an intensive study of seventeen large "white" Protestant denominations, with approximately 25,000,000 members and comprising about eighty per cent of

¹Discipline, 1948, op. cit., par. 2026, pp. 600-603.

the white Protestants in the United States.¹ First of all, he found that approximately 7,500,000 of about 8 million Negro Protestants² belong to separate Negro denominations.³ Of the 561,951 members belonging to the nine denominations (of the 17 studied) which included Negro churches among their churches, 330,600 belonged to the Methodists and 60,000 to the Disciples. These two denominations (combined membership of Negroes, 390,600) practice segregation on national and regional as well as on the local levels. This leaves seven denominations⁴ (combined Negro membership, 171,351) in which Negro churches do not experience segregation at the national level.

The Negro Disciples are organized in a National Christian Missionary Convention "which, in theory, is not racial, but in practice is so."⁵ We have noted the organi-

¹Including the 15 largest "white" denominations in the Federal Council: Methodist, Protestant Episcopal, Presbyterian, U.S.A., United Lutheran (consultative), Disciples, Northern Baptist, Congregational Christian, Evangelical and Reformed, Presbyterian, U.S., United Brethren, Evangelical, United Presbyterian, Brethren, Reformed in America, Religious Society of Friends (Five Years Meeting), and two non-members of the Federal Council, Southern Baptists and Friends General Conference. Loescher, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

²Out of 14 million Negroes, about 8 million Protestants and 300,000 Catholics. Loescher, op. cit., p. 51.

³National Baptists, 4 million; A.M.E., 869,000; A.M.E.Z., 489,000; C.M.E., 382,000. Ibid., p. 19.

⁴N. Baptist, Congregation-Christian, Presbyterians U.S., and U.S.A., Protestant Episcopal, United Lutheran, and United Presbyterian. Other 8 denominations did not have any Negro churches. Ibid., p. 52.

⁵Ibid., p. 53.

zation of the Negro churches in the Central Jurisdiction in The Methodist Church.

Regionally, Presbyterian U. S. A. Negro churches in the South (except in Kentucky) are in separate Synods. Most of the Negro churches in the Presbyterian U. S. are also in separate presbyteries. The Congregational Christian Negro churches in the South are in separate bodies but those in other sections are not segregated.

"Negro churches which are members of the Northern Baptist Convention are included in the Baptist associations at all levels, national, state, and local."¹ The Protestant Episcopal Negro churches are all integrated in the regional organizations, including those in the South. All five Negro congregations in the United Lutheran Church in America are integrated.²

Even though there is a degree of integration at the regional and national levels, there is extremely little integration on the local level. In reply to postal cards sent out to 17,900 ministers of six predominantly northern denominations³ (which were followed up with questionnaires), Loescher found 290 predominantly white churches with 1,132 Negro attenders and 1,320 Negro members. Among the Congre-

¹Loescher, op. cit., p. 54.

²Loc. cit.

³Congregational Christian, Northern Baptist, United Presbyterian, Evangelical and Reformed, Church of the Brethren, and Protestant Episcopal. Loescher, Ibid., p. 65.

gational Christian churches which replied, a total of 337 Negro members and 339 Negro attendants was reported. Just two churches accounted for over one half of the Negro participants.¹

From these figures, the following picture emerges:

(1) Out of 8 million Protestant Negroes some 7,400,000² are in separate denominations. These 92.5 per cent "are without association in work and worship with Christians of other races except in interdenominational organizations which involve few of their leaders."

(2) Among the remaining (approximately 600,000), nearly two-thirds are in two denominations (Methodist and Disciples) in which they are separated nationally, regionally, and locally.

(3) Among the remaining, only a handful of Negro members are in "white" churches. Loescher estimates:

Call it one-tenth of one per cent of all the Negro Protestant Christians in the United States--8,000 souls--the figure is probably much too large. Whatever the figure actually, the number of white and Negro per-

¹Ibid., p. 66. Congregational Social Action reports: In January, 1945, 388 churches out of 3,800 canvassed had non-white minority persons in their congregations; 189 gave detailed reports; 14, or 7 per cent of the 189 churches indicated that their non-white membership consisted of 10 or more members; in all but four churches less than 7.5 per cent of the membership was non-white; the percentages of the four churches were 16, 50, 58, and 65 respectively. Social Action, (January 15, 1947), p. 41.

²Loescher, op. cit., p. 76. Loescher uses the figures 7,500,000 and 500,000. However, he gives a list of the membership of Negroes in 9 denominations, which, when totalled, add up to 561,953. It seems more likely that there are close to 600,000 Negroes in predominantly "white" denominations. However, this does not materially alter the total picture.

sons who ever gather together for worship under the auspices of Protestant Christianity is almost microscopic.¹ (See the accompanying graph, Fig. 13)

Loescher notes further: "And where interracial worship does occur, it is, for the most part, in communities where there are only a few Negro families and where, therefore, only a few Negro individuals are available to 'white' churches." He also observes that

Negro membership appears to be confined to less than one per cent of the local "white churches", usually churches in small communities where but a few Negroes live and have already experienced a high degree of integration by other community institutions--communities one might add, where it is unsound to establish a Negro church since Negroes are in such small numbers. It is an even smaller percentage of white churches in which Negroes are reported to be participating freely, or are integrated.

Loescher concludes: "That is the over-all picture, a picture which hardly reveals the Protestant Church as a dynamic agency in the integration of American Negroes into American life."²

Working on the balance sheet of Protestantism's relation to the Negroes, Loescher finds finds it be to "heavily on the debit side." He notes that Protestantism arose in the European exploitation of colored peoples. "It blessed slavery. It sanctioned a caste system with its stamp of inferiority on a whole race." But he also calls attention to the exceptions: "Individuals and some groups became sensitive to the incompatibility of the Christian ethic and the slave system. Some dedicated their lives to

¹Ibid., p. 77.

²Ibid., pp. 77-78.

SEGREGATION OF NEGROES IN PROTESTANT CHURCHES




Fig. 13

Source: Loescher, op. cit., pp. 19, 76-77.

teaching the freedmen." Looking to the future, Loescher concludes:

Latterly this number of concerned individuals has grown and we find many church members devotedly working for a non-segregated Church and a non-segregated society. Although Protestantism, by its policies and practices is still actually contributing to the segregation of Negro Americans, there is some ground for confidence that the intelligence and devotion of these pioneers will show a way. Let us hope that it may come sooner than we think.¹

A Brief History of the Negro Church in the United States

The prominent characteristic of primitive African Negro religion was nature worship with the accompanying strong belief in sorcery. There were some theistic tendencies, the supreme god sometimes being a sun-god, a moon-deity, or a sky-power.² DuBois observes that the slave-trade, along with the physical peculiarities of the land, and the foreign conquest, prevented the integration of African life and the evolution of religion.³ After their transplantation into the new world, the West Indian plantation was substituted for the tribal life of Africa. "The despotic political power of the chief was now vested in the white master; the clan had lost its ties of blood relationship and became simply the aggregation of individuals on a plot of ground."⁴ The two great changes that took place

¹Ibid., p. 117.

²W. E. B. DuBois, ed., The Negro Church (Atlanta, Atlanta Univ. Press, 1903), p. 1.

³Ibid., p. 3.

⁴Loc. cit.

were: "first, the enforcement of severe and unremitted toil and second, the establishment of a new polygamy."¹ Instead of the limited polygamy in Africa, where women and girls were protected, "the plantation polygamy left the chastity of Negro women absolutely unprotected by law, and practically little guarded in custom." In the place of a strong institution of the African polygamous home arose in America "sexual promiscuity, a weak community life, with common dwelling, meals and child nurseries. The internal slave trade tended to further weaken natural ties."²

Du Bois believes that even though practically all the vestiges of spontaneous social institutions of the Africans were destroyed in the plantations, there remained the realms of medicine and religion, in which the priest had held vast powers, which remained largely unaffected by the new plantation life. "The Negro priest, therefore, early became an important figure on the plantation." DuBois notes a connection between this survival and strength of the Negro church. "This institution, therefore, naturally assumed many functions which the other harshly suppressed social organs had to surrender; the Church became the center of amusements, of what little spontaneous economic activity remained, of education, and of all social intercourse."³

Benjamin E. Mays and Joseph W. Nicholson regard the development of a "religious" technique as "possibly the

¹Ibid., pp. 3-4.

²Ibid., p. 4.

³Ibid., p. 5.

most significant technique of survival developed during the days of slavery." This technique was represented by "the Negro spirituals and by the early efforts to establish and develop the Negro church."¹

Woodson observes that Roman Catholic Spain and France had stipulated that the Africans enslaved in America should be indoctrinated in the principles of the Christian religion, but there was no inclination among the planters to comply with these decrees.² In Maryland, after some opposition, Negroes were given some sort of instruction in the church doctrine.³

The Protestants were even more reluctant to evangelize the Negro slave. The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to Foreign Parts was an exception. "This organization was established in London in 1701 to do missionary work among the heathen, especially the Indians and the Negroes."⁴ Generally speaking, however, "one should say that the Negroes were neglected. The few missionaries among them stood like shining lights after a great darkness."⁵

During the latter part of the seventeenth century

¹Benjamin Elijah Mays and Joseph William Nicholson, The Negro's Church (New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1933), p. 1. See Howard Thurman, The Negro Spiritual Speaks of Life and Death (New York: Harpers, 1947), for an artistic treatment of the relationship of the Negro spirituals to the deepest spiritual needs of these people.

²Carter G. Woodson, The History of the Negro Church (Washington: The Associated Publishers, 1921), pp. 2-3.

³Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴Ibid., p. 6.

⁵Ibid., p. 19.

and throughout the eighteenth century, two new sects, the Baptists and Methodists, rose to power in the colonies (later, the United States) and, "because of their evangelical appeal to the untutored mind, made such inroads upon the Negro population as to take over in a few years thereafter the direction of the spiritual development of most of the Negroes throughout the United States."¹ An obstacle to the evangelization of the slaves was removed when "theologians, legislators, and courts declared, around the year 1700, that conversion to Christianity was not incompatible with the worldly status of a slave."²

Although Whitefield was a slaveholder and advocated the introduction of slavery into Georgia, other leaders of Methodism were abolitionists. "Wesley, Coke, and Asbury opposed the institution and advocated emancipation as a means to thorough evangelization."³ Freeborn Garratson told his countrymen, "it is not right for you to keep our fellow creatures in bondage; you must let the oppressed go free."⁴ Bishop Asbury was distressed when, in 1776, some of the masters forbade their slaves to attend his meetings. The historic Christmas Conference of 1784, at which time the Methodist Episcopal Church was organized,⁵ viewed slavery

¹Ibid., p. 25.

²Myrdal, op. cit., p. 859.

³Woodson, op. cit., p. 26.

⁴Ibid., p. 28.

⁵William Warren Sweet, Methodism in American History (New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1933), p. 109-111.

as "contrary to the golden laws of God; and the inalienable rights of mankind, as well as every principle of the Revolution, to hold in the deepest abasement so many souls that are all capable of the image of God."¹ Not only did the conference take this strong stand but made some drastic provisions for the abolition of slavery. "Rule Forty-two comprised an elaborate plan 'to extirpate the abomination of slavery.'"² Earlier in the same year, "it was decreed that all, who having been warned and yet 'buy slaves to keep as slaves,' shall be expelled, and that travelling preachers 'who now have slaves and will not free them if the law allows, shall be no more employed.'"³ At the Christmas conference, these new rules (including those concerning emancipation) were recognized as forming "a new term for communion." Anyone who would not obey them was allowed to withdraw but it was decreed that "he shall never partake of the Supper of the Lord with the Methodists" until he complies with the rule.⁴ "Those who 'buy or sell slaves, or give them away' are immediately to be expelled 'unless they buy them on purpose to free them.'"⁵

¹Woodson, op. cit., p. 29.

²Sweet, op. cit., p. 111.

³James M. Buckley, Constitutional and Parliamentary History of the Methodist Episcopal Church (New York: Eaton and Mains, 1912), p. 249.

⁴Buckley, op. cit., p. 249.

⁵Loc. cit.

This ruling was so far ahead of the times¹ that it was suspended by the conference of the following year, which made a recommendation "to suspend the execution of the minute on slavery till the deliberations of a future conference; and that an equal space of time be allowed to all our members for consideration when the minute shall be put in force."² The 1784 resolution was never put into effect. These declarations of the 1784 and 1785 conferences are extremely relevant to our inquiry. The views expressed by the conference which established the independent Methodist church in America reflected both the Biblical-theological doctrines of the Christian tradition and the humanitarian, equalitarian and libertarian spirit of the Revolution. The writer can hardly refrain from the "idle and useless" speculation how the subsequent history of race relations would have been affected had the Methodists vigorously and perhaps undemocratically tried to carry out the rules of the 1784 conference, which were essentially democratic in spirit and purpose.

"The Baptists were winning more Negroes than Methodists by their attack on slavery during these years, but because of the lack of organized effort, the Baptists did

¹Bishop Asbury is reported to have said after a conference with George Washington, who "gave his opinion against slavery," "I am brought to conclude that slavery will exist in Virginia perhaps for ages. There is not a sufficient sense of religion nor liberty to destroy it." Woodson, op. cit., p. 30.

²Loc. cit.

not exert as much antislavery influence as the early Methodists."¹ The first Negro Baptist Church is said to have been founded "by one Mr. Palmer at Silver Bluff across the river from Augusta, Georgia, in the colony of South Carolina, some time between the years 1773 and 1775."² The Methodists reported 11,862 colored members in 1790, only six years after the founding of their denomination.³

In many plantations, slaves worshipped in the same churches as did the whites, but in separate sections, often in the galleries. In Philadelphia, Negroes sat on the main floor of the St. George's Methodist Church. But as their number increased rapidly, the church became alarmed and attempted to force the Negroes into the gallery. Richard Allen and Absalom Jones and others refused and left in a body. Allen organized an independent Methodist church about 1790. Later he became the founder and the first bishop of the African Methodist Episcopal Church.⁴

After the rebellion in 1831, led by a Negro preacher named Nat Turner, the plantation masters endeavored to check the separate religious meetings of the Negroes. But the "idea of free worship and the advantages of having a slave work off his frustration in religion was too strong." Not only were the slaves allowed in most white churches but were

¹Woodson, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

²Ibid., p. 41.

³Sweet, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴Du Bois, Negro Church, op. cit., pp. 123-125.

permitted to meet by themselves if a white man observed them. However, meetings without the presence of white men had to be secret. Efforts were made to separate the slaves completely from the free Negroes, who continued to have their own churches. The church services, with all the restrictions, afforded one of the few opportunities for the slaves to congregate "when they could feel that they were equal to the white man--in the eyes of God." The Negro preacher became their leader and their interceder for favors from the masters.¹ Howard Thurman relates how he was drilled with the awareness of being a child of God by his grandmother:

The idea was given to her by a certain slave minister, on occasion, holding secret religious meetings with his fellow slaves. How everything in me quivered with the pulsing tremor of raw energy when, in her recital, she would come to the triumphant climax of the minister: "You--you are not niggers. You--you are not slaves. You are God's children." This established for them the ground of personal dignity, so that a profound sense of personal worth could absorb the fear reaction. This alone is not enough, but without it, nothing else is of value.²

At the time of the Emancipation only "one adult in six was a nominal Christian."³ At the end of the Civil War there was a tendency among the white church men to drive the Negroes out and a tendency among the Negroes to establish their own denominations. Many of the Negro preachers became the political leaders of the Reconstruction, be-

¹Myrdal, op. cit., pp. 859-860.

²Howard Thurman, Jesus and the Disinherited, op. cit., p. 50.

³W. E. B. Du Bois, The Negro (New York: Holt, 1915) p. 227, quoted by Myrdal, op. cit., p. 860.

cause there were few among the Negroes who had had experience in leadership. After the end of the Reconstruction period, many of them returned to their pulpits. Under the pressure of the Restoration era, the Negro church in the South came to assume the similar role that it did before the war. The frustrations of the redisfranchised and oppressed Negroes were sublimated into emotionalism, and the preachings became once again otherworldly. "Negro preachers even cautioned their flocks to obey all the caste rules."¹ However, the white preacher and the white observer disappeared from the Negro church. To a certain extent the segregation of the Negro church, even though an act of accommodation, was a step in the direction of emancipation from white domination. Furthermore,

the Negro church was able in some cases to modify the harshness of the system, and it has helped to maintain the solidarity of Negroes in their cautious pressure to ameliorate their position. In many cases, the churches helped to support schools, and education was one of the main ways that Negroes, individually and collectively, could rise in the world.²

The Negro churches in the North are far more independent and the preachers are free to preach what they believe. In many cases, the Negro churches have become the center of social work in the Negro communities. In some cases, preachers are political and community leaders and the voices of protest. Notable among them is the Rev. A. Clayton Powell, the pastor of the Abyssinian Baptist Church of New York City, one of the largest Protestant churches in

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. 861.

²Ibid., p. 862.

the nation, who is also the Congressman from his district. But by and large, even in the North, the Negro Church remains a conservative institution and the preachers tend to conform to the pattern of segregation.

Segregation of Orientals and Others
in Protestant Churches

The situation which confronted the Orientals and Mexicans as they arrived in California was of such a nature that Protestant churches had to establish separate mission work specially for each ethnic group. These new arrivals were different from the white Protestants in matters of language, custom, economic status and religion (here, including Filipino and Mexican Catholics as different religiously, from the standpoint of the Protestants). From the motives both of assimilation and of Christianization, mission work among them was conducted with earnestness and vigor from the earliest times.

One of these missionary efforts, namely, the Methodist work among the Chinese, dates back to the 1860's. In 1866 three women of the Sixth Street Methodist Episcopal Church in Sacramento opened a Sunday School for the Chinese.

Two years later the Reverend Otis Gibson, a returned missionary from China was sent by the Missionary Board to the Pacific Coast to work among the Chinese. Using the Sacramento Sunday School as a model, Rev. Gibson soon established a system of these schools up and down the coast.

The Pacific Chinese Mission was organized in 1904 from the churches which grew out of these schools.¹

Among the Japanese immigrants, "the first converts were three who heard the Gospel as preached by Dr. Thomas Guard of the Howard Street Church in 1877." It is very interesting and significant that the retired Superintendent of the Pacific Japanese Provisional Conference, The Methodist Church, notes in his historical report that "Dr. Guard was at a loss to know how to deal with them." So he "introduced them to Dr. Otis Gibson, Superintendent of the Chinese Mission."

In Dr. Gibson's night school the young Japanese students studied English and under his faithful instruction they soon learned the way to Christ and were duly baptized and received into the Chinese Methodist Episcopal Church. In 1878, a Japanese Gospel Society was organized with one [of the earliest converts] as the president. For eight years this group met in the Chinese Mission.²

From such a beginning it is natural that the Protestant work among the Orientals and Mexicans has remained segregated. In The Methodist Church, the work is not only segregated at the local level, but also at the Annual Con-

¹Wilbur W. Y. Choy, Secretary of the Conference, "Historical Sketch, California Oriental Provisional Conference," (The Methodist Church), manuscript (May, 1947), p. 2.

²Frank Herron Smith, "Historical Report of Conference," Official Journal, Ninth Annual Session of the Pacific Japanese Provisional Annual Conference of The Methodist Church, San Francisco, California, May 19-23, 1948, p. 38.

ference level.¹ To the writer's knowledge the segregation in other Protestant denominations does not extend beyond the local level.

It is interesting that in their study of the capacity of the Japanese for assimilation and the progress made by them toward assimilation, the U. S. Immigration Commission noted in 1910:

In every community where any considerable number of Japanese have settled Christian missions have been instituted for their benefit. The membership of the Christian missions, while large and increasing year by year, is smaller than that of Buddhist organizations. These missions are for Japanese alone, a recognition of a difference between them and other races and a condition which lessens their value as an assimilative force. All are Protestant missions, some five denominations (Episcopal, Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational, and Baptist) being represented among them.²

It was not only natural but practically necessary that these early missionary programs should have been conducted in separate missions. This segregation was based on the differences of culture, particularly that of language, along with "a recognition of a difference between them and other races." But it can hardly be denied that these missions, while promoting assimilation in the intellectual and religious aspects of life, did lessen "their value as an

¹Organized into California Oriental Provisional Annual Conference (Chinese, Filipino and Korean work in the Western jurisdiction, except Hawaii), Latin American Provisional Annual Conference (Spanish speaking work in the States of Arizona and California, also in the states of Sonora and Lower California), and Pacific Japanese Provisional Annual Conference (work among the Japanese in the Western Jurisdiction, except Hawaii).

²U. S. Immigration Commission, op. cit., p. 163.

assimilative force," because of segregation.

If segregation was inevitable or necessary in 1910, it does not hold true at the present time, when the majority of American Christians of Japanese descent do not have linguistic, educational, and other cultural barriers¹ or economic disabilities to a very large extent, there remaining principally inertia and the somewhat nebulous factor of caste-like stratification to maintain this segregation.

The absence of these minority groups from the "white" churches, in turn, has helped to fasten these caste-like barriers upon them. In some communities, such as Pismo Beach, California, where Japanese have always taken an active part in the local Protestant church, social barriers have not been established nearly to the same extent as in neighboring communities.² Quite naturally the acculturation and assimilation of the Buddhist adherents in general have

¹However, Meyners maintains, and this writer inclines to agree with him, that although the Nisei have made remarkable adaptations and although they compare favorably with the native-white population in most indices of group adjustment, "the prevalent notion that the process of Americanization has been completed in the second generation needs to be dispelled." Jo Bob Meyners, "Integration of Japanese-Americans into Protestant Churches of Chicago with Special Reference to Six Churches," (Unpublished B. D. Thesis, Chicago Theological Seminary, 1947), p. 187. (Type-written Final Draft, in author's possession.)

However, as Meyners recognizes, this fact of lack of complete acculturation is integrally interrelated to the fact of caste stratification and caste barriers.

²Toru Matsumoto, Beyond Prejudice (New York: Friendship Press, 1946), p. 3. Also from a personal interview of the writer with a resident (both pre-war and post-return) of Pismo Beach who was a member of the Pismo Beach Presbyterian Church.

not been as great as the Christians.¹

The forced evacuation of persons of Japanese descent during World War II and the dispersal resettlement in areas outside of the Pacific Coast States were accepted as a challenge by the Protestant churches to integrate this ethnic minority into American life through the churches. Many denominations passed strong resolutions urging the churches to welcome them into Christian fellowship. Many city federations of churches took the initiative in organizing ministries to these resettlers.² Yet, with all the sincere hard work of a number of Christian workers, and the advantage of working in new communities where segregation patterns had not been established, there are indications that to some degree a segregated pattern is being pursued by the Japanese and Americans of Japanese descent in many of the large centers in the Middle West and East.³

¹From the writer's observations and impressions. Cf. Meyners, op. cit., pp. 93-97.

²See Matsumoto, op. cit. Cf. Meyners, op. cit., pp. 145 ff. See Loescher, op. cit., pp. 85-86. This writer was a member of the staff of the United Ministry to Resettlers, Church Federation of Greater Chicago, from June, 1943 to August, 1944.

³For example, there are, to the writer's knowledge, five Japanese Protestant Churches in Chicago at the present time: Methodist, and those closely affiliated with Holiness, Free Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregational denominations. All these serve both Japanese-speaking and English-speaking congregations. Cf. also, Meyners, op. cit., pp. 168 ff.

However, Meyners reports: "It is apparent that the Nisei are participating in church services at least as much as is usually expected from the Caucasian Protestant preference group. It further seems to indicate that more are being reached through unsegregated churches than through segregated ones." Ibid., p. 191 a.

There are some notable exceptions to this general picture, one of the most notable of which is the First Baptist Church in Chicago, where the pastor, an American of Japanese descent, serves an integrated congregation of whites, Japanese Americans, and others.¹ Another remarkable work in integration has been achieved by the South Congregational Church in Chicago, located in a borderline community which had successfully kept out the Negroes. At about the time the Japanese began settling in this district in large numbers the barriers between this district and the adjacent Negro community began breaking down. Subsequently a considerable proportion of the residents in this area was comprised of Negro families. At the time of Meyners' survey, the membership of the South Congregational Church numbered 350, including "28 Japanese, 2 Mexican families, and 5 Negroes." Meyners observes that the events which have transpired in this church so far "are a signal example of the fact that white and non-white people can worship together in a community where there is tension between the groups."²

When the Pacific Coast excluded areas were reopened to persons of Japanese descent in January, 1945, efforts were made by most Protestant denominations (except the one containing the largest number of Japanese members, The Methodist Church) to prevent the reorganization of a segre-

¹Cf. Meyners, op. cit., pp. 179-181. Cf. Matsumoto, op. cit., pp. 68-69.

²Meyners, op. cit., p. 187.

gated pattern in the West Coast, especially among the English-speaking groups. However, the struggle for integration in California, where segregation has been deeply entrenched for over half a century, proved much more difficult than in the newly resettled communities. With a few exceptions, English-speaking Japanese Americans seem to have chosen to worship in segregated churches or not at all.¹ The impression of the writer is that the question of integration among other racial and nationalital groups in California, who were not disturbed by the war as greatly as the Japanese, has not become as great an issue as among the Japanese, and that they are continuing in general the pattern of segregation.²

The General Conference of the Methodist Church, in line with its stand on the question of discrimination, passed an enabling act making it possible, if and when it seems desirable, to integrate the Pacific Japanese, the California Oriental, and the Latin American Provisional Conferences "with the Annual Conferences through which these groups are geographically distributed."³ The discussion on this ques-

¹Impressions and observations of the writer who has served as a pastor of Japanese Methodist Churches in California since his return to his pre-evacuation charge in Fresno, in March, 1945.

²Impressions gathered from the writer's conversations with church leaders in other groups, particularly the California Oriental Conference.

³Discipline, 1948, op. cit., par. 1850, n. 10-12, p. 436.

tion by the members of the Pacific Japanese Provisional Annual Conference at the session held in June, 1948, was appreciative of the sentiments behind the enabling act, but cautious as to making any rapid progress toward its realization. Arguments for caution cited both the inevitability of integration (therefore, there is no need to take drastic action) and the dangers of moving too fast. Uncertainties as to the status of the ministers and churches, mission support, various assessments, pension arrangements, etc. also added to the cautious mood.¹

Factors which tend to Maintain or to Break down
Caste Segregation in the Churches

Church Fellowship and Caste

The Protestant Churches, true to the tradition of the primitive church, emphasize the fellowship of the faithful. E. F. Scott stresses the mood of ecstasy out of which the church derived its being,² and the sense of fellowship that united the disciples.

And the church is not a society of people who have agreed to accept the ideas of Jesus and maintain and propagate them. It represents that new type of humanity which Jesus brought into being, and its rise and growth were inevitable, since it was involved in the primary intention of the Christian faith. The message and the community cannot be separated.

He adds: "In his account of the first days at Jerusalem Luke lays emphasis above all on the sense of perfect fellow-

¹The writer was one of the participants in the discussion.

²E. F. Scott, The Nature of the Early Church (Scribner, 1941), p. 63.

ship. 'They were all of one heart and one mind.' 'No one counted anything to be his own, but they had all things in common.'"¹

The worship of the early church, moreover, centered around the common meal, perhaps the evening meal at the opening of the day following the close of Sabbath. "In conjunction with it [they] held the Lord's Supper and their own Christian service."² "The purpose of the Christian meeting was to hold the common meal, and to make it a memorial to Jesus' Last Supper with his disciples."³ This breaking of bread was the characteristic expression of the fellowship. It was called agape (Love Feast) and was the symbol and embodiment of the Christian Love, also called agape.

When the initial ecstasy wears off and the vitality of fellowship weakens, and the social patterns of the world around come to dominate the church life, then this very emphasis on fellowship becomes corrupted into the antithesis of its true nature. The very reality and intimacy of fellowship, so dramatically expressed in the breaking of bread, a central act of the family, becomes an occasion for the denial of true fellowship. Once the social norms of status and caste are admitted, they become "natural" means of selection of those with whom to have this intimate and family-like fellowship.

¹Ibid., pp. 68-69.

²Ibid., p. 74.

³Ibid., p. 77.

Thus segregation arises at the very heart and origin of the church life. Once caste enters the church, then it is inevitable that the "rank order of discrimination" in which taboo against eating together ranks very high should tend to separate the believers according to caste. Agape, (as Love Feast) becomes an occasion for the betrayal of agape (as Christian love). The central symbol of church life, in which is united the whole Church, becomes the symbol of division.

Allison Davis observes:

As compared with economic institutions, the church exhibits quite a rigid form of color sanctions. Like the family, school, and all institutions which involve intimate social participation, the church in the three southern societies under consideration is organized in all-or-none basis with regard to Negro-white participation.¹

This virtually complete separation by caste occurs both in Protestant and in Catholic churches in the deep South.² For the Negroes in the northern and western states, and for the Orientals in the West Coast, segregation appears to be far more complete in the church than in the school and other public institutions. In this respect, they are similar to the fraternities, fraternal orders, and voluntary associations. The very spirit of brotherhood is subverted to exclude those who are not considered brothers.

¹Allison Davis, "The Churches and Associations in the Lower South," (Unpublished resource memorandum, prepared for the Carnegie study, Schomburg Collection, New York Public Library, 1940), Book I, p. 19. (Microfilm Copy, Univ. of Calif. at L. A.).

²Ibid., p. 33.

On the other side of the caste barriers, the same forces of the family-like fellowship in the church tend to deepen separation. Except in centers of great concentration of the members of the particular ethnic group, the family tends to assume a greater place in the life of the members of minority groups. This may be due to a large extent to the tradition of strong family ties in the culture of many of these minority groups, for example, the Chinese and the Japanese. It may be partially due to the need for a greater sense of security based on the family when the society at large is prejudiced or hostile toward them. Similar psychological mechanisms carry over into the segregated churches of these minority peoples to a significant degree. Strong in-group ties of these peoples are reinforced by the feeling of insecurity arising out of discrimination and social segregation.¹ Moreover, the social and recreational needs of the young people not met by the community in general are often met by the segregated churches. These factors tend to strengthen the forces for segregation within the churches.

Vitality of the Faith and Caste Segregation in the Church

Scott notes that "in the days when the people of Christ has the clearest vision of the approaching Kingdom they were drawn most closely together. They were conscious . . . that they were a new race of men, belonging to a

¹See p. 411, infra.

higher world, and in consequence they felt themselves belonging to a brotherhood."¹ Conversely, we might add, when the vision of the Kingdom is lost, the securing of a sense of belonging and an anchoring of the self in status through the church become ends to be sought rather than by-products of belonging to a vital fellowship. Thus the fellowship becomes subject to caste patterns, rather than overcoming the barriers of caste with the tremendous impact of the sense of urgency and vitality of the newly received faith. In the early church, the consciousness of being a new "race" of men broke down the barriers of genos and ethnos. When this vital faith is lost, the fellowship of the church becomes secondary to racial divisions. The consciousness of being a "new race" is corrupted into the consciousness of racial exclusiveness.

When religious vitality and urgency are present, there seems to be some degree of transcendence over the barriers of caste, even in this latter day. A. Boisen, after describing the experience of Mr. T., "an intelligent and well-educated white man," in a Negro Pentecostal mission, observes:

It is to be noted that Mr. T. is not the only white person to identify himself with a Negro Pentecostal group. There were a number of others in this same House of Prayer, and in the country at large there are several of the Pentecostal sects which are composed of both black and white. One of these is known locally as the "Holstein Church." The experience of religion means so

¹Scott, op. cit., p. 69. See also Gallagher, Color and Conscience, op. cit., n. 2, p. 41; n. 3, p. 42.

much to these people that it provides a new basis for fellowship, one that cuts right through caste lines as fixed as that between the whites and the Negroes.¹
(Underlines added)

This writer has observed on a number of occasions a real sense of brotherhood in the "Heavens" of Father Divine in Harlem, New York City, which transcended and overcame the caste barriers between Negroes and whites, which are to Father Divine merely black and white "expressions" of common humanity.²

In some cases, this religious vitality can also be an occasion for separation, especially when that religious faith is associated with a segregated church. In many cases the immigrant (first generation) members of the segregated Christian churches are converts from other religions and consequently take their religion "more seriously" than those who have "grown up" in the church. Their loyalty to the church is often associated with particular ethnically segregated churches. Some of the children (second generation) inherit (in a cultural sense) this attitude from their parents though they themselves have grown up in the church. Their loyalty to the family and the local church is often

¹ Anton T. Boisen, "Economic Distress and the Rise of the Holiness Sects," The People, The Land, and The Church in the Rural West (Chicago: Farm Foundation, 1943), p. 109.

² From personal observations while an assistant of Reconciliation Trips, New York City, 1937-1938. Myrdal writes: "Most estimates have it that about 10 per cent of the membership are white . . . , and one of the strongest injunctions of the sect is against recognition of color differences." Myrdal, op. cit., p. 871.

associated with the particular ethnically segregated church to which they have always been connected. Also, when these minority peoples, for example, the Japanese Christians, live in communities in contact with people of other religions, such as the Buddhists, they tend to be preoccupied with the rivalry with these religions, and to be more conscious of their religious affiliations. These factors tend to deepen the separation from "Caucasian" churches.

Psychological Functions of the Church and Caste Segregation

The psychological function of the Church -- to give anchorage and security to people--is corrupted until this very function becomes a part of the caste pattern. When the church becomes for an individual a means of gaining status, then obviously the caste purity of the church must be maintained in a caste society lest the church and church members lose status by having subordinate caste persons in its participating (as contrasted with token) membership. Drake observes:

The primary function of the church in the life of the individual is to give him a "place" in a pattern of social relationships, a meaningful position in a hierarchy and in a primary group. Any church can be viewed as a group of ordered status-positions each having certain privileges and obligations associated with it.¹

¹J. G. St. Clair Drake, "The Negro Churches and Associations in Chicago," (Unpublished research memorandum prepared for the Carnegie study, Schomburg collection, New York Public Library, 1940), Book II, p. 435. (microfilm copy, Univ. of Calif. at L. A.)

Though this may be far from the doctrine of the church, it is difficult to deny that this is the way "the church in the life of the individual" functions in actual life a great deal of the time for most of the members. From a realistic, "existentialist" standpoint, it is necessary to take into consideration this function of the church in order to understand fully the strength of caste upon the life of the church.

Geographical Segregation and the Segregation of the Churches

We have referred to the fact that residential segregation is the physical basis of other phases of segregation.¹ Drake, for example, notes in connection with his survey of the Negro churches in 1940, before the wartime increase of Negro population:

The Negro population of Chicago is an endogamous group of over 250,000. This social separateness is associated with spatial separation, over 85 per cent of these individuals living in Census tracts whose population is predominantly Negro.²

Where the residential areas meet, such as across Cottage Grove in Chicago, the tension between the two groups becomes more tense, and caste lines even more rigid. The fear of "invasion" tends to increase resistance on the part of the "whites," in church as well as in other areas of human relationships.³

¹See pp. 218-224, supra.

²Drake, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

³See p. 398, supra for a notable exception.

Similar conditions obtain in the case of minority peoples in California. Residential segregation is the basis of the segregation of the churches. Churches of minority (also lower-class) peoples are located "across the tracks." Even if the church serves people scattered over a wide area, a segregated shopping center usually determines the location of the churches and the pattern of segregation for the churches.

Beliefs and Ideologies of Segregation in the Church

The external forces that maintain segregation within the church are the caste pattern of society at large. We have noted that segregation arises also out of the corruption of the very genius of the church. In this section we shall deal in a summary fashion with some of the beliefs and ideologies that arise out of and buttress segregation.

The basic beliefs of church segregation are the same as those of discrimination at large. We are specifically interested here in the beliefs and ideologies that have direct bearing upon the caste structure in the church. The stereotypes of the Negro's inherently childish character and his incapability of intellectual and emotional maturity are supported by and buttress the stereotypes in the religious realm (that is, inherent humility, child-like faith, and other other-worldliness of the Negro).¹

¹Allison Davis, The Negro Church, op. cit., p. 40.

The belief that the slave position of the Negro is the will of God is still held by some whites.¹ Woodson writes: "The argument in favor of this segregation was that God in making the races different intended that they should be kept separate."² The Negro ministers tend to be conservative concerning the caste system and uphold the beliefs of the dominant caste.³

Drake points out that "historically, Christian dogmas have been used both to support and attack the caste system in the United States. There are both a caste-potential and a 'democratic' potential in Christianity."⁴ Since the Abolition, even the southern apologists of the caste system tend to interpret their relation to the Negroes as those of helping a weaker brother. Thus altruistic beliefs, whether sincerely held or mere rationalizations, become tools for paternalism and for the firmer entrenchment of caste. Drake observes further: "White people are thus apt to emphasize the 'mercy' aspect of the Christian logic and Negroes (at least, upon occasions) the 'justice' aspects."⁵ Even the passage most frequently quoted in support of universalism and brotherhood of man that transcends the differences of

¹Ibid., p. 43.

²Carter G. Woodson, The History of the Negro Church (Washington: The Associated Publishers, 1921), p. 133.

³Ibid., p. 45.

⁴Drake, op. cit., p. 254.

⁵Ibid., pp. 254-255.

color and caste can be so used that it too serves the end of buttressing the caste stratification. Drake writes:

There is little question but that all Christian churches have some beliefs which they would verbalize as "the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man," but this analogy itself offers a rationalization for super- and subordination, for are there not older and younger brothers, stronger and weaker ones?¹

However, it must be emphasized that this is a perversion of the Judeo-Christian doctrine of the Fatherhood of God. That a sincere and actively held belief in the brotherhood of man based on the doctrine of the fatherhood of God can, as it should, become a powerful force in overcoming barriers is demonstrated by the reality of fellowship which obtains in the interracial fellowship churches. By the emphasis upon this doctrine as one of the central articles of faith,² these churches have united the believers in a way similar to that of the Pentecostal sects (i.e. unity obtained in a

¹Ibid., p. 255.

²For example, the Covenant of the South Berkeley Community Church, Berkeley, California, contains the following statements:

"Witnessing in our day the division of Christendom by many distinctions of race, class, nation and creed; concerned by these denials of the spirit of Him who prayed that we might all be one; and wishing in our worship, fellowship, and service to express the ministry of reconciliation committed to the followers of Jesus, we do solemnly covenant together in the presence of God and of each other to establish this Church.

.
"We welcome to our fellowship all persons, without regard to race, class, nation, or creed, who join with us in this covenant;

"In the love of truth and in the Spirit of Jesus, we unite for the worship of God and the service of man." (A statement of the purpose and faith of the South Berkeley Community Church, Congregational, approved by the vote of the membership, July 9, 1944).

common loyalty to something more real and vital than the divisions of caste). But the interracial churches radically differ from the Holiness sects in their approach, dogma, and manifestations of vitality.

"Voluntary" Segregation of the Churches

It is often held that Negroes, Orientals, and Latin-Americans desire to be by themselves and maintain their own groups and churches. To a great extent this is true. But this "voluntary" segregation is often a consequence of more "involuntary" manifestations of caste. The members of the lower castes often feel "out of place," that they do not "belong," that they are not wanted, that they are "merely being tolerated" in a "white" church. They feel that it is not their "own church." This feeling of caste arises both as the result of the psychological consequences of caste society upon the members of lower castes¹ and as the reflection of the attitudes of the white congregation. Both are consequences of the caste structure of society. Therefore, they are not really "voluntary," any more than acquiescence to Jim Crow is "voluntary."

Among the arguments most frequently mentioned in favor of the segregated church is that the members of minority and racial groups can be better reached by the members of these groups themselves. This is also generally true. Particularly is this true of language and nationalital

¹See p. 403, supra.

groups, but in general it holds for racial (non-nationalital) groups as well. Jesse H. Atwood discovered "one of the most striking demonstrations of the fact that proponents of ameliorative caste-solidarity accept the separate church structure in fact, although they oppose it in theory." As the result of a careful study of 64 Negro ministers in Chicago, he found:

Four-fifths of the ministers condemned segregation but only one-third took the position that the separate Negro church does not serve the religious needs of colored people.¹

The striking thing is not that Atwood found these facts but that he draws such implications. It seems to this writer that the conclusion is falsely drawn. It is possible (indeed inescapable) for the ministers, while condemning segregation, at the same time to recognize that, under the present caste structure, the Negro churches do serve the religious needs of colored people. Indeed it is difficult to understand how as large a percentage as one-third of the Negro ministers could have admitted or pretended that the "separate Negro Church does not serve the religious needs of colored people."

The point is that in spite of the fact that segregated churches do serve "social" and religious needs of segregated people, they may also do great harm in doing so. Segregated churches reinforce segregation and discrimination and hostility. If segregated churches are contrary

¹Drake, op. cit., pp. 283-284.

to the will of God, as the Amsterdam and other pronouncements of the churches declare, then they must be done away even at the cost of some loss of service to the needs of the members of the lower castes. Caste itself must be attacked if caste in the church is to be abolished. Moreover, it may be that the gain resulting from acting upon the much-pronounced principles of integration may be so great in terms of vitality and faith and service to the religious and psychological needs of the people concerned (both of the dominant and of the subordinate castes) that they may far exceed any loss even in the short run, not to speak of the long-run gains in psychological release, spiritual integrity, and religious vitality of the church. The moral impotence and guilt feeling of the churches when they are confronted with the race question, which characterizes both the segregated churches of the dominant group¹ and those of the subordinate groups, may be overcome if segregation is attacked and integration actually attempted. The race issue, a source of embarrassment for the Protestant Churches, and of the major denominations in particular, will then become a source of strength and revitalization for the churches rather than occasions for repeated apologies.

The theological and ethical position held by this writer, which opposes the legalistic application of a general principle to all particular situations, and which

¹The so-called "white" or "Caucasian" churches are rightly designated. They, too, are segregated churches.

insists upon the necessity of taking into consideration all existing situational factors, is not adverse to discovering and adhering to some general principles of justice. Working for a non-segregated church and a non-segregated society as proposed by the Federal Council may be regarded as a guiding principle for Christian social action in this area of human relationships. As Thurman emphasizes, the barriers placed in the way of the experience of common worship of God is particularly evil. For "a common sharing of a sense of mutual worth and value" is the first step toward love. "This cannot be discovered in a vacuum or in a series of artificial or hypothetical relationships. It has to be in a real situation, natural, free."¹ Segregation which places barriers in the way of common experience is "a complete ethical and moral evil." Its result is

that in the one place in which normal, free contacts might be most naturally established--in which the relations of the individual to his God should take priority over conditions of class, race, power, status, wealth, or the like--this place is one of the chief instruments for guaranteeing barriers.²

Thurman insists that this task of removing caste barriers is not to be a form of wishful thinking or simple desiring but a "discipline, a method, a technique."³

The Christian ethic holds that in addition to (not instead of) striving to act upon clearly (or not so clearly) observed rational moral principles, we must remember

¹Thurman, Jesus and the Disinherited, p. 98.

²Loc. cit.

³Ibid., p. 101.

that such principles come short of the fullness of the agape, and that, if self-righteously and legalistically held, they may defeat the very objectives which they propose to achieve. We must strive both to attain justice, and to do so in the spirit of love.

CONCLUSION

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This study has been an attempt to relate a more dynamic interpretation of Christian ethics to a dynamic theory of social process as both impinge upon a particular configuration of social forces--namely, color caste. Throughout the work, the writer has endeavored to relate (as well as to distinguish between) facts and valuations, ethics and social processes, whenever they are relevant. At several points in the paper, he has also made summarizing and concluding remarks. However, an additional statement may be helpful at this point in order to present a more comprehensive view of the relationship in its totality.

The point of contact between the sociological and theological¹ sections of this paper is the view that social events and processes cannot be interpreted without valuations, and that ethical judgments cannot be made without reference to the particular situation. From this view of Christian ethics, it is not sufficient to state a general ethical principle abstractly and then attempt to apply such a principle to a particular situation. Ethical principles must be related to the social situation in the

¹Under the term sociological, here, is included not only sociology but all of the social sciences; likewise, under theological is included ethics as well as theology.

context of that particular situation. Conversely, a sociological situation cannot be studied apart from a particular perspective and a set of value premises. Thus the situation and the valuation of that situation are inseparable. This work is an attempt to study Christian ethics in the context of the problem of color caste and to investigate color caste from the value premises of Christian ethics.

The interrelationship between facts and valuations may be illustrated from the problem of color caste. There is little controversy as to what is (facts); there is a greater controversy as to what ought to be (valuations). There is an even greater controversy as to how, when, and how much change ought to be made. (moral decisions and actions). The problem of color caste is not simply a fact-finding problem; it is fundamentally an ethical problem. As Myrdal points out, it is "a problem in the heart of the American."¹ Furthermore, it is an ethical problem which cannot be studied without reference to the particular conjuncture of social forces involved in each situation. Thus the statement that in the United States, Negroes are placed in a position subordinate to the whites is hardly ever questioned. There is a difference of opinion as to what the situation ought to be. But the greatest and the most heated controversy is over the issue of what particular changes should actually be made, and what steps should be

¹Myrdal, op. cit., p. xlvi.

taken immediately. The principles of justice, tolerance, fair play, brotherhood and democracy are necessary as guides to ethical action, but by themselves they are not sufficient. They become relevant only as they are related to the situational factors. A dynamic assessment of the particular issue must be made, taking into account the forces involved in the nexus of social configuration and the ethical principles relevant to the issue involved. This dynamic assessment must be tempered with the spirit of humility, understanding and love. Christians must be both hardheaded and softhearted. Christian love is not another ethical principle but an overarching "norm" of all ethical principles and, at the same time, the judgment upon these ethical principles. The grace of God is both the source of any goodness in man and the power of God that enables man to act ethically.

The writer has based his interpretation of Christian ethics discussed in Part One upon the Christian faith. The Christian faith is the response of man's whole person to the self-disclosure of God. The particular point of contact for man's ethical decisions and actions is man's awakened conscience.

In Part Two, in which the historical development and the present day operation of caste in two of its manifestations were studied, the writer found that various factors--psychological, economic, cultural, and others--intermingle and interact in a dynamic manner. This

interacting relationship is not such that several factors can be isolated and studied apart but such that it can be investigated and understood only in its dynamic, interacting relationship with other factors. Thus the "pattern" of caste was viewed not as a static pattern but rather a dynamic configuration of various factors. The forces generally designated as economic factors are among the most important. But the writer has not found them to be the sole or the basic causes underlying all other "secondary" factors. Although the Marxian insistence upon the "determining" influence of economic factors, particularly of the conflict of interests between the exploiting and the exploited classes, has been of great aid in understanding the nature of the social change, this writer has found its economic determinism to be far short of presenting a complete explanation.

The historical roots of American caste go back at least as far as the Commercial Revolution and the great Discoveries. The cultural and power differential between the Europeans and the peoples of Africa, Asia and the Americas was greatly aggravated by these developments and the Industrial Revolution which followed them a few centuries later. The very spirit of freedom at the heart of the Great Enlightenment was subverted into an insatiable drive for freedom in trade and profit. Slave trade became a gigantic enterprise. The growing of cotton and the expanding colonization of the American South in

the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries opened a vast area for the use of slave labor. This supply of slave labor in turn made possible the development of the cotton plantation with its peculiar economic, cultural, and social patterns. A similar interaction between the supply of "cheap" labor and agricultural organization took place a century later in California. The presence of a Chinese labor supply enabled the development of large-scale intensive agriculture which in turn made such a labor supply necessary. An important difference between the two lies in the forced capture and transportation of the Negro slaves and the voluntary immigration of the Chinese and others to California.

A system of chattel slavery developed which in the South was buttressed by the beliefs and valuations that antedated the institution of slavery and those that arose and grew with the institution. Whites and blacks were of different color and of different status. Status was associated with color. After the Civil War, Emancipation, and Reconstruction, the doctrine of white supremacy was restored as the basic political and social dogma of the South, and color caste was firmly established. Segregation became the basis of caste discrimination. A parallel development had been taking place in California, where organized labor, rather than agricultural employers, had been the spearhead of anti-Oriental agitation.

Christianity has contributed its share in the de-

velopment of caste both in its theological and institutional dimensions. Slave trade and slavery were at first defended as means of bringing the heathen under the influence of a Christian civilization. When this rationalization became obviously untenable, the doctrines of the divinely ordained difference of race and the divinely ordered system of occupational and social status were advanced. The institutional segregation of the churches helped to maintain the distance and differences between the dominant and the subordinate castes. The obvious differences of culture and status were associated with the equally obvious differences of biological heritage, and the two were brought together under divine sanction. The church became one of the most completely segregated and caste-ridden institutions. However, within the church were people who challenged both the institution and the ideology of caste. They insisted that the central teaching of the Christian religion is that of brotherhood and love and that this teaching is diametrically opposed to the institution of caste.

At the present time, the tension between the various forces which tend to maintain the pattern of color caste and those which tend to break down the pattern of color caste is in a state of dynamic and unstable equilibrium. In such a state, a sufficiently powerful force applied in either direction may act as a precipitant to change the course of social events in either direction. The evils of

caste may be greatly modified at this time if concerted action is taken to combat them.

Caste must be overcome in our society and in our churches. As the Federal Council recommends, we must work for "a non-segregated church and a non-segregated society."¹ For in the words of the First Assembly of the World Council of Churches, it is in the field of race relations that the church's "guidance concerning what God wills for it is especially clear."² Toward this task, we should employ every means consistent with the Christian view of social change and human dignity. The findings of the social sciences and the techniques of social engineering must be appropriated in full; at the same time, the spirit of brotherhood and humility must be made manifest in all our strivings. The techniques of protest and social action used by organizations and movements such as the N. A. A. C. P., the March-on-Washington movement, and the Committee on Racial Equality, give us valuable guides to action. The experiences of the various interracial churches and Christian fellowships provide us with significant and valuable guidance. All these, and many other experiences of Christian social action should be analyzed, studied, and evaluated in making decisions for the courses of action to be followed by individuals and by churches. New experiments must also be undertaken.

¹The Church and Race Relations, p. 5.

²World Council of Churches, op. cit., III, 195.

The precarious nature of the international situation makes it the more imperative that this problem of color caste be solved in order to achieve international and interracial harmony. Only as caste is overcome--beginning in our own nation and throughout the world--can we ever expect to approach the attainment of a just and durable peace. Both from the standpoint of intergroup and interpersonal relationships and from that of man's relationship to God, caste barriers must be uprooted, and natural and free opportunities for fellowship established.

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